SUNY Series in The Sociology of Culture Charles R. Simpson, Editor

Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece

A Sociology of Greek Ethics from Homer to the Epicureans and Stoics

Joseph M. Bryant

State University of New York Press

Universidad de Navarra Servicio de Bibliotecas

10/23653176

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

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Production by Susan Geraghty Marketing by Dana Yanulavich

Printed in the United States of America

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For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bryant, Joseph M., 1954-

Moral codes and social structure in ancient Greece: a sociology of Greek ethics from Homer to the Epicureans and Stoics / Joseph M.

p. cm. — (SUNY series in the sociology of culture) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-3041-3 (alk. paper). — ISBN 0-7914-3042-1 (pbk. :

alk. paper)

1. Ethics, Ancient. 2. Knowledge, Sociology of. 3. Greece--Social life and customs. 4. Greece—Intellectual life—To 200 B.C. 5. Greece—Social conditions—To 200 B.C. I. Title. II. Series. BI161.B78 1996 95-40573 938-dc20 CIP

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Acknowledgements

Even for a project that has been carried on for nearly a decade, I suspect I have incurred a disproportionately large number of intellectual debtsfar too many to allow for anything approximating "full disclosure." A few contributors, however, must be singled out for special mention, beginning with Irving Zeitlin, mentor and cherished friend, whose formative influence on my scholarly paideia will continue to find expression in all my future endeavors. John Rist brought his unparalleled knowledge of ancient philosophy to bear on numerous problems of interpretation, and all the enjoyable time spent in his company never failed to edify, whatever the subject. Randall Collins, a third exception to the Heraclitean dictum, polymathiê nóon exein ou didaskei, provided encouragement, guidance, and practical support when it mattered most. Brad Inwood generously offered his time and expertise to help me avoid some of the more treacherous pitfalls of Hellenistic philosophy, and Alan Samuel got the whole thing started by agreeing to teach me Greek. Ever since our days together in graduate school at Toronto, my good friend Rod Nelson has been "on call" for every scholarly need, from timely references to incisive commentary on submitted drafts; without his efforts, my own would be decidedly poorer. I would also like to thank Bernd Baldus, Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, Andrew Kim, and Jack Veugelers, for their much appreciated input and friendship. And warmest and abiding gratitude to Debra, whose support and understanding over so many years provided a higher meaning and purpose to our time together. To Christine Worden, Susan Geraghty, and the people at SUNY Press, a heartfelt thanks for the courteous professionalism that was displayed in bringing the manuscript to publication. The generous financial assistance that I have received over the years from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is also gratefully acknowledged.

Preface: The Sociology of Knowledge and Historical Sociology

Illuminating the genesis, meaning, and limitations of ideas in their own time, we might better understand the implications and significance of our affinities for them in our own time.

-Carl Schorske

The work herein presented is intended as a contribution to the sociology of knowledge, more widely known of late as the sociology of culture. Whatever the designation, that field of inquiry has as its primary objective the specification of the varied and dynamic linkages between ideas and institutions, cultural forms and social structures. It is an enterprise with a controversial history, for the supposition that intellectual and aesthetic achievements are "socially conditioned" ("ideological" in stronger parlance) has been loudly decried as a relativist assault on rationality and objective truth. We will return to that difficult question in the Epilogue, but a few preliminary remarks are required to clear up some enduring misconceptions. A sociological approach to cultural creativity does not seek to indict, debunk, or discredit the workings of mind or spirit; the enterprise is concerned with understanding and elucidating how cognitiveaffective processes are bound up with concrete social arrangements and pressing existential concerns. Notwithstanding past predilections, explication here does not require a reductionist logic. Art, morality, law, religion, philosophy, science: the point is not to "reduce" these domains of intellectual and aesthetic praxis to more "fundamental" pursuits, economic or political, as mere ideological reflexes of constellations of power and privilege, but to view each as a distinct form of life integral to wider patterns of social organization. Since the search and struggle for new meanings, new truths, is ever refracted through the prisms of existing cultural traditions and established social conventions, the empirical task of "contextualizing creativity" is logically prior to any evaluative effort. Sociology thus constitutes an indispensable, "discriminating" component in the grand project of critical rationalism, for it is only by relating thought to action, theory to praxis, that we can begin to assess the epistemic and existential value of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic ideals. Indeed, evaluating truth claims and gauging the partisan content of any

cultural product—whether affirmative or subversive, reactionary or revolutionary—presupposes insight into how that particular philosophy, creed, monument, or poem relates to the social-historical field in which it arose and functioned.

What the above enjoins methodologically is historical sociology, i.e., the adoption of a contextual logic of analysis, whereby phenomena are explicated by tracing their intrinsic relations to other mediating structures and processes within historically specific constellations of social practice. The manifold and dynamic relations between ideas and institutions preclude subsumption under any universal generalization, save the basic principle that a tendency towards "existential congruence" or "coherence" repeatedly manifests itself over time. Because culture is both communicative and expressive, the instrumental import of cognitive-evaluative processes is sufficient to ensure that "adaptive utility" or "functionality" with existing or emerging conditions of life typically obtains. The creation, consolidation, and demise of cultural forms—artistic, normative, intellectual-must accordingly be situated within the ongoing struggles of social groups to establish meaning, purpose, and value within shifting contexts of reciprocity, domination, and resistance. What is of greatest sociological interest in all this is not the mere reality of correspondence, of congruence or mutuality between thought and action, but the continuing processes of adjustment and change, and their specific modalities of realization.

The sociological exegesis of ancient Greek moral codes and social philosophies that follows attempts to bring empirical specificity to the preceding analytical generalities. Three primary lines of investigation are featured: the main structural changes within the economic, political, military, religious, and kinship institutions of Greek society are traced from the Dark Age period to the early Hellenistic era; the impact of those developments on the social position and "consciousness" of various groups and strata is documented and assessed; and the discourse of artists and intellectuals is related to their social affiliations and the patterns of institutional change. It will be documented that each of the distinct phases in the development of Polis society promoted and sustained corresponding constellations of norms and values. Thus the aristocratic warrior ethos canonized in the Homeric epics comported with the social arrangements of the turbulent post-Mycenaean era, which were marked by the exclusive dominance of freebooting nobles whose claims to political supremacy and status honor were based on martial preeminence and wealth accumulated in landed property and livestock. Over the course of the Archaic period, colonization abroad and expanding trade and production combined to raise material standards, thereby enabling the more prosperous elements of the peasant-dêmos to acquire costly armor and therewith a more prominent role on the field of battle. As population pressures on the land mounted, the appropriation and defense of border territories became a communal imperative, requiring ever greater deployments of armed force. Changes in military technology and tactics followed accordingly: the heroic style of open-field combat is supplanted by disciplined formations of hoplites, heavily armed infantry whose success in battle depends on numerical strength and collective steadiness in the ranks. Those members of the dêmos with the means to equip themselves with the costly panoply now rise to become the military bulwark of their communities. and thus armed they successfully press their claims for greater legal and political rights. By the start of the Classical period, the vast majority of poleis feature institutionalized civic communalism, a set of practices legally framed by constitutions that accord self-governing powers to a substantial portion of the citizen body. Paralleling this structural "democratization" is a democratization in cultural ideals, as the hoplite phalanx provides the experiential basis for a new social psychology that undermines aristocratic exclusivity and strengthens communal bonds. Reformist lawgivers, poets, and sages codify an emerging Polis-citizen ethos that celebrates devotion to the collectivity and self-fulfillment through public service. Though providing the "psychic" commitment that sustains a remarkably rich cultural flowering, the ideals of communalism and civic equity will periodically founder against the ecological-material barriers of limited resources. A soil-climate regime of modest fertility and a static technology combine to generally restrict agricultural output to subsistence levels, thus putting to risk the viability of civic communalism in times of natural or socially induced disaster or hardship. Remedial actions were invariably predatory: either warfare against outsiders (to procure land, booty, and slaves) or factionalism within, practices that—as they intensified in scale and scope during the protracted struggle for Hellenic hegemony between Athens and Sparta—set to motion various trends that were to rupture the classical bonding of citizen to Polis. An escalating militarism introduces new, more "rational" methods of destruction and pillage: extended campaigning, growing tactical specialization, and improvements in siege technology rapidly undermine traditional conventions and strategic balances, as does the ascendancy of new personnel—lighterarmed troops and professional mercenaries—both drawn disproportionately from the lower ranks of society. Internally divided between rich and poor, economically ravaged by decades of incessant warfare, and shielded by a citizen-army of diminishing capability under changing conditions of war, the city-states of Greece prove incapable of checking the

imperial ambitions of the Macedonian national monarchy, and the Polis falls subject to patrimonial forms of domination. With the suppression of civic autonomy, the ideals of the classical Polis fall victim as well. Where Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle had each regarded the Polis-citizen nexus as the basis for *eudaimonia*, the life of virtue and human fulfillment, the new courses in ethics charted during the Hellenistic era sought to sunder the filaments that bound the individual to the collapsing Polis framework. The ascetic antinomianism of the Cynics, the apolitical hedonism of the Epicureans, and the cosmopolitan individualism of the Stoics are to be understood sociologically as intellectual responses to the structural processes of demilitarization and depoliticization that robbed the old civic ideals of their efficacy and social anchorage.

The radical abridgments contained in the foregoing synopsis lay out only the broadest lines of development; these must now be set within the moving contexts that gave them determinate form. Inadequencies in surviving source materials will, admittedly, hamper that effort at various points. But the inferential possibilities afforded by a systematic attempt to offer both a sociologically comprehensive account of Polis society—i.e., an integrated analysis of its principal institutions and core cultural forms—and a historically sensitive specification of trends and trajectories, should enable us to overcome some of the hazards of narrow empiricism and isolated specialization. As our interpretive and explanatory efforts will feature a contextual-narrative logic, established or familiar historial materials will figure prominently in our overall exposition, though not without some modest hope that a sociological reading may at times educe new insights from sources long overworked from more traditional perspectives.

To carry out a project of interdisciplinary synthesis necessarily entails heavy reliance on the scholarship of others; rather than encumber the text with an endless stream of names, I have generally confined citations and attributions to the Notes, which will also serve as the battleground for controversial points of detail or interpretation. I have examined the primary literary sources directly and, for epigraphic and archaeological data, have relied upon standard source books and the relevant specialist literature. The Bibliography lists secondary sources and collections only, as the ancient literary texts—cited in the Notes—typically abound in various editions. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Greek are my own, literal rather than artistic fidelity being the aim throughout. Transliteration in this field is presently in a state of flux, but I have opted to follow the trend for closer approximation to the original, rendering kappa as k rather than the latinized c in most instances; eta is transliter-

ated as \hat{e} , omega as \hat{o} . A glossary is appended for key Greek ethical and philosophical vocabulary.

A closing word on gender-based linguistic usage. I have retained the "androcentric accent" in the course of exegetical commentary throughout the text, all other considerations being sacrificed for the sake of historical verisimilitude. Ancient Greek society was a male-dominated social formation, with the consequence that political and ethical discourse was in the main addressed to that audience. To suggest otherwise through adoption of gender-neutral phraseology would only obscure that fundamental reality.

Introduction: The Polis and the "Spirit" of Hellensim

It is still commonplace to refer to the cultural achievements of the ancient Hellenes by the abbreviated designation "Greek Miracle." Though multiform in expression—from the visual arts to the dramatic, from poetry to science—that miracle was informed and sustained by two essential "breakthroughs": a discovery of civic politics, i.e., the practice and principles of participatory self-governance; and a complementary discovery of the ideals of human excellence, i.e., the harmonies of body and soul as realized in the cult of athletics and in the cultivation of art and philosophy.

Citizenship and rational humanism—to so condense complex realities—thus formed the defining axis of the ancient Greek experience, their mutual dependence recognized and celebrated by the participants themselves as well as by subsequent generations of interested spectators who have sought to mediate and conserve that legacy for a wider humanity. The classic line from the poet Simonides, polis andra didaskei, 'the polis teaches man', finds its modern equivalent in the celebrated observation by the historian Jacob Burckhardt, that the Polis "set free the mind and tongue." Generalities of that sort, however, can only serve as orienting principles for scientific investigation, and the task of specifying and explicating the linkages between Polis society and its attending cultural forms remains a daunting challenge.

Two intuitions have long framed the ambit of scholarly understanding and research: that the unique arrangements of the Polis form of social organization provided a structural basis for the emergence of both a civic-based individualism and critical rationalism and, correspondingly, that the "decline of the Polis" and the "rise of Empire" in the fourth and third centuries ushered in a protracted phase of cultural decadence and corrupting syncretism. As a prelude to the detailed sociology that follows, let us review the standard arguments on both of these issues.

As regards the birth of rationalism and the discovery of the civic individual, the most suggestive evidence is that drawn from comparative analysis.² Of the major cradles of ancient civilization, the Greek Polis differed fundamentally both in scale and in form from the social complexes of Egypt and Mesopotamia, China and India. Situated in the ecology of great river valleys, these eastern civilizations featured the early emergence of highly centralized command structures, "states" that arose

in connection with the organizational imperatives of hydraulic engineering and the defense needs of large-scale, requisition-based agriculture. The immense surpluses generated by artificial irrigation and bureaucratically administered labor came to sustain teeming human populations and considerable craft specialization, as well as an enriched ruling stratum comprised of the palace and its privileged functionaries in the military, civil service, and priestly sectors. Subject to the imperium of court officials and interlocked by controlling networks of royal roads, canals, and fortresses, urban centers and villages lacked autonomous law-creation and policy-formation powers, a circumstance that precluded the emergence of any civic-based communalism. State management and control of land and labor resulted in pronounced and enduring ruler-ruled polarities, with politics effectively limited to intrabureaucratic intrigues and dynastic turnovers unaccompanied by significant changes in the life-situation of the subject masses. The regnant cultural forms produced in the East were correspondingly court centered, celebratory of imperial "harmony and order," and typically given over to adulation of the divinized ruler, in grand ceremonials, in imposing monuments of stone, and in commissioned texts of self-glorification; legitimating ideals of status distinction and aesthetic refinement for the governing elites also figured prominently.3 As for higher standards of "wisdom and truth," the theologicalcosmological speculations that emanated from corporate priesthoods and court diviners served to provide heavenly warrant for the hierarchical status quo. Rationality was likewise harnessed to the needs of the state apparatus: astronomical observations and time calculations were central to the calendric operations necessary for effective agrohydraulic management, while mathematics and geometry answered to administrative requirements for accurate record keeping and measurement. Literacy, which arose out of the notational demands of complex requisitioning and redistribution arrangements, remained largely scribal, which is to say that most practitioners functioned in state employ.

The world of the classical Greek Polis—though centrally situated within the Mediterranean region, and thus in cultural, political, and economic contact with the neighboring eastern civilizations—was geared to entirely different specifications. Independent, self-governing communes dotted the alluvial plains of an otherwise mountainous landscape, their livelihood dependent upon rainfall farming and defended by the proprietors themselves, militarily self-equipped in contrast to the standing armies of the East, which were provisioned out of royal arsenals and storehouses supplied by taxation, tribute, and requisitions. With economic and military performance organized on the household unit rather than coordinated by a centralized court, political and cultural life in the

Polis evolved in a civic, communal direction, with levels of participation varying not in terms of a state-society divide, but according to the shifting social composition and resources of the citizen body, i.e., noble and commoner, rich and poor, the few and the many. A technologically limited, subsistence-bound economy generally kept wealth and power differentials to socially "manageable" proportions.

The contrast between "Oriental despotism" and "Hellenic freedom" implicit in the foregoing is of course an old one—the Greeks themselves having initiated it! But for all its age and partisan features, it does capture a distinction of momentous sociological import: in social formations based upon mass subordination and bureaucratic regimentation of the pritrolled by an apparatus of domination, it is obvious that neither civic politics nor a free-ranging intellectualism are viable prospects.

Identifying the structural impedimenta to citizenship and autonomous rationalism in the great eastern civilizations is instructive on the greater possibilities for public participation and cultural openness afforded by the city-state form of social organization; what remain elusive are the actual connections or "synergies" between the two modalities within the Greek Polis. The most sophisticated contributions on this subject to date can be found in the works of the historian G. E. R. Lloyd, who in a series of publications has sought to chart the gradual crystallization of rational modes of discourse within Hellenic culture.4 That some form of civic connection was instrumental seems confirmed by the discursive and linguistic parallels that Lloyd draws between the legal-political spheres on the one hand and Greek philosophical-scientific discussion on the other. Shared analytical procedures and vocabulary indicate that the higher forms of critical rationalism developed within a wider context framed by the experience of civic self-governance: the scientific notion of evidence or proof, for example, marturia, derives from the legal-political practice of calling witnesses and assessing testimony; the critical appraisal of hypotheses or propositions, elenchos, represents a lexical extension of juridical procedures of cross-examination; analytical-empirical deliberation, logon didonai, trades on the rendering of fiscal and administrative accounts by civic magistrates and officials. Lloyd's central claim here is that with the increasing democratization of political life-in the assemblies, councils, and jury courts—the Greek citizen came to participate in various communicative and reflective processes to an unprecedented degree, processes that routinely entailed the construction of arguments, the weighing of evidence, the adjudication of disputes, and the rendering of justifications. In contrast to the empires of the East, where "truth" was revealed in the unquestioned commands of kings and priests, the Greeks actively and

collectively searched for it in the public domain; where divinized autocrats and their bureaucratic functionaries dictated policy and placed premiums on silence and obedience, the Polis not only promoted accountability, dialogue, and rational modes of deliberation, but also afforded the structural "space" for competitive rivalry and intellectual innovation. The civic-based political rationality of the ancient Hellenes, in short, provided the linguistic, discursive, and existential foundations for the emergence of philosophic and scientific modes of critical reason.

Given this posited relationship between politics and rationalism at the dawn of Hellenic history, it should come as no surprise to learn that classical scholars have long associated the two at the supposed sunset as well, maintaining that the "decline of the Polis" precipitated a "failure of nerve" in the cultural sphere, as evidenced by an apparent recrudescence of superstition and the rise of apolitical individualism and self-serving ideals of cosmopolitan nonattachment and indifference.5 The standard line, much abbreviated here, is that the ruinous Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) heralded the passing of the "civic" way of life. The achievements of the men of Marathon and the glories of the Periclean era were made possible by a unique bonding of citizen to community, and as that bond became subject to incapacitating strains and pressures over the course of the fourth century, a crisis of norms and values mounted inexorably. When the Macedonian phalanx deprived the Greeks of their political autonomy at Chaeronea in 338 BC, the civic ideals of the classical Polis lost not only much of their possibility for practical realization, but much of their meaning and purpose as well. A new social order was to be fashioned in the wake of Alexander's world-transforming conquests, one in which kings and empires not citizens and poleis—were to be the important players. As the Polis yielded the historical stage to the forces of imperial patrimonialism, many individuals—now reduced to de facto subject status—replaced public with private pursuits and sought comfort in mystery cults promising afterlife rewards. The Epicurean, Stoic, and Skeptic philosophies that arose amidst this transitional turmoil are to be understood as intellectual responses to the changing conditions, offering both guidance and refuge for those no longer sustained by the classical koinônia tôn politôn, 'the community of citizens'.

The perspective just outlined, drawing much early inspiration from Hegel's well-known dictum that "philosophy is its time comprehended in thought," remains the prevailing intuition, but it has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, a brief survey of the secondary literature reveals some rather fundamental disagreements, as can be seen in the following selected statements. According to proponents of the traditional view:

Stoic apathy, Epicurean self-contentment, and Sceptic imperturbability were the doctrines which suited the political helplessness of the age (Zeller).

In its origins Stoicism, like its rival Epicureanism, was a response to the new world . . . of Alexander the Great. Geographical and political horizons were enormously expanded, the insulation of the small city-state was stripped away, and individuals had to come to terms with and find a place in an enormously enlarged environment. Epicureans and Stoics alike addressed themselves to the task of redressing the imbalance between little man and huge world, of restoring dignity to little man by arming him with autarky or self-sufficiency . . . To endow man with autarky in the face of a world which threatens to overwhelm him, either the world must be shown to be less important than it seems, or man more important. The first of these strategies is the way of Epicureanism, the second of Stoicism (Hadas).

Because the polis had lost its all-embracing community quality, it could no longer be the center of man's spiritual life. Each individual now had to find his salvation himself. Insofar as classical ethics were based on the community of the city-state, they became meaningless in the Hellenistic absolute monarchies . . . Ethics had to be divorced from society, and even more from current politics (M. I. Finley).

The facts of the decline of the Polis and the rise of the large-scale state have immensely . . . important consequences for the history of moral philosophy . . . The milieu of the moral life is transformed; it now becomes a matter not of evaluations of men living in the forms of immediate community in which the interrelated character of moral and political evaluation is a matter living private lives in communities which are politically powerless. In Greek society the focus of the moral life was the city-state; in the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman empire the sharp antithesis between the individual and the state is inescapable (MacIntyre).

The voices of dissent who reject this line of reasoning usually downplay any notion of a major cultural rupture, and in the course of their own work tend to stress the logical continuities between Classical and Hellenistic thought, highlighting the immanent development of the latter out of the problems and directions set by the former:

Stoicism is sometimes represented as a philosophy devised to form a refuge for men disoriented by the collapse of the system of city-states, 'a shelter from the storm'. This is based on a misapprehension. The city-state had never given security, and it remained the standard primary form of social organization even after military power had passed into the hands of the great monarchies (Sandbach).

It is a fantasy and a perversion to see in Stoicism a new personal doctrine invented to sustain the Greeks in a cityless world of Great Empires, for Hel-

lenism was a world of cities, and Hellenistic Greeks were making money, not worrying about their souls. . . . In this area it is hard to see any influence on men's thinking exercised by the conquests of Alexander (C. B. Welles).

There are also a few compromise efforts that, while admirably nondogmatic, suggest a basic uncertainty on the issue:8

It would certainly be wrong to isolate Stoicism and Epicureanism from their milieu. Epicurus' renunciation of civic life and the Stoics' conception of the world itself as a kind of city may be viewed as two quite different attempts to come to terms with changing social and political circumstances. But many of the characteristics of Hellenistic philosophy were inherited from thinkers who were active before the death of Alexander . . . It is difficult to find anything in early Hellenistic philosophy which answers clearly to a new sense of bewilderment (Long).

In light of these enduring interpretive ambiguities and disagreements centering on both the genesis of the unique civic-based aspects of Hellenic culture and its supposed decline—a more comprehensive historical sociology of Polis society is urgently needed. That a distinctive and determinate nexus obtained between the citizenship experience of the ancient Hellenes and their normative ideals and cultural practices seems indisputable, but the actual connective links have to date been rendered in terms that are vague and general, and so remain elusive. There has been much talk about the nature of the Polis, but little systematic attention to the institutional orders within it or their transformations over time; the situation of the Greek citizen has been broadly contrasted with that of the Eastern subject, but less clear are the evolving social psychologies of the various strata and groups within the civic body itself; there exists a general awareness that major structural changes typically occasion corresponding cultural reforms, but left unspecified are the mechanisms and modalities by which institutions and class structures actually come to sustain congruent constellations of norms and values or promote distinctive modes of cognition and affect.

These limitations are not, to be sure, confined to any particular field of scholarship; they constitute the perennial problem complex in the social sciences and humanities more generally: that of relating cultural phenomena to social structural arrangements. All the old polarities between "idealistic" and "materialistic" accounts, intrinsic versus extrinsic explanations, remain largely unresolved, with accomplished practitioners continuing to work from both ends of the spectrum. Though a source for confusion and partisan polemics, it is an analytical "bifurcation" that accurately reflects the fact that the relationships between cultural forms and institutions are variable and volatile, with ideas serving

both as catalysts for change and as conserving ideologies, and with cultural producers being molded and influenced by the traditions within which they work as well as by the societies within which they live. The full the internal history of any form of cultural life—artistic, religious, philoprocesses—economic, political, demographic—within which it finds a proper of the societies and purpose.

A proper comprehension of the philosophies of the Epicureans and Stoics, the aim of our concluding section, thus presupposes attending not only to their respective reactions to the intellectual legacies bequeathed by Aristotle, Plato, and the pre-Sokratics, but also explicating the manifold and dynamic linkages between philosophy and society in their own as well as in preceding historical periods. Our analysis must accordingly begin at the point of departure for the Polis form of social organization: the violent demise of the Mycenaean order.

1

The End of the Bronze Age

The advanced Bronze Age civilizations of the Near East that had formed during the second millennium BC were subjected to mounting internal strains and external pressures towards the close of that era. Successive waves of Indo-European invaders from the barbarian fringes, strengthened by improvements in metallurgy that both cheapened the cost of bronze and opened up the abundant deposits of iron for implements of war and agriculture, swept through the Mediterranean basin, overturning dynasties and empires in the process and rupturing the slender trading links that sustained the refinements of elite high culture. The Hittite empire in Anatolia collapsed under these protracted onslaughts, as did Kassite rule in Babylonia; even the great pharaohs of Egypt found themselves pressed to repel raiding "sea peoples" who descended repeatedly on the Delta. In roughly the same period, c. 1200 BC, the Bronze Age or "Mycenaean" civilization of the Greek mainland and Aegean also fell victim to unidentifiable forces of violence. Several of the major palace complexes—Mycenae, Tiryns, Thebes, Pylos—were sacked and burned, while scores of other settlements were simply abandoned amid the spiraling chaos. As Mycenaean society had been centered on the palaces, with their elaborate bureaucratic management of production and distribution, the resulting administrative anarchy entailed widespread social disruption: the scribal craft of writing disappeared, large-scale construction ceased, and material culture relapsed into a phase of degenerate poverty.²

The famous chronology of early Greek history provided by Thucydides is a confusing tangle of myth, legend, and fact, but the great historian's description of a primitive and turbulent period for the immediate post-Mycenaean world is strikingly consistent with what has been unearthed by the archaeologist's spade:³

It appears the country now called Hellas was not firmly settled in ancient times, but that migrations were frequent, each tribe readily abandoning its own territory whenever constrained by others more powerful. For at that time there was no commerce (emporia), nor did people have secure dealings with each other, either by land or by sea. The use they made of their land was sufficient for daily necessities, but they had no surplus left over for capital (chrêmata), and they did not plant the earth with orchards, it being uncertain when an invader might appear and—in the absence of walled fortifications—deprive them of their lands.

This ancient testimony to unsettled populations, undeveloped agriculture, and depressed standards of material life, finds confirmation in various aspects of modern research. From the distribution of Greek dialects in later times, linguistic specialists have been able to retrace the earlier migratory movements and contacts of major tribal "peoples" such as the Dorians, Ionians, and Arkadians. The widespread abandonment of settlements indicated by archaeological surveys—the number of known inhabited sites for the thirteenth, twelfth, and eleventh centuries is roughly 320, 130, and 40 respectively—suggests not only a return to pastoralnomadic modes of survival, but also, when coupled with information yielded by the study of burial sites, a drastic falloff in population.4 The paucity of artifacts made from precious metals during the eleventh and tenth centuries is striking in comparison to the glittering wealth found for the Mycenaean period, as is cessation of all major construction featuring stone and marble. A shattered social order, in sum, precipitated not only a massive demographic "emptying" of the peninsula, but a pronounced decline in material culture as well.

When the migratory influxes and relocations of the Hellenic peoples came to an end early in the first millennium, there emerged three basic patterns of settlement that were to have lasting significance on the pace and nature of subsequent developments in the various Greek communities.⁵

In a few areas the invading forces enserted or enslaved surviving indigenous populations and on that basis created highly militarized, aristocratic societies. Sparta and Thessaly are the two most significant examples of such "conquest states," but collective domination over earlier inhabitants was practiced elsewhere, notably in parts of Krete and later in the colonized regions of the Black Sea and Greek Sicily. In the case of Sparta, a corporate body of militarized citizens came to be sustained by the labors of a servile class known as Helots, while other productive functions were performed by politically dependent communities of perioikoi ('dwellers around'). In Thessaly a more decentralized, quasi-feudal system took form, one in which the expansive estates of warriorhorsemen were cultivated by an enserfed people aptly designated as penestai, or 'toilers'. These and other conquest societies would face serious and enduring problems of social control, as the subject populations in some cases numerically far larger than their rulers—frequently revolted, and the mechanisms of domination that evolved to meet this challenge gave an indelibly authoritarian and rigid stamp to their way of life.

The pattern in other mainland areas appears to have been based on some degree of assimilation between conquerors and conquered, a privilege confined in all likelihood to an elite stratum among the vanquished,

since some manner of enslavement of the original inhabitants is indicated by the presence of clearly demarked disprivileged strata, such as the "naked ones" of Argos and the "dusty-feet" at Epidaurus (these and other similar groups being likened by contemporaries to the Helots of Sparta). That select segments of the original population escaped servitude is suggested, however, by the fact that the tribal organization of the conquerors occasionally expanded to incorporate new members. Along-side the traditional three tribes of the victorious Dorians, for example, a fourth, non-Dorian tribe was created at Argos, Sikyon, Epidaurus, and elsewhere. These communities thereby avoided the problems inherent in controlling massive subject populations, but the process of assimilation was not always successful, and in subsequent periods there were several cases in which "racial" antagonisms contributed to factional violence and political upheaval.⁶

As to the third pattern, a few Bronze Age communities managed to survive the protracted turbulence of the Mycenaean collapse-though under greatly reduced circumstances—as invaders either bypassed these regions altogether or encountered effective resistance. Most prominent in this category is Athens, a circumstance that explains why the Athenians came to believe that among the Hellenes, they alone were an autochthonous people, having sprung—as their national myth has itfrom the very soil of Attika itself. Athens also apparently served as a temporary haven for groups of refugees fleeing the violence and chaos, for the tradition that Athens organized the Ionian colonization of coastal Asia Minor (c. 1050–950 BC) is well attested by the similarities in speech, tribal organization, religious practices, and mythic traditions that existed between the Ionian cities and Athens. At roughly the same time, the northern region of coastal Asia Minor was settled by groups emanating from Thessaly and Boeotia, while the Dorians came to colonize Krete and the southern Aegean. Again, those overseas settlements were to have somewhat distinctive histories based upon their ecological circumstances, their relations with indigenous peoples, and the proximity and power of neighboring civilizations.

A caveat of methodological import emerges from the foregoing: whenever generalizations about "Polis society" are made in the course of this study, it is essential not to lose sight of the fact that the number of Greek city-states was to grow quite large, with estimates ranging from between seven hundred and one thousand self-governing communities. Notwithstanding certain basic similarities in structural morphology and cultural forms—especially marked among the historically significant fifty or so "major" poleis—diversity on the local and regional levels was considerable. The Polis, moreover, was not the only "organizational shell" for

The End of the Bronze Age

Greek social life: the *ethnos* pattern, featuring a more rural, territorial-tribal mode of communal federation, tended to prevail in parts of the western Peloponnese and throughout much of central and northern Greece. Though lacking the urban refinements of civilization, and politically static and militarily marginal for much of the early and Classical periods, these "cantonal" communities were integral elements in the larger tapestry of the Hellenic experience, entering into relations of alliance and opposition with various poleis and participating in sundry economic and cultural exchanges.

It has become conventional in historical surveys of ancient Greece to pass rather rapidly from—and over—the fall of the Bronze Age on to the gestation and emergence of Polis society in the Archaic period. That tendency is both understandable and unavoidable, given the discontinuities that separate the world of the Mycenaeans from the world of the Polis, and the paucity of surviving source materials for the Dark Age transition period. Sociologically, however, the consequences of the Mycenaean collapse warrant closer consideration, even if this necessitates giving freer reign to speculation than is customary. Most essential is the established fact that in social-historical evolution, points of departure (or deflection) impart directionality on the course or "trajectory" of subsequent developments.

The destruction and collapse of the palaces entailed a near total rupturing in terms of social organization, particularly marked in the economic and political sectors. The archival records from destroyed centers attest to a highly regimented production-distribution system, featuring specialized occupation categories (some apparently servile) whose services are controlled by palace officials and a military stratum whose armament—light chariots and bronze weaponry—is inventoried and stockpiled in palace storerooms. The Mycenaean order, in short, bears rather striking similarities to the agromanagerial regimes of the neighboring Near East, where narrow circles of ruling elites, bureaucratic and military, exacted the requisite surpluses from toiling subject populations of peasants and artisans. That carapace of power and privilege—its extractive capacity on clear display in the fabulous riches contained in the shaft graves of the Mycenaean warlords unearthed by Heinrich Schliemann—was irrevocably shattered by the violence that brought down the palaces. Amid the turbulence and depopulation that followed, new social arrangements were to arise on Hellenic soil, with considerable ecological space for productive expansion and without the smothering and polarizing impact of bureaucracies and professional armies. The concentration and accumulation of wealth and power by palace-based elites was thus suspended, with the consequence that in post-Mycenaean Greece, a "state" did not succeed in separating from, and dominating over, civil society.

Much like the so-called European miracle of the early modern period, the remarkable advances of the ancient Greeks would thus seem to owe much to the creative freedoms and opportunities afforded by the absence of centralized, imperial bureaucracies. As we shall see, it is in the unique synergies of the Polis form of social organization—its citizen-based communalism—that the keys to the cultural dynamism of Hellenic civilization are to be found. The violent removal of the Mycenaean palace complex accordingly stands as a prelude to all that follows, a fateful altering of the arc of historical possibility.

2

Dark Age Greece

The massive devastation and turmoil that attended the fall of Mycenaean civilization plunged the entire Greek peninsula into historical darkness for several centuries, as material poverty and the loss of scribal skills conspired to mute the testimony of those who endured amid the ruins. Out of the wreckage of the old order and the migratory influx of tribal peoples, a new social pattern would gradually emerge, consisting of nucleated, agrarian-based urban settlements organized as communal associations under the leadership of warrior-kings and nobles. What little we know of this formative "Dark Age" period is derived from two primary sources: archaeology and the poems attributed to Homer. Use of the latter for historical purposes is fraught with controversy, inasmuch as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are composite works, containing materials "sedimented" from several distinct historical periods—a feature common to traditions of oral composition. The historian thus faces the difficult task of decomposing the artful model of a unitary "Heroic society" offered by the bard and then rearranging the elements so as to produce a plausible chronology and a convincing sociology. The situation has been simplified considerably, however, by the decipherment in the 1950s of the surviving archival records from several destroyed Mycenaean centers—the so-called Linear B tablets—for it is now clear that Homer was unaware of the palace bureaucracies that had dominated the Bronze Age period. That central fact, supplemented by other archaeological details and the retrospective inferences that can be drawn from subsequent historical developments, has convinced most scholars that while Agamemnon, Odysseus, and the Trojan war itself belong to the Mycenaean era, the institutional life represented in the epics is largely that of Dark Age Greece, with only minor Mycenaean survivals and occasional projections from Homer's own period, probably the early eighth century.

2.I SOCIAL STRUCTURE: THE OIKOS AND THE COMMUNITY

It is the social world of the *aristoi*, or 'best people', that occupies the poet's attention, but in the shadows of noble heroes another human category is occasionally visible, the *dêmos*, or 'people', oft simply styled

"the multitude." The major spheres of social life are dominated by the aristocracy; and on the basis of their military prowess and superior wealth (chiefly in lands and livestock, precious metals and domestic slaves), they maintain a distinctively seignorial or knightly style of life, centered on ritualized displays of status such as the feast and the gift exchange. Commoners are not enserfed or enslaved, however, and all signs indicate that they constitute a free peasantry. This nexus of aristocratic supremacy and landowning peasants becomes understandable when we look closer at the immediate post-Mycenaean environment.

Dark Age history was shaped by two defining developments: the collapse of the palace-systems and the protracted influx of new peoples. The violent fall of the Mycenaeans precipitated a serious decline in material culture and massive depopulation. Settlements that were initially small and primitive gradually arose, many of them occupying topographical sites best suited for defence. Other military considerations shaped settlement patterns as well, for the conquering invaders are likely to have entered Greece in the form of organized warrior-bands. The early history of the kinship subdivisions characteristic of developed Greek communities—the tribe, phratria ('brotherhood'), and genos ('clan' or 'patrilineal family')—is exceedingly obscure, but most scholars believe that the tribes, and probably also the phratries, were originally organized along military lines.² It is known that in later periods tribes and phratries were sometimes created "artificially," i.e., they were not true descent or kinship groups, but rational subdivisions instituted for purposes of allocating privileges and collective responsibilities, often of a military nature. Since these artificial units were able to develop strong personalist ties through shared cultic practices and the symbolism of bloodrelationships (descent from a mythical hero), an inference that something similar occurred in the prehistorical period is not unreasonable. At least one fact points strongly in that direction: in all the many Dorian communities, the three major tribes—Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyloi are present, which not only suggests that this arrangement existed before the Dorians embarked on their wide-ranging migrations, but that the earliest principles of organization were not restricted to kinship; as the name of the third category plainly attests (pamphyloi means 'mixed of all tribes'), it was an artificial composition of different groups. From these considerations and suggestive comparative evidence, Max Weber surmised that the origins of the Greek Polis were largely military in nature, with direct roots leading to the warrior confraternities characteristic of tribal societies. Indeed, the point was so fundamental for his sociology that he considered it one of the major factors in explaining the different historical trajectories of East and West:3

The occidental city is in its beginnings first of all a defense group, an organization of those economically competent to bear arms, to equip and train themselves. Whether the military organization is based on the principle of self-equipment or on that of equipment by a military overlord who furnishes horses, arms and provisions, is a distinction quite as fundamental for social history as is the question whether the means of economic production are the property of the worker or of a capitalistic entrepreneur. Everywhere outside the West the development of the city was prevented by the fact that the army of the prince is older than the city. The earliest Chinese epics do not, like the Homeric, speak of the hero who fares forth to battle in his own chariot, but only of the officer as a leader of men. Likewise in India an army led by officers marched out against Alexander the Great. In the West the army equipped by the warlord, and the separation of the soldier from the paraphernalia of war, in a way analogous to the separation of the worker from the means of production, is a product of the modern era, while in Asia it stands at the apex of historical development. There was no Egyptian or Babylonian-Assyrian army which would have presented a picture similar to that of the Homeric mass army, the city army of the ancient polis, the feudal army of the west, or the medieval guild army.

If the invading and migrating peoples who repopulated Hellas were, on point of entry, organized as "consociations of warriors" (internally stratified in the standard manner as leaders, retinues, and followers), this would account for the early appearance of extensive private ownership, as all qualified members would be entitled to shares in the conquered land for purposes of military self-maintenance, an allotment to be passed on through hereditary succession. It is worth noting that Karl Marx anticipates Weber's speculations on the military origins of the Polis, for he too stresses that the Mediterranean city-states emerged "from the womb of warrior communes."4 Property relations in the ancient mode of production, Marx observes, were centered on a particular functional interdependence between the community and its individual members: the citizen's status as proprietor was mediated by membership in the communal association (noncitizens being excluded from landownership), while the community itself was sustained by the collective military labors of its citizenry, i.e., procuring slaves through battle and safeguarding and acquiring the territory upon which the whole social formation was based.

A point in favor of this Marx-Weber thesis linking a landed citizenry to the phenomenon of "warrior communism" is its correspondence with both Greek tradition and historical practice: not only do the legends and myths of settlement conventionally make mention of some primordial division of land among commune members, but the establishment of new colonies abroad—and the refounding of destroyed sites or relocations—typically entailed just such an allotment procedure. Moreover, the term

for designating one's land or property, klêros, also refers to the drawing or casting of lots, while the verb klêroô means to choose or apportion by lot—an etymology that is suggestive of some form of foundational land division. Archaeological field surveys and aerial photography have since confirmed the practice of equitable distributions, as an orthogonal layout of both agricultural and residential holdings seems to have been a standard arrangement, from the Dark Age period on through Hellenistic times.

The political arrangements of Dark Age society likewise display a substantial military cast. Already in the epics one finds in embryonic form the three basic political institutions of the developed Greek political, or 'constitution': the assembly of all adult male citizens, undoubtedly a legacy of the tribal "people in arms"; a council consisting of the heads of the aristocratic families, likely successors of the preeminent retinues; and a basileus, or 'king', the supreme warlord whose powers were later parceled and vested in various state magistrates, such as the archon (the chief executive) and the polemarch (the military commander).8

At the apex of authority within a community stood a basileus like Agamemnon or Odysseus, though his position was essentially primus inter pares, as other warrior-nobles ranked as basilees themselves—the same term covering both statuses in Greek, a revealing fact in itself. Royal authority of the chief or "most kingly" basileus depended first and foremost upon personal power and effectiveness and only secondarily upon lineage. Hereditary succession appears to have been the norm, but we observe that Odysseus' son Telemachus did not expect to become king given the power of the noble suitors, and Achilles at one point expresses concern that his aged father may have been unseated during his sojourn at Troy. Greek myths and legends abound with tales of dynastic murder and usurpation, practices that are likely to have had a historical basis in this unsettled period that preceded the full institutionalization of political life.

As for the responsibilities of the king, his major role remained that of warlord, but the performance of religious rituals and the adjudication of disputes also figured prominently. No autocrat, his authority is circumscribed by two important conditions: the first is *themis*, which we translate as 'custom' or, as Finley more aptly expresses it, the enormous power of "it is (or is not) done"; the second limitation, subsumed under the first, involved normative pressures calling for the justification of one's position in an open forum. Legitimacy and support, in other words, were to be won through adherence to tradition and effective argumentation. Throughout the epics the heroes consistently praise two virtues above all others: ferocity in combat and sagacity in counsel. In a society lack-

ing written laws and fixed regulations, and where the coercive apparatus of the state is absent or undeveloped, a strong concern for oratorical and reasoning skills is likely to be promoted, as such traits provide the only effective means for communal mobilization and discipline. Heads of the leading families undoubtedly decided matters amongst themselves in most instances, but when disagreements over vital public issues arose, these were aired before the people in the place of assembly. 11 Debate was customarily reserved for the nobles, and if a commoner spoke out of place, he could expect a stern reminder from one of the aristoi, such as the bloody welt Thersites received from Odysseus in the Iliad. There was no formal voting, nor could the dêmos propose policy; but even so commoners were not passive onlookers, for either through acclamation or loud grumbling they let the kings and nobles know where sentiment lay. A king was under no obligation to follow the advice of the nobles or heed public opinion, but in an insecure age where power rested upon personal loyalties, a king who too often flouted the will of his people was unlikely to retain authority for long. Homer on occasion intimates that the dêmos can be a dangerous force, as when old Nestor inquires whether Telemachus' difficulties stem from the people's hatred, and again when one of the noble suitors expresses fears that should the dêmos learn of their evil deeds, they might rise up and drive them out of Ithaka.12

In a sociological sense, the history of Polis society begins with the Dark Age assembly, for its very existence confirms the reality of an operative sense of 'community', a koinônia of the citizenry that was to become the defining feature of developed Polis life. At this formative stage, the assembly's legal-political functions were quite minimal, and the koinônia more passive than active; it was the effective power of the aristoi rather than any rudimentary communalism that shaped the course of events.13 But the civic principles implicit in the Dark Age assembly were soon to become explicit—and institutionally elaborated—once the balance of power began shifting away from hereditary nobles. As we shall see, the rise of the dêmos will find ideological expression in a cry for social justice, dikê, largely understood as an extension or fulfillment of communalism and the citizenship ideal, with the original right of public consultation leading on inexorably to the notion of sovereign command. The Dark Age assembly, with its germinal sense of koinônia, is thus the fons et origo of later Greek democracy.

A brief excursus is necessary at this point to consider what is perhaps the central paradox of ancient Greek history: the apparent contradiction between the professed ideals of civic communalism on the one hand and recurring eruptions of civic factionalism on the other, as the Polis form of

social organization came to sustain both consensual and conflictive patterns of politics to degrees unparalleled in their mutual intensity.14 This seemingly anomalous relationship between koinônia and stasis was, in actuality, a "logical" consequence of certain obdurate historical and social realities. The communalism inherent in the military origins and imperatives of Polis society operated from the outset in a stratified manner, as a warrior aristocracy exercised political domination and secured economic advantages on the basis of its martial superiority. Progressive shifts in the locus of military power were thus bound to elicit calls for corresponding alterations in the distribution of political authority and economic resources, and hence to internecine conflicts within the citizen ranks. Overall standards of material life were, moreover, quite meagre, bound by a comparatively inelastic and vulnerable economic base. In such circumstances, a powerful sense of communalism has the potential to foster zero-sum demands, all the more so when the contending parties are animated by an "agonistic" or competitive ethos of the kind that was so pervasive in Hellenic culture.15 Against all "outsiders," the citizens of a Polis constituted a closed status group, in Max Weber's terms, a "political guild" monopolizing certain key ideal and material privileges; but internally, the allocation of those rights and resources were subject to egalitarian pressures that frequently overtaxed the existing means of production.16 The highly charged, at times violent atmosphere one finds in the developed Polis must accordingly be seen as an unintended by-product of the community ideal, as a struggle over those limited resources and valued privileges to which each citizen felt entitled by virtue of his membership in the civic koinônia.

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

In the unsettled aftermath of the Mycenaean collapse, the major legal-political institutions within the Dark Age communities were socially unbalanced as well as rudimentary: the levers of power were controlled by warrior-nobles, and assemblies were summoned on an ad hoc basis at the discretion of the basilêes. In this world without writing (a situation that would not change until the Greeks borrowed and transformed the Phoenician alphabet sometime during the latter half of the eighth century), law was based on oral tradition and, more directly, on interpretations given by the nobility. From the epics we learn of two types of legal procedure: a simple process of oath-taking, wherein fear of divine punishment is relied upon to foster proper behavior; and another that involved formal public appeal, with disputants arguing their cases before groups of seated nobles, interested onlookers voicing support from the sidelines.¹⁷ The nobles would lay down what was themis (proper or customary) and for their efforts collect "mediation fees," a lucrative source of income.¹⁸ The

methods by which judgments were enforced and wrongs redressed receive no clear exposition in Homer but apparently involved a mixture of acceding to public pressure and the principle of "self-help" on the part of the injured party. In the case of homicide, the victim's nearest kin were held responsible for bringing about justice, to be achieved either through vengeance against the murderer or by accepting material compensation in the form of a "blood price." Such an enforcement system was clearly open to abuse, for not only would the weak and poor lack the means to make "self-help" a viable option, they were also at the mercy of aristocrats who controlled and interpreted what passed as *themis*. Little wonder, then, that in the social struggles of later periods, demands for a written and public codification of law would figure prominently in the populist agenda.

In the absence of any centralized, coercive authority, arrangements for collective action—whether military or legal political—were basically ad hoc and intermittent rather than permanent and pervasive. We hear neither of labor conscription nor of taxation, and the elaborate requisitioning networks attested to in the Linear B tablets had plainly vanished with the destruction of the Bronze Age palaces. The organizing principles for everyday life accordingly centered on the individual oikos, or 'household', an institution common to both the aristoi and the dêmos, but with significant differences in scale. The essential components of an oikos included the patriarchal family, all landed property and livestock, various personal possessions, any servants free and unfree, and for the leading basilêes, a few comrades who were granted table fellowship and who served primarily as armed retainers. As the basic unit of social organization, the oikos was much more than a joint arrangement for the satisfaction of material needs; it also provided the context for a series of core social relationships—kinship, religious, political—and their defining complexes of norms and values, rights and responsibilities.

Though Hellenic civilization would find its classic expression in an urban idiom, material existence was everwhere founded upon an agrarian basis. When the Greeks insisted that civilized life was possible only within a Polis framework, that was an arrangement which for them—unlike the town dwellers of the medieval and modern eras—encompassed both an urban settlement and its rural hinterland, the chôra. Throughout the history of Polis society, the typical citizen is a yeoman farmer whose livelihood is drawn from the soil and whose public existence is mediated by urban-based practices. In the primitive Dark Ages, when life was more decentralized, the attractions of the urban core were limited to occasional legal-political activities and major religious events. All surviving evidence indicates that oikos self-sufficiency and village localism characterized the

age. Particularly instructive are the situations in Argos and Athens, two of the better excavated sites to date and, on the basis of comparatively rich archaeological records, clearly among the more "progressive" of Dark Age communities. Even so, the Argos of this period has been classified "a mere village" whose inhabitants were preoccupied with eking out the bare necessities from their lands, while Athens itself "consisted of a number of separate, discontinuous, unfortified villages." Ongoing archaeological research from elsewhere in the Greek world attests to a similar reality of depressed populations, isolation, and material poverty extending throughout the eleventh and tenth centuries.²⁰

Given the undeveloped state of collective insurance mechanisms, the primary concern for the head of each oikos was subsistence and survival, a fact that helps explain why Homer's heroes so often express a longing not only for their beloved family members, but for their properties and possessions as well.21 Modern sensibilities have sometimes found fault with this unromantic coupling, but the oikos was inconceivable apart from its material underpinnings, and the fate of the beggar or landless man forced into servitude was feared by all. The chief means of sustaining a family involved agricultural toil, and Homer attests to both grain cultivation and the raising of livestock.²² The heroes are distinguished by the extent of their holdings and the huge size of their flocks and herds, but commoners are modest proprietors in their own right.²³ In addition to the already mentioned military circumstances that favored an extensive distribution of landed allotments, it is unlikely that shortages of arable were an obstacle to private ownership in this period, given the massive depopulation that had followed the collapse of the palace systems. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the real challenge facing these resource-poor communities was bringing available land under effective cultivation. The problem of land hunger would confront the Greeks in due course, but in the Dark Ages neither archaeology nor Greek legend suggest any major competition between the aristoi and the dêmos over land.

To work their estates the *aristoi*, while engaging in sundry productive tasks themselves, drew upon the services of dependents, primarily a few slaves, but also propertyless free men known as *thêtes* who toiled in exchange for food and shelter. These *oikos*-based operations were quite limited, and the slave system must be classified as patriarchal or domestic rather than the chattel form characteristic of later periods. The slave was a member of the *oikos*, and as can be gathered from the epics, strong personalist ties were not uncommon.²⁴ Female slaves, clearly the largest category, owing both to reasons of social control and the labor demands of small-scale production, were engaged in everyday domestic chores and with the traditional specialty of women: "the loom and the distaff."²⁵

All facets of production were oriented towards satisfying the consumption needs of the oikos, but complete self-sufficiency was unattainable since several vital resources—metals and slaves above all—could be obtained only from the outside. There existed two basic methods of proundeveloped political institutions and unsettled populations, trade usually nence of booty raids and minor "looting wars" in the epics. Trading practices are nonetheless mentioned by Homer, and several of the heroes through bartering exchanges—a picture confirmed by the scattered trail of the Phoenicians, however, whose epithet in the Odyssey is "greedy nibbers" or "gnawers," and who by the ninth century were truly a trading people, these activities were irregular and small scale.²⁶

When attention is shifted from the aristoi to the dêmos, one confronts that familiar historiographic challenge: the paucity of information on the lower orders of society. The study of premodern societies in particular is hampered by the fact that our primary literary sources derive overwhelmingly from ruling or privileged circles. Royal scribes, priests, court poets, and leisured elites form the standard authorial cohort, with the consequence that perspectival bias and incompleteness are ingrained in the empirical record. As regards the peasant oikos of early Greece, our direct information is limited to the few inferences that can be drawn from Homer, the nobleman's bard, and the estimation of material standards from archaeological remains. There is an indirect source, however, which provides a more expansive "view from below," one complementary to Homer's aristocratic slant.27 That source is the Works and Days, a versified agricultural digest composed by Hesiod, a farmer-poet of the late eighth century and the first "common man" in history to make his voice audible through the ages. To the possible objection that Hesiod cannot shed light on the Dark Age period, inasmuch as he lived a century later and, unlike Homer, sang of conditions within his own society, there are two responses. First, Hesiod was an inhabitant of Boeotia, a region that lagged noticeably in the modernizing trends of urbanization and commercial expansion; the difference here between the late Dark Age and the early Archaic is thus more of a chronological formality than a sociological reality. Second, if there is any role that might have some claim to timelessness, it is surely that of the peasant-farmer, a figure still engaged in an unending struggle with the seasonal patterns and vicissitudes of nature, and still resisting encroachment by his social superiors and the caprice of market forces.

Dark Age Greece

The overriding impression created by Hesiod is that life was extremely hard for the poor man, and not much better for small farmers like himself. The spectre of "burning-eyed Famine" is raised several times, and Hesiod is tireless in singing of the necessity of toil, to pile "work upon work." The men of his era, he informs us, are of the race of iron (the fifth generation in the Ages of Man), and Hesiod bewails the untimeliness of his birth: if only he had been born earlier, or in an age to come, for now men "never rest from toil and suffering," and the gods give them "grievous cares." To survive this harsh reality Hesiod counsels three necessary courses of action: ritual piety before the gods, honest dealings with men, and unrelenting labor.

Much of Hesiod's song concerns the technicalities of farming, the instruments needed and the personnel, the timing and modalities of ploughing, sowing, the harvest, etc. We learn that the small farmer works his land with a few slaves and hires a supplemental laborer or two at harvest time. That a figure like Hesiod should own slaves is perhaps surprising, but booty raids were routine communal enterprises, and in the epics a fair distribution of the spoils appears standard practice—indeed, in some cases the commoners themselves assume responsibility for the act of allocation.30 A fairly wide distribution of slave-ownership is therefore a likely by-product of the military koinônia that would sustain the Polis throughout its history. Even so, it must be kept in mind that the maintenance of slaves entailed substantial "overhead" costs in food, shelter, and clothing. Those lacking sufficient resources—no doubt the overwhelming majority in the early Dark Age—would be in no position to utilize slave labor on any significant scale. And though slaves were clearly valued by enterprising farmers like Hesiod—he recommends giving them adequate rest and extra rations in winter—it was a yoked team of draft animals that ranked as the most prized possession. The poet vividly observes that when the singing of the crane heralds the season for ploughing, her song "bites the heart of the man without oxen."31

The remaining sections of the Works and Days comprise a miscellaneous patchwork of practical aphorisms, with advice ranging from injunctions to rise early and work late, to recommendations that the noisy agora of "idle wrangling" be shunned. Through it all the principal objective is the attainment of "full barns," for that is the one security against famine and the loss of one's lands. It is far better to work hard, Hesiod famine and the loss of one's lands. It is far better to work hard, Hesiod counsels, "so that you may acquire the klêros of other men, not another man yours."

Beyond the grim realities of farming life, Hesiod offers occasional comments on the kinship arrangements of the lower classes, and together with Homer's portrayal of the aristocratic family, this information pro-

vides the basis for a few general comments on the kinship structure of early Greece.33 The first point to be made is that for aristocrats and commoners alike, the most important social unit is the nuclear family, consisting of the head of the household, his wife and children, and possibly his elderly parents. Extended kin relations did exist, most notably ties to clan and brotherhood, but since these groups play virtually no role in our literary sources, their specific functions remain obscure, thereby affording some credence to the thesis that their importance is a product of later developments.34 In any event, it is clear that Odysseus' troubles are those of his own oikos, for there is no mention of any wider kin that he or his son Telemachus can turn to for assistance. Similarly with the murder of Agamemnon and the usurpation of his kingship; it is the responsibility of his son Orestes to avenge the crime and regain the royal patrimony, inaided by any wider network of interested relatives. 35 Among the commoners, Hesiod encourages good relations with neighbors, pointedly observing that in times of emergency "kinsmen take too long to arm themselves." He also makes it clear that those who suffer economic disaster will be forced to take their wives and children and go begging from neighbors—an observation which seems to indicate that wider kinship relations provided no security.³⁶ And when it comes to that vital matter of borrowing tools or oxen, Hesiod again suggests that one turns to neighbors rather than kin as the usual source for mutual aid.

The institution of marriage constitutes the organizing center of the nuclear family, and our sources reveal that conventions of spouse selection for the nobility differed considerably from those of the dêmos. For the aristoi, marriage served as a means of establishing alliances and enhancing prestige. Noble suitors, often from outside the community, would compete for the hand of a prominent man's daughter, displaying their prowess and skills in athletic contests, and giving rich gifts and marriage presents in abundance. In many cases the noble patriarch simply arranged the marriages of his sons and daughters, again with the aim of securing powerful allies. Noble women accordingly enjoyed high social standing in the age of the heroes, a status that would be reduced in later periods, as enhanced citizenship norms began to curtail aristocratic power by severely restricting the scope for exogenous marriage alliances.³⁷ Concubinage functioned alongside marriage, and the aristoi not only bred warrior sons through dependent women, they also determined the legitimacy and rights of these offspring—in marked contrast to later times when questions of legitimacy were determined solely by state law.38 In Dark Age society, the oikos reigned supreme.

For commoners, spouse selection was a more mundane affair, with women being valued primarily for industrious habits. Hesiod advises

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men to marry at the age of thirty, to brides of around eighteen. The ideal choice is one who is "innocent of the ways of Aphrodite," for she can still be taught "discreet customs." In arranging these marriages there is no mention of athletic contests or competitions in gift giving-Hesiod simply enjoins the prospective groom to search very carefully so that the marriage will not turn out to be a source of amusement for others. The general characterization of women is rather unfavorable; Hesiod relates the tale that as punishment for Prometheus' theft of fire (which he gave to the race of men), Zeus ordered the creation of the first woman, Pandora, who then brought "countless miseries" to men. Hesiod allows that there is nothing better in life than marriage with a good woman; but then adds that nothing is worse than a bad wife, for she is a "parasite" who "roasts her man without fire" and "brings him to an early old age."39

A tradition common to both the aristoi and the dêmos was the practice of dividing the landed patrimony of the oikos among all male heirs, with daughters generally receiving portable goods. 40 Hesiod himself claims to have been inspired to verse because of a quarrel with his brother over the division of their father's klêros (the brother having unjustly gained the largest share through "gift-devouring" basilees). The peasant-farmer is encouraged by Hesiod to raise one son only, partly because of the difficulties in feeding more, but also because a larger number would lead to excessive partitioning of the family klêros. Hesiod grants that if Zeus bestows sufficient "ways and means" (presumably a substantial farm), a large family can be a blessing, with more hands synergistically producing greater wealth; but given the low standards of material life and the evidence suggesting thinly populated settlements, the norm for the peasantry was probably towards lower fertility in the immediate post-Mycenaean period.41 Various methods of birth control were known to the Greeks, including sundry abortive techniques, and the exposure of unwanted children—usually owing to physical deformities or poverty was an established practice throughout antiquity. The aristoi were in better position to sustain larger families, but it is perhaps significant that many of Homer's greatest heroes have only a single son (e.g., Agamemnon, Menelaus, Odysseus, Achilles, Laertes, Peleus, Hector, and Sarpedon). When it came—in conjunction with emerging order and material recovery—the demographic surge of the dawning Archaic Age would take place against a social and ecological backdrop of considerable "openness."42

The problem of too many heirs brings us to the dêmiourgoi, literally 'those who work for the people', a rather broad category that included bards and musicians, seers, healers of ills, carpenters, potters, and workers in metals. The reason for the connection is rather basic: those inca-

pable of deriving a sufficient livelihood from the soil would perforce have turned to other occupations. Rather than divide a family klêros into unworkable parts, we can imagine that an "extra" son may have used his share of the patrimony to acquire the tools and workshop necessary for a small trade. It is observed in the Odyssey that not all men are suited to life on a farm, "for different men rejoice in different works" (though the specific option mentioned here is piracy!)43 Behind the mythic prototypes of blind singers and seers and lame craftsmen (such as the god Hephaistos), there probably lies a reality wherein those who suffered from serious injury or physical disabilities took up vocations better suited to their situation. Irrespective of the reasons for undertaking such careers, the dêmiourgoi performed many important tasks, essentially all those that were beyond the capacity of the individual oikos. Some dêmiourgoi were itinerant, "these are the men who all over the endless earth are invited," while others resided permanently in their communities.44 They appear to have worked generally by commission, their craftwork aimed at satisfying local demand. Towards the end of the Dark Age, however, archaeological evidence suggests a significant upsurge in small-scale trade, and the famous verse in Hesiod where "potter envies potter and carpenter holds grudge with carpenter" likewise seems to indicate an expansion of craft activity.45 Nonetheless, given that Greek soil was incapable of yielding huge grain surpluses, the size of the nonagricultural segments in the population would necessarily remain small—most estimates are in the 10% range—so long as overseas grain supplies were not available. That situation would only begin to emerge in the Classical period for a few wealthy and powerful city-states; but even in these communities the peasantfarmer far outnumbered all other occupations combined. 46 Simply stated, for both the aristoi and the dêmos, the soil was always the principal source for what the Greeks called bios, a word that appropriately signified both 'life' and the means by which it was sustained.

2.II NORMS AND VALUES: THE ETHOS OF THE WARRIOR-ARISTOCRACY

Cultural sociology proceeds on the premise that thought and action, ideas and institutions, are mutually implicated in ongoing processes of social interaction. Cognitive structures are co-constitutive of the social worlds we create and inhabit, in that they shape experience and convey meaning, but they are also embedded within existing associational patterns and material-ecological constraints. Cultural forms creatively and responsively organize the social terrain upon which human beings move, as embodied in patterns of work, play, art, ritual, and ceremonial. If the constellations of motives, norms, and values that comprise moral codes are to be properly understood, it follows that they must be related to the institutional contexts that define and sustain the principal forms existential experience.¹

Warrior, nobleman, athlete, comrade, father, husband, landowner: the central characters in the epics are presented in a variety of roles and statuses, but it is undoubtedly their dedication to the vocation of arms that most clearly distinguishes Homer's heroes from the rest of the community. That martial considerations should have figured so prominently is hardly a mystery, for this was an age of instability, marked by predatory invaders, widespread piracy and brigandage, and an undeveloped legal-political order that left considerable scope for the use of naked force. The exigencies of everyday life would thus have placed high "premiums" on military prowess, and indeed, the very survival of the community depended upon the capacity of its members to prevail in what Marx called "the great communal labor."²

Since proficiency in combat is in all periods and places basically a function of superiority in weaponry and physical skills, preeminence in early Greek warfare was the special preserve of the aristoi, who alone possessed the wealth required for costly arms and the leisure for proper training. In an era so given over to armed violence, both predatory and defensive, the warrior role served to anchor and orient the behavioral repertoire of the nobleman and provided as well basic standards of selfimage and prestige. The paideia, or 'socialization', of the sons of the aristoi was correspondingly military in orientation, with training in the use of arms, gymnastic sports, horsemanship, and hunting all geared towards development of the requisite fighting skills. The inculcation of proper motivations and values was achieved primarily through poetic lays that recounted the "great deeds" of past heroes, mythical or historical warriors who served as paradeigmata, or 'exemplars', of valorous conduct. Noble youth performed minor service at royal households and at the warcamps—pouring wine at banquets, singing at sacrifices, etc.—as yet another means of absorbing the knightly warrior culture.3

This overriding centrality of the warrior role was in large measure predicated upon its functional relationship to political power. Supremacy in war secured for the nobility its dominance in the political sphere, as is clear from that memorable scene in the *Iliad* where Odysseus reproves any "man of the *dêmos*" he finds shouting during the breakup of a tumultuous assembly; following a hard blow with the sacred scepter comes the firm command: "Fellow! Sit quietly and listen to the words of others, those who are better than you—you who are unwarlike and without

strength, of no account either in battle or in counsel!" Claims to political power and full citizenship were thus largely justified on the basis of military performance, a fact that helps explain why the heroes were so strongly inclined to emphasize their warrior role vis-à-vis the militarily inferior dêmos. "Shepherds of the people," to use the revealing parlance of the epics, were the preeminent fighting men of the community.

Effective mastery of the means of violence also figured prominently in the accumulation of wealth—a connection so basic that Aristotle would actually characterize war as a "natural means of acquisition." A buccaneering "sacker of cities" like Odysseus obtained considerable material riches in the form of slaves, precious gold and silver, and other booty. The more limited enterprise of raiding the flocks and herds of others was also profitable and apparently a common means for enriching one's oikos. Although the spoils of war and brigandage were typically divided, the epics make clear that the aristoi laid successful claim to the lion's share, and therewith the means to continuously sustain their own martial supremacy as well as attract and support armed retainers. Instructive are the grumbling words of Thersites, who, while protesting Agamemnon's hubristic appropriation of Achilles' awarded prize (the captive maiden Briseis), declares:

Son of Atreus, what thing further do you want, or find fault with now? Filled are your tents with bronze, and with many women too, select ones, whom we Achaians give to you first of all whenever we capture some citadel. Or is it still more gold that you will be wanting, which some son of the Trojans, tamers of horses, brings as ransom out of Ilion, one that I myself or some other Achaian has bound and led in?

The warrior-aristocrat's view of wealth acquisition is decidedly anticommercial: particularly telling is a scene in the Odyssey where a nobleman seeks to insult the disguised Odysseus by suggesting he is probably a
merchant "greedy for gain"; elsewhere Odysseus speaks glowingly of his
mother's father, a noble man "who surpassed all others in oath-taking
and thievery (kleptosunê)." Plato and other later moralists would understandably find much that was objectionable in Homer's verse, but it is the
social conditioning of normative life that is decisive in any "genealogy of
morals." Given the prominence of military considerations in the hero's
"definition of self," itself expressive of the imperatives of both individual
and collective self-preservation, it followed as a matter of course that
positive evaluations would adhere to those activities that allowed for the
assertion of prowess in obtaining desired ends.

Political and economic interests thus served as powerful incentives for performance in the warrior role, and in moments of crisis the heroes typ-

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ically bolster each other by appealing to those concerns. The entire nexus is strikingly revealed in the famous "noblesse oblige" speech of Sarpedon, a Trojan ally who rouses the fighting spirit in his comrade with an exhortation that underscores the aristocrat's prime social obligation, and also pointedly associates martial preeminence, political supremacy, great wealth, and noble birth—the four reinforcing pillars of power in Dark Age society:8

Glaukos, why are we two the most honored in Lycia in seats of honor, with choice meats and full goblets, and all look upon us as on gods? And why do we possess an allotment of public land beside the banks of the Xanthus, a fine one of orchards and wheat-bearing arable? Therefore it is necessary that we now stand among the first of the Lycians and partake in the burning battle, so that one of the Lycians covered in breastplates would say, "Truly not inglorious are our basilées who rule in Lycia, they who consume fat sheep and precious honey-sweet wine; for they are also of noble strength, since they fight in the first ranks of the Lycians."

We thus see that for the aristoi, the acquisition of material goods was inextricably bound up with certain standards of conduct. Calculating incentives alone could hardly have proven sufficient to compel a man to repeatedly face "pitiless bronze"; an inner compulsion bestowing higher meaning and value to his actions was also necessary. That standard—the galvanizing current of Homeric discourse—was philotimia, the heroic love of glory and honor. As is commonly the case in the history of morals, a virtue was made out of a necessity, for in a world where violence and warfare were endemic, a congruent ethos emerged wherein a man's personal and public worth was largely measured by displayed skills in combat.

It was Nietzsche's pioneering explorations in the sociology of language that first disclosed that moral vocabularies could be "read" as indexes of social praxis, a hermeneutic that would in turn deepen our understanding of the moral codes themselves, laying bare their ulterior "logic" and animating spirit. By examining lexical usage of words such as "good" and "virtue" in several different cultures, Nietzsche discovered that these terms originally had no connection with unegoistic or benevolent actions, but rather denoted the preferred activities and existential "being" of powerful, noble strata. In the case of the ancient Hellenes, Nietzsche observed that the words esthlos and agathos, both containing the notion 'good', were generally applied to acts of bravery, fighting efficiency, and noble birth—i.e., if a man is called agathos in Homer, it is usually because he is both a good fighter and a member of the 'best men', the aristoi.10 Alternatively, terms of derogation like kakos (bad) and deilos (cowardly, vile, worthless) were typically used to signify cowardice, ineffective fighting, and men of lower status. For the early Greeks, moral vocabulary and ethical standards alike were thus heavily informed by class distinctions and the performance demands of the warrior role. As summarized by Nietzsche;11

Good and bad are for a time the same as noble and low, master and slave. But the enemy is not considered evil, he can repay [i.e., has power]. Trojan and Greek are both good in Homer. Not he that does us harm but he that is contemptible is considered bad. In the community of the good, good is inherited: it is impossible that a bad person should grow out of such good soil. If one of the good nevertheless does something unworthy of the good, then one has recourse to excuses; one blames a god, for example, saying that he struck the good man with delusion and madness.

Under the heroic code, the degree to which a man was agathos or esthlos was measured by how much time, or 'honor', he could lay claim to. Noble birth in itself provided a certain measure of honor, so that even aristocrats who engage in discreditable acts—such as the suitors who prey on Odysseus' oikos during his absence—are frequently labeled esthlos by Homer, though he reproves their hubristic behavior. The principal means of gaining honor, however, was through the performance of megala erga, 'great deeds', which publicly demonstrated a man's aretê, a word best translated as an 'excellence' in some concrete capacity rather than the more abstract 'virtue' of later Greek philosophers. Homeric aretê was demonstrated by raiding, sacking, or defending cities; offering good counsel; prevailing in athletic contests; and above all, by slaughtering other heroes in the travails of combat. The greater the prowess of the foe, the greater the glory that redounded to the victor. Hence the spectacle of heroes stopping in the very din of battle to strip armor from the vanquished, not so much for the sake of gain, but so as to acquire tangible symbols of their aretê in war. The heroes' unabashed delight in possessions, prizes, and gifts is to be similarly understood.

Within their own ranks the aristoi were constantly vying for honor, as evaluations by peers carried the greatest significance. The "agonistic" or competitive ethos that was to become one of the defining traits of Hellenic culture is to be traced to this heroic pursuit of glory, classically expressed in the paternal injunction offered by Peleus to the young Achilles: aien aristeuein, a socially loaded phrasing that loses some resonance in the more neutral 'always be the best and excell above the others'. 12 Indeed, the unrivaled Hellenic appreciation of body and mind owes its existence to this aristocratic ideal, for it was through the strength and swiftness of their limbs and the sharpness of their minds that these heroes strove to surpass all others in honor. Of particular social import was the requirement that time be won and measured publicly, a situation that accounts for the

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anthropological classification of early Greek society as a "shame-culture," wherein estimations of value-persons and actions alike-are determined by the appraisals of others, and where merit and excellence depend on intentions less than on results.13 This normative orientation is to be understood in contrast to a "guilt-culture," which assigns primary responsibility for praise and censure to the individual conscience, and where intentionality takes precedence in the assessment of conduct. These categories are of course ideal-type constructs, and substantively the two are not mutually exclusive; even in a so-called shame-culture, a person could not anticipate or forecast the reactions of others unless he or she had personally internalized the accepted social standards.14 The notion of "inner-" and "other-directed" personalities must therefore be seen as forming an interactive continuum rather than a rigid dichotomy. It is the relative emphasis that is decisive, and in the social world of early Greece, it is manifest that "shame-culture" standards predominated, the heroes being virtually obsessed with public estimations of their status and conduct.

Thomas Hobbes famously asserted that humankind is animated by "a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death." Others have offered substitutes for this proposition, "pleasure" and "material gain" being among the more popular alternatives. For the heroes of Homer's epics, however, it is quite clear that the primary motivating principle was timê, 'honor', an objective that in a sense did not countenance death as an obstacle or terminus, inasmuch as the heroes were striving for a form of "posthumous existence," i.e., the hope that through their glorious deeds they might live on in the memories of generations to come. Viewed sociologically, this ideal of "fame immortal" must be seen as a response to the fatalism which necessarily inheres in the warrior role: 16

Oh dear friend! If truly by escaping this battle we were destined to live forever, unaging and immortal, then neither would I fight in the first ranks nor send you into battle which brings glory to men. But since the numberless fates of death stand close at hand, they whom it is not possible for mortals to flee nor avoid, let us go on, either winning glory for ourselves or yielding it to another.

Death being inescapable, glory and honor were the only worthy objectives for a warrior. Hence the characteristic attitude of Odysseus, who on several occasions during his difficult return home, expresses the wish that he had fallen under the "bronze-tipped spears" of the Trojans, for then he would have been among those "thrice, even four times blessed" heroes who died in battle, rather than a wretched wanderer facing an inglorious

and dismal death.¹⁷ The same tone is set in the very first book of the *Iliad*, where Achilles complains that since his life is fated to be short-lived (a destiny all warriors could relate to), Zeus should at least grant the recompense of honor. In such violent and unsettled circumstances, the best one could hope for was to be among those heroic few whose *megala erga* earned them immortality in the songs of singers "loved by the Muse."

The issue of death and immortality raises the more inclusive subject of the role of religion in early Greek society. Developing an empathetic understanding of the religious life of other peoples is never easy, and polytheistic religions in particular often appear a confusing welter of practices and beliefs. The study of ancient Greek religion is beset with additional difficulties, including the fact that surviving source materials are so deficient in detail that they rarely allow for sociological or chronological interpretation. Much like the wider culture, Dark Age religion was a loose-fitting composite of elements derived from different historical periods and peoples: one finds traces of the Minoan-Mycenaean era, a few continuities from the even earlier pre-Greek Mediterranean populations, sundry Near Eastern influences, and many features that were introduced by the Indo-European invaders who helped bring down the palace systems. 18 The religious universe of the Greeks was thus marked by a kind of "layered coexistence," within which three kinds of divinities and spirits figured most prominently: (a) the well-known Olympian deities, led by the great Sky Father Zeus and his extended "family," Hera, Aphrodite, Apollo, Athena, Ares, Pluto, Hermes, Poseidon, and a retinue of lesser deities: (b) countless nature spirits and chthonic powers, less visible owing to the artistic brilliance of the first group, but of great ritual importance since they were rooted in the agricultural and pastoral life of the countryside; and (c) various kinship gods and spirits that were associated with the family, clan, and tribal organizations. Some of these divinities and spirits were significant on a national scale (the Olympians being the most pan-Hellenic), while others were purely local in importance.

The fact that this conglomerate was never fully systematized or integrated can be attributed to the city-state and ethnos, or 'cantonal', patterns of social organization that, unlike more unified national polities, assured the persistence of local and regional differences. Correspondingly, the autonomous, "cellular" nature of Greek society was not conducive to the development of any national hierocratic organization responsible for religious matters nor a clerically educated professional priesthood. The primary locus of integration was the individual community, and religious beliefs and practices were articulated with reference to its particular history—in the form of founding myths and legends—and

functionally coordinate with its political, economic, and kinship practices. Supervisory tasks and sacral performances were exercised by representatives of the community or, in nonpublic matters, by the commune members themselves. The emphasis in Greek religion was on pragmatic, ritual observance rather than on creed and theology, the latter aspects conspicuously undeveloped in the absence of corporate priesthoods and sacred canonic texts. To the extent that common theological or cognitive ground did exist, it was furnished by Homer and Hesiod, nonsacerdotal poets who concentrated more on religious form that on doctrinal content.²⁰

From the epics it is clear that religion was a firmly established element in communal life at an early stage: "altars of the gods" are located in the place of assembly, judges sit in "the sacred circle" during legal proceedings, and "god-supported" basilêes are said to derive their authority from Zeus himself. More fundamentally, sacrificial offerings to win divine favor are deemed a necessary prelude to most activities, whether communal or personal, ranging from war and sport to marriages and simple meals.21 Most scholars have assumed that since public institutions in Dark Age society were undeveloped and rudimentary, domestic and clan concerns must have predominated in the religious sphere as well. In his comparative studies on religion, Max Weber observed that the worship and tendance of ancestor spirits is commonly associated with patriarchal kinship structures.22 That pattern appears to hold in this case as well, given both the centrality of the patriarchal oikos and the attending prominence of the cult of the dead in early religious practice. Much of our archaeological data, in fact, consists of grave-dedications, various possessions that were intended either for the deceased's use in the afterlife or as simple honorific tokens.23 From later Greek practice we know that family members serviced the tombs of their ancestors with offerings of food and drink (often directly through feeding tubes), while larger clan unions worshiped the founders of their line.24 Important religious festivals of ancient pedigree involved rites for the dead, and Attik tragedies, which preserve many archaic features, abound in scenes with tendance and appeals to the spirits of the dead.25 Beyond honoring the deceased and thereby affirming the continuity and solidarity of the family line, the basic aim in all these actions was either to placate potentially hostile or vengeful spirits or to invoke their supernatural assistance.²⁶

The domestic cult of the household held an equally prominent place in Greek religion, with each domicile having its own sacred hearth, or hestia. Newborn children were accepted into the family by being carried round the hearth, and all meals opened and closed with a small libation in honor of the household's divine protector. The great sanctity of the

family is in evidence when Odysseus invokes both Zeus and the family hearth as witnesses for an important oath. ²⁸ Zeus himself was intimately associated with the family in his capacity as "the father of gods and men"—not in the biological sense (the Olympians being latecomers on the cosmic scene), but as pater familias, the patriarchal head of the human and divine order.

Both of these cultic arrangements, the ancestral and the domestic, express the fundamental Greek concern with lineage, i.e., the view that the most important forms of human association or koinônia are those established through descent or blood ties. In their collective or national mythology, for example, the Greeks thought themselves related as the descendants of Hellen, the firstborn son of the parents of humankind. The Dorians in turn traced their ancestry to Hellen's son Dorus, while the Aeolians and Ionians claimed his other two sons Aeolus and Ion; the four original Ionian tribes were descended from Ion's four sons, likewise the three Dorian tribes from the sons of Dorus; the Athenians traced their origin to Erectheus, the founder of their line, while the Spartans were descended from the offspring of Herakles. Even when the Greeks created new subgroups for administrative purposes, great care was taken to assign these categories an eponymous founder or ancestor and to base future recruitment on the principle of descent. Religion and lineage were thus intimately linked in ancient Greek society—as perhaps most clearly crystallized in the later Athenian practice of dokimasia, the annual examination of hundreds of incoming magistrates, which centered on whether the individual nominee honored both his familial and his communal ancestors, for it was participation in these two cults that established one's legitimacy as a citizen.29 As we shall see, the developed Polis itself was not a territorial institution (like the modern nation-state), but a personal association based upon an ideology of shared descent and cultic solidar-

From the shared experience of domestic and ancestor cults, let us turn to the specific religious views of the two major social strata, the warrior-nobility and the peasantry. Here again it is possible to employ Homer and Hesiod as complementary sources, for despite certain common elements, the nobleman's bard and the farmer-poet gave voice to two distinct religious mentalities, each rooted firmly in the social realities of class and status.

Aristotle undoubtedly had the Homeric deities in mind when he observed that men "imagine not only the forms of the gods, but also their ways of life to be like their own." Excepting their immortality and immense powers, the Olympian gods reflect in most essentials both the style of life and the normative ideals of the early warrior-aristocracy.

Thus Zeus, like Agamemnon, holds assemblies in which others can counsel, but he himself holds ultimate authority. As befits any of the great basilêes, the Olympians dwell in palatial abodes replete with servants, and they share the heroic delight in banquet and song. In order to wed the sex goddess Aphrodite, Hephaistos had to provide her father Zeus with rich marriage gifts (which in one memorable scene he wants returned after learning of her infidelity). The gods are also regularly portrayed in such mundane activities as riding in chariots, arming for battle, and sleeping in beds; in short, anthropomorphic characterization is extensive.³²

The motivations and ideals of the gods likewise conform to heroic standards. Notwithstanding that the Olympians "have greater aretê and timê than men," they are no less zealous in pursuing or defending these concerns.33 The reverence and honor that mortals are expected to show the gods is manifested through sacrificial offerings and by prayer-invocations that express gratitude or recognition of divine glory. Should a person neglect a sacrifice or fail to acknowledge a god's greatness at an appropriate moment (either willfully or by mistake), or should he become reckless in his thoughts and assign too much credit for his station and prowess to himself, the gods will react to this affront by punishing the transgressor.34 Alternatively, proper observance of divine time and having a "mind that is god-revering" is generally associated with various benefits, "gifts from the gods" as they are usually styled.35 These range from personal attributes like strength of limbs and sharpness of mind to worldly goods such as wealth, status, and the sensual delights of Aphrodite. There is, however, no strict correlation between proper religious observance and the acquisition of divine favor. This lack of fit is partly a consequence of the competitive struggle over limited goods, i.e., when two heroes "dear to the gods" clash, one must yield honor to the other. More important, however, is the notion that there exists an immanent and impersonal order in the cosmos, vague powers or a force behind all things that is ultimately responsible for the general disposition of "what is" and "shall be." In Homer this view is expressed by the word moira, a multivalent concept usually meaning one's 'portion' or 'part' in prosaic circumstances (as in a helping or portion of food), but conveying the notion of 'destiny' or 'fate' in more generalizable existential situations (as when a hero dies in battle).

The relationship between the gods and *moira* is somewhat ambiguous: in one famous scene Zeus contemplates saving his warrior-son Sarpedon from a *moira* that had decreed his death, while elsewhere we are told that not even the gods can save a man they love once the dread *moira* of death lays claim to him.³⁶ Despite Zeus' supremacy, which occasionally creates the impression that he is the ultimate power, the *moira*

motif is the predominant notion, poetically captured by such repeated scenes and images as Zeus holding in his hands the sacred "golden scales" that measure destinies, and the "weighty Spinners" who spin out the fates of mortals.³⁷ This belief in an immanent, impersonal "order" undoubtedly fostered the heroic fatalism that Homer presented with such artistic brilliance, but it is essential that we locate the social-psychological mechanisms involved—after all, a sense of pessimistic resignation is an equally consistent logical response. The answer, of course, is that "logic" is subject to sociological pressures, and in this particular case two considerations seem decisive. The first and most obvious point is that for ruling strata like the Dark Age aristoi, world views involving resignation or passivity would prove repugnant to their sense of status as well as incompatible with their basic social functions. The second point was convincingly argued by Weber, whose comparative research on the religious propensities of different social strata revealed that warrior-aristocrats incline towards a religiously neutral fatalism (excepting the special case of "warriors for the faith," as in early Islam and medieval Christianity):38

The life pattern of a warrior has very little affinity with the notion of a beneficent providence, or with the systematic ethical demands of a transcendental god. Concepts like sin, salvation, and religious humility have not only seemed remote from all ruling strata, particularly the warrior nobles, but have indeed appeared reprehensible to its sense of honor.

This orientation Weber explains succinctly:

It is an everyday psychological event for the warrior to face death and the irrationalities of human destiny. Indeed, the chances and adventures of mundane existence fill his life to such an extent that he does not require of his religion (and accepts only reluctantly) anything beyond protection against evil magic or ceremonial rites congruent with his sense of status.

The life-affirming disposition characteristic of ruling strata was thus coupled with a warrior's "existentialism," a combination that allowed a master poet to create heroes worthy of his magnificent verse, while introducing the "tragic vision" to Western civilization.³⁹ In Homer's world the everpresent shadow of death did not cast a withering pall on life, notwithstanding an afterlife that held no attractions. Hated death brought one to Hades, a gloomy place "where senseless dead men dwell, mere images (eidôla) of perished mortals." Even the lowliest station on earth was preferable, as the spirit of the dead Achilles made clear:⁴¹

Do not speak lightly to me about death, glorious Odysseus. I would rather be bound to the soil, to labor as a hired-man for another, by the side of a propertyless man who has no great livelihood, than to rule over all the dead men who have perished.

Life was therefore all, and one had to accept the sufferings as well as the blessings, since father Zeus gave a mixture even to the fortunate.42 It is not without good reason that most common epithets for Odysseus are "enduring-heart" and "much-enduring."43

Before proceeding to the religious views prevalent among the lower strata, a brief comment is necessary on the much disputed question of the Olympians' moral value. The finest scholars have grappled with this subject, but here too the intellectual's inherent need to discern or impose order has occasionally done violence to the evidence. 44 The simple truth is that the many verses demonstrating the moral bankruptcy of Homer's gods can be countered by other verses conveying the opposite. The Olympians do indeed appear capricious in many respects, and they are certainly all-too-human in their emotions (jealousy above all) to stand as reliable moral agents. Yet higher standards can also be found, as when we are told that "the blessed gods do not love savage deeds, but honor justice (dikê) and the right actions of men."45 In a similar vein it is Zeus who "most of all is angered by evil deeds," and who "lets pour the most furious waters when he is angered, bearing malice against men who by violence in the assembly judge crooked decrees, driving away justice and paying no heed to respect for the gods."46 What the evidence conveys, then, is that while religion and morality are not wholly separate in this period, the link between them is tenuous—structurally analogous, in fact, to the tension between the self-regarding ethos of the warrior aristoi and their relationship to the wider community. Anthropomorphism, the moira motif, and the historical emergence of many of the Olympians out of primeval nature gods or spirits prone to ethical neutrality were the key intellectual obstacles to the formation of a religiously grounded morality, while the particularism of nucleated communities militated against the clear articulation of universalistic standards. 47 As we shall see, attempts were subsequently made to elevate Homer's gods and to establish Zeus as a transcendental moral authority, but these efforts were limited and restricted in their social impact. It was not to the heavens that the majority of Greeks would turn for ethical guidance and binding norms, but to their own society, to the civic religion of the Polis itself.

That Homer presented only a partial picture of early Greek religious life has long been known: fertility rites, ecstatic practices, apotropaic measures, scapegoat magic, and other features common to primitive agrarian-based religions were apparently deemed unseemly for an audience of banqueting warrior-nobles. But such practices surely existed in Dark Age society, for later Greek rituals and cults still bear the stamp of their primitive origins, while Hesiod gives testimony to much that was hallowed by the time of his own generation.48

As comparative research has demonstrated, the religious mentality of peasant strata is fundamentally shaped by their dependence upon organic processes and natural events, a circumstance that accounts for their attachment to weather magic and animistic ritualism.49 It is no accident that the Greek religious calendar largely corresponds to the peasants' annual cycle of ploughing, sowing, reaping, and threshing, for each of these essential activities requires the "cooperation" of Nature, which is to be gained through sacrifice and ritual. Magical coercion of nature spirits and the supplication of those higher deities connected with agriculture thus constituted the primary religious concerns of the peasantry. Hesiod's Works and Days is basically a catalogue of this peasant ritualism, giving evidence for both the prevalence of superstition and the conventional peasant view that all of nature is somehow spirit. Among other things we learn that one must not urinate facing the sun, nor should one befoul rivers and springs; it is bad to beget children after a funeral but propitious following festivals for the gods; before crossing a river one should offer it prayer and cleanse one's hands; it is bad to wash your body with water a woman has bathed in; and never cut your fingernails at a festival! Hesiod also offers advice concerning lucky and unlucky days: the eleventh and twelfth days of the month are good for shearing sheep and picking fruits; you should geld boars and bulls on the eighth, but mules on the twelfth; bring home a bride on the fourth, but make sure the omens are favorable; the thirteenth is bad for sowing; and one should be careful on the fifth.

The religious atmosphere of the countryside was thus somewhat heavier than that found in the great halls of the Homeric nobles; the peasant's concern with spirits, ritualistic magic, and superstitious rules, while not obsessive, stood in sharp contrast to the boldness with which the heroes bestrode their world. Yet it must not be thought that there existed contradictions or heresies here, for in addition to lacking the systematization that comes with priestly bureaucracies and canonic texts, Greek religion was pragmatic in orientation and therefore accommodative to the wide range of religious activities that were consonant with the life situations of various social groups.50 It will accordingly come as no surprise that when we have occasion to discuss trials for impiety—the product of a later age and a rarity in Greek history—the offending personages will turn out to be a few "impractical" intellectuals, whose highly rationalized, abstract conceptions of the divine were thought to contradict and violate ancestral customs and belief.

Archaic Greece

The dating of epochs is a minor occupational hazard for historians, dusk and dawn being equally hard to distinguish in the twilight that envelops most times of transition. Establishing an acceptable chronology for Greece's Archaic Age is not similarly burdened, however, for the conventional dating provides termini both memorable and significant: the founding of the Olympic Games in 776 BC, and the Persian invasion of the Greek mainland in 490 BC. Whereas the closing event stands as one of the pivotal turning points in Mediterranean geopolitics, the inaugural dating is largely symbolic, the Games constituting the first major enterprise meritorious of the "pan-Hellenic" label. The athletic dimension, too, is suitably evocative, heralding as it does an age dominated by the "agonal man," Burckhardt's fitting epithet for the warrior-aristocrats who now reigned supreme following the decline of Heroic kingship, and whose emulous pursuit of fame and distinction was to impose its competitive form and spirit upon virtually every aspect of Hellenic culture.

Although "the glory that was Greece" is a phrase normally reserved for the Classical period, developments in the Archaic Age not only laid the foundation for many later achievements, they possess intrinsic value in their own right. Indeed, the structural and normative changes marking the three centuries of Archaic history were so formative and consequential that the term "revolutionary" is not inappropriate in characterizing the age.

3.I SOCIAL STRUCTURE: THE EMERGENCE OF POLIS SOCIETY

Social life in the Dark Age period, to the extent that it can be reconstructed from archaeological remains and the verses of poets, was centered on the individual oikos, a "prestate" order that featured a basic division between warrior aristoi and a subordinate "multitude" of free peasants and artisans. Collective institutions were rudimentary, though the legacy of tribal migrations and the imperatives of defense and security were sufficient to insure that vital communal interests found expression in various

legal-political, military, and religious arrangements. The community was not yet a Polis, the commune member not yet a citizen: but from these Dark Age beginnings, the city-state would take form.

3.I.i Social Change in the Early Archaic Age

Considerable recovery from the catastrophic fall of Mycenaean civilization had been achieved by the close of the Dark Age, and with growing stability, the material and social resources were available for accelerated expansion.1 The archaeological record indicates that the period was ushered in by an almost revolutionary burst of demographic growth and economic productivity: burial sites in some regions suggest as much as sixto seven-fold increases in population over the course of the eighth century, while rising material prosperity is everywhere confirmed by signs of increased metalworking, a widening distribution of fine and standard pottery, the reappearance of skilled craftwork, and an impressive flowering of stone construction.2 Precipitating and sustaining these developments was a vibrant agrarian base increasingly given over to arable farming, as iron-tipped ploughs and axes allowed for land reclamation and a more extensive cultivation of staple and diversified crops.3 Increases in population density and economic expansion in turn prompted organizational reforms within the community, the most important of which were encompassed within the framework of synoikismos, the act of political consociation, or 'settling together'. This process normally entailed a reorganization (or new creation) of administrative units that advanced Polis centralization and communal coordination by integrating and subordinating various village, tribal, and clan associations.

Synoikismos entailed equally important changes in the religious domain. We noted earlier that the basic organizational units within Greek society—family, clan, phratry, tribe, and the community as a whole—represented distinct religious associations, each with its own cultic practices. Household and clan concerns appear to have dominated the religious orientation of the Dark Age period, but signs of growing communalism are evident early in the eighth century. A dramatic increase in the dedication of votive offerings at sanctuaries is datable from this period, coincidental with a sharp decline in the practice of burial with arms and other sacral objects. A shift in religious sentiment thus appears to be under way, with the communal sanctuary rising to greater prominence, not at the expense of the domestic and personal, but as a more potent locus for transactions with the divine. The eighth century also marks the appearance of Greek temple architecture, a development likewise expressive of a growing civic-based religiosity. Initially constructed of timber and brick, and then of stone beginning in the seventh century, these temples functioned as the domicile of the community's patron deities—themselves anthropomorphized in cult images—and as such afforded majestic public assurance of concord between the citizenry and their spiritual allies.⁴

Greek cultic practice centered on the sacrifice, a ritual offering of incense, libations, first fruits, and the slaughter of consecrated animals.5 On the occasion of a major celebration, scores of animals (cattle, goats, sheep) were ceremoniously sacrificed to the gods, who received mephitic plumes of smoke from the fat and entrails that burned upon the altars while the citizenry feasted upon the choicer portions. Of all the rituals in Greek religious life, none had greater social import than this communal sharing of the sacrificial meal, symbolizing as it did not only a bond of union between the Polis and its patron gods, but also full confraternity within the civic community itself. The far-reaching significance of cultic commensality was first discerned by Max Weber, who observed that the Occidental "city" and its conception of "citizenship" were both dependent upon civic confraternization, a principle that presupposes the dissolution of exclusionary religious barriers. Weber noted that civic communalism in the Orient had been prevented or constrained by numerous magico-religious taboos, which served to promote ritual as well as social segregation between clans, tribes, castes, and other group associations. In contrast, cities in ancient Greece developed as true "communes," i.e., as associations of citizens based upon "religious and secular equality before the law, connubium, commensality, and solidarity against non-members." Wherever sacred taboos continued to impede civic confraternization—as in ancient China and India—cities could not provide the organizational bases for true citizenship and independent politics, functioning instead as centers for trade and as administrative command posts for patrimonial bureaucrats and other royal officials. The formation of a communal religious brotherhood was thus an essential prerequisite for the full development of Polis society, as it made possible the consolidation of disparate tribes, clans, and villages into a politically autonomous and solidary "civic guild"—what the Greeks themselves termed a koinônia.7

As city-states grew in size and complexity, the old Heroic form of kingship gradually gave way to collective aristocratic rule, the office of basileus being either abolished altogether or restricted to largely ceremonial functions. The hereditary aristoi who now assumed commanding power are identified in our sources by their patronymic titles: the Eupatridai, or 'well-sired', at Athens; the Aleuadai and Skopadai of Thessaly; the Bacchiadai of Korinth; the Penthilidai of Mytilene; the Basilidai of Ephesus, Chios, and Erythrae; the Neleidai of Miletus; the Hippobotai, or 'horse rearers', of Chalkis; and so on.8 Though detailed information about

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early aristocratic rule is meager, power was everywhere concentrated in the hands of narrow oligarchies, limited in many cases to alliances between the leading families.9 Of the chief organs of politeia, or 'government', identified by Aristotle-the deliberative, executive, and judicial—all three were dominated or controlled by aristocratic factions.10 Small councils comprised of the leading nobles functioned as the supreme governing body in most poleis, with administrative responsibilities devolving upon various offices that were routinely filled by designees of the council itself. Popular assemblies were called infrequently, and then only to learn of policies already determined. The position of the commons deteriorated in the judicial sphere as well, as powers of adjudication passed from kings-who at times pursued populist policies as a check against aristocratic encroachments upon royal authority—to those very aristocrats, who now controlled juridical procedures either through the council or through magisterial office. That oppressive "class justice" prevailed under this arrangement is confirmed not only by Hesiod's embittered railings against "crooked judgments" and "bribe-devouring" nobles, but by the fact that the codification of law became a primary objective of the dêmos in the political struggles that were to erupt throughout the period.

A concern more pressing and volatile than "justice" was the problem of land hunger, an inevitable by-product of the population surge of the eighth century and the ecological constraints posed by a largely mountainous terrain interspersed by precious few alluvial plains. The resulting shortfall in available arable—compounded by the parcellization of holdings that prevailed in the absence of primogeniture—threatened to sunder the linkage between landownership and citizen status, the very foundation of Polis society. Lacking the technological means—and cultural predilections-to achieve dramatic breakthroughs in productivity, the ancient world knew of only one effective response to the crisis of land hunger, and that was to appropriate additional territories, either through colonization abroad or through armed conquests closer to home.

Beginning around 750 BC and continuing for more than a century thereafter, the Greeks spread throughout the Mediterranean in search of lands for settlement and opportunities for trade.11 The initial waves followed a westward course, as numerous colonies were established in Sicily and southern Italy, while a lesser number lined coastal north Africa and eastern Spain. Migrations to the northeast began with the founding of settlements all along the Thracian-Macedonian coast, proceeding eventually up into the Black Sea region. Nearly all of these new communities were founded as independent, sovereign poleis, though ties of kinship, culture, and religious fellowship often served to preserve relations between colony and metropolis. By the time this massive outpouring came to a close, the number of Greek communities had more than doubled, greatly expanding the geopolitical, economic, and cultural horizons of the Hellenic world.

In addition to relieving population pressures, the colonization movement acted as a spur to economic expansion. With geographic dispersion, both the range and scale of trade grew considerably, giving rise over time to the formation of differentiated market structures. Western settlements exported grains and much-needed metals such as iron and copper; Libya furnished horses, wool, and medicinal plants; the resourcerich Black Sea region supplied flax, hemp, dried fish, high quality grains from the Ukraine, and slaves (a commodity increasingly in demand); while Thrace provided timber, hides, silver, and still more human chattel. In exchange, the Greek homeland supplied various products derived from the grape and the olive, the mainland's two principal trading commodities, as well as finished goods wrought from skilled artisans. Greek pottery and other craft products have been unearthed as far away as northern Europe and Scandinavia, while in southern Russia the burial mounds of Scythian chieftains are adorned with Greek luxury items, testimony to the brisk exchange for slaves and grain that developed towards the close of the period.12

The impact and nature of this trade expansion was once the subject of heated academic controversy, and even today certain issues evoke sharp debate.13 On the main points, however, enough information has been gathered to correct the basic misinterpretations of past scholarship, which not only exaggerated the role of trade in the ancient economy, but also tended to depict its development in anachronistic fashion. The following point is fundamental: trade and manufacture—no matter how vibrant and profitable in any particular phase—always played a secondary, largely supplemental role in comparison to agriculture. Attempts to present the economic history of the ancient world as if it prefigured, en miniature, that of the modern age are therefore seriously misleading, as is all talk of an "economic revolution" that purportedly entailed the rise of "a new capitalistic aristocracy" of merchants and financiers.

Luxury items, slaves, resources such as timber and metals, and select foodstuffs (notably wine, olive oil, and bread wheats from Greek Italy and the Black Sea region) were the standard articles of trade, and this was an inventory that neither revolutionized productive forces nor created new social classes. Luxury goods by definition do not allow for mass production, while products for everyday use were for the most part produced and consumed locally, thereby restricting manufacturing output. Metalworking activities followed basically the same localized pattern. With regard to

the trade in foodstuffs, this limited affair was itself bound up with the selfsufficient agrarian classes, from prosperous aristoi disposing of their harvested surpluses to marginal peasant-farmers who, in Hesiod's words, embarked upon occasional sea trade so as "to escape from debt and joyless hunger."14 As for the commerce in human beings, a regular traffic did not fully emerge until the late Archaic/early Classical period, and this was an operation that required few economic personnel in any event, since the "commodity" was typically produced by war.15 Even apart from a restricted trading inventory, mass markets and economies of scale were simply not possible in a world where the costs of overland transport were prohibitive, where the dangers of sea trade were great (pirates and bad weather), and where the consumption capacities and demands of peasant-based communities were low. We do hear of a few successful maritime "entrepreneurs" over the course of Archaic history, but the vast majority were petty traders, probably forced into a seafaring life by some misfortune that deprived them of their ancestral land. Note too that the absolute number of merchant "middlemen" was severely constrained by the fact that artisans and peasants typically sold or bartered their goods directly in the local agora.

Thus, while commercial trade and craft manufacture expanded considerably over the course of the Archaic period, this was not a development that entailed any massive structural transformation of the ancient economy, the foundations of which remained very much embedded in the soil. That said, however, one should not conclude that the intensification of production and exchange was without social effects, for by raising the level of material prosperity and by increasing the fluidity of wealth, the economic dynamism of the period was to contribute greatly to a series of ramifying upheavals throughout Polis society.

3.I.ii Hoplites and Tyrants in an Age of Transition

In a section of the *Grundrisse* that has failed to attract proper sociological interest, Karl Marx observed that the ancient mode of production and its urban civilization emerged out of the womb of warrior communes. Singularly incisive was Marx's recognition that a specific "dynamic" had been imparted to the ancient city-state by reason of this formative connection between militarism and social organization:

The difficulties which the commune encounters can arise only from other communes, which have either previously occupied the land and soil, or which disturb the commune in its own occupation. War is therefore the great comprehensive task, the great communal labor which is required either to occupy the objective conditions for existence, or to protect and perpetuate that occupation. Hence the commune consisting of families is initially organized in a

warlike way—as a system of war and army, and this is one of the conditions of its being there as proprietor. The concentration of residences in the town is the basis of this bellicose organization . . . The survival of the commune is the reproduction of all of its members as self-sustaining peasants, whose surplus time belongs precisely to the commune, the work of war, etc.

Land, citizenship, and intercommunal warfare were thus bound together in a mutually reinforcing nexus. To create and sustain the agrarian foundations of production, the civic commune must prove capable in war, for an inability to expand or defend one's territories will bring on the nemesis of land hunger, and therewith an internal rupturing of the bonds of community. Though not generally noted for his sociological appreciation of military factors, Marx has here provided an indispensable key for the analysis of social change in Greek and Roman antiquity, particularly relevant for the transition period now under review.

The massive colonization effort of the Archaic Age and the economic stimulus it provided proved generally inadequate in the face of continued population growth and the scarcity of good arable. The option of lateral expansion accordingly presented itself with mounting urgency, and the city-states of Greece responded by turning upon each other in acts of predatory aggression.2 A veritable epidemic of border wars suddenly erupts in our historical sources, beginning in the second half of the eighth century with the famous clash between Chalkis and Eretria for possession of the Lelantine plain. That war, which also centered on aggressive competition between the two city-states in the establishment of overseas colonies, triggered a number of secondary confrontations between rival powers allied to one side or the other. Samos squared off against Miletus, Erythrae challenged Chios; even distant colonial settlements found themselves caught up in the spiraling violence. Sparta's appropriation of the rich soil of neighboring Messene soon followed, as did a series of victories by Argos that secured control over the fertile Argolid. The opening of hostilities between Korinth and Megara also dates from this period, as the two communities contested by the spear their contiguous territories as well as rival ambitions in colonization and trade.

Interpolis warfare intensified markedly over the course of the seventh century, embroiling virtually the whole of Hellas in a cycle of violence that set neighbor against neighbor in competition for the life-sustaining soil. Archaeology adds empirical depth to surviving literary accounts of heightened territorial conflict, for owing to the Greek custom of offering dedications at the major pan-Hellenic sanctuaries following successful military ventures, material evidence on the subject of interpolis war abounds. Although precise details and statistics cannot be derived

from the surviving assortment of martial inscriptions and sacral offerings, the sheer quantity and explosively rising incidence of these dedications tendered from every region, from major city-states on down to insignificant hamlets—discloses unambiguously the prevalence of warfare in this period.3 The sanguinary foundations of another form of religious piety were likewise given material expression, as war spoils constituted a primary source of revenue for the many temples and statues that graced the hallowed grounds of pan-Hellenic shrines and sanctuaries. Sacred Delphi in particular became, in Burckhardt's striking formulation, "the monumental museum of Greek hatred for Greeks, of mutually inflicted suffering immortalized in the loftiest works of art." Militarily-funded support for religion and culture was to find an even more vigorous local expression, as each Polis customarily dedicated a substantial portion of the proceeds from war booty to various forms of civic adornment and self-glorification, honoring the patron deities of the community with monumental temples, statuary, porticoes and colonnades, as well as through the maintenance of festivals and cults.

As conflict over border territories intensified, adaptations in the Greek mode of warfare became increasingly necessary.5 Although specific details remain elusive, the entire process was undoubtedly rooted in a major shift in military objectives, away from the raiding and plundering ventures of the Dark Age freebooters to the actual appropriation and possession of the soil by established city-states. For territorial expansion or security, a much greater mobilization and coordination of armed force was obviously required, and therefore a significant upgrading in the military capacity of the nonaristocratic majority. This epochal transition did not escape the keen sociological attention of Aristotle, who relates the essential developmental sequence in Book IV of his Politics, a work richly informed by the extensive historical research that had been carried out within the Lyceum under his direction. Aristotle observes that following the phase of Homeric-style kingship, the earliest constitutions were narrowly oligarchical, dominated by hereditary warrior-nobles whose military superiority was a function of their role as hippeis, or 'horsemen'. In the stirrupless days of antiquity, the effectiveness of cavalry did not typically feature the shock tactics of a coordinated charge, but use of the horse as a means of transport and for harrying purposes.6 The latter tactic was particularly effective during this early period, notes Aristotle, "since heavily-armed infantry are useless without orderly formation." He then adds that as the city-states grew in size and as infantry forces became stronger, greater numbers of citizens began to acquire full rights in the constitution, thereby creating more balanced or democratic polities. Aristotle neglects to specify just how and why the infantry became stronger, but it seems manifest that the territorial objectives of city-states with burgeoning populations exerted the decisive pressures, occasioning a military reform that lessened the martial significance of mounted aristocrats and reassigned strategic and tactical primacy to masses of heavily armed infantry capable of securing possession of the vital croplands.

The agrarian crisis that was sparked by the rapid population growth at the start of the Archaic period is sufficient to account for the marked intensification of interpolis warfare; what still needs to be explained is the consequent ascendancy of the dêmos on the field of battle. Aristotle's military interpretation of political change directs us to two factors in the rising importance of the infantry: increasing numbers and the adoption of formation tactics. The first of these developments presupposes a wider social distribution of heavy armor, i.e., members of the dêmos must find the acquisition of armament within their means. As the cost of a warrior's panoply was rather expensive—the defensive armor of cuirass, helmet, greaves, and shield being made of costly bronze and requiring days of labor by highly skilled craftsmen—any extension in the availability of such arms must be associated with the aforementioned rise in economic prosperity. Owing to the practice of military self-equipment (a factor stressed by Max Weber), it followed that service as a heavily armed warrior or "hoplite" was effectively restricted to the more prosperous elements of the community. A "democratic" alteration in the compositional mix of the warrior group was thus dependent upon a widening diffusion of wealth, which enabled well-to-do members of the dêmos to play a role hitherto reserved for the aristoi, i.e., to serve as the dominant force in battle. Formerly relegated to the low status positions of lightly armed skirmishers and slingers, a revolutionary conjuncture of changing military demands and economic expansion brought certain commoners—mostly yeoman farmers, but also a few wealthy merchants and craftsmen—into a position of military parity with their aristocratic rulers. The old Odyssean taunt that the dêmos is "of no account in battle" would ring increasingly hollow as this military transformation advanced; and in a society where political power was largely a function of military performance, the progressive dissolution of aristocratic domination was all but assured.

Before addressing the social consequences of the hoplite reform, we must first determine when the hoplite actually emerged and, second, when organized formations found tactical expression. Archaeological evidence suggests that various elements of the hoplite panoply were introduced between 750–700 BC, beginning with the bronze cuirass. The closed-face helmet with its T-shaped aperture for eyes and mouth is dated to approximately 700 BC, as is the wooden, bronze-covered hoplon shield, fastened by a strap for the left forearm and with a handgrip near the rim. Both

pieces of equipment are likely to have promoted close-formation tactics, since the new helmet greatly reduced lateral vision and auditory capacity (serious liabilities in open-field combat), while the concave-shaped hoplon shield was both heavier and held closer to the body (an enhancement in defensive strength, but at the cost of agility). With regard to serried formation-fighting, our first unambiguous pictorial representation of the phalanx is from a masterfully painted Korinthian vase dated to 650 BC, but the existence of several earlier, less refined versions suggests that artists had been attempting for some time to convey the logic of hoplite warfare (a rather demanding artistic task). The first few decades of the seventh century would thus appear to mark the advent of the hoplite phalanx, a style of combat decidedly unsuited to the largely hilly and mountainous topography of the Greek peninsula (a natural haven for lightly armed guerillas) but singularly effective in contesting the level plains that were in such short supply.

The phalanx itself was an organized formation of heavily-armed troops, as wide as necessary to avoid being outflanked and having a depth normally ranging from four to eight ranks (hence the tactical urgency in fielding an increased number of warriors). The principal offensive weapon was a bronze or iron-tipped thrusting-spear six to eight feet long (replacing the earlier throwing-spears), secondarily armed with a spike butt should the shaft or lance head shatter in the course of combat, and ideal for impaling fallen opponents under tread; a short iron sword was held in reserve. As opposing armies clashed, "pressing shield against shield, crest upon crest, helmet upon helmet," maintenance of formation discipline was imperative, since each soldier received partial rightward protection from his neighbor's shield. As frontline troops fell, succeeding ranks filled in amid the continuous pressing and shoving known as the othismos. Victory was usually achieved by breaking the opposing line, which typically precipitated mass flight. Casualties were accordingly rather modest—reported figures are in the 15% range—since victorious hoplites could not pursue too aggressively without disrupting their own formation, and hence exposure to the swift counterstrokes that could be delivered by cavalry and lightly armed troops. Massive slaughter usually occurred only with the capture of a city, an uncommon event throughout the Archaic period owing to the undeveloped state of siege technology.

What, then, were the institutional implications of this momentous military revolution? The evidence is rather fragmentary for the actual transition period, but a measure of clarity can be gained if we begin with the long-term consequences: over the course of the Archaic era, there can be little doubt that the rise to military prominence by well-to-do members of the *dêmos* contributed decisively to the decline of aristo-

cratic rule. The exclusive power of the *aristoi* had been based upon superior wealth and military preeminence, and now social changes were undercutting their dominance in both areas as an economically prospering segment of the *dêmos* became the military bulwark of the Polis. In due course these advances were registered in the political arena, as the men of hoplite status—normally anywhere from a fifth to a third of the adult male poptional arrangements.

The picture is much less clear, however, regarding the immediate aftermath of the hoplite reform. The chief complicating factor is that another major development—the rise of tyrants—began in roughly the same period, and historians have disagreed over the precise relationship between the military ascendancy of the hoplite-dêmos and the usurpation of political power by individual autocrats. Within the period between 670 and 500 BC, most of the major poleis of mainland Greece and Ionia appear to have experienced a phase of tyrannical rule.10 And as this "age of tyrants" follows closely the introduction of hoplite tactics, it seems reasonable to assume that the military reform was somehow instrumental in bringing the tyrannoi to power, especially since their acts of usurpation typically entailed the use of force. There is, however, no direct evidence that the hoplites themselves placed any tyrant in power, and given the unevenness of development in the Greek world (some poleis experienced tyranny early in the mid-seventh century, while elsewhere tyrants arose only in the late sixth), generalization is somewhat hazardous.

Any sociology of the ancient tyrannis must begin with the conditions that made possible and abetted its rise. Of the many problems confronting Polis society in the seventh century, none was more pressing than land hunger. Though conquest and colonization intermittently relieved some of the strains and pressures, a majority of city-states continued to suffer from agrarian distress. While economic expansion during the early Archaic period had generated a rising level of material prosperity, the benefits of growth were not shared equally: as is common in societies where commercial forces begin penetrating the countryside, the gulf between rich and poor tended to widen, not narrow, as natural limits to accumulation were removed. With their superior resources and social position, the powerful and privileged were able to exploit these new opportunities and intensify their exactions, using force, fraud, and foreclosure to drive the peasant masses into various forms of debt bondage and servile dependency. Though of citizen status, the poor could expect no relief or redress from a legal-political order subservient to the command of hereditary nobles: one need only turn to the impassioned strictures of Hesiod against aristocratic hubris and "crooked judgments" to

learn the plight of a peasantry whose legal fate rested with those most likely to oppress them.

Discontent and disorder were not confined to the lower orders of Polis society. The traditional rivalry between noble clans and families for individual preeminence now assumed a more consequential urgency, as economic and military developments combined to progressively erode the aristocracy's time-honored position of exclusive dominance. Formerly free to contend amongst themselves and impose their settlements on a compliant "multitude," aristocratic clans and factions were increasingly compelled to address the new challenges and options posed by a prospering and fully armed yeomanry. The old order was thus riven along both its horizontal and vertical axes: intensifying competition and divisions within the ranks of the hereditary elites, threatened by a palpable slippage of power; a middle stratum whose rising economic and military strength no longer corresponds with its inferior status ranking and exclusion from politics; and widespread disaffection among the peasant masses, increasingly radicalized by threats of emiseration and displacement from their holdings. The reader will recognize in these conditions the standard elements that form the explosive compound of social revolution.

Of the scores of tyrannies that erupted on the political landscape of Archaic Greece, detailed information is limited to a few major cases. One of the earliest seizures of autocratic power took place in Korinth, where the exclusive Bacchiadai had long reigned supreme, "wealthy and numerous and nobly born." An aristocrat on the fringe of the clan (his father was non-Bacchiad) staged a successful coup around 655 BC, forcing into exile those Bacchiads who survived the insurrectionary slaughter. The social bases of Kypselos' tyranny are nowhere clearly specified in the sources, but other marginal or "excluded" aristocrats were undoubtedly involved, resentful of Bacchiad hubris and their monopoly on power. It is also all but certain that his main support came from the dêmos—the hoplites in particular—for to shatter the entrenched despotism of the Bacchiadai, an oligarchy of some two hundred families, obviously required the mobilization of considerable armed force. A late source holds that Kypselos had held the military office of polemarchos prior to his tyranny and had earned populist credit for his mild treatment of debtors. Aristotle states categorically that Kypselos was a dêmagôgos, 'a leader of the people', and adds the telling point that during his thirty-year reign, the Korinthian tyrant routinely ventured in public without bodyguard, a practice suggesting considerable popularity.11 Indeed, the new regime proved so stable that Kypselos' son, Periandros, continued the tyranny for another four decades—though with the increasing despotism and terror that commonly marked, and eventually doomed, the second and third genera-

The sources are largely silent regarding the advent of tyranny at Megara, c. 640 BC, but the few scraps of information that have been preserved are particularly revealing. In the context of his historical-comparative analysis of Greek tyranny, Aristotle mentions the Megarian autocrat, Theagenes, as exemplifying the type of tyrant who gains the confidence of the dêmos by stirring up enmity against the rich. The specific act that is said to have brought Theagenes to power was his "slaughtering of the flocks of the well-to-do," an incident presumably related to disputes over grazing rights and land ownership, pitting the peasantry against an aristocracy bent on violating customary practices in the interests of the new commercialism.12 As Megara was a major exporter of woolen textiles, we might reasonably surmise that what Sir Thomas More observed of the sixteenth century English countryside—with common lands enclosed and peasants driven from their tenancies—applied here as well, mutatis mutandis: "your shepe that were wont to be so meke and tame, and so smal eaters, now, as I heare saye, be become so great devourers and so wylde that they eate up, and swallow downe, the very men themselfes."13

Popular backing also seems likely in the case of Greece's longestlived tyranny, that in Sikyon of the Orthagorid family, whose reign spanned nearly a full century (c. 650-550 BC). Aristotle attributes this remarkable longevity to a moderate rule that "looked after the people's concerns."14 Orthagoras, founder of the tyranny, is said to have initially distinguished himself in war, garnering support for his seizure of power first from the frontier guards and then the people as a whole. Other issues played a role in the perpetuation of autocratic rule, as Kleisthenes, the grandson of Orthagoras, instituted a policy of elevating the Sikyonians of non-Dorian descent over the Dorians. The reasons for this tribal or "racial" policy are as obscure as it is bizarre (in one of his moves the tyrant renamed the Dorian tribes with the insulting titles of Pigmen, Assmen, and Swinemen, while renaming the non-Dorian tribe "Rulers of the People"); but as Sikyon was then experiencing military difficulties with the Dorian states of Argos and Korinth, it is just possible that the new tyrant needed "to whip up sectional feeling" against an internal scapegoat that may have been viewed as a potential "fifth column."15

The social turmoil that erupted repeatedly in Mytilene on the isle of Lesbos over the course of some six decades (c. 640–580 BC) is exceptionally well documented, for in addition to later historical summaries, an eyewitness account by one of the participants has been preserved in a series of political poems that circulated as part of the ideological campaigning of the day. Protracted civil strife formed the immediate context, as an

increasingly divided aristocracy could no longer maintain its domination over a rising and disaffected dêmos. The original rulers were the Penthilidai, an aristocratic clan that claimed descent from Agamemnon's grandson, alleged founder of the city. What history records of their rule is sufficient to explain their unpopularity: they had a penchant for clubbing people with staves and cudgels, a custom that eventually brought retribution in the form of a tyrannical coup and annihilation of the clan. Order now broke down completely as one tyranny followed another, all short-lived and variably linked to unstable factions among the feuding aristocratic clans. The poet Alkaios belonged to one such circle, and from his verse we obtain a personalized account of what it was like to be an aristocrat in a world where time-honored traditions and assumptions fell daily to the relentless advance of social change. Among Alkaios' hetairoi, or 'companions', in the political intrigues was a man named Pittakos, a prominent military figure. This cabal had sworn an oath to overthrow the reigning tyrant, but when Pittakos abruptly changed sides, it was Alkaios and his co-conspirators who were driven into exile. Cursing his fate and idealizing in his poetry the standards of an earlier generation, Alkaios pours bitter abuse on his erstwhile hetairos, deriding him for his potbelly and flatfeet, an unheroic physical appearance that gave license for Alkaios' other slander that Pittakos was "base-born." 16 Most galling of all was the fact that the dêmos actually elected Pittakos to the office of aisymnêtês (defined by Aristotle as an "elective tyranny"), empowering him with a ten-year term to restore civic order and repell the exiles.¹⁷ Though Alkaios speciously claims that it was the heartfelt intention of his own faction to "rescue the dêmos from distress," the people obviously judged Pittakos a more trustworthy figure than a band of conspiratorial aristocrats nostalgic for the past.18

This brief review of several case histories is sufficient to explain the summary judgment of Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, and other ancient observers, that in the overthrow of hereditary aristocratic rule, the Archaic tyrannis represented a popularly based autocracy or dictatorship, with the tyrant typically launching his career as the champion of an aggrieved dêmos. The most reliable generalization is that provided by Aristotle, whose assessment is based on information that had been diligently gathered by Peripatetic research on the constitutional histories of no less than 158 different city-states: ²⁰

The tyrant is set up from among the *dêmos* and the multitude against the notables, so that the people may suffer no injustice from them. This is clear from the facts of history. For the greatest number of tyrants have arisen from being leaders of the people (*dêmagôgoi*), so to speak, having won confidence by slandering the notables.

Unique considerations and contingencies were clearly important in individual cases, most notably military defeats and intertribal strains;21 but it was a common underlying pattern of structural change that made tyranny a widespread social phenomenon. A succession of ramifying demographic, economic, and military developments all combined to undermine the stability of the old order, making possible the seizure of power by capable and ambitious men who mobilized the disparate forces of opposition. The groups instrumental in any particular tyrant's rise varied according to local circumstances, but in most instances the role of the hoplites must have been decisive, for a ruling aristocracy that could command the loyalty of its hoplite-dêmos was unlikely to be overthrown, whereas disaffected hoplites could either actively support a would-be tyrant or passively refuse to defend the nobles in power. Several scholars have raised problems of motivation here, noting that the men of hoplite status were unlikely to be amongst those suffering exploitation and oppression, and hence averse to any radical undertakings. From that fact alone, however, it would be erroneous to conclude that there were no political or "class-conscious" hoplites in this early period.22 After all, the pangs of status dissonance have "stirred" other groups in history, and we can well imagine that they were operative here, inclining at least some of these prosperous and militarily significant "commoners" to support a man who at minimum promised to check the more insufferable aspects of aristocratic rule. No other explanation is consistent with the fact that a wave of tyrannies claiming popular support swept aside many hereditary regimes, while elsewhere the aristoi were compelled to grant a significant measure of power to the foremost elements of the dêmos, more often than not under the duress of mounting social antagonisms.

That the interests of the tyrants initially tended to coincide with those of the dêmos is unambiguously confirmed by the social policies commonly sponsored by the new autocracies. The seizure of power itself was routinely accompanied by an obligatory "settling of accounts," i.e., a public distribution of properties confiscated from the exiled and the exterminated. A series of legislative measures designed to limit aristocratic power and privilege usually followed, ranging from sumptuary decrees that placed curbs on luxury and ostentation to bans on the formation of private clubs or associations. Most tyrants strove to secure a popular following through the financing of major building programs and public works, a great stimulus to the craft and commercial sectors and a conspicuous advertisement of a tyrant's power and devotion to the city. As a further move to strengthen the sense of religious confraternity and civic consciousness within the Polis, a number of tyrants are known to have instituted new state cults or enlarged existing ones, a policy that had the dual benefit of

publicizing the autocrat's "piety" while curtailing traditional aristocratic maintenance and supervision of cultic practice. Agrarian relief also occupied a prominent place in the tyrant's social agenda, with various trade and fiscal measures implemented for purposes of providing safeguards and material assistance to a peasantry still struggling to adjust to the risks and opportunities of monetization and an expanding market.

In the annals of history, it is not uncommon to find times of transition associated with the momentary ascendancy of autocratic rule. The tyrant, the dictator, the "great man," such figures invariably rise to power under conditions of social upheaval, born aloft by the discontents and ambitions of various factions that lack the strength, conviction, or experience to rule alone, but willing to bind themselves to a leader whose program of restoration or reform holds the promise of addressing their immediate needs and interests. The ancient Greek tyrannis is no exception to this familiar pattern, as it coincides with the initial rupturing of hereditary aristocratic power and the first stirrings of power from the hoplite-dêmos. Those in decline could no longer suppress the clamor for reform, but the ascendant lacked the means and will to impose it directly. Tactical space was thus created for renegade aristocrats to rally popular support and assail the undermanned and divided bastions of hereditary privilege. The instabilities of the situation are well brought out by the fact that the internal balance of forces was such that many of the tyrants turned to supplemental outside assistance in their bids for power, procuring financial contributions as well as private mercenary gangs from other established tyrants and dynasts. Though negligible in extent and numbers, such external support was often all that was needed to tip the scales in a would-be tyrant's favor.

Through its forced suspension of aristocratic patterns of domination and its corresponding claim to popular legitimacy, tyrannical rule acted as a solvent of the old order and as an cradling carriage of the new. It was, as M. I. Finley has observed, "the decisive feature in the transitional stage from the personal, familial rule of the nobility to the classical city-state." When the sons or grandsons of the first tyrants were overthrown, the gestation of a new society was largely complete. Save for a reactionary remnant, aristocrats no longer assumed or proclaimed an inherent right to rule, but spoke rather of an obligation to lead. As for the men of hoplite status, steeled by their growing prowess in war, they now claimed a right not simply to choose, but to hold to account those who requested their loyalty and support. By the close of the Archaic period, most of the original tyrannies had given way to republican constitutions, oligarchically composed in accordance with property qualifications that

enfranchised the hoplite-dêmos, but replete with developed legal and political institutions that made citizenship a meaningful and functional reality. As we shall presently see, it was this protracted triumph of the citizen over the noble clan that made possible the progressive realization of the Polis ideal.

Before turning to the major cultural trends of the Archaic period, it is necessary to take note of the early histories of the two states most responsible for shaping the collective destiny and legacy of Greece: Sparta and Athens. For although these societies differed significantly in many fundamental respects—antipodal as darkness to light in the judgment of history—each in its own way represented a fulfillment of certain principles inherent in the Polis ideal. From that tragic paradox it followed that their rivalry would not be confined to the contest of arms alone, but would entail a struggle for hearts and minds as well.

3.I.iii Sparta's Perfection of the Warriors' Guild

The historical origins of the world's most famous militaristic society are shrouded by propagandistic legend and myth, relieved but occasionally by the culturally expressive but discursively mute testimony of archaeology. An act of trespass opens the saga and helps explain the legitimizing intent of early Spartan legend. Towards the close of the eleventh century, the fertile territory of the Eurotas river valley was infiltrated and settled by Dorian pastoralists from the north, i.e., the "returning sons of Herakles" as related in Sparta's foundation ideology. As this region of Lakonia (also known as Lakedaimon) was tenuously inhabited by surviving Mycenaean peoples, the Spartans found it necessary to reclaim their "birthright" by exercising the normal prerogatives of conquerors, gradually extending and consolidating their sway through acts of extermination, enslavement, and expulsion.

For the next two centuries, virtually nothing is known of Sparta apart from the progressive shift from pastoralism to settled agriculture that is intimated by the archaeological record. By the mid-eighth century, the pressures of land hunger—the bane of many Archaic Age communities—arose in Sparta, there to provoke the usual responses. We hear of several local military ventures, followed by a major campaign around 735 BC to annex the territory of Messenia, Sparta's neighbor to the west. This war was to be waged intermittently for nearly two decades—apparently under prehoplite tactics—before the Spartans finally succeeded in appropriating the northern half of the rich Messenian plain. Our chief source for this history is the Spartan war poet Tyrtaios (c. 650 BC), who records the glory of his ancestors in the following elegy:

To our king, Theopompos, dear to the gods, through whom we took broadspaced Messene: Messene, good to plough and good to plant. Over it they fought for nineteen years, unceasingly, with hearts of enduring spirit, the spearmen fathers of our fathers. And in the twentieth year, the foe deserted their rich fields and fled from the great mountains of Ithome.

The conquered territory was parceled amongst the victors, and with the land generally too distant to be farmed directly from Sparta itself, captured Messenians were enserfed on their former properties as "helots" (a similar fate having befallen Sparta's earlier victims in Lakonia). Tyrtaios again provides a vivid portrayal:3

Like asses worn down with great burdens, bringing to their masters under harsh necessity half of all the crop that the field will bear.

This immense acquisition of territory and concomitant extension of the Helotage system greatly increased Spartan prosperity, at least within aristocratic ranks. The archaeological record attests to a considerable infusion of riches at the start of the seventh century, as imported eastern ivory, Egyptian scarabs, northern amber, skilled bronze-works, gold and silver, and fine ceramics all now make their appearance. From the spoils of conquest the Spartans were able to finance construction of a stone temple for their sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, c. 700 BC. Cultural dynamism is likewise suggested by the presence of the famed musician Terpander of Lesbos (c. 675 BC), a recipient of Spartan patronage, duly recompensed by lyric praise for his gracious hosts: "There flowers the martial spirit of young men, there the Muse is sweet-singing; there farreaching Justice is the ally of noble deeds." Sparta's poetic tradition was subsequently enriched around midcentury by the native verses of Tyrtaios himself and by the high art of his older contemporary Alkman. Alkman's choral lyrics in particular bespeak a highly refined aristocracy, one so cultured and "un-Spartan" as to find in "beautiful lyre-playing" a delightful counterbalance to the blood-spilling "work of iron."s

While the aristocracy battened on the spoils of martial success, the condition of the community as a whole was unstable. Herodotus and Thucydides both record the tradition that Sparta's early history was marked by "bad governance" and "factional disunity," the first sign of which concerns Sparta's lone venture in colonization.6 Legend again obscures the history, but it appears that a conspiratorial group of disprivileged Spartans-suffering from some stigma related to the recent war with Messene-were forced to emigrate to Italy in 706 BC. Against this backdrop of domestic turmoil a series of military setbacks followed, as Sparta suffered major defeats to Argos in 669 BC and then to the Arkadians about a decade later. Deficiencies on the battlefield coupled with social discontent suggests that significant numbers of Spartans felt little or no commitment to the regime as presently run by their aristocratic overlords.

As this period of Greek history marks the transition to hoplite warfare and the attendant rupturing of hereditary aristocratic domination. constitutional reforms and concessions to popular grievances were no doubt urgently needed in a demoralized Sparta. In a document known as the Great Rhetra, a reorganization of tribal and village arrangements is called for, along with explicit recognition that the right to approve or reject proposals initiated by the governing gerousia, or 'council', lies ultimately with the dêmos.7 Although the council, composed of Sparta's two hereditary kings and twenty-eight aristocratic elders, is clearly the dominant power, the constitutional position of the dêmos has been greatly enhanced—so much so that a "rider" was soon appended to the Rhetra, legislating that "if the dêmos speaks crooked," the council has a right of veto. What that modification indicates is that hardline segments of the aristocracy were as yet unconvinced of the need to grant the dêmos a meaningful share in sovereignty.

A more realistic attitude was to be occasioned by the crisis of the Messenian revolt, variously dated between 650 and 620 BC. This massive uprising, commonly known as the Second Messenian War, threatened to destroy the material bases of Spartan power—the territorial conquests and the servile labor of the vanquished—and as such it naturally exacerbated tensions within the community. Aristotle records that during the war. Spartans "in distress" pressed for a redivision of the land, while Tyrtaios' exhortations reveal that the army was in dire straits on the battlefield as well:8

Now, since you are of the race of Herakles the invincible, Have Courage! Zeus has not yet turned away from us. Do not fear the multitude of their men, nor flee in dread.

Each man should bear his shield straight at the foremost ranks, setting hatred in his soul . . .

You know how destructive are the works of Ares, who causes many tears; You have learned well how these things go in painful war,

for you have been with those who ran and with those who pursued.

Oh young men, you have had your fill of both.

The struggle against the Messenians and the rebellious Helots lasted for many years (one estimate is as high as thirty), but the Spartans eventually prevailed and went on to complete their conquest of Messenian territory—the tide having been turned, so it was said, by Tyrtaios' inspirational verses. Despite the victory, Sparta faced unresolved internal problems—the polis was, in other words, still "ripe for tyranny," the common

remedy to the ills of the period. Virtually alone among the major citystates, the Spartans managed to avoid that fate, but the desperate measures adopted would entail nothing less than a total militarization of their society.

Having reestablished and extended their dominion over the Messenians, the Spartans embarked on a radical course of domestic renewal. Key political and economic institutions were transformed, as was cultural life in general. The net effect of these developments was that a community that had been notorious as the "worst ordered" in Hellas presently became synonomous with stability and 'good order', eunomia. Ancient commentators, generally more interested in personalities than in social forces, considered this revolution to be the work of one man, the legendary lawgiver Lycurgus, whom they variably placed in the ninth or eighth century. The untenability of this tradition is disclosed by the fact that neither Tyrtaios nor the Great Rhetra make mention of the hero, who was in all likelihood "resurrected" from the dim past and canonized for purposes of legitimizing the new order. The "Lycurgan system," in short, was ideological shorthand for a protracted, uneven process of reform, the most essential developments no doubt occurring within the half century that followed the Second Messenian War. 10 Since a reliable chronology cannot be provided for this process, it is best to proceed to consideration of the end product: the social structure of the mature Spartan polity.

Owing to military successes, Sparta's position was unique with regard to both land and labor power, the twin foundations of any premodern agrarian mode of production. Following the conquest of fertile Messene, Sparta encompassed some thirty-three thousand square miles of territory, an expanse more than thrice the size of each the next two largest regions, Attika and Boeotia. Resources to alleviate the problem of land hunger were thus available, and tradition holds that "Lycurgus" himself had enjoined an equal division for the citizenry. Whether the land was so divided cannot be confirmed, but it does appear that each Spartan citizen received an allotment sufficient for family maintenance and reproduction. The size of these klêroi, or 'lots', is nowhere recorded, but on the basis of land surveys, population estimates, and calculations of productivity yields, a klêros of some fifty acres (twenty hectares) passes as a reasonable inference (with estimates ranging from twenty to eighty-eight acres).11 Holdings on that scale required a corresponding complement of labor, and here the Spartan practice of enserfing the vanquished on their dispossessed lands provided an unmatched supply. The subjugated peoples of Lakonia and Messene, in their capacity as primary producers, freed their Spartan overlords from all necessity of self-sustenance, thereby underwriting their release for full military professionalization. The several Helot families assigned to each *klêros* were required to turn over to their masters a certain portion of the annual produce (Tyrtaios' "half of all the crop"?), while the remainder allowed for the maintenance and biological reproduction of the servile labor force. Not privately owned, Helots were *douloi tou koinou*, "slaves common to all citizens," and could be manumitted only by state decree. 12

Although the Helotage system emancipated the Spartans from the physical burdens associated with agricultural toil, it did not usher in a life of calm leisure. Constant vigil and military preparedness were henceforth necessary in order to hold down a servile population longing for freedom and the opportunity "to eat Spartans raw,"13 A coercive apparatus was duly built up, centered on the notorious Krypteia, an ancient initiation rite that was reinstitutionalized so as to enable bands of Spartan youth to ambush and kill as many Helots as they could during select periods. Related to this terroristic "culling" operation was an annual declaration of war against the Helots made by Sparta's magistrates, a practice that allowed Spartan masters to murder their slaves without fear of religious pollution.14 Victimized by organized and sanctioned murder, the Helots were also subjected to public degradation rituals that included forced intoxication and acts of self-deprecating song and dance. Though terror, force, and psychological maining were the main modalities of control, the Spartans did not neglect more positive methods, such as the selective granting of manumission for acts of bravery and loyalty. As companies of Helots often served as lightly armed troops in Spartan campaigns, this was not a negligible incentive. Manumitted Helots formed a class of freedmen known as the neodamôdeis ('newly enfranchised'), but there is little information about their role in Spartan society, apart from the fact that many were settled on frontier regions so as to provide a buffer against Sparta's hostile neighbors. 15 An imposing complex of social control was thus erected over the teeming servile population, but the security provided was precarious; the Helots rose repeatedly in revolt, and as this was an ever-present possibility, the Spartans were compelled to subject themselves to a regimen of surveillance and terror that effectively shackled them to those they held down in bondage.

Located between the masters and the slaves, both socially and geographically, stood another important group in the Spartan system, the *perioikoi*, or 'dwellers about', who lived in the small communities that dotted the regions of Lakonia and Messene. These people were in a condition of semidependence to the Spartans, owing them allegiance in foreign policy—there were separate hoplite divisions of *perioikoi* in the Spartan army—and in some cases paying land-rents to Sparta's kings. They appear to have exercised civic autonomy within their own communities,

which numbered a hundred or so, but the sources fail us on details. Much of the trade and craft activity essential to Spartan society, such as arms manufacture and metals procurement, was in the hands of *perioikoi*, "Lycurgus" having proscribed direct Spartan participation in all such "servile occupations." The location of many *perioikoi* communities seems to have served a strategic function as well, encircling helotized territories and thereby preventing escape as well as potentially subversive contact with outsiders. Given these contributions, it is not surprising that although the *perioikoi* were not accorded citizenship status within Sparta, they were considered an integral part of the social order, as is indicated by the common designation of the members of Spartan society as "Lakedaimonians," a term encompassing both Spartans and *perioikoi*.

On this infrastructure of conquered territories and dependent labor, the Spartans were able to raise all members of the citizen body to the status of hoplite warriors, a development that led to extensive political modifications. The end product was a form of "hoplite democracy," but one so ingrained with military discipline and hierarchy that even the ancient theorists had difficulty in classifying the Spartan politeia.¹⁷ The more "democratic" institutions included the warrior-assembly of all male citizens (the apella), and the magisterial office known as the ephorate, composed of five ephoroi, or 'overseers', chosen annually from the citizen body by the assembly. These ephors, likened to a "collective tyranny" by the theorists, enjoyed enormous powers, largely determining the course of state policy and supervising life within the community. The more "aristocratic" institutions included the council of elders and the dual monarchy. The council functioned as the main advisory body and prepared all proposals—presumably initiated by the ephors or kings—before they were submitted to the assembly for approval or rejection. Membership in the council was restricted to twenty-eight men over sixty years of age (apparently from noble lineage) and the two hereditary kings; the term of office was for life. Sparta's unique dual monarchy was of ancient pedigree, but by the end of the Archaic period, royal power had been largely reduced to various religious ceremonials and command in war. Occasionally, however, kings of strong character and ability would exert greater influence in the affairs of state.

Emotive political vocabulary typically discloses something of the animating spirit and sentiments of a people, and in this case nothing is more revealing of the Spartan politeia than their own preferred term of self-designation: they identified themselves as Homoioi, 'the men who are alike', the 'Equals' or 'Peers'. Notwithstanding the "Lycurgan" tradition of equal landed allotments, Spartan equality did not refer principally to the economic sphere; there were always some wealthy Spartans, and poverty

too began to emerge in a later period. Rather, Spartan egalitarianism featured the inclusion of all full Spartans in the constitution and, more importantly, in a common way of life. 18

The centerpiece of Sparta's cultural system was the agôgê, a compulsory 'upbringing' for all Spartan males (save heirs to the throne) that was designed with one purpose in mind: the creation of disciplined hoplites. 19 Male children, upon attaining their seventh year, were removed from maternal supervision and turned over to civic officials for military training and character formation. Enrolled in "packs," the boys passed through a series of age grades that prepared them for citizenship duties. Reading and writing were taught, along with certain musical arts, but "only for practical purposes"; the aim throughout was to produce "obedience, fortitude in distress, and victory in battle."20 This educational system was under the authority of a special magistrate known as the paidonomos, attended in his activities by whip-bearing youths who administered "necessary" floggings. Communal living began at twelve, as did a full-blown military asceticism. Boys' heads were shaved, and they were required to go about barefoot and clad in a single threadbare cloak, winter and summer alike. Bedding materials were restricted to reeds drawn from the marshes, and the diet was so meager that stealing food became a necessity; those caught in the act received a severe beating—not because they stole, but because they stole so badly! Manliness and fighting spirit were developed by way of organized brawls and other forms of competitive sport. The agôgê lasted until age twenty, when, having learned unconditional obedience to authority figures and the unwritten commandments of the Polis, along with physical endurance, bravery, and the requisite fighting skills, the young men joined the syssitia, the dining clubs or 'messes' of the adult Spartan community. Membership in the syssitia was the criterion for full citizenship, and it constituted the basic military and social unit in Spartan life. Required to live communally in a barracks with fifteen or so comrades until the age of thirty, the Spartan spent most of his time honing his fighting abilities and perfecting formation tactics. Pederastic attachments were common, even encouraged, and apparently served as an essential practice in the socialization of youth and in establishing a comradeship of warriors.21

The institution of the family was likewise subordinated to the aim of producing warriors. Newly born children were presented to a special committee of elders responsible for determining whether rearing was in the best interests of the Polis; all puny and sickly infants were thrown into a designated mountain ravine. As the primary function of women was to produce strong children, they too received an education emphasizing physical fitness: "running, wrestling, and throwing the discus and

javelin."22 As a way of advertising the breeding potential of future wives, "Lycurgus" enjoined that Spartan women exercise and compete in the nude (the accepted Greek custom for men) and that special public processions of nude maidens be held as a means of finding marriage partners. The marriage ceremony itself symbolized this tendency to model the female's existence after that of the male: the bride was ritually carried off by force and subjected to a bizarre transvestite practice in which she was dressed in male attire after having her head shaved; the husband made a brief appearance to consummate the marriage, and promptly returned to the male fellowship of his barracks. Not until age thirty was he allowed to live with his wife in his own oikos, and for the next thirty years thereafter he was required to eat the main meal of the day with the comrades of his syssitia. Marriage was thus largely an instrumental rather than an affective institution, and the eugenic concerns were so prominent that Spartan wives were sometimes lent to third parties for procreative purposes. These customs tended to shock most other Greeks but comported perfectly with the Spartan belief that "children were not the private property of their fathers, but the common property of their Polis."23

In short, what we observe in the Lycurgan system is an instrumentally rational effort to minimize all economic and familial "diversions" so as to enable the male citizen to devote himself fully to the vocation of war. Uniformity was fostered by the compulsory agôgê, while barracks living and various sumptuary decrees promoted a common style of life. In the new Spartan order, the individual was totally subordinated to the interests of the collective:²⁴

Overall, Lycurgus accustomed the citizens neither to wish nor to know how to live as private individuals, but just like bees they were to be always integrated with the community and with each other, swarming around their leader, almost beside themselves from inspiration and love of honor to belong wholly to their fatherland.

The early cultural promise of Sparta, as evidenced by the verses of Terpander and Alkman and the refinement of the aristocracy, was cut short by the "Lycurgan" transformation, documented archaeologically by a decline in imported luxury goods that began in the first half of the sixth century. Henceforth Sparta was to be mocked for its sterility in the arts—and feared for her professionalism in war.²⁵ As to the reasons for this "voluntary petrification," the fundamental answer is not hard to come by: the Helotage system, the real foundation upon which this unique "warrior communism" was erected, created security requirements of such an order that only the complete militarization of social life could prove effective as a means of domination.

Despite the obvious limitations, Lycurgan Sparta was an impressive achievement, one whose constitutional stability and military superiority elicited a mixture of admiration and anxiety from the rest of the Hellenic world. Political theorists in particular were fascinated by Spartan Eunomia, and though they generally objected to the excessive militarism, it could not be denied that Lycurgan Sparta had realized certain principles inherent in the Polis ideal: there was, first and foremost, a basic equality in customs and life-style for all the citizenry; private life was thoroughly subordinated to communal interests and regulated by law and custom; political institutions allowed for order as well as participation; and, most enviably, Sparta's citizens were fully freed from the necessity of economic toil.26 For oligarchically minded men like Kritias, friend to Sokrates and kinsman to Plato, Spartan "good order" served as a convenient foil to the "licentiousness" and "mob rule" that they believed existed within their own democratic communities. For philosophers like Plato, who believed that the Polis should train its citizens with the utmost rigor in the practice of aretê, or 'virtue', the pattern of discipline and training that existed in "man-taming" Sparta revealed the possibilities inherent in the "total community," just as Lycurgus served as an inspiration for the lawgiving "philosopher king."27

By the middle of the sixth century, the various elements of the Lycurgan system appear to have fallen into place, quite possibly under the directing hand of Chilon, the famous Spartan ephor. Territorial ambitions were not quite sated, however, and around 560 BC the Spartans made an attempt to helotize the Tegeans. Herodotus records how the Spartans marched into battle carrying fetters for their foe, only to suffer the ignominy of having some of their own men shackled following the unexpected defeat.28 In their next venture some ten years later, the Spartans triumphed over Argos and gained possession of a portion of the Argive frontier. The Spartans now opted for a new course in foreign policy, abandoning their efforts to conquer and helotize their neighbors in favor of military alliances and nonaggression pacts. After all, Sparta's real enemy-the Helots-resided back home in Lakonia and Messene. By the end of the century, many of the cantons and city-states of the Peloponnese had been brought into formal alliance with Sparta, referred to as the "Peloponnesian League" by modern scholars, but the Greeks more accurately spoke of "the Lakedaimonians and their allies." As hêgemôn, or 'leader', of the alliance, Sparta not only dictated foreign policy, but exerted a strong influence on the domestic policies of her allies as well. The cornerstone of the compact was an oath sworn by each ally, binding them "to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans and to follow the

Spartans whithersoever they may lead."²⁹ Internally, Sparta saw to it that her allies were "governed by oligarchies that would work in the Spartan interest," and this entailed the forcible expulsion of populist tyrants on occasion and the steady suppression of all democratic forces.³⁰ It is one of the more striking ironies of history that when the Spartans attempted to bestow the benefits of such a policy on the Athenians, they succeeded only in part, thereby contributing unintentionally to the rise of their future rival. As we shall see in the next section, Spartan arms were instrumental in overthrowing a tyranny grown odious, but the ascendancy of the Athenian dêmos was a process that could not be reversed.

3.Liv Toward Democracy in Athens

The Athenian people had been spared the devastation wrought by the waves of invaders who brought down the Mycenaean palaces, a circumstance that accounts for the relative prosperity of the city throughout the Dark Age period. Natural advantages also played a part, the peninsula of Attika forming a geographical unit of considerable expanse (roughly one thousand square miles) with several fertile plains, ample coastline, timber-crested mountains, mines of lead and silver, good clay for pottery, and quarries of stone and lime. The resources were thus available for substantial internal development, an option not available to many other Greeks who were often forced to set sail for new lands overseas or to fight for the territories of their neighbors.

Ruled by kings for much of the Dark Ages, Athens entered the Archaic period under the firm control of the hereditary aristocracy, the noble clans known collectively as the *Eupatridai*, or 'well-sired'. Magisterial offices were monopolized by Eupatrids, and an aristocratic council, the Areopagus, administered "the most important affairs of the Polis." An assembly presumably existed, but as Aristotle describes the constitution as having been oligarchical in all respects, its functions were clearly minimal. Though *synoikismos* had promoted a measure of administrative centralization, noble clans still exercised considerable influence in the villages of the countryside, which in effect served as local power bases. Indeed, in times of factional strife, the strength of the contending clans was determined by the number of armed retainers and supporters they could command, largely on the basis of regional loyalties.

Like aristocratic rule elsewhere, Eupatrid supremacy was not destined to last, as the economic and military upheavals of the Archaic period pressed for adjustive institutional changes. Prosperous members of the dêmos began swelling the ranks of the hoplite infantry, while the expansion of trade and craft activity altered many traditional arrangements. Although the oikos-based economy with its supplemental local

exchanges between agricultural and craft sectors remained predominant, the growth of long-distance trade and the increasing monetization of economic life introduced far-reaching changes. It is a basic economic axiom that where calculation in kind functions as the primary exchange mechanism, the satisfaction of domestic want or need is the principal objective, and overall social stability is maintained. Where precious metals or coinage serve as the media of exchange, production—now released from natural limits of storage and consumption—is increasingly geared towards the making of profit, always a catalyst for innovation and social differentiation.³

In the Greek world of the seventh and sixth centuries, commercial forces—stimulated in large part by population growth and the colonization movement-began penetrating formerly secluded agrarian communities. Monetary exchanges became more prevalent, first in the form of precious metals, and then as coinage in the opening decades of the sixth century. This quickening pace of economic activity occasioned a rising level of prosperity, but also a widening gap between rich and poor, as natural subsistence barriers to accumulation were removed. In Hesiod's world of barter, the criterion of wealth had been "full barns"; a century later the poets could speak alarmingly of ploutos ouden terma, 'wealth without limits'.5 This mercurial development and its attending novel dispensations assailed many old certainties, particularly those involving status. How can it be, it was asked, that great Zeus now gives ploutos to some who are kakoi, and penia ('poverty') to some who are aristoi? In addition to creating new opportunities for social mobility, dynamism in the economic sphere also suspended time-honored relations of "exploitative reciprocity" between the strong and the weak. As seaborne trade made a wider variety of luxury goods available, the wealthy and powerful found new reasons to intensify their exactions. Higher yields and labor services were forced upon tenants in dependency, while neighboring peasants were subjected to intimidation, foreclosures, and outright seizures of their holdings. Thus at the very time when material conditions and living standards were on the rise, the countryside resounded with the revolutionary cries of gês anadasmos and chreôn apokopê, 'redistribute the land' and 'cancel all debts'.

Having weathered the turbulence of the Dark Age period in relative prosperity and stability, Athens by the mid-seventh century was a society in decline, economically stagnant and militarily insecure. Her pottery ware, once the glory of Hellas, was eclipsed by that of Korinth; and unlike many of their more adventurous neighbors, the Athenians planted no new colonies. The tiny island polis of Aegina, one of the leaders in commerce, defeated her in war; while a hostile Megara controlled the strategic off-

shore isle of Salamis, despite Athenian opposition. In 632 BC an aristocrat named Kylon, a former champion of the chariot race at the Olympic games, attempted to establish a tyranny with the aid of foreign troops supplied by his notorious father-in-law Theagenes, tyrant of Megara. The acropolis was seized, but in the absence of mass support, the enterprise ended with the slaughter of Kylon and his men.6 Just why the coup failed is unclear, but perhaps the connection with archenemy Megara alienated the Athenian people. In any event, the situation remained unsettled and vulnerable to the appeals of autocracy, as Aristotle records that factional strife soon erupted between "notables" and "multitude." Within a decade of the Kylon affair, the first Athenian lawcode was written down by Drako, no doubt largely in response to the growing political unrest. Little is known of these Drakonian laws apart from their alleged harshness ("written in blood," tradition records), but codification did provide something of a check against the arbitrariness of themis-giving nobles. According to Aristotle, the constitution of this period included the men of hoplite status, but it is uncertain whether they received enfranchisement through Drako's legislation or slightly before. On the plight of the masses Aristotle is more explicit: "the many were enslaved to the rich" and "the land was under the control of the few."8

After a protracted period of stasis, the contending factions turned to mediation in 594 BC, commissioning one man to act as arbiter and archon with extraordinary constitutional powers. The man chosen was Solon, a prominent figure respected by all parties, owing both to his patriotism in the struggle to wrest Salamis from Megara and his poetry on the current social difficulties (verse, with its evocative and mnemonic advantages, was the favored medium for public discourse in early Greek society, as elsewhere in the ancient world). A Eupatrid by birth, Solon was of "middle rank" in terms of property (ousia) and affairs (pragmasi), the latter referring to his participation in trade. Aristotle informs us that the nobles had assumed Solon would make no far-reaching reforms, presumably because of his lineage, while the poor earnestly believed he would redistribute the land, seeing that in his poetry he had placed the blame squarely on the rich, censuring them for their unbridled arrogance and 'love of silver' (philarguria).

The social crisis, though exceedingly complex, was rooted in one underlying problem: a large and growing number of Athenians were losing their civic freedoms and falling into the manifold ranks of the "unfree." The terms and conditions of servitude varied widely, but debt bondage and a rather obscure system of clientage constituted the two principal forms. Those in the latter category were known as *pelatai* ('men who approach another'), and they owed to their overlords various labor

services and payments. The largest number of pelatai were identified as hektêmoroi, for their position entailed the payment of a 'sixth part' (hektêmoros) of the produce from lands they themselves probably owned. but under a precarious form of conditional tenure: should a man default in the mandatory payments, he and his family could be seized and sold into slavery, his land appropriated by his master. 11 Such arrangements were undoubtedly a legacy of the "prestate" Dark Age, that violent and insecure era when the lower orders would have been inclined to attach themselves to powerful patrons in exchange for military and legal protection, and economic assistance in times of hardship. The networks of hereditary dependency thus established would naturally begin to appear onerous and unnecessary to the more prosperous commoners of a later age (especially those of hoplite standing), while the poor were embittered by the very real prospect of outright enslavement. Dependency, in short, was no longer an acceptable status for the Athenian citizen, a stigma all the more galling now that the rich had grown more exacting in their quest for silver and luxury.

Allied to those who sought relief from the yoke of clientage were citizens who had fallen victim to the scourge of indebtedness. The tragic sequence of events forms a recurrent theme in the history of landlord-peasant relations: having borrowed foodstuffs, seed, or equipment in times of difficulty—due to an illness in the family, disease-ravaged live-stock, or inclement weather and resulting bad harvests—peasant small-holders were obligated to repay these loans with interest in kind or through labor services. Harsh necessity would force them to continue borrowing, now on security of land and person, a vicious cycle that usually reached its terminus with creditors appropriating their properties and subjecting their persons to the compulsions of debt bondage.

To deal with these problems, Solon initiated a series of social reforms known collectively as the *Seisachtheia*, the 'shaking off of burdens'. He began by abolishing the invidious status of the *hektêmoroi*, removing the marker-stones (or *horoi*) that designated that their lands were encumbered by the claims of other men. Next on the agenda was the explosive debt crisis, which Solon defused by a legal proscription against all future "pledging of the body as security," thereby invalidating the practice of debt bondage. Existing debts were also canceled, and an effort was made to retrieve those Athenians who had been sold into slavery abroad. As he described his work afterwords:¹³

Did I leave off before I attained the ends for which I brought the people together? May the great mother of the Olympian gods best bear witness in the court of Time, the Black Earth, from whom I at once tore up the *boroi* planted in many places: enslaved before, now she is free. To their god-given

homeland, Athens, I brought back many who had been sold, one unjustly, another justly, others fleeing from dire necessity, no longer speaking their native tongue, so widely had they wandered. Others held here in shameful slavery, trembling at their master's whims, I did set free. These things I made prevail, fitting together might with right, and I achieved what I had promised.

Having addressed the social crisis, Solon attempted to secure civic concord by reforming the constitution, a process that for the Greeks always turned on a redefinition of citizenship rights (the word for 'constitution' and 'citizenship' being in fact the same, *politeia*). Solon's fundamental innovation was to reallocate civic rights on the basis of wealth rather than ancestry, thereby eliminating the old Eupatrid monopoly of political power. He divided the citizen body into four property grades or classes, with membership assigned in accordance with income differentials that were calculated in terms of annual agricultural production:

the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, or 'five hundred bushel men' (which would generally require thirty acres [twelve hectares] of land or more),

the *hippeis*, or 'horsemen' whose lands produced three hundred measures or more (eighteen or more acres [seven or more hectares]),

the zeugitai, or 'men of the yoke', who could produce two hundred measures or more (twelve or more acres [five or more hectares]),

and the thêtes, or 'laborers', whose land, if they had any, was negligible.

To each of these classes Solon allocated specific political rights and responsibilities.14 The highest magisterial positions were reserved for the two top classes, the pentakosiomedimnoi and the hippeis, while the zeugitai, basically the men of hoplite status, gained access to minor administrative posts. Although the thêtes were barred from all office holding, their attendance in the assembly was legitimized, along with expanded electoral and legislative voting rights. Meetings of the people, formerly called at the discretion of the Eupatridai, were now placed on a more regular schedule, and functions were upgraded to include selection of the various state officials, by popular election as well as by lot. 15 Solon also instituted a legal reform that granted a right of appeal from magisterial courts to the assembly, thereby investing the citizenry as whole with appellate sovereignty. According to Aristotle and other conservatives of a later age, it was this reform that decisively shifted the balance in favor of democracy: "For the dêmos, on gaining the power of the judicial vote, became kurios ('lord' or 'master') of the politeia." 16 That interpretation is somewhat anachronistic—effective sovereignty by the dêmos is a product of the Classical period—but it does bring to light the "democratic" possibilities inherent in Solon's measure. By enhancing the powers of the assembly, the lawgiver had opened a vista that clearly countenanced the ultimate realization of full sovereignty by the people.

Solon's constitutional renovations were capped by the creation of a new people's council, ostensibly to serve as a popular counterweight to the immensely powerful Areopagus. From Plutarch's biography of the law-to justify this reform, referring to the two councils as a "double anchor" that would enable the Polis to ride out the buffeting storms of stasis. The composition and functions of this Solonic boulê are largely uncertain, but its four hundred members (drawn equally from each of the four Athenian tribes) undoubtedly included the hoplites, and it appears to have prepared business for assembly meetings and supervised the work of minor officials. The Areopagus still retained considerable powers, however, serving as the supervisory body responsible for "the most important affairs" of the Polis and as the "guardian of the laws." This situation was not as reactionary as it might appear on the surface, for the Areopagus was composed of ex-archons, an annual office now open to wealthy commoners.

Having dealt with the administrative apparatus, Solon turned his reforming hand to the content of the law itself. Perhaps his most important decision was to render the law a common possession of the citizenry, which he accomplished by publishing his statutes on revolving wooden boards that were set up in the agora for public display. The jurisdictional range of the Solonic code was comprehensive: criminal law (homicide, theft, rape), public morality (adultery, prostitution, sumptuary measures), family law (marriage, legitimacy, inheritance), land law (boundaries, limiting the size of estates, the sharing of wells), tort and commercial law, political matters (treason, amnesty, taxation), and religious law were all covered.19 Much of this legislation probably did little more than codify customary practices, but henceforth all of these matters fell under the binding authority of the Polis rather than the individual clan or oikos. The spirit behind Solon's legal reforms can perhaps best be seen in the ordinance that empowered any citizen to initiate prosecution on behalf of those whose rights had been violated, a measure that at once converted all forms of wrongdoing into a public concern, and not just the private business of an aggrieved party.

Solon's social, constitutional, and legislative reforms collectively bespeak a new Polis-citizen ethos, one that elevates the community to the highest normative authority and sanctifies the principle of collective self-governance. No single concept or ideal expressed this axial shift in political culture better than *Eunomia*, a notion signifying both 'good order' and the rule of law, *Nomos*:²⁰

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These things my heart bids me teach the Athenians, that *Dysnomia* ('bad order') causes very many evils for the Polis, but *Eunomia* makes all things well-ordered and fitting, and often puts fetters on the unjust; she smooths the rough, ends excess, weakens hubris, and withers the blossoming flowers of delusion; she makes straight crooked judgments and tames arrogant deeds, she ends the works of civic dissension and the anger of painful strife; under her all things among men are fitting and wise.

True justice and civic concord, however, could be achieved and maintained only if propriety and balance were duly respected:²¹

To the *dêmos* I gave as much privilege as is sufficient, neither taking away nor adding to their honor, while those who had power and were famed for their wealth, for them I took care they should suffer nothing unseemly. I stood holding my strong shield over both, and I did not allow either side to triumph unjustly.

Consistent with his reforming vision, Solon stood firm against the more extreme objectives of both left and right. Against the "revolutionary" demands of the multitude, Solon foreswore any desire to act with "tyrannical force," adding the pointed rebuke that "it did not please him that in our homeland the base (kakoi) and the noble (esthloi) should have an equal portion (isomoria) in her rich soil." This renunciation of the tyrant's course safeguarded the interests of property, but his countering call that the notables "set their excessive thoughts in moderation" failed to win many converts in the party of reaction. These "great and mighty to win many converts in the party of reaction. These "great and mighty men," he protested, should have considered him their friend, for had a lesser man been appointed in his place, "he would not have restrained the dêmos, nor checked them before he had churned up and robbed the cream from the milk."

These bitter reflections by the lawgiver indicate that the contending factions were still unreconciled to the necessity of adopting a middle course; one faction adamantly rejecting the very idea of including the dêmos in meaningful politics, while the poor continued to clamor for demos in meaningful politics, while the poor continued to clamor for economic relief. His term of office complete, Solon departed from the economic relief abroad for the next several years. After a brief period of scene, traveling abroad for the next several years. After a brief period of relative calm, factional strife erupted yet again: no archon could be elected in the years 590 and 586 BC (a condition known as anarchia), while in 582 the individual elected continued to hold office for more than two terms, apparently with the intent of securing a tyranny until he was expelled by force. In response to the unrest, ten archons were chosen in 579 to serve collectively, five drawn from the Eupatridai, three from the agroikoi, or 'farmers', and two from the dêmiourgoi, the artisans. All ten members probably belonged to the wealthy pentakosiomedimnoi, ten members probably belonged to the wealthy pentakosiomedimnoi,

but the conspicuous return of the old title "Eupatrid" may indicate something of an aristocratic reaction. General disturbances followed, and the contending groups began to coalesce around three factions, identified according to their primary regional loyalties: the men of the Plain, hardline oligarchs who were led by Lykourgos; men of the Coast, who aimed at a moderate constitution and were led by Megakles of the Alkmaeonid clan; and men of the Hill, who sought greater reforms in favor of the dêmos, headed by Peisistratos.²⁴

The divisions between these three "parties" or factions (staseis) were complex, with clan rivalries, class distinctions, and regional affiliations all overlapping. It seems clear that the oligarchs of the Plain represented the hard core of the hereditary aristocracy, Eupatrids in possession of the richest farming lands in Attika; while the men of the Hill consisted primarily of smallholders, including those whose ridge lands were so barren that they were literally "farming on rocks." Plain and Hill thus constituted the main "class" division, though it must be stressed that large and small landowners were scattered geographically and that aristocrats headed each of the three factions.

Peisistratos, whose leadership of the Hill probably owed much to his earlier record of military glory against Megara, managed to secure from the assembly a personal bodyguard of fifty armed men on the pretext that oligarchs had tried to assassinate him. With this nucleus of a private army he established himself as tyrant in 561 BC, ruling for a few years before Lykourgos and Megakles united to drive him out of Athens, Some time later (the chronology is very obscure) Lykourgos and Megakles fell out, and the latter formed an alliance with Peisistratos, sealed—as is customary in "family politics"—by the bestowal of a daughter in marriage. This arrangement likewise failed to last, and Peisistratos was expelled for a second time. While in exile he managed to acquire possession of several gold and silver mines in Thrace, a rich source of revenue that he used to hire mercenaries and influence potential allies. In 546 he made his final return, supported by mercenary adventurers, a number of private partisans from Thebes, Argos, and Eretria, and his numerous Athenian supporters from the Hill. Those of his enemies who were not killed in the ensuing battle were exiled, and he took the sons of potential opponents hostage, delivering them over to his ally Lygdamis, a man who had recently established a tyranny on the island of Naxos with Peisistratos' aid.

Firmly entrenched in power, Peisistratos ushered in a reign of internal peace and rising material prosperity, subsequently hailed as a "golden age" by the peasants who benefitted greatly from his populist policies. Although the sources and realities of the tyrant's power were ultimately

personal—in the form of mercenaries, loyal partisans, and an immense private fortune—Peisistratos artfully maintained the façade of constitutional government. The formal legalities of Solon's reforms were dutifully preserved, if little of their substance, as the highest magisterial offices were routinely filled by the tyrant's relatives and closest supporters. In Aristotle's famous "Machiavellian" chapter in the *Politics*, it is in fact Peisistratos who serves as the exemplar of the tyrant who rules primarily through conciliatory and quasi-constitutional means.²⁵

The chief political challenge facing the tyrant was one of balance: that of reassuring his potential Eupatrid enemies without, however, alienating the affections of the dêmos. Most of the rich and powerful were soon won over or mollified, collectively relieved by Peisistratos' refusal to countenance any radical agrarian measures and personally gratified whenever their families were selected for the honors and emoluments that flowed at the tyrant's behest. Largesse was no less instrumental in Peisistratos' dealings with the masses. Solon had freed the peasantry from the chains of dependency, but it was Peisistratos who offered them the material means to survive and even prosper, establishing a fund that provided easy loans for those in need. Another boon to his peasant supporters was the creation of an itinerant judiciary for the settlement of local disputes, a measure that not only spared rural residents the inconvenience of coming to the city for their justice (a day's labor lost), but restrained the powerful in their use of private violence and intimidation. A lavish and extensive program of public works was sponsored by the tyrant, the many temples, public buildings, and aquaducts providing much-needed employment for artisans and laborers and welcome business for merchants and contractors. Aristotle, looking at the darker side, suggests that massive building programs—citing the pyramids of Egypt and Peisistratos' major commissions—are one of the hallmarks of despotism, the aim being to keep the masses in poverty and constant toil, and hence without the means to carry out rebellion.26 Peisistratos' motives were no doubt mixed, but as a popular dictator his interests were best served by the prosperity rather than poverty of his people. Monumental construction, moreover, provided ideological as well as economic dividends, for in adorning the city with works of imposing beauty and majesty, Peisistratos elevated the civic pride of the citizenry in a manner that enduringly proclaimed the grandeur and power of his leadership. The tyrant is also known to have pursued an energetic religious policy, enlarging existing ceremonials and instituting several new cults and festivals. Two deities particularly dear to the peasantry, Demeter the grain goddess and Dionysus the god of the vine, were conspicuously honored, as was Athena, the patron deity of the polis. Much of this may have been heartfelt, but the politics of piety were not lost on Aristotle, who observes that tyrants are well advised to appear "exceptionally zealous" in religious matters, for then people are "less afraid of suffering anything unlawful from such men" and will plot less whenever they believe their ruler has "the gods as allies."27

Peisistratos steered an equally astute course in foreign policy. An Athenian presence was secured in Thrace, a region rich in timber and valuable minerals, and through conquest and colonization the tyrant furthered Athenian interests in the Hellespont, acquiring new lands for his citizens and security for the increasingly important trade in high-grade wheat from the Ukraine.28 Closer to home an elaborate network of alliances served to preserve the peace, a respite that in turn provided an additional stimulus to an already expanding economy. It is no accident that the peasants in Aristophanes' comedies are, along with women, the foremost champions of peace, as ancient warfare frequently entailed heavy agricultural devastation, in the form of plundered livestock and slaves and ravaged orchards and vineyards. To lose one's olive trees, for example, meant the loss of upwards of twenty years investment in labor and capital—certain ruin for the smallholder. Under the Peisistratid peace, production of the Athenian staples—wine and olive oil—soared and found ready markets, conveyed in vast storage amphorae and oft accompanied by the exquisite painted pottery that flourished during this period. Athenian silver coinage, first minted under the tyranny, quickly became the preferred medium of exchange in the Mediterranean world and a major source of export earnings in its own right. Little wonder that when the venerable tyrant died in 528 BC, his sons Hippias and Hipparchos were able to continue the tyranny for another eighteen years: a generation of peace and prosperity had effectively stilled the voices of revolution and reaction.

The difficulties inherent in the preservation of despotic authority are of course compounded whenever the charismatic founder passes from the scene; the merest trifle or accident can precipitate a crisis in the exercise of power for his successors. Such a fate befell the Peisistratid tyranny, as a pederastic lovers' quarrel led to Hipparchos' murder in 514 BC, eliciting greater oppression from an unnerved Hippias. Banishments and executions began generating opposition within aristocratic ranks, and when burdensome taxes were imposed for the purpose of securing additional mercenaries, disaffection became widespread. A band of Athenian exiles attempted to overthrow the tyranny by force but were defeated in battle. Realizing that the task required external military support, members of the Alkmaeonid clan devised an ingenious scheme: the priests at Delphi were bribed to instruct the Spartans "to free the Athenians from tyranny" whenever they consulted the oracle for advice. The rulers of Sparta even-

tually warmed to Apollo's command, which was not altogether unwelcome since they had long been opposed to the existing alliance between the Peisistratids and archenemy Argos. A Spartan army accordingly joined forces with the exiles, and together they swept aside the tyranny in 510 BC, driving Hippias into exile.

A struggle for power presently broke out among the aristocratic political clubs or hetaireiai, one prominent faction being led by Isagoras, an advocate for oligarchy, and another by Kleisthenes, head of the Alkmaeonidai. As Kleisthenes found himself losing support in aristocratic circles, he opted for the populist course and "added the dêmos to his hetaireia," apparently on the promise of granting them a greater share in the constitution.29 Isagoras responded by appealing to the Spartans, the ally of oligarchs everywhere, who at once dispatched a modest policing force under King Kleomenes. Kleisthenes withdrew from the city, allowing Isagoras and the Spartans free reign to impose their designs: seven hundred families were banished, and the Solonic people's council was ordered to disband in favor of an oligarchical syndicate manned by three hundred of Isagoras' henchmen. When the council balked at its own liquidation, the "multitude" unexpectantly rose up against Isagoras and the Spartans, blockading them on the acropolis. Heavily outnumbered, Kleomenes consented to the withdrawal of his own troops (with Isagoras secretly in tow), while the Athenian oligarchs were surrendered up to the triumphant dêmos—a summary trial and execution decided their fate. Returning to Athens, Kleisthenes and his supporters now prepared the city for the anticipated Spartan onslaught.

Back in Sparta Kleomenes gathered a large army, commanding additional levies from his Peloponnesian allies. Arrangements were simultaneously made with the Boeotians and Chalkidians, rivals of Athens to the north, to enter into a joint attack. Upon reaching Athenian territory, however, the Peloponnesian army abruptly dissolved amid internal dissension, the Korinthians in particular balking at the proposed intervention. When Sparta's other king expressed a similar opinion, Kleomenes' attempt to restore Isagoras came to an inglorious end. Thus freed on their southern flank, the Athenians quickly turned north and routed the invading Boeotians, strewing the plain with their dead and enslaving hundreds of others. Steeled by the victory, the Athenians force-marched against the Chalkidians and scored yet another shattering success. Chalkis was promptly garrisoned by an Athenian military colony, with each soldier in the four-thousand-man contingent receiving an allotment of land parceled out from the estates of the Hippobotai, Chalkis' humbled ruling aristocracy. In commemoration of their double triumph, the Athenians dedicated a magnificent bronze chariot to the goddess Athena, placed conspicuously on the acropolis and inscribed with an epigram celebrating how the men of Athens had "quenched the hubris of the Boeotian and Chalkidian races."³⁰

Secured against their external foes, the Athenians proceeded to the novel business of creating a democracy. The chronology and precise nature of the constitutional reforms carried out under Kleisthenes' leadership are frustratingly obscure, but their overriding aim appears straightforward: to check the power of the hereditary aristoi by raising the dêmos to full sovereignty.31 In practical terms that meant that the traditional instruments of aristocratic domination—the clan and phratry organizations, the hetaireiai, and the networks of personal dependency—would all have to be neutralized or democratically transformed. That objective was effectively realized through a singularly bold measure: in place of the four original tribes based on kinship, and hierarchically controlled by the noble clans and phratries, Kleisthenes created ten new tribes on the basis of residence or locality. The lines of political action and mobilization were thus fundamentally redrawn, as rational territorial subdivisions supplanted hereditary kinship and clientage associations as the primary loci of power and authority. A transformation of that magnitude naturally required the bracing collaboration of ideology, and sources record that Kleisthenes obtained religious sanctification from Delphi, the oracle providing the names and attending cults of ten eponymous heroes for incorporation in the new tribal system. Nor did the Kleisthenic restructuring invite any relapse to the fractious politics of regionalism, for each of the new tribes was composed of three distinct groups of dêmoi, or 'wards', one group being drawn from the coastal region, a second from the urban district, and a third from the inland areas. A rough cross-section of the entire community was thus included within each of the new artificial tribes, a representational arrangement obviously designed to suspend the old regional antagonisms of Coast, Plain, and Hill. These wards or demes, of which there were well over a hundred, functioned as local governments, implementing national policies and administering district affairs through their own deme-archons and assemblies; they also maintained the official citizenship lists (important for allocating civic benefits and duties) and registered new male citizens on their eighteenth birthday. Like the ten new tribes, membership in the demes became hereditary following initial registration.

On the national level, the new tribal framework provided the essential organizational basis for both political and military service. Kleisthenes expanded the size of Solon's council from four to five hundred, with fifty members drawn from each of the ten tribes by the lot mechanism, a powerful expression of growing egalitarian sentiment. Elections were annual,

and as eligibility was restricted to two terms in a lifetime, a large proportion of the citizenry would eventually enter political office. Solon's property qualifications for the state archonships continued in effect. Militarily, each tribe was responsible for fielding a regiment of hoplites and a squadron of cavalry, logistical problems being greatly simplified by the rationality inherent in the decimal-territorial plan of organization. The command structure itself was reformed in 500 BC, with the creation of a corporate board of ten tribal *stratêgoi*, or 'generals', annually elected to assist the polemarch.

The new tribal system was no less instrumental in restructuring religious life. In addition to the new cults for the ten tribes, Kleisthenes proceeded to undermine the religious monopolies still exercised by noble clans and families. One of his laws enjoined that the phratries—which were at once political, social, and religious bodies—must henceforth admit nonnobles into their membership; and a number of hereditary cults that had been controlled by Eupatrid families were now either absorbed into larger civic arrangements or passed over to the control of the local wards. The sociological importance of these measures was well brought out by Fustel de Coulanges, who observed that by democratizing religion, Kleisthenes had carried out an indispensable psychological emancipation of the dêmos, freeing the lower orders from their dependent status in the domain of cult and custom, the last stronghold of Eupatrid

supremacy.33 Solon's original aim of creating a unified civic body was thus realized to a large extent by Kleisthenes' success in breaking down the principal forms of political and religious dependency. The new tribal framework provided the scaffolding for a full-scale institutionalization of democratic practice, extending from the intimacy of the local wards on up to the highest councils and offices of the state. This was direct, not representative democracy, for as Aristotle emphasized, Kleisthenes had thoroughly "mixed together" the citizenry, overriding distinctions of kinship and region in favor of collective self-governance.34 The new ideal was no longer Eunomia, 'good order', but a much more progressive principle, Isonomia, 'equal order', a slogan that initially heralded and then registered the triumph of constitutional equality within the community.35 Though Eunomia had once embodied the hopes and aspirations of a dêmos in dependency, it was clearly too hierarchical for a free citizenry now seizing the reigns of effective sovereignty. Its currency dated by the march of events, Eunomia became the rallying cry for defensive oligarchs everywhere.

As for those most powerful and determined supporters of "good order," the Spartans, they naturally viewed the revolutionary proceedings

in Athens with growing alarm. Convening a conference of their Peloponnesian allies, the Spartans called for a restoration of the tyranny at Athens—not Isagoras, but Hippias himself. Admitting that it had been a grave mistake to free such an "ungrateful" rabble, the Spartans avowed that all could still be set right if the infant democracy were to be "strangled in its crib." Once again, however, the Korinthians objected to Spartan aims, and other allies found the design equally distasteful. As the conference broke up, a bitter Hippias prophesied that the day would come when the men of Korinth would suffer grievously at the hands of the Athenians and regret their unwise decision. History was to validate Hippias' reproach, but those at the conference could hardly have been expected to predict how vigorous the Athenian rise would be, or how the ideal of *Isonomia* itself was destined to be short-lived, soon to be supplanted by an even bolder program: Dêmokratia, 'rule of the dêmos'.

3.II NORMS AND VALUES: THE ARTICULATION OF THE POLIS-CITIZEN BOND

The momentous changes that transformed the nature of Polis society over the course of the Archaic period were bound together in a marked structural catenation. Recovery from the depths of Dark Age depression and disorder manifested itself in unprecedented population growth and in rising levels of material prosperity. Ensuing pressures on limited natural resources in turn occasioned the two standard forms of "lateral" expansion: colonization abroad and territorial seizures against neighboring communities, the one a stimulus to trade and productivity, the other a spur to far-reaching reforms in military technology and tactics. A widening diffusion of wealth and the rise of the hoplite yeomanry on the field of battle was accompanied by the continued strains of land hunger and various forms of debt servitude—an explosive compound of waxing middle class strength and peasant emiseration that touched off a series of political crises that challenged and then overturned traditional patterns of aristocratic supremacy. Ramifying throughout the social order, each of these developments contributed to the creation of new social conditions and relationships, engendering new problems and concerns that compelled the various groups in society to adjust their manner of existence to the changing environment. The arena of artistic and intellectual life during this period displays a reciprocal ferment, as the effort to organize experience and convey meaning-in cognitive as well as emotive terms—both reflexively mirrored and informed the ongoing struggles between the forces of domination and resistance, dependency and reciprocity.

3.II.i Aristocratic Supremacy in the Early Archaic Age: Hereditary Virtue and the Agonal Ideal

The largely peaceful transition to aristocratic patterns of governance in the early Archaic period introduced no revolutionary principles to the Greek higher circles, for the same spirit of honor and distinction—the "heroic ethos" as articulated in the oral tradition of epic verse—had animated kings and nobles alike. Indeed, many of these ascendant aristocrats will have been nurtured on Homer's own compositions, for there are numerous indications that the bard's reign as the "educator of Hellas" was well under way by the second half of the eighth century.2 Artistic representations depicting celebrated scenes from the epics begin to appear in vase paintings of the eighth and early seventh centuries; and as regards religious practice, archaeologists have unearthed evidence that several of the centuries-old Mycenaean chamber tombs were revived or expanded for cult purposes at this time, with Agamemnon, Menelaus and Helen, and Odysseus being identified among the recipients of hero worship in newly founded sanctuaries.3 Even more indicative of Homer's spreading influence is the fact that when poets of the day felt inspired by the Muse, they all relied heavily on Homeric formulaic expressions in giving that inspiration form.4 Taken together, these developments confirm that by the end of the eighth century, wandering singers and rhapsodists had succeeded in making Homer a common possession of the Greek people, having regularly presented the epic masterpieces at local festivals as well as in the houses of noble patrons.5 Transmission was also facilitated by the eighth-century reintroduction of writing to Greece, this time in the form of an alphabetical script borrowed from the Phoenicians and transformed through the revolutionary invention of vowels. A highly flexible and simplified system of writing was thereby created, with latent possibilities for general literacy (in contrast to the restrictive scribal syllabaries of Mycenaean Linear B and those of the ancient Near East). The use of writing became quite widespread between 750 and 650 BC, as poetry, legal-political decrees, commercial transactions, religious-magical invocations, and other communicative acts found written expression on stone monuments, pottery, wax and wooden tablets, papyrus, leather, and metal surfaces. By the end of the Archaic period a significant proportion of the population appears to have attained a rudimentary functional literacy, as key areas of social life-political, religious, economic, military—came to rely increasingly on written forms of communication. The Greek social response to the powers and uses of the written word thus constitutes the first "democratization of literacy" in history, and a great spur to Hellenic rationalism.6

Preeminent in war, supreme in politics, and unrivaled in wealth, the aristoi at the dawn of the Archaic period lived lives that differed little from those of their immediate forbears, save for a marked rise in material standards. The warrior role remained the major determinant in the nobleman's definition of self, and it continued to serve as the centerpiece in the aristocratic pattern of paideia. Technical training for youth and adult alike emphasized the perfection of fighting skills, as practice in the use of arms, gymnastic exercise, horsemanship, and the hunt were all assiduously pursued. For ethical guidance the nobles turned chiefly to the bards, whose songs recounting the "glorious deeds of heroes" provided them with proper role models and normative ideals. The lessons thus learned in the wrestling grounds and in the banquet halls served to reinforce the traditional Heroic code that held that a man's ultimate worth, his aretê, or 'excellence', was largely determined by his skill and valor in war.

Another prominent life-style activity of Archaic aristocrats was athletic competition, long favored as a medium for the public manifestation of individual excellence. As Johan Huizinga documented in his classic study, Homo Ludens, a preoccupation with sporting pursuits is commonly found among the noble strata of warrior societies, a correlation to be explained by the fact that where military success hinges on physical prowess, athletics serves as a peaceful propaideutic for armed combat. That martial function is unambiguously central in the Hellenic cult of sporting competition, which featured the racing of chariots, speed and endurance contests conducted in full-body armor, forms of "no holds barred" wrestling, leather-thonged boxing, as well as armed dueling and the hurling of projectiles. The mists of prehistory conceal the origins of these practices, for the competitive passion for athletics has already attained ritualized form by the Homeric period. Complementing the military value of sport was the ideological status and "distancing" it provided, inasmuch as athletic ability was strongly implicated in the class structure. The differentiation between noble and commoner basically corresponded to the distinction between the man with leisure for training and competition and the man compelled to pile "work upon work." Within the ranks of the aristoi, the taunt that one "looked no athlete" was abusive defamation indeed.8

Over the course of the Archaic period, athletic competitions multiplied and were placed on a more institutionalized basis. The most famous of the games achieved pan-Hellenic status and formed what came to be known as "the Circuit," arranged in cycles such that one or two of the major competitions would be held in every year: the Olympic games (founded in honor of Zeus in 776 BC), the Pythian (in honor of Apollo in 582), the Isthmian (for Poseidon in 581), and the Nemean (for Zeus in

573). To these sanctuaries the *aristoi* from all parts of the Hellenic world would gather to honor the gods through competition, their travel through hostile territories safeguarded by a temporary sacred truce. The main events included wrestling, running, the hurling of discus and javelin, boxing, and the chariot race. As befit the spirit and function of the games, no venue was provided for team sports—glory being intrinsically personal in the eyes of these agonal aristocrats. Similarly revealing is the fact that no effort was made to record times or distances: the aim of competition was simply to stand without peer in visible triumph over other men, "favored by the gods" in a moment of unqualified exultation.

Prizes for victory were for the most part honorific, beginning with the celebrated wreaths of laurel or olive and sometimes including embossed cups and shields or finely wrought tripods. More substantial rewards typically awaited the victor upon return to his native Polis, which in prideful recognition might crown athletic success with monetary gifts, commemorative statues, honorary decrees inscribed in stone, seats of honor at communal entertainments, and perhaps even free meals for life at public banquets. As lucrative as these benefits could be, it was the prospect for fame, not fortune, that ultimately inspired the competitors, each seeking the opportunity to "surpass all others" in the manner of a new Herakles or Achilles. In the latter half of the sixth century and throughout the fifth—the heyday of aristocratic sport—the talents of Greece's finest poets were commissioned to immortalize in victory odes the sporting triumphs of their noble patrons. Indeed, the celebration of the athlete on occasion attained a transcendent level, as a few deceased champions became the objects of hero-cult worship.

Warfare and sport, while primary, were not the only pursuits of the aristoi, and when not honing their fighting or athletic skills, we often find them cultivating the gentler arts of the Muses: singing, dancing, and instrumental music. The heroes of the epics again served as paradeigmata, for those princes of war were also men of developed aesthetic refinement: Achilles, though best noted for his murderous proficiency with the spear, was also renowned for his delightful singing and delicate skill with the lyre. An instructive parallel can be drawn with the chivalrous knights of medieval Europe, who likewise sought to frame the necessary cruelties of their vocation in the ennobling and calming harmonies of the musical arts. By elevating the mundane and horrific to the realm of the glorious and the sublime, such art provides the legitimizing idealization that simultaneously inspires the requisite conduct while cloaking its baser features. No less important was the marked relief that mousikê provided from the stresses of combat, a function poetically rendered by the representations of Ares the war god finding momentary tranquillity in the euphonious melodies and graceful rhythms of the divine Muses. As the seventh century poet Alkman expressed it: "Counterbalanced against iron is the play of the sweet-sounding lyre." 10

Much of the Lyric poetry of the Archaic Age was composed for public choral performances, a sophisticated art form combining verse with musical accompaniment and dance. Enacted on the occasion of a wedding or festival, and with thematic content ranging from celebrations of the gods to encomia on the grace and beauty of aristocratic maidens, these elaborate pageants required extensive choreographic training as well as considerable financial outlay. Artistic productions sustained by private riches and the leisured participation of an elite are of course ideal vehicles for both ideological affirmation and the enhancement of status, eliciting sentiments of awe as well as deferential appreciation from spellbound audiences. The other major form of Lyric poetry was monody, or solosong, performed primarily in the symposion, one of the defining institutions of aristocratic society. 11 Derived from the Heroic warrior feast, and held in the andrôn, or 'men's room', in private houses, the symposion was much more than an informal gathering for purposes of revelry and entertainment; it also provided the chief setting for the transmission of cultural ideals and the forging of political and interpersonal relationships. The aristocratic hetaireiai, or 'political clubs', so conspicuous in the eruptions of civic turmoil mentioned earlier, were social clubs centered in the symposia. It was here that hetairoi, 'comrades', would gather for drink and discourse, to dine from lavishly set tables while reclining on elegant couches, their necks covered with aromatic garlands, their bodies annointed with "sweet myrrh." Professional poets, dancing girls, musicians, and courtesans supplied the core entertainment, but the highlight of the evening usually took the form of competitive singing between the guests themselves, a game that demanded considerable poetic literacy from the participants. Amatory themes, politics, the gods, drink, and sundry other aspects of the human condition were all standard items in the symposiast's repertoire.

Although their lives were now enfolded by greater luxury and comfort, aristocratic values and practices still remained keyed to the old Heroic "agonal impulse," that competitive urge triggered by the motivating norm of *philotimia*, the 'love of honor'. In the shame-culture atmosphere of the day, it was all but compulsory that members of the nobility demonstrate their 'hereditary virtue' (aretê genous), either by conquering in battle, triumphing in sport, offering the best counsel in debate, or by singing and dancing with the most grace. The central function of wealth was to garner that all-important public recognition through

maintenance of a sumptuous life-style, one that normally featured costly symposia and choral entertainments, the breeding of horses that might bring home an Olympic victory, and the wearing of expensive articles of adornment, such as the "golden grasshopper" clasps worn by aristocratic men to fasten their long hair. The social significance of this latter custom was well brought out by Aristotle, who pointedly observed that tresses were the mark of free and noble men, "since it is not easy to perform any menial work (ergon thêtikon) when one's hair is long."14

This agonal impulse, this unrelenting drive for distinction and display, was no doubt instrumental in spurring the Greeks to their many cultural achievements, eliciting and sustaining the immense psychic energies that are necessary for the attainment of excellence, whatever its forms. The disruptive legacy, however, must not be overlooked. We have already had occasion to mention how political strife between rival aristocratic clans was endemic in Archaic society and how new opportunities for the use of wealth encouraged many of the powerful to force their humbler compatriots into bondage. Agonal aristocrats, in other words, were somewhat reluctant "citizens" and made difficult neighbors, especially for those who were deemed "of no account in battle nor in counsel." To add depth: to our portrait of these heroic competitors, let us turn to those who had substantial interests at stake in the games that were played, but who were long excluded from the right of participation.

3.II.ii The Dêmos in Dependency: Peasant Values and the Cry for Social Justice

In the chapter on Dark Age Greece, we relied on the peasant-poet Hesiod to provide us with information on what Fernand Braudel has termed "the groundfloor of history," that virtually inertial realm of routine that predominates at the level of everyday life: the planting of seed and the gathering of harvest, the patterns of kinship and the rituals of religious propitiation, the local exchanges between artisan and peasant, and the myriad constraints imposed by geography and the limitations of existing technique. But in addition to registering the abiding rhythms of the countryside, Hesiod offers what is all too rare in the historical record: a selfconscious reflection on the times from below, acutely sensitive to realities of power in an age of unbridled aristocratic domination. Although the poet's commentary and advice covers a wide range of pragmatic topics, from tilling the soil to finding a good wife, his social and ethical discourse returns time and again to two overriding themes: an affirmation of distinctively peasant standards and values on the one hand, and an impassioned censure of the existing legal-political order on the other. In the parlance of contemporary anthropology, it is in Hesiod's verse that one finds the first articulate expression of the "moral economy" of the Greek peasantry.

Armed combat, athletics, and cultural display: these were the recognized arenas for the public manifestation of aretê, or 'excellence', in Archaic society—pursuits that allowed nonaristocrats scant opportunity for positive self-expression. In the prehoplite phase of warfare, commoners typically served as slingers and lightly armed skirmishers, a secondary, "inglorious" role that gave warrant to the aristocrat's sneer that such men were of "no account in battle." Sporting competitions were only slightly more open, for while members of the dêmos participated in the contests held at local festivals (traveling to the pan-Hellenic games would have been costly and time consuming), it is unlikely that they could have matched the better-trained, better-fed aristoi. Until professionalization took hold in the fourth century, the cult of sport remained basically a preserve for leisured aristocrats. As for artistic expression and life-style, here too opportunities were decidedly unequal. A popular "folk" culture, with its own dances, songs, and fables, brought festive joy to all those who labored for their livelihood, but the highest and most conspicuous cultural achievements—those commissioned on the basis of private largesse—necessarily belonged to the privileged and wealthy few. In short, what most commoners lacked (and have always lacked) was both the means and the leisure time required to distinguish themselves according to the standards of value set by their social superiors. Thus debarred from the established agonal arenas of self-expression, it followed that if the lower orders were to resist or oppose aristocratic evaluations that branded them as kakoi and deiloi, 'bad' and 'worthless', they would have to find other grounds for the demonstration of merit. Hesiod's importance lies not only in his effort to codify and create those new standards—emancipation on the ideological front being the normal prelude to other forms of liberation—but to have done so with such artistry that his works became recognized classics, thereby insuring a continued presence of populist sensibilities within the Hellenic cultural tradition.

Given the social provenance of the author and his prospective audience, it should come as no surprise to learn that the peasant-bard's principal didactic theme concerns the necessity and value of hard honest labor. That message is sounded repeatedly throughout his Works and Days, beginning with an opening sermon that strikes an interesting counterpoint to the ideals of warrior-aristocrats:2

So, it turns out, there was not one kind of Strife alone, but upon the earth there are two. One of them a man would praise when he came to understand, but the other is blameworthy; and they have wholly different characters. For the one fosters evil war and battle, being cruel: her no mortal man loves.

The other kind of Strife is far more beneficial, stirring even the shiftless to productive endeavors:

For a man grows eager to work when he sees another, a rich man, who hastens to plough and plant, putting his *oikos* in good order; and so neighbor vies with neighbor, hastening after wealth. This Strife is good for men. And potter envies potter and carpenter holds grudge with carpenter, beggar is jealous of beggar and minstrel of minstrel.

Noteworthy here is that while Hesiod retains the agonal impulse, he frames his celebration of labor with a devaluation of warfare, the "blameworthy Strife" that is the nobleman's cherished vocation. To be fair, Homer and the nobles he sang for were not blind to the sufferings and horrors of war; indeed, few poets have ever matched Homer's sensitive pathos on the subject:³

... a woman weeps, lying over the body of her dear husband, who fell fighting for her polis and people as he tried to beat off the pitiless day from city and children; she sees him dying and gasping for breath, and winding her body about him she cries high and shrill, while the men behind her, hitting her with their spear butts on the back and shoulders, force her up and lead her away into slavery, to have hard work and sorrow, and her cheeks are wracked with pitiful weeping.

Yet despite a profound understanding of war's grim realities, Homer is still able to enshrine the warrior and his craft in glory and assign the highest social values to armed combat.4 It is precisely those ennobling aspects that are tellingly muted in Hesiod's nonheroic testament, with the consequence that his verses convey an unmistakeable subversive tone. For whether Hesiod's omissions were accidental or intentional—and we do know from contemporary studies of peasant protest that "tactical silence" is a common resistance strategy for those constrained to dissemble in asymmetrical relations of power—the result is the same: a counterrealm of value is established, with alternative possibilities for the estimation of human dignity and self-worth.5 That interested contemporaries had no difficulty comprehending these implications is confirmed by a revealing exercise in "literary criticism" offered by King Kleomenes of Sparta, who once opined that as Homer is the natural poet of freemen everywhere, Hesiod is a minstrel for Helots and slaves. The king's rationale? The one sings of the glories of war, whereas the other sings praises to labor and toil!6

To continually reproduce a spirit of consent and submission in the subject classes is one of the operative intents of ruling or dominant ideologies, an objective more readily attained whenever the powerful and privileged monopolize the vocabulary of commendation and retain interprivileged monopolize the vocabulary of commendation and retain interpritation and the vocabulary of commendation and the vocabulary of commendation and commendation and commendati

pretive command over those cultural myths and symbols that inform the prevailing world view. Though rarely confrontational in a direct manner, Hesiod repeatedly challenges and subverts hegemonic or exclusionary discourse, either by transvaluing aristocratic terms and conceptions in a populist direction, or by simply widening the range of privilege to include the dêmos. Representative is the following pronouncement:

Through work men grow rich in flocks and substance, and by working they become much dearer to the immortals. Work is no disgrace, it is idleness which is a disgrace. And if you work, the idle will soon envy you as you grow rich, for *aretê* and *kudos* ('glory') attend on wealth.

This hardly appears oppositional or revolutionary on the face of it; but two significant departures from the dominant persuasion are pointedly effected. Aristocratic families routinely made great show of tracing their bloodlines to divine origins, and in Homer's epics, being philos, or 'dear', to the gods was the special privilege of Heroic warriors. Hesiod breaks that monopoly by contending that the common man, through diligence in his own calling, can also share in divine affections and favors. In a complementary manner, he employs aristocratic vocabulary to elevate the necessity of toil into a potential virtue, arguing that hard work—pointedly rejecting the aristocratic estimation—leads to wealth, which in turn garners aretê and kudos, 'excellence' and 'fame'. Subtlely but unambiguously, the virtues of aristocratic warrior-athletes have been counterbalanced by the virtues of artisans and peasants, as the traditional contest of war and sport has been supplemented by the agôn of productive labor.8

While justifying the normative standards of the *dêmos*, Hesiod boldly ventures a trenchant moral indictment of the nobility's guardianship of the community. Their hubristic conduct and corrupt legal practices, he charges, will bring down a stern chastisement from the gods, one that will make the entire community pay for the rapacity and recklessness of the ruling princes. Although censure of "crooked decrees" and acts of unjust violence can be found in Homer, the principles of collective responsibility and social justice are expounded with far greater urgency by the peasant Hesiod, an understandable shift in emphasis since it is not the powerful who suffer first or foremost from the collapse of justice, but the weak and impoverished. As a means of establishing a moral basis for his communal ethics, Hesiod creates an inspiring iconic contrast between the "Just" and the "Unjust Polis": 10

Those who give straight judgments to strangers and to the people of the land, and who do not transgress what is just, their Polis flourishes and the people in it prosper. Peace, the nurse of children, is abroad in their land, and far-seeing Zeus never decrees grievous war against them. Neither famine

nor disaster ever consorts with men who give straight judgments; with good cheer they manage their carefully tended fields. The earth bears them an abundant livelihood, and on the mountains the oak bears acorns upon the top and bees in the middle. Their woolly sheep are laden with fleeces; their women bear children like their parents. They flourish continually with good things, and do not travel on ships, for the grain-giving earth bears them fruit.

But for those who practice hubris and cruel deeds, far-seeing Zeus, the son of Kronos, ordains punishment. Often even an entire Polis suffers because of a bad man who does wrong and contrives reckless deeds. Upon the people the son of Kronos sends a great woe, plague and famine together; the people perish, their women do not bear children, and their oikoi diminish through the contriving of Olympian Zeus. And again, at another time the son of Kronos either destroys their wide army, their walls, or their ships on the

In portraying Zeus as a divine force for social justice, Hesiod ventures yet another selective modification of the epic tradition. For despite the fact that the Homeric Zeus had protected certain groups from outrage (notably parents, strangers, and guests), and had opposed oathbreaking and corruption, his role as a moral agent was rather ambivalent; in far too many cases he appeared more concerned with his own personal honor than with justice per se (thereby reflecting the "heroic" primacy of aristocratic over communal values). The peasant-bard strives to overcome that anomic inconsistency by transforming Zeus into an ethical power, a committed champion of justice throughout the cosmos. In the Theogony, the poet relates the great "war of the gods" in which Zeus and his Olympian allies triumph over hubristic Titans and other monstrous forces. Following the victory, Zeus is significantly "elected" by his supporters to be the supreme ruler, who in his very first "legislative" act brings order to the cosmos by assigning offices and functions to the other deities. The guarantor of peace and stability, then, is not naked force, but constitutional concord—and if such is the way of the gods, wherefore should mortals differ? Continuing to draw politically charged lessons from heaven, Hesiod creates a divine paradigm for human society by having Zeus wed Themis (Right), a union that yields three "ideal" daughters: Eunomia (Good Order), Dike (Justice), and Eirênê (Peace).11 As the embodiment of Hesiod's central communal ideal, it is the maiden Dikê who reports to her Olympian father on men's injustices, and she is aided in this supervision by the "thirty thousand guardian spirits" that are assigned to keep watch on those who "grind down" their neighbors and who steal wealth by violence or deceit.12 All such acts are violations against Zeus' cosmic order, for it was he who gave justice to mankind so that they would not "devour each other" as do fishes, beasts, and winged birds. Through this potent collage of sacred symbolism and social imagery, Hesiod crystallizes the political aspirations of the oppressed, and in so doing enriches the repertoire of protest that will serve to both orient and inspire their pending struggles for civic freedom and justice.

Hesiod's reformation of "celestial politics" marks a significant theological departure from the agonal, banqueting gods of Homer, and the moral course charted clearly owes its direction to the constraints imposed by prevailing social conditions: in an age of untrammeled aristocratic supremacy, recourse to "other-worldly" sanctions was all but inevitable for a dêmos lacking the "worldly" means to restrain hubristic nobles. Unattainable temporal objectives thus find sublimated release in the spiritual realm, there to prefigure the hoped-for earthly deliverance. Indeed, the only serviceable weapon in Hesiod's arsenal is the threat of divine sanction against all transgressors, and even he shows signs of unease about the reliability of Olympus in these matters. After claiming that Zeus sees what kind of justice prevails in the Polis, "if he wishes!" Hesiod anxiously comments:¹⁴

May neither I nor my son be just among men, for it is a bad thing to be just if he who is more unjust is to have the greater right: but I hope that Zeus wise-in-counsel will not yet bring that to pass.

The optative tone here serves to weaken the vigorous denunciation of "bribe-devouring" nobles found elsewhere in the poet's verse, and underscores the dilemmas that are associated with any complete dependence on divine sanctions—problems compounded whenever the theology is new and lacks institutional reinforcement. In another passage, Hesiod appears to give up on hope as well:¹⁵

Now I will tell a fable for princes who themselves understand. Thus said the hawk to the speckled nightingale, while he carried her aloft among the clouds, gripped fast in his talons, and she, pierced by his crooked talons, wept pitifully. To her he spoke in imperious command: Miserable thing, why do you cry out? One far stronger now holds you fast, and you must go wherever I take you, singer as you are. And I will make you my dinner if I wish, or let you go. He is a fool who tries to withstand the stronger, for he will be deprived of victory and suffer pain besides his shame.

The predatory hawk, of course, is but a symbol for the ruling nobles, while the weak songbird represents the singer himself, a man of the *dêmos* who must submit to the coercive will of the stronger. Lacking "talons" of his own, Hesiod's only option was to turn to Zeus and pray for divine retribution. His descendants would not be so ill equipped: a revolution in military technology and tactics will soon bring the more affluent among

them into the front ranks of battle—hardworking peasant-farmers still, but now armed with the means to realize Hesiod's call that communal justice take precedence over aristocratic aggrandizement.

3.II.iii The Rise of Hoplite Heroes and Codification of the Polis Ideal

The various circumstances and developments that enabled the dêmos to remove the oppressive yoke of aristocratic domination were mutually implicated, but the decisive pressures in the overall process of "democratization" were those exerted by the "hoplite reform" of the seventh century. As economic expansion, population growth, and changing military demands brought prosperous commoners into the ranks of the phalanx, the martial supremacy of the aristocracy was progressively suspended. Commensurate with their diminishing stature on the battlefield, the aristoi lost ground in the political arena as well: a wave of popularly backed tyrannies swept aside many hereditary regimes, while elsewhere constitutional reforms were necessitated as a means of forestalling revolution and civil war. Wealth replaced lineage as the criterion for full participation in the affairs of government, and by the end of the Archaic period most Greek poleis were moderate republics based on some form of "hoplite franchise." Since the phalanx tended to include between one-fifth to one-third of all adult male citizens, this effectively meant that powers of self-governance were now held by a substantial portion of the free population.1

This general process of structural democratization was paralleled by a democratization in cultural ideals, and here too dynamism in the military sphere exerted a preponderant influence. As both a catalyst for normative change and a conduit for an emerging social psychology, the institutionalization of the hoplite phalanx entailed a radical rupture with traditional principles of aristocratic exclusivity.2 With its revamped weaponry, tactics, and personnel, the phalanx created new role demands for the warrior and modified the norms of interaction between noble and commoner. As disciplined formation tactics supplanted the Heroic form of mobile, open-field combat, individualistic hero ecstasy was forced to give way to routinized collective skill—the warrior frenzy of an Achilles being no longer appropriate for a style of warfare that depended upon uniform steadiness in the ranks. Particularly revealing in this regard is the fact that the adoption of close-formation tactics coincides with a significant shift in meaning for one of the major virtues in the Greek moral code, sôphrosunê, a word originally signifying 'prudence' and 'shrewdness of mind' but that henceforth came to mean 'self-control' and 'moderation'-precisely the traits a man hoped to find in the hoplites who stood beside him in the line, since it was their composure that literally shielded his life.3

As prosperous commoners began swelling the ranks of the new-style army, a democratization in status honor followed apace. A large and growing number of men of nonnoble origin could now lay claim to martial aretê, and with it the personal and public privileges of positive self-identification. Indeed, the very structure of the phalanx—with its massed rhythmic coordination and its collective uniformity and equality in the ranks—could not help but elicit and convey a powerful experiential and symbolic sense of cohesion and solidarity within the civic community. Formerly in the van of the fighting, the aristoi were now compelled by the changing nature of war to lock shields in formation with their fellow citizens, a "leveling" circumstance that facilitated in ideological as well as practical terms the triumph of Polis communalism over aristocratic domination.

As the scope for individualized performance was restricted by formation discipline and heavier armament (a full panoply weighing in at more than a third of a man's body weight), the personal quest for glory became subordinate to and dependent upon collective success; herein lies the essential difference between the Homeric and the hoplite hero. For the early warrior-aristocracy, the psychological inspiration for facing "pitiless bronze" had been supplied by the self-regarding ethos of philotimia, the competitive 'love of honor'. While this value orientation did not preclude a recognition of social responsibilities—Hektor and the besieged Trojans in particular give evidence of communal attachments—it is nonetheless true that private considerations involving honor, oikos, and friends tended to outweigh public concerns whenever these were not in harmony.5 A clear and compelling articulation of communal obligations is simply not to be found in Homer's epics, as motivations for conduct and hortatory appeals are customarily expressed in personal rather than patriotic terms. In the war poetry of the seventh century, the vocabulary of motives is recast, and the vehicle most responsible in bringing the communal ideal to the fore was the phalanx. As Hesiod's forlorn invocation of transcendental sanctions suggests, the emotive appeals of communalism could gain fair hearing only if self-regarding aristoi were "domesticated" or "tamed," i.e., compelled by force of circumstance to serve rather than oppress their communities. That "reining in" of the nobility—a recanalization of the heroic impulse towards civic performance—is precisely what transpired with the ascendancy of the phalanx. Corporate discipline leveled and collectivized the old hierarchical conception of honor, while growing participation by the dêmos made the hoplite army a more representative communal institution. Through drill exercises on the parade

ground and frequent clashes over border territories, a pervasive and deeprooted sense of civic responsibility and Polis patriotism was born, one that duly came to demand the ultimate commitment: self-sacrifice for the community.

The emergent ideal finds its clearest expression in the stirring verses of Tyrtaios, the warrior-poet of Sparta, the first city-state to reorganize itself (and in extreme fashion) as a "Hoplite Polis":6

To die falling in the foremost ranks of battle is *kalos* ('noble' and 'beautiful') for an *agathos* man, fighting for his fatherland; but he who abandons his Polis and rich fields and goes begging is of all things the most distressed.

Let us fight with courage for this land and die for our children, no longer sparing of our lives.

Let each man hold his shield straight in the foremost ranks, making life his enemy and the black spirits of death as dear as the rays of the sun.

A demand that one fight and possibly die for interests that transcend the immediate welfare of the individual presupposes for its effectiveness a strong sense of self-identification with the community; and the bases for any such identification are of course the material and ideal interests that link individual and collective destinies. As "the great communal labor" (Marx) and as a "natural means of acquisition" (Aristotle), military action provided much in the way of personal and collective gain, from various forms of booty (slaves, ransom payments, flocks and herds) to territorial security and conquest ("Messene good to plough and good to plant"). These tangible incentives would remain more or less constant throughout Greek history; but with the transition from Homeric to hoplite heroes, the requisite "spiritual" motivations undergo a fundamental modification. Commitments that had once been sustained by the aristocratic cult of honor and the quest for a posthumous existence through "glorious deeds" were henceforth anchored in a more collective and communal ethos, with "glory" redefined so as to become synony mous with Polis devotion and service. Correspondingly, the community itself (rather than wandering bards) became the bestower of undying fame:7

He who fell fighting in the foremost ranks of battle, losing his dear life for the good fame of his city and people and father, with many a frontwise wound through his breast..., he is wept for by young and old alike, and the whole Polis is distressed by grievous longing. His grave and his children are conspicuous among men, and his children's children and his line after them. Never does his noble glory and good name perish, for though he lies under the earth, he becomes immortal, whosoever excelled and stood his ground, fighting for the land and children when the fierce War-God slew him. But if

he escapes the doom of death, and wins the splendid boast of his spear by conquering, he is honored by all alike, . . . and growing old is distinguished among his fellow citizens.

As the ideal of the Polis pressed its claims upon the individual ever more strongly and gained ground *vis-à-vis* aristocratic honor, a revision in the old moral vocabulary became increasingly necessary. Excellence or *aretê* would henceforth need to be defined primarily in terms of service to the Polis; and as the hoplite was the principal "carrier" of the growing communalism, it was his *aretê* that set the new standard:⁸

I would not make mention of a man nor set him in account, neither for the excellence of his feet nor his wrestling skill, not even if he had the size and strength of a Cyclops and could outrun Boreas, the Thracian North Wind. Not if he was more pleasing in stature than Tithonus, or more wealthy than Midas and Kinyras, nor if he was more lordly than Pelops and had the soothing-voiced tongue of Adrastus. Not if he had every fame except a warrior's prowess. For a man does not become agathos in war unless he can endure to see bloody slaughter and while standing firm can strike the enemy from close range. This is aretê, this is the prize which among men is the best and fairest thing for a young man to win. This is a common good (xynon esthlon) for the Polis and all her people, when a man stands firm, fighting in the foremost ranks of battle and abides unceasingly, shameful flight wholly forgetting, having set endurance in his heart and soul; and he encourages with his words the man who stands beside him.

That various aristocratic excellences—athletic strength and speed, physical beauty, wealth, nobility, skill in counsel—are here rendered subordinate to martial prowess is not in itself a new message, for the aristoi were themselves warriors first and foremost. The originality lies rather in the fact that the new masters of war are hoplites, formation warriors whose martial excellence is largely collective and more "democratic" given the changing social composition of the army. Through hoplite service a man from the dêmos could now lay claim to the crown of virtue, a dramatic change from the days when the aristoi monopolized the terms of commendation, agathos and esthlos, and derided commoners as worthless kakoi. In the emerging Polis-citizen morality, it is not individual capacities or talents per se that determine human merit and value, but one's record in providing for the xynon esthlon, the 'common good' of the community.

The efforts of the Archaic war poets to transform martial aretê into a civic virtue were paralleled by the work of lawgivers in the domain of justice. That serious disorders plagued the legal-political structures of many Archaic states is manifest not only from Hesiod's impassioned railings against the men whose "justice" rested with the "violent might of their

hands," but also from the numerous eruptions of factional strife throughout the seventh and sixth centuries. Our most eloquent and informed witness on these turbulent times is the Athenian poet and statesman Solon, whose social reforms were discussed above (3.I.iv). Much of the great lawgiver's didactic poetry codifies the emerging Polis ideal, with special emphasis being placed on the communality of interests between all the citizens, whether rich or poor, noble or commoner, and the social necessity that greed and hubris be restrained by justice. An ardent patriot who saw his homeland ravaged by factionalism, Solon was moved to take to the agora and preach to his fellow citizens a new moral program:¹⁰

Our polis shall never perish by a fate decreed by Zeus or by the will of the blessed immortal gods; for a great-hearted guardian born of a mighty father, goddess Athene, stretches her hands over us. But the citizens themselves in their folly choose to destroy the great polis, having put their trust in money (chrêmata). The rulers of the people have an unjust mind, and they are about to suffer many pains for their great hubris, since they know not how to restrain their excess, nor how to arrange their present cheerful feasting in quiet. Nay, they grow rich putting their trust in unjust deeds, and refraining from neither sacred nor public properties, they steal with an eye to plunder, one man from another, giving no heed to the solemn foundations of Justice, who in silence is aware of what is and what has been, and in time always comes to take retribution. This wound now spreads inescapably to the whole polis, and into an evil slavery she quickly falls, rousing from sleep civil strife and war, which destroys the lovely youth of many. For by malevolent men in associations dear to the unjust this much-loved city is afflicted. These are the evils that roam among the people; and of the poor many arrive at a foreign land, having been bound and sold abroad in unseemly fetters, there to bear the evil works of slavery under compulsion. In this way a public evil comes to the oikos of each man, and the courtyard gates can no longer keep it out; it leaps over the high wall and finds every man, even if he flees to the innermost recess of his bed-chamber.

In this powerful appeal on behalf of social justice, Solon seeks to awaken his fellow citizens to the reality that any form of oppression or injustice within the community constitutes a dêmosion kakon, a 'public evil', that invariably brings collective ruin in its train. Through the vivid metaphor of social disorders penetrating into the recesses of each man's home, Solon gives expression to an idea central to the emerging Greek conception of citizenship; namely, that to be both a "private man" and a citizen was a contradiction in terms. In his capacity as archon, Solon proceeded to enshrine that principle legislatively, with one ordinance disfranchising any man who failed to take part once stasis erupted (hoping no doubt that moderate majorities would thereby restrain militant minorities), and another that empowered any citizen—and not just the

party personally aggrieved—to indict for wrongdoing.11

Communal responsibility was thus the keynote in Solon's social message, and in his role as lawgiver he attempted to weave that ethos into the constitutional fabric. We have already seen how his extensive lawcode raised the authority of the Polis above that of clan and oikos, while his allocation of citizenship rights on the basis of income rather than ancestry created a more equitable polity. Realizing that "excess breeds hubris," Solon attempted to achieve a social balance by giving to the dêmos "as much privilege as is sufficient," while simultaneously preserving the traditional elite from "unseemly" depredations. Throughout his verses one finds the vocabulary of moderation and balance: "restrain excess"; have an "even-fitted mind"; set your excessive thoughts "in moderation"; show "measured judgment"; the dêmos should be "neither too much free nor too much under compulsion"; his reforms are a "shield" protecting both parties; he stands "midway between"; and so on.

In the history of Greek ethics, this marks an important turning point, a period when the Greeks came to realize that their "agonal man" was sometimes rather hard to distinguish from "hubristic man," and offered as solution the principle of moderation and the mean, epitomized by the famous inscription over the doors of Apollo's temple in Delphi: Mêden Agan, 'nothing too much'. 12 That these two quite different value orientations—the so-called competitive virtues of the Heroic code, and the cooperative virtues of the civic ideology—were able to coexist in the Hellenic consciousness was due in large part to the uniqueness of the Polis form of social organization. Following the constitutional curtailment of hereditary aristocratic power and privilege, the agonal impulse was successfully "rechanneled" to serve communally approved objectives—in culture and sport as well as in war and politics—while collective self-governance and the rule of law served to moderate or defuse the excessive rivalries and inequalities that were bred by emulous competition. "I wrote down laws," declared Solon, "for commoner and noble alike." Though this synthesis frequently broke down in practice—Solon's own work failed in the short run—the Greeks have been justifiably credited with striking a creative balance between the outward-striving energy of the individual and the unifying power of the community, allowing neither, to borrow a phrase from Solon, "to triumph unjustly."13

A well-ordered society founded upon the rule of law, a wider and more equitable distribution of political power, an ethic of civic responsibility—such were the objectives celebrated in the Archaic conception of *Eunomia*, a vision shared by both Tyrtaios, the Spartan war-poet of communal devotion, and Solon, the Athenian lawgiver who codified the prin-

ciples of social justice. Although detailed information from other regions is scarce, the available evidence does suggest that this was an ideal espoused by many during the Archaic period. Lawgivers were appointed in a great number of city-states to cope with the problems inherent in the transition from aristocratic regimes to hoplite republics, while elsewhere tyrants rose as champions of the disaffected and initiated progressive reforms designed to secure a popular power base. The democratization of Greek life was further advanced by the codification and publication of law, which not only checked the arbitrary jurisdiction of "bribe-devouring" nobles, but transferred legal authority from the aristoi to the Polis. It is no exaggeration to speak of a Greek invention of "true legislation" here, for the combination of an alphabetical script and the public display of promulgated decrees rendered law a communal possession of the citizenry, to be employed by all in the arbitration and management of daily affairs. 14 Several early inscriptions give testimony to this expanding communal sovereignty: from tiny Dreros in Krete a late seventh century inscription delimiting the powers of an important office opens with "This has pleased the Polis"; in early-sixth-century Kyzikos, an honorary decree exempting the descendants of two citizens from various taxes reads "The Polis grants"; a public decree from Argos dated to within the first half of the sixth century lists various crimes against the Polis that are punishable by death or banishment; and an early sixth century inscription from the island of Chios refers to a "people's archon," the "laws of the people," and provides for a procedure of appeal from the decisions of magistrates to the "people's council"—arrangements betokening a considerable measure of ordered self-government very similar to that found in Solon's Athens.15 As fragmentary as these sources are, they manifest a clear conception of the Polis as both a functioning koinônia of citizens and as the supreme moral authority in social life.

In the domain of ethical standards, this growing communalism found normative expression in the corpus of gnomic or "wisdom" literature associated with the so-called Seven Sages, a group of wise men—mostly statesmen of some sort—who were credited with various maxims and anecdotes of a moralistic nature. There were rival lists of the Seven, and we have the names of more than twenty figures in all, including such notables as Solon, Pittakos the elected tyrant of Mytilene, Chilon the famous Spartan ephor, and Thales the first philosopher. While it is not generally possible to attribute particular sayings to specific individuals, nor to provide a strict chronology, a fairly uniform gnomological tradition did emerge in the seventh and sixth centuries, one in which harmonious social relations and civic responsibility loom large as the principal objectives: "Do not speak ill of neighbors"; "Prefer loss to shameful

gain"; "Obey the laws"; "Forgiveness is better than vengeance"; "Win bloodless victories"; "Shun injustice"; "When strong, be gentle, for thus your neighbors will respect rather than fear you"; "Moderation is best"; "Cultivate temperance"; "Counsel the Polis for the best"; "Be pleasing to all the citizens in the Polis where you reside, for this has the greatest favor; but the self-pleasing manner oft flashes forth harmful ruin." A similar concern with moderation can be found in several of the Lyric poets as well, from Archilochus devaluing the fabulous wealth of the Lydian tyrant Gyges to Phokylides declaring: "Many things are best in the middle; I wish to be mesos in the Polis."

The social origins of this normative trend are to be traced to the progressive democratization of Greek society outlined above. As economic and military changes broke down the bases of aristocratic domination, traditional principles of privilege for the few and subordination for the many had to give way to the claims of greater communalism. The changing balance of power between the aristoi and the upper sections of the dêmos necessitated changes in the norms of interaction and in the standards of value: hence the "hoplite virtue" of Tyrtaios, the ideals of citizenship and social justice of Solon, and the ethos of moderation found in the gnomic tradition. As the rule of law superseded the rule of hereditary power and personal prowess, obedience and loyalties were increasingly attached to the Polis, the organizational basis and spiritual force behind the growing communalism. With greater self-government and Isonomia replacing the old patterns of domination and dependency, the koinônia of citizens implicit in the Dark Age assembly became a functioning reality and an inspiration for the distinctive twin ideals of Greek civilization: the Polis as the center of all custom and culture, and the citizen as the highest type of humanity.

3.II.iv Troubled Aristocrats, Confident Commoners, and the Contest for Status Honor and Self-Affirmation

Ruling strata long accustomed to the exercise of authoritative command and the deferential compliance of the ruled invariably find the transition from domination to compromise difficult to comprehend within the frames of the regnant ideology. Having been nurtured on the standard aristocratic prejudice of innate superiority, any perceived loss in power and privilege threatens the self-image and identity of those in command and as such instinctively provokes reactionary measures in defense of ancestral prerogatives. The rampant factionalism of the seventh and sixth centuries attests to the determination of Greece's hereditary nobles to perpetuate a crumbling hegemony; but defensive, rearguard actions could

only retard, not reverse, the dawning reality and its novel dispensations. As economic, military, and political changes steadily restricted the nature and scope of aristocratic supremacy, adjustments in ethos and life-style became inevitable. Many of the aristoi—some through foresight and leadership, others chastened by the harrowing experience of stasis—eventually came to see in the moderate ideals of Eunomia an acceptable solution, a sensible "middle course" with its own attractive opportunities for advancement and distinction. After all, the emerging communalism did not so much repudiate aristocratic excellences as redeploy them in the interests of the Polis; and in the newly established hoplite constitutions, the aristoi still retained a predominant, though no longer exclusive, position. The career of the Athenian Kleisthenes—a Eupatrid who "added the dêmos to his hetaireia"—was thus repeated widely throughout Greece, as prudent aristocrats adopted the platform of civic justice and "good order" as a means of retaining power and prestige in an age when commoners had to be cultivated rather than coerced. For "hardline" elements within the aristocracy, pragmatic flexibility could not be countenanced: to accede to any form of power sharing with the "kakoi" betokened nothing less than a craven betrayal of both pedigree and birthright. Oppositional cabals thus entrenched themselves within most communities, their strength and numbers varying, but ever ready to restore an idealized "old order" should opportunity present itself.

As Karl Mannheim documented in his classic study, "Conservative Thought," traditional principles of power and privilege rarely rise to a level of self-conscious reflection and coherence without the goading stimulus of class conflict, of challenge from below. The "conservative reaction" of the Archaic warrior-aristocracy lends support to Mannheim's thesis, as one finds a heightened preoccupation with ideological concerns in various poetic works composed by the nobility during this period. Our primary means of access into the social consciousness of troubled aristocrats is a massive composition known as the Theognideia, a collection of nearly fourteen hundred verses that the ancients ascribed to Theognis of Megara, but that includes select pieces from other poets as well. The history behind this unusual work—one of the most unguarded declarations of naked class sentiment in the annals of cultural expression—is itself worth noting, for it appears that the collection was put together in the fifth century to serve as a kind of "moral handbook" for the aristocracy, an anthology of reactionary maxims and reflections that found much favor with those whose "politics" were being effectively reduced to impotent protestations within the private walls of the symposion.

The chronology of Theognis' life cannot be fixed with certainty, but a floruit between the late seventh and early sixth centuries is proposed by

most scholars.² We have had occasion to mention one famous citizen of Megara already: the tyrant Theagenes, who rose to power around 650 BC by "slaughtering the flocks of the wealthy." Theognis may have witnessed that traumatic event, though it is more likely he was born somewhat later, perhaps around 630 BC. In any event, Theognis' poetry transcends questions of local history, for his real value lies in his articulate reaction to the precipitous erosion of aristocratic power and the spiritual crisis that followed in its wake.

The *Theognideia* is essentially the testament of an aristocracy under siege, recorded by a man deeply tormented by the decay of his own order and by a personal loss of position and privilege. In verses animated by a strident spirit of reaction, Theognis bitterly realizes that the aristocratic ideals that he had inherited are no longer effective or consistent with the emerging social reality. Great wealth, prowess in war, political supremacy, claims to honor, and moral excellence—all these had once been the special preserve of the hereditary *aristoi*, but in a changing world that comforting unity has given way to alarming fragmentation:³

Those that were agathoi before are now kakoi, and those that were kakoi are now agathoi. Who can endure to behold such things, the agathoi dishonored and the kakoi obtaining honor?

Like other contemporary observers, Theognis recognized that disruption of the old order was due in large measure to rapidly changing material conditions, above all to the new sources of wealth that were blind to distinctions of lineage. In a mocking elegy he hails the deity no longer exclusively loyal to his own class: "Oh Ploutos, fairest and most desirable of all the gods, with you even a *kakos* man can become *esthlos*." The economic expansion of the seventh and sixth centuries—fueled by widespread colonization, an increase in trade and craft activities, and a growing monetization of economic life—created new opportunities for the acquisition of wealth and for social mobility. For bluebloods like Theognis, the partial restructuring of the status hierarchy that followed was appalling:

This polis is still a polis, but the people are different now. Those who before knew neither judgments nor laws, but who used to graze like deer outside the polis, wearing out the goatskin rags about their ribs, these men now are agathoi, while those who were esthloi before are now deiloi. Who can endure to behold such things?

Preoccupied by athletic pursuits, honorific gift exchanges, the sympotic pleasures of wine and song, and instinctively disdainful of the "sordid" calculating rationality of merchants "greedy for gain," it is readily apparent than many of the *aristoi* found it difficult to maintain their hereditary prosperity in the more competitive and fluid economic environment:

Poverty subdues the *agathos* man most of all things, more than hoary old age and fever. To flee from her it behooves one to hurl himself into the deep sea or over a sheer precipice. For every man subdued by poverty can neither act nor speak, as his tongue is fettered.

As Thorstein Veblen documented in his celebrated study of the "leisure class," it is emulation—the quest for invidious distinction and social preeminence—that serves as the driving motive for pecuniary accumulation among privileged strata. Without wealth in abundance it is hardly possible to maintain that sumptuous life-style that wins honor and esteem and that provides the basis for the leisured callings of politics and sport. Although antedating the irreverent economist by some twenty-five-hundred years, Theognis relates the same correlation: poverty, by robbing the nobleman of his social functions, "shames his body and mind," rendering him aphônos, 'without voice', in the assemblies and gatherings that determine the destinies of men.7 A contemporary Spartan poet summed up the new standard in characteristic laconic style: chrêmater anêr, 'money's the man'.8 Notwithstanding Theognis' defiant avowal that he would never "exchange his aretê for wealth," he himself repeatedly bemoans the arrival of "life-destroying" poverty, "the mother of helplessness," and declares that friends must prove their worth by deeds, with "hands and wealth both," and not by the mere words that slip from the tongue.9

Hereditary virtue unbuttressed by pecuniary prowess was clearly of little value in the agonal, shame-culture world of the Polis—a point not lost upon a good many noble families in decline, much to Theognis' anxious chagrin:¹⁰

In rams, asses, and horses we seek the eugenês, the 'thoroughbred', and a man wishes to get offspring from noble stock. But an esthlos man does not hesitate to marry the kakê daughter of a kakos father, if the father gives him much chrêmata. Nor does a woman refuse to be the wife of a kakos man if he is wealthy; she prefers the rich man instead of the agathos. It is chrêmata these people honor; and so an esthlos weds of kakos stock, and a kakos of agathos. Riches have corrupted breed! (ploutos emeixe genos.)

The peasant values espoused earlier by Hesiod, of hard work and diligence securing virtue and fame, find ironic confirmation here in the marriage practices of impoverished nobles, social skidders who are "persuaded by *chrêmata*" to trade upon their "good repute" and marry rich but "base-born" consorts. ¹¹ The goatskin rustics of the past have thus risen to become the *agathoi* of today, and even our unregenerate poet, the open partisan of "breeding," concedes that it is money, not birth, that now makes the man: "Everyone honors a wealthy man, and dishonors the poor; the mind in all men is the same." ¹²

The course of Theognis' own mind can perhaps be better charted if we turn at this point to the stormy political currents within his native Megara.13 The reign of the tyrant Theagenes had been followed by a socalled sôphrôn politeia, a 'temperate constitution' that featured some form of oligarchical power-sharing between the aristoi and the more prosperous elements of the dêmos. Theognis himself appears to have held an important office in the new regime, and it is to this period that we should probably date his well-known elegy celebrating the cooperative excellence of justice: "The whole of arete is summed up in justice, and every man is agathos if he is dikaios."14 Neither justice nor moderation, however, were to prevail as Theognis understood them. A surging dêmos continued to press for additional political reforms, while impoverished elements within the peasantry clamored for immediate debt relief. In the ensuing turmoil many of the old alliances and friendships collapsed, as strategies for survival and advancement allowed scant regard to principles long since dated by the shifting realities of power. A disproportionately large number of Theognis' poems are concerned with these divisive strains and their debilitating consequences, and as such give clear testimony to that rupturing of elite solidarity that normally presages revolutionary

Repeated warnings are sounded that one should never trust or align oneself with the *kakoi*, but Theognis also candidly laments the loss of loyalty within his own class: twice he complains of personal betrayal by his own comrades. No longer secure in their traditional ascendancy, a number of these lordly and assertive nobles of the past have now become *kibdêlos* men, 'counterfeit' or 'spurious': 16

Kibdêlos gold and silver are tolerable delusions, easily found out by the wise man. But if the mind of a friend is secretly false, and holds a deceitful understanding in his heart, this has god made the most kibdêlos for mortals, and of all things the most grievous to perceive.

The moral outrage here is genuine, almost visceral, and yet Theognis himself goes on to acknowledge the necessity of duplicity in a world that has lost all semblance of order and propriety. Deception when interacting with the *kakoi* is now deemed essential for survival, a consideration that even outweighs the older principles of aristocratic honor:¹⁷

Never make one of these townsmen your friend, not even for the sake of need nor from the heart's desire; but seem to be a friend to all from your tongue, while in serious business never mingle with any of them.

More distressing still is the fact that one must wear a false front even within the ranks of the aristoi:18

Turn towards all friends a many-colored disposition (êthos), mingling your temperament to that which arises in each man; now follow this man, then take on the temperament of another. For surely cleverness is better than great aretê.

Elsewhere he recommends becoming like the "much-twisting" octopus, whose chief asset is its ability to assume the coloring of whatever rock it temporarily clings to. As the octopus was known as "the boneless one" in popular idiom, it is hard to conceive of an animal less suited to serve as a role model for an aristocracy accustomed to the exercise of authoritative command. Indeed, the symbolic disparity between the predatory hawk of Hesiod's verse and Theognis' artful invertebrate tellingly registers the marked erosion of aristocratic power and spiritual self-assurance. Opting for profitable intermarriages rather than "eugenics," allowing opportunism and mere survival to override the claims of loyalty, cultivating the arts of duplicity rather than "great aretê," these are the unmistakable signs of an aristocracy in decay, a class no longer trusting in its inherited standards and no longer capable of unified and determined resistance in defense of its hegemony.

The stasis that Theognis feared erupted around 600 BC, as the dêmos, rallying beneath the banner of greater freedoms and equality, forcibly shattered the narrow coalition-oligarchy. Later writers of a conservative bent labeled the new Megarian constitution an "unbridled democracy" and preserved for posterity a few of the more "notorious" incidents of its tenure. Though intending thereby to discredit the revolutionary regime, what they record only serves to expose the patterns of exploitation that occasioned and legitimized the mass uprising. For as comparative research on popular protest and revolution reveals, notions of justice and sentiments of ressentiment often find release in practices of social inversion or role reversal and in the restoration of traditional arrangements deemed to have been violated. Thus the wealthy are compelled to attend upon the poor or perform manual labor; terms of personal address and demeanor are altered or inverted; staple commodities—bread most commonly are forced to be sold at "fair" prices. One practice that proved particularly popular in Megara touched upon the aristocracy's invidious life style, as rampaging mobs of the poor would periodically force their way into the homes of the rich and demand feasts and entertainment-"symposia for the needy" as it were. Debt relief was a matter of greater urgency, and here too one finds the spirit of "popular justice" at work under an ordinance known as the palintokia, or 'return interest', law, existing debts were not only cancelled, but creditors were obligated to return to their debtors all interest that had already been legally "extorted."20 Other forms of retribution included the wholesale exile of

the supporters of oligarchy and the confiscation and public distribution of their estates. Among the victims of the latter policy was Theognis himself, who registers the disaster of his class with a clarity that crystallizes the immense disparities between the contending "moral visions":²¹

Now the ills of the agathoi have become boons to the kakoi; and they rule with perverted laws; for respect is perished, and shamelessness and hubris have conquered justice and grip the whole land.

The cup of exile was a bitter draught indeed, a lament repeatedly sounded in Greek poetry and prose as one of the worst fates that could possibly befall a human being: the loss of property and all civic rights; no longer able to honor the tombs of ancestors; old friendships lost and new ones unlikely ("Truly no man is a friend and faithful comrade to an exile"); forced into dependency upon others for protection or compelled to turn to piracy or mercenary service; and not least the soul-wrenching homesickness, rendered all the more unbearable by a searing thirst for vengeance. Alkaios, another exiled aristocrat from Theognis' era, rails at having to live "as a wretched rustic among the wolf-thickets" far from the refined luxuries and leisures he once knew, "longing to hear the assembly summoned and the council," things his father and his father's father "grew old possessing," but that now belong to "potbellied" Pittakos and the ascendant dêmos.22 Theognis' lamentation is equally bitter: "It strikes my heart black that others now possess my fair-flowered fields, and not for me do the mules draw the yoke of the plough." His one sustaining prayer is that Zeus will one day grant him his due, that he may yet "drink the black blood of those who seized his possessions."23

The grim supplication of Theognis was eventually answered. The "unbridled democracy" was violently overthrown by returning exiles around 580 BC, after the popular regime had been devitalized by internal disorders and a series of setbacks in foreign policy (including the loss of Salamis to Solon's Athens, and a naval defeat inflicted by the Samians over disputed colonial territories). Aristotle attributes the fall of the democracy to what he calls "disorder and anarchy," but more reliable is his observation that the exiles constituted so large a body—the dêmagôgoi having continued to banish "the notables" and redistribute their confiscated lands—that they were eventually able to defeat the dêmos in pitched battle. An overjoyed Theognis was moved to counsel his comrades on the best policy towards the defeated commons:

Set your heel upon the empty-headed dêmos, prick them with a sharp goad, and place a harsh yoke upon their necks; for you will not find a dêmos so loving of their master (philodespotos) among all the men the Sun looks down

The returning exiles needed little convincing: after twenty years of self-governance by the wretched "kakoi," a narrow oligarchy was established that excluded from power all save the counterrevolutionaries. For the next hundred years, the politics of reaction prevailed in Megara.

An aging Theognis was fortunate in his return to power, but isolated successes of that sort could not restore the hereditary aristocracy to the supremacy of the past. Changing economic conditions, the new style of warfare, expanding legal-political institutions—these and related developments necessarily called forth modifications in aristocratic life-style and ethos, thereby precluding any complete revival of the old order. When the newly enriched "goatskin men" of the past came to enter the ranks of the phalanx and the political arena—to say nothing of the marriage beds of impecunious aristoi—this did not merely create problems of continued domination for the hereditary elite, it created a profound moral dilemma, a challenge to those psychic or spiritual defenses that are integral to all forms of hierarchy: "Those that were kakoi are now agathoi!" Traditional justifications for exclusive status honor and political supremacy—i.e., martial prowess and great wealth—were no longer capable of providing unambiguous grounds for distinguishing "the noble and the good" from "the wretched and the base." Under such unsettling circumstances-"unendurable" for a Theognis-the pressing task of revising and refurbishing aristocratic standards could no longer beavoided.

We have already examined in some detail the sequential developments that were most instrumental in forcing this transvaluation: how, in the aftermath of rising material prosperity, the adoption of hoplite tactics leveled and collectivized the functionality and honor of the warrior role; and how ensuing "democratization" in the legal-political domain contributed to a deeper sense of communalism founded upon social justice and the rule of law. Aristocrats could—and would—still provide leadership in these areas; but the rationale and legitimacy for doing so had changed dramatically. They were no longer peerless warriors fighting heroically in the van, but stalwarts in a formation of equals; they were no longer "god-nourished" men holding an immutable and divine claim to the scepters of power, but the elected leaders of a community of citizens. To provide for the xynon esthlon, the 'common good' of the Polis, was the new criterion for continued aristocratic leadership; and for agonal aristocrats wishing to secure their share of public renown and glory, the manifestation of aretê would henceforth have to operate according to the norms of citizenship, a new modality that increasingly held sway in the arenas of communal life.

Becoming "good citizens" was not the only possible response for aristocrats confronted by the loss of exclusive dominance in politics and war. For those who found the arts of public compromise either too difficult or too distasteful to master, it was more comforting to redirect their passions towards the private sphere, in the form of heightened appreciation of leisurely pursuits. Suggestive evidence for this reorientation can be found in changing representations on funerary art: where the standard motif of the late Dark Age and early Archaic period depicts public mourning at the funeral bier of a dead hero and other militaristic features, later art portrays the deceased enjoying the fellowship and entertainment of the symposion. There is a corresponding emphasis on the life of pleasure in the Lyric poetry from this period, with eros, drink, and companionship forming the preferred subjects for inspired reflection and commentary. Advancing age and death (two other major themes) were "hated" in large part because they entailed the loss of such pleasures: 27

What is life, what is delight, without golden Aphrodite? May I die when I no longer care for secret love, sweet gifts, and the bed, things which are the flowers of youth, attractive to men and to women. But when painful old age comes, which makes a man both ugly and ashamed, ugly cares press ever upon his mind, and he no longer delights in beholding the light of the Sun, and he is hateful to the boys and dishonored by the women; thus has god set for old age a hard and grievous time.

Once a nobleman is dead, another elegy records, "he will lie in the deeprooted earth and share no more in the banquet, the lyre, or the sweet cry of flutes."²⁸ A popular sixth-century drinking song registers a similar devaluation of military and political concerns:²⁹

Health is the best thing for mortal men, second best is to be born with a beautiful stature, third is to be wealthy without fraud, and fourth is to be young with friends.

Cultural movements or trends typically announce and advertise their presence through the creation of various badges or labels that allow adherents a means for assertive self-reference and distinction. The Greek lexicon was similarly enriched at this time, as a new compound word—pointedly fusing aesthetic and status attributes—was coined to celebrate the emerging sensibility and its social carriers. They spoke of themselves as the *kaloikagathoi*, 'the beautiful and the good', men of noble blood all, whose spirits were refined by the gentle arts of the Muses and whose bodies were honed by rigors of sport. To add permanent lustre to the pride and achievements of these men, the finest sculptors and poets of Greece were commissioned to bestow immortality through the enduring mediums of stone and verse, and in both fields the canon of aristocratic

superiority finds clear-cut expression. The statuary of the Archaic period is dominated by the male nude known as the *kouros*, or 'youth', a monument slightly larger than life that usually served as a graveside memorial or as a dedication at religious shrines. The serene dignity and power that one senses in the chiseled posture of these figures—an idealized embodiment of noble demeanor and carriage—testifies to the skill of ancient masons in projecting the values of their patrons into stone.³¹ A similar artistry was demonstrated by the poets whose talents were employed to celebrate various noble accomplishments, those of the sporting arena above all. Excellence in the Games was customarily crowned with choral songs known as *epinikia*, or 'victory odes', a complex genre combining praise for the athlete and his noble lineage, along with supportive encomia to the gods, mythic heroes, and his native Polis.

It is worth attending briefly on one of the greatest of these professional poets, the Theban nobleman Pindar (b. 526 BC), whose densely woven compositions have been aptly described as codifying a veritable "metaphysic of aristocracy." Adopting for his lyrics a deliberately "archaizing" style and tone, redolent with heroic and mythic imagery that served to assimilate his patrons to the blessed immortals, Pindar repeatedly sounds the theme that all genuine excellence is a product of noble blood, of "hereditary virtue": 33

A man is a man of weight who has inborn (syngenês) glory, but a man who must be taught is an obscure man.

What comes of nature is the most excellent in all things.

Nobility is conspicuous by nature, passing from sires to sons.

When a man is born for virtue, he may, with the aid of god, whet his keen spirit and bestir himself for mighty glories.

Not infrequently amid these celebrations of aristocratic "nature," however, Pindar must register a discordant note, that of resentment and envy of the *esthloi* by their baser fellow citizens. Most striking in this regard is his ode for the Athenian Megakles, of the highborn Alkmaeonid clan, and winner of the chariot race at the Pythian Games in 486 BC:³⁴

At this newest triumph I have no little joy; but it is truly grievous when noble deeds (kala erga) are requited with envy.

The painful fact alluded to here is the recent ostracism of Megakles from his native city, a decision that had been voted upon in the Athenian assembly by a now sovereign dêmos. Although Pindar could still proclaim that "the good-piloting of cities depends upon the agathoi, who receive this as their hereditary trust," such a sentiment was less prescription.

tive than nostalgic; elsewhere he more realistically advises the cultivation of *hêsuchia*, 'peace' or 'quietude'—"the *hêsuchia* that delights in the symposion"—for those who enjoy great wealth and who have attained the summit of virtue.³⁵

The aristocratic life of leisure and pleasure we have been examining cannot be properly understood without a few words about one of its more controversial but central attractions. Unfortunately, while it is well known that the Greek conception of romantic and erotic love was strongly colored by homosexual—more specifically, pederastic—overtones, the cultural and historical significance of that fact is difficult to determine.36 What complicates our understanding is the wide range of attitudes and practices encompassed by Greek homosexuality; indeed, "homosexualities" might be a preferable term inasmuch as the warrior pederasty and bonding found in militaristic societies like Sparta and Krete differed significantly from the relationships formed in the gymnasia and symposia in places like Athens. It should be noted as well that even for those who were strongly inclined towards pederastic practices, the majority would more accurately be described as functioning bisexuals. The Greek lexicon is quite instructive here, as ta aphrodisia, 'the things of Aphrodite', was an omnibus term that encompassed both heterosexual and homosexual intercourse, without suggesting any invidious distinction or rank-ordering between them.

Given the selective veiling that pertains to sexual matters in general. it is hardly surprising that the origins of Greek pederasty are somewhat obscure, though scattered evidence suggests that the practice gained prominence only towards the end of the seventh century. That is the judgment of recent scholarship, and it is largely based on the fact that neither in the epics nor in the earliest Lyric poetry are there clear allusions to pederasty, whereas such practices are widely and openly celebrated in verse during the sixth and fifth centuries. The earliest pictorial representations of homosexual courtship on ceramic ware likewise date from the end of the seventh century. By the time it became an institutionalized feature of upper-class sociality, the standard relationship involved an adult male known as the erastês, or 'lover', and an adolescent known as the erômenos or 'beloved'. Literary sources usually attempt to present an idealized portrait by downplaying the erotic element and emphasizing the educational or socializing features, but in practice the two were typically combined. The basic social function of the adult was to serve the youth as both guide and role model, imparting the requisite ideals and customs that would prepare the boy for the world of adult male fellowship. Many of the poems in the Theognideia are in fact examples of this

"pederastic paideia," with Theognis passing on to his youthful erômenos the wise counsels that he himself had received from "noble men of great power." That relationships of this sort were largely confined to aristocratic circles and wealthy social climbers seems likely not only from the literary and pictorial evidence, but from the fact that the costly routines of the symposion and gymnasia were frills for the well-to-do and leisured. Occasional homosexual practices for the rest of the male population certainly existed, however, as the institution of male prostitution—a function legally restricted to slaves and noncitizens—unambiguously confirms.

Any attempt at understanding the complex nature of Greek pederasty must first take note of the general segregation and subordination of women within Polis society.38 Excepting festivals, sacrifices, and funerals, women were largely excluded from public life and restricted to what was deemed their natural domain in the oikos. From cradle to grave, every female of citizen status was under the legal and social protection of her nearest male relative or husband, and the honor of these men was partly dependent upon how closely the women of their household adhered to the cardinal feminine virtues of chastity, modesty, obedience, and inconspicuousness.39 The extent of gender segregation naturally varied along class lines, as only aristocratic and wealthy families could afford to limit the productivity of their women to the traditional domestic crafts of spinning and weaving. Women from lower down in the social scale were routinely obligated to undertake labors beyond the hearth, including the selling of bread and vegetables in the agora, working in the fields, and tending to livestock. As Aristotle pointedly observed, since the poor generally lack slaves, they are "forced by necessity to work their wives and children."40

With unsupervised contact between unattached males and females rather limited, particularly for the upper classes, opportunities for sexual satisfaction were necessarily greater with partners of the same sex. Female homosexuality, accordingly, was not unknown, as attested by the erotic poetry of Sappho of Lesbos (whence the term "lesbian"); but it was apparently less common and lacked the institutional supports that characterized the male variant. More decisive than the physical barriers to sexual contact, however, were the prejudicial norms and attitudes implicated in the Greek pattern of gender segregation. The forced exclusion of women from the major fora of public life could not help but reinforce the central ideological premise of patriarchy, that of innate female inferiority. Rendered secondary and subordinate to men, the capacity of women to provide positive reinforcements and appraisals of male self-image was somewhat constrained, a circumstance that correspondingly lessened their attractiveness as partners in emotive-erotic relationships. Marriages were not typically arranged to satisfy the demands of romantic love, but for the familiar triadic packaging of politics, property, and procreation. Although pragmatic considerations of that sort did not preclude strong affective ties between spouses (a phenomenon amply documented in our sources), much of the husband's affection took the form of what might be called "patriarchal paternalism," a disposition fostered by the fact that young girls (normally fourteen to eighteen years of age) were customarily given in marriage to mature men (usually past thirty), an age differential of considerable sociological magnitude in experience and temperament.

Family life and social life thus constituted two largely separate spheres within Polis society, and in the central aristocratic institution for male recreation, the symposion, the only women who participated were those with no reputation to lose: high-priced courtesans, common prostitutes, and the slaves and noncitizens who provided musical entertainment. In light of these institutional arrangements, it is readily understandable why upper-class men did not generally direct their emotive-erotic feelings rowards the opposite sex—whether the segregated females of citizen status or various "disreputable" women for hire-but rather towards younger generations of "the beautiful and the good," adolescent boys who shared, or were about to share, the masculine world of war, politics, and sport. These were the worthy love interests who received the personal poetry ("I love Kleoboulos, I am mad for Kleoboulos, I gaze upon Kleoboulos"41), and who were showered with attention and gifts, including the famous "kalos-cups," painted drinking vessels inscribed with the dedication "So-and-so is beautiful." The favors granted in return naturally included those of a sexual kind (the pictorial evidence abounds with scenes of intercrural and manual intercourse—anal penetration being generally frowned upon as dishonorable for a noble erômenos); but since heterosexual contacts would have proved no less satisfying in this regard, one must assume that other considerations were paramount. At the socialpsychological level, it seems manifest that adolescent males—in contrast to segregated females—were ideally suited and situated to provide the adult nobleman with fortifying validations of his public stature, as well as positive appraisals of his private self as a man (rather than as a "contracted" husband). And at a time when the agonal aristoi were finding it increasingly difficult to manifest their aretê in the traditional arenas of war and politics, the agôn of eros undoubtedly offered much in the way of compensatory gratification.

In assessing the sociological significance of these changes and refinements within aristocratic culture, several scholars have suggested that the pronounced emphasis on eros, luxury, and sport constitutes a kind of "soft escapism," a retreat from the martial vigor of the past triggered by the curtailment of aristocratic power over the course of the Archaic

period.⁴² As is perhaps clear from the preceding discussion, I am in substantial agreement with that interpretation—it conforms, after all, to the standard response pattern of other declining aristocracies. But two qualifications need mention: first, it should not be overlooked that the Homeric-style warriors had themselves cultivated euphronsune, the "good life" of joy and pleasure; and second, that aristocrats continued to exercise considerable power and influence in the oligarchical republics that generally prevailed at the close of the period. Changes in aristocratic cultural practice, then, were subtle, and entailed a rechanneling rather than any open rupture with the past. As the public roles of warrior and ruler were "democratized" by progressive economic and military developments, the aristoi naturally proceeded to a greater psychic investment in their leisurely pursuits—activities that the "ravening host" (Pindar's epithet for the dêmos) were less interested in sharing and less capable of "sullying." The intrinsic delights derived from such a life-style were no doubt alluring incentives in their own right, but a motive of weight was surely the desire to maintain a distinctive sense of status honor in the face of social upheavals that compromised or qualified the old standards.

Owing to the class-based asymmetries that have prevailed historically within the sphere of cultural expression, the response of the lower orders to the crucible of change can never be recovered and documented as adequately as that of ruling or privileged strata. That information gap is particularly pronounced in this instance, as written materials dating from the Archaic period derive almost exclusively from aristocratic sources, and it was this same class that utilized its wealth to dominate the visual media as well. Hesiod's impassioned articulation of the grievances, values, and aspirations of the subjugated masses—a rare surviving discourse from the depths—portrays vividly the early history of the period; but for the dêmos in ascendancy, no comparable body of literature exists. For Hesiod's heirs we must stitch together various strands of information, including the inferences that can be drawn from partisan aristocratic witnesses and known social changes, the testimony of archaeology, and, most revealingly, several poetic works that originated in popular religious culture.

When a Theognis laments the rise of "goatskin men" into the ranks of the agathoi, and castigates the wealth that procures their entry into the marriage beds of noble families, he confirms the reality of upward mobility for select segments of the dêmos. The wealth that had been diligently won by adherence to Hesiod's counsel of "piling work upon work" did much more, however, than allow for occasional hypergamy. In donning the panoply of the hoplite warrior, well-to-do peasants acquired the

means to act upon those ideals that Hesiod could only pray for; and though mute today owing to the silence of our sources, there can be little doubt that such men made themselves audible in the agoras and assemations of their time, demanding social justice and the rule of law. Rallying at first beneath the banner of Eunomia, their ideal was upgraded to lawgivers responding to the problems of civic factionalism or through tyrants who rose as champions of the disaffected, aristocratic domination was everywhere constrained to give way to a broader-based politics that citizenship.

With the political rise of the peasantry, the Polis as a functioning koinônia of citizens at long last entered the stage of history. 43 But though this progressively widening circle of civic self-governance constituted a revolutionary advance, the stirring rhetoric of "community" and "equality" should not obscure certain obdurate realities. Hierarchy—though demystified and ideologically transformed by the ethos of communal service-still remained operative throughout all sectors of Greek life. Pronounced material inequalities continued to divide the citizenry, and when speaking of "the rise of the dêmos," it must be kept in mind that the prosperous peasant-farmers who now swelled the ranks of the phalanx and who gained access to political power differed substantially from their poorer and more numerous neighbors. The men of hoplite status, generally those with landholdings in the thirty acre (twelve hectare) range, were still something of an elite group, rarely comprising more than a third of the free adult male population. For the smallholding majority, many of them fortunate to possess a couple of hectares, the most pressing concern was not political emancipation but economic survival, and it was here that the radical program for debt relief and land reform would repeatedly find its most ardent supporters.44 A fundamental opposition between the richer and poorer segments of Polis society would thus persist throughout Greek history, varying in scale and intensity, but ever vulnerable to the rupturing experience of stasis.

Although working the land and tending to livestock dominated the daily routines of peasant life, interludes of leisure and entertainment were sponsored by the many religious festivals that marked the changing agricultural seasons. 45 Ploughing, sowing, reaping, threshing—these were among the most important communal events requiring divine favor, and the religious rituals that had evolved to address that need formed the mainstay of peasant culture. Sacrifices to the gods furnished the occasion for public feasts symbolizing table fellowship within the community, and no celebration was complete without processions, dancing, and

music—activities that would in time give birth to the high art forms of tragedy and comedy. Particularly important were songs honoring the deities most responsible for the peasant's livelihood: Demeter "the bestower of glorious fruits and holy grains," Dionysus "the god of abundant grape-clusters," and Pan "the shepherd's god." The following Hymn to Gaia, the primordial earth-mother, captures something of the peasant's ideal:⁴⁶

To well-founded Gaia I will sing, the mother of all, eldest of all beings, she who feeds all the things that are upon the land, . . . through you, O Queen, good children and good fruits come into being, and to you it belongs to give livelihood to mortal men or to take it away. Happy and prosperous is the man you kindly honor, for to him all things are in abundance: his life-giving cornlands are heavy-laden, livestock abound upon his fields, and his oikos is filled full with good things. These men rule with eunomia in their Polis of fair women, and great happiness and wealth follow them; their sons rejoice in everfresh merriment, and their flower-laden daughters in cheerful playing bands skip over the flowers of the soft meadow. Thus it is with those you honor, holy goddess, bountiful spirit.

As the ancient city was founded upon an agrarian basis, the majority of its citizens did not look beyond Mother Earth for their immediate livelihood. For various indispensable accoutrements and appreciated refinements, however, peasants and nobles alike turned to the skills and services of the dêmiourgoi, the craftsmen and traders whose small numbers belied their great importance to the social and economic vitality of Polis society. 47 Indeed, for those communities that lacked sufficient farming lands or whose geographical location enabled them to play pivotal roles in the conveyance and exchange of needed resources, the trade and craft sectors were to become essential components within their economies. We noted earlier that numerous colonies and trading posts had been established throughout the Mediterranean basin during the expansion of the seventh and sixth centuries, and the interchange of commodities that these networks facilitated greatly enhanced the overall level of prosperity within the Hellenic world. The impact of accelerating commerce and trade on self-sufficient agrarian communities is never entirely harmonious, however, as expanding markets are typically accompanied by widening social disparities and distinct "hard times" for marginal peasants. The principal carriers of the new economic order—the merchant especially, and the craftsman to a lesser degree—would accordingly labor under a permanent cloud of moral ambivalence, at once distrusted and disparaged by landed citizens apprehensive of being "taken" in inequitable, profiteering transactions, but also welcomed for the valued goods and services that they alone could supply.

The ambiguous social status of the artisan dates back to the Dark Age period (cf. 2.I), as can be seen in Homer's portrayal of Hephaistos, the divine smith whose craftsmanship earned admiration from all the gods. but whose limping gait and misshapen form provided occasion for their "unquenchable laughter." Leisure was the aristocratic ideal, and if one had to work (rather than supervise), then let it be upon the land and not amid the fires and fumes of a dingy workshop. As Marx accurately observed: "Antiquity unanimously esteemed agriculture as the proper occupation of the free man, the soldier's school," while manufacture was widely regarded as "a corruption" fit for slaves, freedmen, and resident aliens lacking citizenship rights. 48 The justifications for this prejudice were manifold, beginning with the fact that craftsmen, unlike peasant-farmers, were thought to work for others in a fashion similar to landless laborers and slaves. Peasants were thus much closer to the Greek ideal of independence and self-sufficiency, while artisans were stigmatized for their occupational dependency. Powerful emotive linkages between soil, citizenship, and war provided additional grounds for disesteem, as those without proprietary ties to the land were judged to lack permanent, sustaining commitments to the community, analogous to noncitizens who were legally debarred from landownership. To these political-ideological considerations one must add that many crafts were not only intrinsically unpleasant but also potentially hazardous: tanners, fullers, and dyers had to cope with noxious smells, while potters and metalworkers routinely risked severe injuries when stoking kilns or pouring molten ores. Although aristocratic contempt for craft occupations appears to have grown with the expansion of slavery and its attendent devaluation of labor, there is no reason to suppose that any Archaic nobleman would have disagreed with the views of his Classical descendants Plato and Aristotle, both of whom declared that true citizenship was impossible for craftsmen, as the 'mechanical' (banausos) and 'huckstering' (agoraios) ways of life were "ignoble and inimical towards aretê."49

Artisans themselves no more held to these stereotypical slurs than did peasants the abusive label of *kakoi*. Indeed, a few of the more successful craftsmen managed to leave enduring testaments to their own self-pride and standing in the community. An early example is provided by a seventh-century sculptor who, in offering a costly *kouros* statue to Apollo, inscribed with the words: "Euthykartides the Naxian made and dedicated me," publicly announced both his financial success and his artistic self-esteem. A sixth-century sculptor from Chios celebrated his skills in similar fashion: "Far-shooting Apollo, receive this beautiful statue, one of the works accomplished by Archermos in his wisdom (*sophia*)." Several potters from sixth-century Athens commissioned costly bronze statuary as

well as commemorative stelae of themselves, placing these offerings on the acropolis for all their fellow citizens to behold. Vase painters were no less restrained in publicizing their accomplishments, often signing their products by name, "Sophilos made," "Exekias painted and made me," and in confirmation of Hesiod's adage "potter envies potter," there was even agonal rivalry: "as never Euphronios" declares a vase "made by Euthymides!" The numerous pictorial representations of agricultural and craft activities that appear on Archaic ceramic ware also confirm a keen interest in the various callings of labor; and it has not gone unnoticed that many of the workshop scenes are highly idealized, with serene and majestic artisans manifesting their skills before admiring onlookers. 50

Artisans who could afford costly dedications of the sort mentioned represented the elite of their professions, but the desire for public recognition their actions manifest was undoubtedly widely shared, as was the inner satisfaction they derived from technical accomplishment. Those feelings were well founded, seeing that many years of specialized and continuous training were required before a man could hope to chisel stone into divine statues, model soft clay into fine and durable wares, or transform ores into gleaming swords and shields. That craftsmen viewed their skills as a coveted patrimony is clear from the strong tradition of family continuity revealed by our sources. While sons of the *aristoi* disported themselves in the gymnasia and symposia, the sons of craftsmen were entering the arduous apprenticeship that would eventually make them accomplished masters, men whose artistic and technical skills secured for Greek wares a privileged position in the markets of the Mediterranean and beyond.

In any artisanal ideology, the most important and inspirational feature is the recognition that technology is the foundation and wellspring of civilization. Found in one form or another in most parts of the globe, in Greece the theme makes its first appearance in the Archaic Hymn to Hephaistos, the divine smith:⁵¹

Sing, clear-voiced Muse, of Hephaistos famed for skilled works, who with bright-eyed Athena taught splendid crafts to men upon the earth, men who before used to dwell in caves in the mountains, just like wild beasts. But now that they have learned crafts through Hephaistos the famed artist, they easily live tranquil lives in their own homes the whole year round. Be gracious, Hephaistos, and grant me *aretê* and prosperity.

Technical knowledge and humanity's ascent from barbarism—that theme was well known among the Greeks in several versions; we moderns commonly refer to it as the Promethean ideal, so named for the mythical Titan god whose bestowal of fire enabled helpless mortals to survive and

fashion the necessary furnishings of civilized existence. Our familiarity with this ancient tale derives primarily from Aeschylus' classic restatement in Prometheus Bound (mid-fifth century), wherein the Titan is credited with giving men not only fire, "the teacher of every craft to mortals, their greatest resource," but also knowledge of the techniques of healing, mathematics, writing, navigation, farming, the working of minerals, and divination. 52 In his detailed study on Greek myths, Geoffrey Kirk notes that Prometheus appears in the earliest mythical versions simply as the conventional "trickster" figure: the Titan cleverly maneuvers Zeus into selecting animal bones and fat for his sacrificial portion (an aetiological story designed to account for why humans keep the best portions for themselves), and when Zeus tries to neutralize this deception by withholding fire from humanity, the cunning Prometheus returns it by stealth. 53 Later on however, towards the end of the sixth century, Prometheus' functions are considerably extended, so much so that he becomes the great technological benefactor of humankind. The primary social function of this elaboration—which coincides with the general expansion of trade and craft activities in the Greek world—is readily transparent: like the Hymn to Hephaistos, it openly celebrates the artisan's contributions to society, thereby legitimizing both the profession and its practitioners. In an age marked by intense political struggles between hereditary elites and rising commoners, we can be certain that these "Promethean values" formed an important fortifying component in the ideological arsenal of the urbandêmos.

There is no shortage of such pride and assertiveness in the Hymn to Hermes, an early-sixth-century work that is our most illuminating source on the consciousness of Archaic artisans and merchants. On any casual reading, this lengthy poem comes across as an aesthetically flawed composition, with several incongruous elements made bearable only by a few scenes of high burlesque. Its apparent limitations, however, should not be traced to presumed artistic deficiencies in its anonymous author, but to difficulties entailed in adapting traditional mythic materials as a vehicle for expressing the contemporary ideals of the urban-dêmos. That point has been convincingly demonstrated by Norman Brown, who offers a brilliant sociological exegesis of the hymn in his book Hermes the Thief. Before turning to Brown's analysis, let us review the basic plotline of the story.

The Hymn opens with the circumstances of Hermes' conception: a philandering Zeus slips out of Olympus and makes love to Maia, a cavedwelling nymph goddess. She subsequently bears a son "of many ways and winning wiles, a robber, a driver of cattle, a bringer of dreams, a watcher by night, a thief at the gates." ⁵⁴ By the noon of his very first day

the infant Hermes is up and around, and comes across a tortoise which he promptly kills and fashions into the first tortoise-shell lyre. Towards evening the infant grows hungry and proceeds to raid the cattle of the gods; he drives away fifty cows from Apollo's herd, covering his tracks by wearing special sandals of his own making. After hiding the herd in a cave, Hermes invents firesticks and offers a sacrifice to the gods. He returns to his cradle, whereupon his mother reproaches him for his thieving ways and warns of Apollo's wrath. Hermes rebukes the censure and announces that he "will set upon whatever technê ('craft' or 'trade') is the best."55 He goes on to complain of the low status he and his mother share in their gloomy cave, and declares that he wants the same honors as Apollo; should Zeus refuse this request for equality, he will become "the leader of knaves" and proceed to rob Apollo's rich temple in Delphi.56 Apollo, in the meantime, is in search of his stolen herd, and eventually confronts Hermes with the crime. Unmoved by Apollo's threats, Hermes cunningly denies all knowledge of the deed. The sun god then carries the infant to Olympus for a trial before Zeus; again Hermes denies everything, even swearing an oath to that effect to his father. Zeus is moved to laughter over his child's "evil-minded" ways but nonetheless orders Hermes to restore the stolen property. As Apollo starts to drive away the cattle, Hermes suddenly begins playing on his lyre, which so captivates his elder half brother that he offers the cows as well as the office of supervising herds in exchange for the sweet-sounding instrument. The bargain is struck, and Apollo asks Hermes to swear that he will refrain from stealing back the lyre. Thereupon Hermes invents another instrument for himself, the shepherd's pipe, and the tale ends with the two agreeing to become dear friends. At no point in the Hymn is there any authorial disapproval of Hermes' thievish and deceitful ways; on the contrary, the god's actions are openly celebrated and admired for their advantageous consequences.

Brown begins his analysis of this odd tale by locating the likely milieu of both author and audience. Although Hermes' mythical origins are rooted in the "cattle raider" and "trickster" figure common to many primitive pastoral peoples, by the time of this particular composition, both the god and Greek society had long since moved beyond the rustic stage. The stock motifs of trickster and cattle raider remain, forming the core of the tale, but new elements have been grafted on which indicate that the myth has been upgraded for a changed environment. By examining the nature of these adaptations, Brown is able to show that Hermes has been ideologically "appropriated" by the craft and commercial strata of Polis society. Drawing support from comparative materials, Brown notes that authorial intentions are rarely observable in the core struc-

tures of myths-traditions that cannot be altered at will-but often emerge in the presentations of characters as "sociopsychological types." Just as the tales of Reynard the Fox and Brer Rabbit are not studies in animal psychology, but rather character types for expressing the sentiments and beliefs of subordinate classes under European feudalism and American plantation slavery respectively, so the Hermes character represents an dealized image of the Archaic urban-dêmos. This is established from the outset, as the infant Hermes bustles out of his cradle and invents the lyre, addressing the unfortunate tortoise in words that could not be more revealing: "Already a sign of great profit for me! . . . You shall be an advantage to me, and I will do you no dishonor, but first of all you shall profit me."58 He proceeds to dismember the tortoise, gaining its shell for the lyre. As Brown comments, the repeated emphasis on profit making and inventiveness (not just the lyre, but the special sandals, the fireworks, the shepherd's pipe) represents the operational creed of those who secure their livelihood by the skill of their hands and technical insight. When rejecting his mother's scolding. Hermes justifies his thieving ways on the principles of acquisitive individualism and "money's the man": "I will set upon whatever technê is best," he declares, for "it is better to live continually in fellowship with the immortal gods, rich and wealthy with many cornfields, than to dwell and sit in a murky cave."59 To get one's due and gain entry into Olympus (i.e., social standing), "shady practices" simply make good sense. A word frequently used to describe Hermes' actions is kerdaleos, translatable as 'cunning' or 'shrewd', but being derived from the Greek word for profit, kerdos, it more pointedly conveys with an eye to profit or gain', i.e., pecuniary advantage. When confronted with his larceny, Hermes exhibits clever litigious skills, sophistically implying to Zeus that since Apollo has "brought no witnesses," there can be no grounds for any accusation! The same smooth tongue and alert mind are on display during his sharp bargaining with Apollo, and in the end Hermes succeeds in gaining partnership over cattle and other honors—the "equality" he originally desired. Who else but Hermes, Brown perceptively reasons, could serve as a god for "the impudent and smooth-talking self-seeker" that haunted the agora?

The ideological affinity between the Hermes character and mercantile interests is indelibly forged in one particular passage that sacrifices conceptual propriety for the sake of sociological realism. After completing the deal for the lyre, Apollo voices a concern to Hermes: "Son of Maia, guide and shifty-minded, I fear you may steal from me both the lyre and my curved bow; for you have an office from Zeus to establish the works of exchange (epamoibia) among mankind." This association is at first puzzling: Apollo fears that he will be robbed and adduces as his reason Her-

mes' position as the god of epamoibia, 'exchange', or 'barter'. The mystery is resolved, however, when one recalls the attitude of horse-loving aristocrats towards those who "live by cheating and stealing from each other in the agora," and that Apollo was generally regarded as the quintessential "aristocratic" deity. The passage thus accurately conveys the aristocratic prejudice that equated commercial exchange with theft, and it affirms Hermes' standing as the spiritual patron of the urbandêmos. In a society where the ruling powers consider the typical tradesman a larcenous rogue, notes Brown, "it is only natural for him to react by justifying and idealizing theft." Hence the appeal of Reynard the Fox to medieval merchants, and the attraction of Hermes to the working classes of the ancient Polis—a god who, as Plato was to caustically observe, symbolizes "theft and verbal deceit and the ways of the agora." "

In fusing the old motifs of trickster and thief with the ideals of an emerging commercial culture, the Hymn sheds light on the turbulent period of its composition. Brown notes that two of the hymn's themes are innovations in the mythology of Hermes: the representation of Hermes as an infant, and the strife between Hermes and Apollo. The first device (with its pronounced stylistic drawbacks) symbolizes the comparative youth of the nascent urban economy and serves to accentuate the differences "between the established authority of the aristocracy [Apollo] and the native intelligence of the rising lower classes [Hermes]."62 By presenting Hermes as an infant, the poet also manages to produce a context that justifies the aggressive actions of his hero: Hermes is born to a lowly station, and the Hymn narrates his quest for equality; the hero's stated ambition is simply to secure the same honors and privileges as Apollo, the purple-robed aristocrat of Olympus. With this second innovation—the conflict between the two gods—the poet skillfully translates into mythic discourse the stasis between aristoi and dêmos, and the latter's struggle to secure social justice and political equality. The Hymn thus not only portrays the social psychology of the men from the agora—with Hermes as the model of cunning, inventiveness, enterprise, boldness—it also gives symbolic expression to the social aspirations of the urban-dêmos during the strife-torn Archaic period.

As told in the revamped myth, Hermes is successful in his quest for equality with Apollo. In historical reality, those who listened with delight to the exploits of the crafty god were advancing towards a similar destiny, for it is clear that the processes of democratization had raised the "common man" to an unprecedented level of political standing by the end of the Archaic period. Unlike the lower orders of the Near and Far East, subservient subjects who toiled in the service of Great Kings or hierocratic

bureaucracies, the peasants and artisans of Greece were able to establish themselves as self-governing citizens, freemen obedient to laws that were ratified in their own assemblies. The logic of social organization in the other cradles of civilization was altogether different, with ramifying consequences for the differing cultural trajectories of East and West. Perhaps nothing speaks louder about the nature of ancient Egypt or China in this respect than the anonymity and silence that envelops their "peoples": the peasants who harvested the grains made abundant by elaborate irrigation networks; the laborers and artisans who swelled the teams of corvée labor that chiseled, moved, and set up the massive stones of construction; the literate scribes and scholars whose minds belonged to their rulers and the apparatus of control. How different the situation in Archaic Greece, where the names of craftsmen appear on their products and where peasant-farmers not only sing of their ideals and censure the mighty, but proceed to realize those objectives through the creation of a legal-political order that effectively subordinates the ambitions of the few to the needs of the many. Although numerous factors contributed to these differences, beginning with the social response to distinct ecological settings, one essential point of contrast stands out: while the patterns of social life in the great civilizations of the East were predicated upon the existence of "a State stronger than Society," the Greeks avoided any such bifurcation by equating the Polis with its politai, its 'citizens'.63 Through direct participation in councils and assemblies, the citizenry in effect constituted the state, a circumstance that meant that the Polis was not an instrument for exploitation and coercion along the traditional ruler-ruled divide, but a collective magnification of the life of each individual citizen. As William McNeill has cogently observed, under such an arrangement, "experience could be widely shared without losing its intimate intensity, thereby unveiling new dimensions of human character and unleashing fresh springs of collective energy to produce the extraordinary flowering of classical Greek culture."64

That remarkable flowering, however, was to exact its own peculiar toll in human suffering and misery. As the progressive extension of full citizenship rights to the lower orders of the dêmos made exploitation within the community increasingly difficult, it inexorably followed that "external" victims would have to be procured—and in large numbers—if the requisite surpluses for the refinements of advanced civilization were to be maintained and expanded. Hence the disturbing dialectic of ancient Greek society, which was to feature the unparalleled elevation of the freeman, to full chattel slavery. The nature and development of that symbiotic Classical period.

3.II.v From Myth to Science, and the Occult: The Quest for Knowledge and Salvation

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

Pride of place in the "Greek Miracle" is usually accorded to the Hellenic contribution to scientific rationalism, and it was in the sixth century that the first impressive steps were taken in such fields as cosmology, astronomy, mathematics, geography, and biology. The pioneers in these studies all hailed originally from the western coast of Asia Minor, Ionia, where economic and cultural contacts with the older civilizations of Egypt and Babylonia were well developed. Building in part upon the accumulated empirical insights of their Near Eastern neighbors (who were particularly advanced in calendrical and engineering operations-vital arts in the maintenance of irrigation agriculture), the Ionians proceeded to produce generalized or "theoretical" knowledge, integrated systems of ideas and principles that constitute the beginnings of science and philosophy. As the historian G. E. R. Lloyd succinctly observed, the Greeks were the first to truly "discover Nature," i.e., to recognize that physical phenomena are not the products of random, arbitrary forces or supernatural powers, but regular events governed or patterned by determinable sequences of cause and effect.1

An instructive example of this emerging rationalism is the naturalistic account of earthquakes offered by Thales (c. 625-547 BC), generally regarded as the first of the physikoi, as those who reflected upon the processes and constitution of physis, or 'nature', presently came to be known. Thales conjectured that the earth was held up by water, and accordingly deduced that quakes must result from subterranean wave tremors rather than divine displeasure. As Lloyd notes, the idea that the earth floats on water was common to several Near Eastern mythical cosmologies, and the Greeks themselves had assigned the provenance of earthquakes to Poseidon, god of the sea. Thales' naturalistic explanation thus represents a rationalization of those magicomythical elements that had defined the traditional mentality. Similar departures from conventional wisdom characterized the speculative rationalism of the other physikoi. Anaximander (c. 611-546 BC) reasoned that thunder and lightning were caused by winds ripping through the clouds; Anaximenes (c. 587-525) contended that all of the myriad changes and transformations in the natural world were caused by the "thinning" or "thickening" of a primary substance aêr ('air' or 'mist'), e.g., clouds forming when aêr is condensed, yielding rain when further compressed, and so on Attempts were also made to account for the genesis of the entire world order through natural processes, such as the "separating out" through motion of various qualities from some primal unity. The cosmos itself was

thought by several of the physikoi (Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles) to operate according to some kind of universal "justice" or "natural law," an assumption that lies at the heart of the scientific perspective. Anaximander even conjectured about the origins of organic life, holding that the first living animals had been born spontaneously in "moisture" vitalized by the sun's rays, with humanity deriving from fishlike creatures. As myth and magic were thus displaced by reasoned explanationadmittedly more in the manner of bold speculation than through rigorous experimentation—and as the phenomenal world became the object of rational analysis and debate, the Greeks created a new form of cultural discourse that was to profoundly influence the course of human destiny: the agôn of ideas in the realms of science and philosophy.2

It has oft been remarked that in the process of discovering the regularities of nature, the physikoi conspicuously and pointedly "left the gods out." That observation is valid to a point, but only if one means by "the gods" the anthropomorphic deities of conventional religion; in other respects, theological elements figure rather prominently in the early cosmologies. Thales, for example, declared that "all things are full of gods," while Anaximander and Anaximenes expressly identified their primal substances as to theion, 'the divine'. Heraclitus maintained that "god" is immanent in the cosmos, as the Logos that governs all things. The precise meaning of these various propositions remains obscure—in large part owing to the paucity of surviving sources—but the adaptation and transfer of conventional religious predicates to the realm of nature does bespeak a continuing piety. Indeed, the basic world view offered by the pioneering physikoi is not one of "material necessity" devoid of all divinity, but a "naturalistic theology," which "rationalizes" traditional religion either by rejecting the personal gods of ancestral belief in favor of some form of "deified" nature, or by interpreting the conventional gods as allegorical representations of the more abstract truths discovered by philo-

Key aspects of that rationalistic perspective emerge clearly in the intellectual challenge to traditional belief posed by the poet-philosopher Xenophanes (c. 570-480 BC), whose remarkable views include the first rudiments of a sociology of religion:4

The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black, the Thracians that theirs have blue eyes and red hair.

But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able to draw with their hands and do the works that men can do, horses would draw the forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they each had themselves.

But mortals consider that the gods are born, and that they have clothes and speech and bodies like their own.

He also assails the orthodox views of the leading bards:5

Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything that is a shame and a reproach among men, stealing and committing adultery and deceiving each other.

As to his own beliefs, Xenophanes, much like the other *physikoi*, articulates a more abstract, philosophical religion, a credo basically shorn of anthropomorphic traits:⁶

One god, greatest among gods and men, in no way similar to mortals either in body or in thought.

Always he remains in the same place, moving not at all; nor is it fitting for him to go to different places at different times, but without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind.

All of him sees, all thinks, and all hears.

Irrespective of the enlightened religiosity contained within these naturalistic theologies, the rational investigation of nature presented an important challenge to traditional religious belief, and to the poets and seers who gave it form. By stripping Zeus, Poseidon, Apollo, and the other Olympians of their responsibilities for the workings of nature, the physikoi removed precisely those visible signs (earthquakes, rain, lightning, etc.) that had served to confirm the existence of the gods. A breach was thereby opened between faith and reason—or rather, between popular religion and philosophical theology—but the immediate social ramifications appear to have been negligible. Having emerged outside the institutional framework of conventional cultic practice, and being unattuned to basic religious concerns of peasants and warrior-nobles, these intellectualist views were largely confined to select circles of the highly cultured. Only with the advent of new educational arrangements in the more "critical" fifth century did rationalistic positions receive a wider distribution, and so contribute to the growth of religious skepticism and normative anarchy (to be discussed in 4.IV).

If the cultivation of reason constituted one important trend in the Archaic period, the celebration of mystery and the occult constituted another. Given that the seventh and sixth centuries were marked by far-reaching structural transformations and, through colonization and trade, widening geographical horizons, it is not surprising that our sources should suggest that this was also a time of considerable religious ferment. The dislocating experience of rapid or extensive social change commonly provides the

backdrop for religious renewal, whether radical or reformatory, as the linkages between society and its spiritual supports press for a new coherence. So far as can be reconstructed, religious agitation during the Archaic period appears to have been animated by two major impulses or concerns: a need for divine security or assurance on the one hand and a quest for personal salvation on the other.

Several distinguished students of Greek religion have argued that heightened anxieties regarding pollution and purification and the rising pan-Hellenic importance of the Oracle at Delphi are manifest signs that the unsettled conditions of the day had necessitated a search for new and more secure guidelines from divine authorities.7 In the absence of sacred canonical texts and a professional priestly stratum, it followed that regional shrines would come to exert a growing influence, and none more so than Apollo's sacred oracle, whose mantic priestess offered guidance to all suppliants, from Polis officials pondering issues of war and colonization to private individuals concerned with matters of hearth and kin. This was also an enterprising time for free-lance professional kathartai, or purifiers', whose arcane knowledge of incantation and ritual enabled them to remove the stains of hereditary or communally infectious pollution and to free tortured souls from the baleful influence of evil demons. Though difficult to assess directly, these practices are more readily understandable when set within the framework of Mary Douglas' seminal work on the sociology of "purity and danger," which underscores the fact that pollution rules and related beliefs generally serve to reinforce role performance and uphold traditional normative patterns. Such concerns are obviously most likely to come to the fore in times of social upheaval and mounting moral uncertainty, as individuals seek to reassert order and security through magical or divine assistance.

Spiritually akin to the search for greater religious security was the quest for personal salvation, most clearly discernible in the various "mystery cults" that arose promising both temporal and otherworldly rewards. It is legitimate to speak here of a general cultural trend, as one finds not only "popular" and lower strata variants (e.g., the Bacchic cult of Dionysus, the Eleusinian mysteries, and the mother-goddess Kybele), but intellectualist and higher strata affiliations as well (Pythagoreanism and certain Orphic sects). Apart from the likely connection between salvation concerns and the wrenching transformations then taking place within Polis society, one must acknowledge that the mystery cults filled a rather conspicuous void in the traditional religious conglomerate. Homer's Olympians, after all, provided no real comfort in the face of death, and the bard's stark portrayal of Hades as a place "where senseless dead men dwell" offered nothing in the way of afterlife compensation or redress.

The verses of Archaic poets abound in testimony to the grim realism and despair that dominated the Greek conception of death: "Be young, my dear heart," said Theognis, "there will be other men soon, but I shall be dead and become black earth"; or as Anakreon expressed it: "The abyss of Hades is frightful, the descent to it painful; once you have gone down, tis certain there's no coming back." The heroic fatalism of the Dark Age warrior, predicated in large measure upon the agonal conception of glorious combat and the irrationalities of warfare, was obviously less well suited to an age of yeoman-hoplites, whose incentives for war were more mundane and pragmatic, and whose normative orientation was accordingly more calculating and compensatory.

Whatever the social and historical origins of the various mystery cults and their salvation doctrines—the annual "rebirth" of nature and fertility magic; contact with shamans from the barbarian world; and the spread of ideas from India and Egypt are among the more prominent and reasonable conjectures—the core idea appears to have been essentially the same: through participation in certain secret rites, mystêria, entailing ritual purification and various ascetic practices, the initiate was offered the prospect of various earthly rewards—typically health, prosperity, and longevity—as well as the promise of a better fate in the life-to-come. In the "popular" mysteries, the content of that "blessed" afterlife seems to have differed little from a temporal paradise, but for the more intellectualist sects of Orphism and Pythagoreanism, an elaborate metaphysics of the soul was offered featuring numerous reincarnations (in all forms of life) and an eventual reunion with the universal Divine.11 The individual psychê, or 'soul', was thought to be an immortal fragment of the greater Divinity, but owing to some primordial sin, the psychê was imprisoned in an earthly body to do penance, the so-called sôma-sêma doctrine, which held that the 'body' is a 'tomb' of the soul. After a lengthy process of ritual purification, ascetic practice, and ethical conduct (which for the Pythagoreans included the cultivation of scientific mathematics and number mysticism), the psychê would escape the wheel of rebirth and return to its Divine origins. The fate of those who failed or who were not initiated differed according to the various sects; in certain branches of Orphism, unfortunates were consigned to lie forever in slime, while greater punishments—sometimes inflicted by terrifying monsters—were reserved for major criminals and malefactors. Belief in the immortality and divinity of the soul was thus linked to its common corollary: postmortem retribution and the horrors of Hell.

Though the mystery cults provided new forms of emotional satisfaction through programs of orgiastic release and ascetic discipline, and a measure of bracing hope against the finality of death, it is important to stress that mystic beliefs and practices did not displace worship of the

Olympians. On the contrary, most of the new cults were officially incorporated within the existing Polis religion through the expansion of ceremonial. The tyrants in particular showed a keen interest in fostering the mysteries of the "popular" gods Dionysus and Demeter, a policy that not only appealed to their supporters among the peasantry, but also weakened traditional aristocratic influence in the religious sphere. Lacking the systematization that comes from fixed dogma and hierocratic institutions, Greek religion always inclined towards eclecticism, the accommodation of new ideas being easily effected in most cases. In sociological terms, the popular mystery cults represented little more than an additional "insurance policy," with redemption being obtained not through any major reformation of life-style or moral disposition, but through institutionalized ritual, what Max Weber called "the sheer sacredness of the manipulation."12 Pythagoreanism and the stricter Orphic sects were exceptional in this regard, for the religious views of these groups did not simply supplement the shortcomings of the traditional religion, but actually constituted an alternative way of life that resulted in the formation of distinct subcommunities within Greek society. The higher demands that such sects placed on their adherents naturally restricted recruitment, thereby ensuring social marginality. Indeed, excepting a brief period when the Pythagorean order actually succeeded in imposing political hegemony over a number of communities in southern Italy, apparently through the conversion of powerful aristocrats, such groups lived in the shadows of the Polis and its patron deities.13 That is not to say, however, that the Orphic and Pythagorean movements were without historical significance. Their ideas regarding the immortality of the soul and eternal punishment would attract the speculative interest of a man named Aristocles, better known to his contemporaries and posterity as the philosopher Plato.

4

Classical Greece

"The period which intervened between the birth of Pericles and the death of Aristotle," wrote Shelley, "is undoubtedly, whether considered by itself or with reference to the effects which it produced upon the subsequent destinies of civilized man, the most memorable in the history of the world." A poet's enthusiasm admittedly, and not the kind of observation that opens most contemporary books on the ancients. Unlike the earlier Romantics, we disenchanted moderns (or postmoderns!) no longer tend to confuse the Greeks with the harmony and beautiful proportion of their sculptured statues, and the "darker side" of their civilization has long since been fully illumined. But though the once popular "cult of the Classical" has given way to a more balanced assessment, the factual basis for Shelley's encomium remains: the principles and ideals for virtually all that comprises secular or "humanist" culture were initially established by the Greeks—in the visual arts, in poetry, in tragic and comedic drama, in historiography, philosophy, and science. The history behind that unparalleled cultural flowering is exceedingly complex and studded with so many remarkable developments and personages that the period ranks as the most concentrated "golden age" hitherto recorded. To cover so eventful an epoch in its entirety obviously lies beyond the compass of this study; as before, our focus will be trained on the core institutions, the major social groups and strata, and the normative developments of greatest relevance. In an effort to cope with the accelerating pace of social and cultural change that marks the short century and a half between the victory over the invading Persians in 490 BC and the extirpation of Greek autonomy by the Macedonians in 338 BC, a new organizational format will be adopted. In lieu of two separate sections, one devoted to socioeconomic conditions, the other to norms and values, a closer narrative interweaving between the major structural developments and their attending cultural response and expression will be offered.

4.1 SLAVERY AND THE MATERIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION

In his notebooks for Das Kapital, Karl Marx observed that "the history of classical antiquity is the history of cities, but of cities founded upon

landed property and agriculture." Max Weber stressed the same correlation in greater detail, pointedly contrasting the integral unity of urban core and rural hinterland that characterized the ancient city, with the increasing polarization of town and country that marked urban developments in the medieval period.² Only recently, however, has the orientation of Marx and Weber come to ground our understanding of the ancient economy, for this was a field long encumbered by misleading modern analogies and concepts.3 Impressed by the resplendent urban veneer and extended commercial linkages and manufacturing skills of Classical civilization—all of which can be easily misread when set against the stagnant backdrop of the rural Middle Ages-distinguished scholars such as Meyer and Rostovtzeff (and even Marx's colleague Engels) tended to see in the ancient economy a smaller-scale version of the modern, replete with its own nascent "capitalism," entrepreneurial "bourgeoisie," bustling "factories," and "scientific agriculture." As with most cases of anachronism, the empirical "facts" for this perspective were not so much lacking or imaginary as simply misconstrued: form was mistaken for content, and parallels were drawn without adequate reference to context. For while it is both true and important that advanced commercial relations did develop in classical antiquity, involving not only the production of commodities for profit but also a significant monetization of economic life, the encompassing institutional framework was such that these practices functioned in a manner sociologically distinct from those associated with market-based economies. As Karl Polanyi tellingly observed in criticism of the formalist precepts of the "modernist" school, relations of production and distribution cannot be understood apart from the historical contexts that define their logic of operation; in contrast to modern capitalism, the ancient Polis economy—even in its most mature phases during the Classical and Hellenistic periods—remained "embedded" within a distinctive sociocultural matrix that prevented the full flowering of capital istic rationalism.4

The vast majority of poleis were firmly founded upon an agrarian basis, with upwards of 90% of the population living directly off the land. Necessary supplemental tasks, which above all included securing metals and transforming them into implements of labor and war, were carried on by traders and craftsmen, but both the volume of materials exchanged and the number of personnel involved were generally quite small. Trade and craft activities began to expand markedly, however, in the wake of the massive colonization movement and the introduction of coinage early in the sixth century. By the start of the Classical period there were a number of major city-states that came to depend on seaborne trade for the disposal of refined craftwork and agricultural surpluses, receiving in

exchange essential raw materials, grains, slaves, and luxury items. Aristotle's observation on the origin of minted currency provides a succinct summary of the motivating principle involved:

For when they had come to supply themselves more from abroad by importing things in which they were deficient and exporting those of which they had a surplus, the employment of money (nomisma) necessarily came to be devised. For the natural necessaries are not in every case readily portable.

Growing trade interdependence in turn fostered a certain measure of commodity specialization, a revealing glimpse of which is afforded by a fragment from a fifth-century comedy listing some of the more valuable cargoes that were being unloaded at Athens' Piraeus, then the busiest port in the Aegean (the humor lies not in any exaggeration of the trade inventory, but with the incongruity of employing a mock-epic style for such an "unheroic" subject):

Tell me now, ye Muses that dwell in Olympian mansions, all the blessings (since the time when Dionysus voyaged over the wine-coloured sea) which he hath brought hither to men in his black ships. From Cyrene silphium-stalks and ox-hides, from the Hellespont mackerel and all kinds of salt-dried fish, from Thessaly salt and sides of beef, . . . Syracuse provides hogs and cheese . . . These things then come from those places; but from Egypt we get rigged sails and papyrus, from Syria frankincense, while fair Krete sends cypress for the gods, and Libya provides plenty of ivory to buy. Rhodes provides raisins and dried figs, while pears and fat apples come from Euboea, glossy almonds come from the Paphlagonians, and are the ornaments of a feast. Phoenicia provides the fruit of the palm and the finest wheat flour, Carthage supplies carpets and cushions of many colors.

To accommodate the expanding volume of trade, shipwrights began constructing larger transport vessels towards the end of the sixth century, and more elaborate commercial arrangements—including loan capital, contractual partnerships, and rudimentary insurance mechanisms—came into being to finance shipping ventures. Cargoes were typically comprised of agricultural goods, raw materials, and finished wares that could command high prices. Mass-produced craftwork never bulked large in such trade, as economies of scale were unattainable given the elementary level of technology, the high costs and risks of transport, and the low demand of peasant-based communities. Craft production accordingly remained geared to the satisfaction of local needs, a market that necessarily limited output. One industry that has occasionally been singled out as an exception to this is pottery, a commodity well known to archaeologists and museum goers owing to its comparative durability. Even

here, however, the scale remained modest, as a single pertinent example will demonstrate. At the time when Athenian fine-painted pottery established a near monopoly in the Mediterranean during the late sixth and fifth centuries, it has been estimated that no more than 150 potters and painters were employed in its production; and when everyday ceramic ware and storage amphorae are included, the work force rises to a total of less than 500 people.⁷

The marginal status of manufacturing and commerce was not simply a consequence of various technical or logistical barriers, however, or of their attending psychological inhibitions. As both Marx and Weber discerned, economic practices within the ancient city were fundamentally regulated and delimited by the encompassing pattern of social organization, which afforded primacy to political and status considerations and severely restricted the scope for notions of optimum productivity and market advantage. The "political economy" of Polis society was oriented not towards any maximal utilization of the available productive forces, but towards the civic or public existence of the citizen, i.e., the collective social relations between members of the *koinônia tôn politôn*. To understand how the politics of citizenship governed material production, one must begin with the land-citizen nexus.

From the very inception of Polis society, land ownership appears as the exclusive right of citizens, whose access to the soil is mediated by their membership in a tribal/civic confraternity that collectively appropriates and defends the territory upon which it is based. That proprietary prerogative in turn serves to validate and enshrine the ideal of the citizen as an independent yeoman-hoplite, a "free" man who sustains his family with the produce of his ancestral klêros and who fights in the ranks to secure the territorial interests of his community. In addition to fostering the various social prejudices against the "dependent" and largely landless "men of the agora" discussed earlier (3.II.iv), this citizen monopoly on land carried other economic consequences. Legally debarred from acquiring landed property within the territorial confines of the Polis, free noncitizen residents or metoikoi (whose presence has been documented for most of the major poleis and whose numbers fluctuated around ten thousand in classical Athens) had little choice but to concentrate in the "open" professions of manufacturing, trade, and money lending—thereby reinforcing the bias that such occupations were a "corruption" for citizens.8 From these interwoven structural and normative constraints, it followed that the craft and commercial sectors of the economy would remain not only comparatively small scale, but also operate under considerable disesteem by being confined to low status citizens and metic "outsiders." That social "stigma" likewise helps to account for the pervasive "anticapitalist" tone that is repeatedly sounded in Greek cultural discourse, from peasants railing against the unscrupulous "huckstering" of retail traders and merchants to aristocrats belittling the virtues of "banausic" artisans and laborers. The basic orientation of state economic policy also becomes understandable when set against the occupational distribution of the civic population, for as Max Weber noted, the Polis consistently tended to serve the "consumer interests" of its "agrarian stuffs and by regulating prices on staple commodities—and not, as in the burghers" in search of export markets.

The ancient economy thus took its bearings from the rhythms of the countryside, and the activities of its markets, workshops, and harbors were symbiotically attuned to the capacities and needs of that agricultural base. As Marc Bloch observed, every agrarian system, as it develops in response to its natural environment, forms "an intricate complex of techniques and social relations." We have already had occasion to mention several of the more consequential features of the Greek landscape: the mountainous topography that favored a dispersed and nucleated settlement pattern; the shortfall of fertile alluvial plains that led to the expansionary expedients of colonization and interpolis warfare; the scarcity of important raw materials (copper and tin above all) that gave impetus to long-distance trading, itself facilitated by easy access to the seas that washed the extended peninsular and island coastlines. Situated in a climatic region of winter rains and light soils, the Greek countryside was not noted for its bumper harvests and generally required careful and intensive tendance if adequate yields were to be realized. To "pile work upon work" was Hesiod's sound counsel, "so that Hunger may hate you, and the dear grain goddess show favor, filling your bins with the necessities of

Cereal production was the most pressing concern on the typical peasant holding, with wheat and barley forming the staple crops, supplemented by various legumes, fruits, and garden vegetables. A biennial rotation—alternating the fields between cultivation and fallow ("the defender from ruin," as Hesiod calls it)—seems to have been commonly adopted in order to minimize soil exhaustion, though various intercropping arrangements are also attested. The two principal "cash crops" were the olive and the grape, both suited to the dry climate and soil, and readily portable in commodity form as oil and wine. Good pasturage was in chronic short supply, apart from a few regions such as land-rich Thessaly, and as a consequence the rearing of cattle and horses did not occupy a large place in Greek agriculture. Goats and sheep, however, thrive on

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highland scrub and stubble, and were raised in considerable numbers, the one providing cheese and milk, the other wool and meat. The basic implements of agricultural production remained rudimentary: an irontipped or wooden scratch plough, the sickle, the mattock and mallet, the axe and spade—a panoply whose effectiveness relies heavily upon human muscle power and stamina. Oxen and mules were the standard draft animals, but many smallholders lacked the means to yoke a plough team of their own and were constrained to borrow from neighbors or the local aristocrat. The low level of technique coupled with the limited yield that could be wrung from the light soils left little time for relaxation, a point underscored by an agricultural calendar that enjoined labor intensive tasks throughout the year: the repeated tillage operations to improve moisture retention and to aerate the topsoil; a staggered cycle for the sowing and harvesting of various crops; the grafting and pruning operations; the endless offensives against weeds; the tendance of livestock; terracing operations on hillsides; and the numerous supplemental tasks that are required to maintain any plot or farm in working order. 11 Little wonder, then, that Hesiod's great poem is essentially one long cautionary tale against "Idleness," pressed home by the warning that those who dally in its company will find Famine and Poverty attending close behind.

While ecological conditions and the implements of production remained basically uniform and unchanged throughout the course of Greek history—apart from limited deforestation and a degree of soil exhaustion—the social relations of production, which turned on the ownership and control of land and labor, exhibited greater flux and variety. As we have already seen, much of the political turmoil in early Polis society stemmed from developments in landholding patterns, typically involving matters of proprietary concentration and the status of peasant klêroi, whether free or encumbered by various service obligations or mortgage claims. These landholding arrangements in turn served to regulate the organization of human labor power, setting limits on the scope and scale of both independent and "compulsory" labor. Since we cannot here examine all the many local variants or the enduring mixed forms that characterized the land-labor linkage, let us briefly review the two basic patterns, the one featuring a more national or collective form of exploitation, the other the coercive power of class or property.

In the so-called conquest states, such as Sparta and Thessaly, indigenous populations had been early on enserfed or "helotized," and thereafter constrained to provide produce and services to their overlords. Though apparently on a smaller scale, several of the newly founded colonial settlements are also known to have forced indigenous peoples into collective servitude, such as befell the Killyrioi of Syracuse, the Bithynians

of Byzantium, and the Mariandynians of Heraklea-Pontica. Though we shall probably never know the exact juridical status of groups like the "naked ones" of Argos, the "dusty-feet" of Epidaurus, the "sheepskinwearers" of Sikyon, or the thousands who were characterized as the "helots" of Arkadia, it is all but certain that they constituted a source of dependent labor for the full citizens. In most of the major Greek communities, however, it was not through these collective or "political" forms of exploitation that the land received its necessary complement of labor, but through the more immediate economic mechanisms of clientage, debt bondage, and chattel slavery.¹²

The extent to which slavery formed the material pedestal for the glories of Hellenic civilization has long been a subject of intense debate, much of it marred—as Moses Finley has documented—by the intrusion of moralistic evaluations and ideological bias.13 The only proper scientific approach is a historical-sociological one, which situates the phenomenon within its defining institutional context and traces its emergence and development. Our effort to provide a general synthesis on this subject will proceed from the following consideration: for any society-or to speak more accurately, for any social segment or group-to develop a labor system that is either primarily or indispensably sustained by "unfree labor," that group must have not only a requirement or need for such labor, but also the power capacity to procure and maintain it. As for what might be considered the third factor, supply or availability, it seems to be the case that where the first two conditions obtain, they are usually sufficient to force creation of the third, whether through the suppression of others within the society or through the importation of deracinated outsiders.

On the basis of what can be pieced together from the Homeric epics and a fragmentary archaeological record, historians have concluded that the exploitation of slave labor was restricted in scale throughout the Dark Age period. A few powerful warrior-nobles employed female domestics in various household capacities and utilized a limited number of male slaves to work the fields and attend to livestock; impoverished freemen known as thêtes also supplied labor services in exchange for food and shelter. Slaves were acquired through war and raiding (though a few exceptional purchases are also mentioned), and as integration into the oikos appears to have been common, strong personalist ties with their masters were probably not unusual (2.II). Our information on the dêmos is less satisfactory, but what evidence there is depicts a free peasantry struggling to survive on small independent holdings. As the maintenance costs in food, shelter, and clothing would have far outweighed the benefits on all but the largest estates, it is highly unlikely that servile labor found any systematic

usage beyond the ranks of the *aristoi*. Nor are there any grounds for assuming that slaves played any vital role in the craft sector, for not only were the Dark Age *dêmiourgoi* few in number (and often itinerant), but the limited scale of their operations—supplying local households on commission—precluded any significant utilization of slave labor.

As economic activity intensified over the course of the Archaic period, through colonization and the expansion of commerce and trade, an "exchange economy" began making inroads upon formerly secluded autarkic households and communities. New opportunities for the accumulation of "wealth without limit" unleashed various productive as well as predatory pursuits, already attested to in Hesiod's poetry. Indebtedness, the loss of one's lands to others, the necessity of buying and selling on the local or regional market—all this testifies to an extremely volatile, competitive environment, one where each individual must take diligent care in "putting his oikos in good order." Differentiation within the peasantry proceeded apace, as some rose from the ranks of the "kakoi" to full hoplite status, while others suffered emiseration and displacement from the land. Hesiod himself can be taken as a forerunner of the rising yeomanry: a hardworking peasant-farmer, he employs a few slaves to assist him in his daily toil and hires a supplemental laborer or two at harvest time (he even includes advice on "turning out the thês" once the grains have been stored). As before, these slaves are the products of successful wars and plundering raids, though some will have been acquired indirectly through barter or purchase. The ownership of human property was almost certainly a luxury beyond reach for the majority of smallholders in Hesiod's day, however, as those struggling to avoid foreclosures and "burning-eyed Famine" obviously lack the means to utilize dependent labor.

Slavery continued to provide a source of supplemental labor for the Archaic warrior-aristocracy, the basic pattern having changed little from the Dark Age period: the majority of slaves remained domestic and female, while a smaller number of male captives toiled in the fields. While it is likely that larger estates began increasing their utilization of slaves with the general rise in material prosperity, their primary labor requirements were addressed through other means. Just when the process began is difficult to determine, but by the end of the seventh century it is apparent that large segments of the free population had fallen into ruinous dependency to the aristoi, some as clients constrained to yield produce and labor services to their masters, others as debt-bondsmen, whose contracted loss of liberty typically entailed forfeiture of their lands as well. Clientage arrangements were a legacy of the turbulent Dark Age, but there is every reason to believe that traditional exactions were becoming

more onerous under the changing conditions: a rising chorus of contemporary protestations against the rapacity of "gift-devouring" and "silver-loving" nobles carries that implication, as does the comparable reaction by the feudal lords of western Europe, whose exploitation of their own dependent peasantry intensified markedly once new luxuries became available with the revival of commerce and urbanization in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. ¹⁴ Even more strongly shackled than the client was the debt-bondsman, a formerly free peasant whose economic difficulties compelled him to indenture land and person in exchange for life-sustaining assistance in emergency foodstuffs, seed, and equipment.

In a seminal article that examined the earliest forms of servitude in classical antiquity, Finley demonstrated that the principal aim of creditors in lending to the poor was not the prospect of enrichment through high interest returns—something the destitute could hardly be expected to supply—but to obtain command over the debtor's labor power. 15 Such a method for mobilizing labor had several distinct advantages over outright slavery, for though human chattels could be exploited without juridical or political constraint, they formed a permanent work force that required provisioning during peak and slack periods alike. Moreover, as a form of "fixed capital," the slave represented a valuable investment, one requiring both diligent care and policing if the initial purchase price and maintenance costs were to be recompensed by productive service. Debtbondsmen, in contrast, were not only responsible for their own sustenance, but could be utilized more selectively to satisfy the seasonal labor demands of the estate. As an added attraction, the loan mechanism offered the very real possibility of acquiring the debtor's holding, as a "forced" default in the contracted services and payments could be easily arranged by the unscrupulous (nocturnal vandalism, for example, or having livestock "stray" into the victim's field, were—and remain—standard ploys for harassing the smallholder). Why, then, was this flexible system of exploitation—with its cost-effective extraction of surplus so well suited to the interests of the propertied elite—abruptly terminated?

In our historical survey of the Archaic period (3.I), we noted that one of the primary causes of political unrest lay with the deteriorating position of the smallholding peasantry, as evidenced by their repeated demands for debt cancellation and redistributions of the land. Open class warfare erupted frequently over those very issues, paving the way for reformist lawgivers or the usurpation of power by popularly backed tyrants in most of the major city-states. In the case of Athens, where "the many were enslaved to the rich" and "the land was under the control of the few," continued civic factionalism led to the sweeping reforms of Solon, which included not only proscriptions against debt bondage and

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other forms of dependency, but the establishment of a new constitution that afforded the masses a greater measure of political power and legal protection. Under the tyranny of Peisistratus, the independent standing of the peasantry was further strengthened through various measures of material relief, a populist course that marked the ascendancy of most other Greek tyrants as well. Whether through timely constitutional reforms or through the agency of popular autocrats, we see that the dependent and debtor classes within Polis society were able to successfully reclaim their status as free citizens, thereby limiting or suspending those exploitative practices that had entailed the subjugation of civic "insiders." As the leisured and propertied elite were now politically and (in some cases) legally debarred from fully exploiting their fellow citizens, they were constrained to look elsewhere for a solution to their labor needs, "outside" the koinônia tôn politôn. The end result was a massive intensification and expansion of what had formerly been a rather limited practice: the utilization of slave labor, full chattels whose forcible importation into the world of the Polis began to accelerate rapidly from the middle of the sixth century onwards.16

The sociological correlation between the emancipation of the peasantdêmos and the transition to full-scale chattel slavery finds its clearest expression in the fact that poleis that developed furthest in the direction of democracy were, correspondingly, also noted for possessing large numbers of slaves. Athens is the primary example, but perhaps the most revealing evidence concerns Chios, a prosperous island polis that not only established one of the earliest democratic constitutions, but is also reputed to have been the first Greek community to rely heavily on imported human chattels.¹⁷ These are suggestive connections, but it would be misleading to view the democracy-slavery nexus in too narrow a political sense, for it is well established that several advanced commercial oligarchies-most notably Korinth and Aegina-likewise proceeded to develop substantial slave populations. The key point rather involves the overall pattern of social organization, which was geared to the enhanced political status of commune members. In contrast to the social formations of the Near and Far East, where citizenship was unknown and where peasant and urban masses remained bound by various forms of collective dependence and servitude to the state apparatus, the institutional and cultural "logic" of Polis society enabled humbler members of the community to fend off efforts to reduce them to subject status. It was that same logic that necessitated, in turn, the systematic development of a labor system that would feature a hitherto unparalleled reliance on chattel slavery. Once the latter arrangement began finding institutional elaboration, it readily spread beyond the confines of "democratizing" polities, as aristocratic and oligarchical regimes likewise required domestic peace, if only as a surety for communal military purposes in an era of hoplite warfare.

The preservation and extension of freedom within the citizen-body thus brought in its wake the negation of freedom—and humanity—for those outside it. That sequence is of great significance, for it controverts the widespread notion that slavery somehow paved the way for democratization in the ancient city, whereas in actuality it was the political rise of the dêmos—and the labor vacuum thereby engendered—that forced a shift and reorganization in the locus of exploitation. That the institution of chattel slavery subsequently came to enhance the civic experience, and to sustain and refine the effective operation of democratic politics, that is an altogether different matter—and, as we shall see, a fundamentally correct characterization.¹⁸

Concurrent with the peasantry's political ascent from bondage was another development that fostered the emergence of a slave mode of production: the economic expansion of the late seventh and sixth centuries and its articulation within the existing institutional framework of Polis society. As Greek communities multiplied their contacts throughout the Mediterranean in the aftermath of colonization, both the range and scale of seaborne trade grew considerably. With emerging markets available for the disposal of surplus produce—abetted in due course by the spread of coinage—the agrarian economy became increasingly involved in supplemental commercial transactions. Craft production likewise responded vigorously to rising material prosperity, in shipbuilding, the various construction trades, and in arms manufacture for the burgeoning number of hoplites. This market-induced spur to production increased the demand for labor in all sectors, rural as well as urban, but here again a distinctive "political economy" imposed limits to the utilization of citizen employment. The overwhelming majority of citizens were themselves independent producers: most as yeoman-landowners and smallholders, a lesser number as craftsmen and traders. So "occupied," these citizens were structurally unavailable and, no less important, psychologically unprepared to serve as hired labor, i.e., as "dependents" in the employ of others. A breach with the practice and ideal of the landed citizen was reserved only for the most unfortunate, the relatively small number of impoverished thêtes who, divorced from the land and lacking the means and skills for craftwork, were compelled by need to supply seasonal labor in the countryside and occasional day labor within the urban center. The size of this declassed stratum available for hire was restricted and inelastic, however, for whenever substantial numbers of the dêmos were threatened with comparable impoverishment, their status as citizens enabled them to participate in

the political process and press for relief, either through war policies and colonization or through a redistribution of wealth via factional struggle. In short, so long as the citizenry remained intent and capable of exercising their exclusive right to land ownership and the full independence that befits "freemen," the Polis did not possess within itself either the means or the inclination to supply an expanding economy with the requisite labor. Owing to its superior military and economic standing vis-à-vis "barbarian" peoples, however, the Polis did have the capacity to capture and import that labor on a massive scale. The full realization of the Polis ideal—a koinônia of free and independent self-governing citizens—was thus inextricably bound up with the transition to chattel slavery, initially because the emancipation of the peasant-dêmos created an offsetting demand for servile labor, and subsequently, because the emergence of a slave economy preserved the land-citizenship bond that keyed and sustained the entire social order.

By the start of the Classical period, the transition to a slave mode of production had been made by many communities, particularly those in the forefront of political and/or commercial development, such as Athens, Korinth, Miletus, Aegina, Megara, Chios, Samos, and Syracuse. Although demographic evidence is frustratingly scarce owing to the virtual absence of recorded information (occasional mention of naval and infantry forces is the major exception), the population estimates that economic historians have put forward on the subject of slavery remain instructive. Regarding the overall proportion of enslaved and helotized peoples in the total population of Classical Greece, the most plausible extrapolations suggest something on the order of 30%.20 In the case of Athens, the wealthiest and most populous state in the Classical period, there is general agreement that the number of adult male citizens reached some 40,000 by mid fifth century and that the slave population ranged between 80 and 100,000. Korinth, another prosperous community active in trade, is thought to have had some 15,000 adult male citizens, and approximately twenty to thirty thousand slaves. For Boeotia, an agrarian region roughly the size of Attika but composed of several independent poleis (the most notable of which was Thebes), the combined number of adult male citizens probably reached 30 to 40,000, with corresponding numbers for the servile population. By far the greatest imbalance existed in Sparta, where a warrior class of five to eight thousand adult male Spartans (with the aid of politically dependent perioikoi and other allies) held down a subject population of Helots whose numbers are thought to have been around 150,000.21 As speculative as these various estimates may be (and I have generally provided the more conservative figures), confidence in the overall impression they create—that slavery was a basic and conspicuous fact of life within Polis society—is reinforced by the countless references to slaves that occur in all the various genres of Greek literature, on topics ranging from sex to taxes, friendship to torture, religion to warfare.²²

The question of numbers is of course far less significant sociologically than the question of function and social location-after all, the slave population of the Old South during the heyday of "King Cotton" barely exceeded a third of the regional total, and no one would dispute that this was a society fundamentally dependent on the exploitation of slave labor. Another point of comparison is similarly instructive: whereas slave ownership in the antebellum South was concentrated in the hands of a narrow plantocracy (some three-quarters of the free whites owned no slaves at all), the ownership of human property in ancient Greece was spread more widely throughout the social scale. The functional utilization of slaves also appears more diverse in antiquity than in the Old South, where employment was overwhelmingly geared towards satisfying the manifold needs of the commercial plantation.23 Massive estates or latifundia on the Roman or American scale were a rarity on Greek soil, with the consequence that slaves were more widely deployed beyond the agrarian sector. Domestic service, mining, craft production, and employment by the state complemented agriculture as the areas of highest slave concentration.24

The utilization of slaves for domestic purposes appears to have been extensive throughout the social hierarchy, with even the smaller oikoi owning a slave woman or two for household chores, nursing, and textile making. Given the gender bias that has marked most scholarship to date, it needs stressing that this kind of service was anything but "unproductive"; food preparation alone was an immensely laborious process, entailing hours of monotonous grinding and pounding of unmilled staples. Those of higher social standing had both the means and status requirements to employ additional, more consumption-oriented servants: among the wealthiest few, conspicuous display was manifested through maintenance of a servile retinue that included litter bearers, messengers, doorkeepers, musicians, and concubines; while many yeoman hoplites were accompanied on campaigns by personal body attendants, who relieved the warrior of the burden of carrying his own armor.25 Though all slaves were juridically classified as property—"animate tools" in Aristotle's lexicon—the lot of the domestic slave was probably the most humane, a justifiable inference from the ritualistic ceremonies that registered such slaves as members of the household and from the expressions of mutual loyalty and affection that appear in Greek literature.26 It was not uncommon for domestic slaves to be rewarded with freedom on their master's

death, as the inscriptional and literary evidence pertaining to manumission plainly attests.

The plight of mine and quarry slaves, in stark contrast, was brutally oppressive, and the physical toll exacted by this strenuous and hazardous form of labor made these pits voracious consumers of human life. It has been estimated that the profitable silver mines of Athens alone employed more than ten thousand slaves in peak periods; and the largest individual holdings of slaves on record are for the servile teams rented out for mine work. The Athenian general Nikias exploited one thousand human beings in that fashion, while two other slaveholders owned teams of six hundred and three hundred respectively. So lucrative was this "business" that the philosopher-general Xenophon proposed a grand scheme whereby the Athenian state would purchase public slaves (up to three per citizen) and then hire them out to contractors working the mines, the profits accruing to a citizenry thus freed from all necessity of self-maintenance.²⁷

Slaves were also extensively utilized in craft production, and a few of the ergastêria, or 'workshops', are known to have attained considerable size. The shield-manufacturing business of the metic Cephalus employed 120 slaves, while that of the rich banker Pasion employed between 60 and 70; the inheritance of Demosthenes, the fourth-century orator-politician, included a workshop with 53 slaves skilled in the manufacture of cutlery and furniture; and comparable numbers of human chattels were employed in the large and profitable tanneries. The operational scale here was atypical, however, for these were establishments run by some of the wealthiest families in Athens. The more conventional arrangement appears to have consisted of an independent artisan whose home doubled as his shop and who worked alongside a couple of slaves and the son who would one day succeed him. Many artisans were themselves slaves (known as chôris oikountes, those 'dwelling apart'), who practised their professions outside their master's supervision, either in self-managed shops or through contracting. A portion of their earnings was paid over to their owners in the form of a body rent, while any remainder beyond that for self-maintenance was accumulated with the aim of eventually purchasing freedom. Another "craft" of sorts was the sex trade local ized in the brothels and taverns, a lucrative commerce in rented bodies that relied almost exclusively on slaves and noncitizen outsiders for its essential personnel.

The employment of slaves by the State, the so-called public slaves (dêmosioi douloi), took a variety of forms, ranging from secretarial and accounting duties in public administration to service as physicians, rowers in the fleet, or even as police (for a time, the Athenians utilized several hundred Scythian archers in the latter capacity). More typical, however,

were the occupations deemed unfit for free citizens, such as the responsibility for waste disposal; removal of the dead; the maintenance of roads, walls, public buildings, and water conduits; etc.²⁸ Slaves were also commonly attached to the major shrines and temples, where they again provided custodial services and attended the needs of the religious officials and the patrons of the deity (e.g., the "sacred prostitutes" of Aphrodite in

The extent to which slavery was utilized in the countryside remains a contentious issue, but there is little reason to doubt that the customary form of labor on all the larger estates consisted of slaves, serving both as field hands and as overseers—that much is clear from the agricultural handbooks. Indeed, even for those smallholders who actually labored on their own land (such as the heroes of Aristophanes' comedies), the ownership of a few slaves does not appear to have been uncommon. Ecological considerations also suggest a vital role for slaves in agriculture, in that labor intensifications were typically required to bring modest and marginal klêroi into adequate productivity: if these inputs had been drawn exclusively from the peasant-farmers themselves, it is manifest that their civic functions as self-governing citizens would have been severely compromised or reduced. Another point to consider is that invading armies routinely hauled in substantial numbers of andrapoda, i.e., 'man-footed creatures', while devastating and pillaging the countryside, thereby confirming a heavy presence for slavery in agricultural production.29 But perhaps the most revealing evidence comes from Aristophanes' Ploutos, where the character Poverty tries to defend herself by saying that if she is banished and everyone is granted equal shares of Wealth, slave traders will no longer operate, with the consequence that "you'll have to do all your own ploughing and digging and all the other backbreaking labor, making your lives even more miserable than they are now."30 Here, ultimately, is the basis for Xenophon's observation that "slaves are bought by those who have the means to do so, in order that they will have fellow

So extensive and systematic a utilization of unfree labor throughout the social order presupposes a comparatively inexpensive supply of slaves, and our sources confirm that such a condition obtained for much of the Classical period. As Aristotle noted, war was "a kind of hunting," a naturally "just means of acquisition" to be used against "such peoples as are fitted by nature to be ruled, but who do not wish it." Even in the days before Odysseus, it was customary for buccaneering "sackers of cities" to subject the vanquished to servitude, a practice recognized as 'everlasting law' (nomos aidios) throughout antiquity. Soldiers defeated in battle and the inhabitants of cities that were sacked (a rarer occurrence) always

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faced the prospect of enslavement—a fate that appears to have been very much on the Greek mind to judge from the frequent references to it in poetry and tragic drama. By the Classical period, it appears that pan-Hellenic sentiments had taken sufficient hold to make the taking of ransom payments for captured Greeks a more common option (the difficulties in "taming" defeated hoplites no doubt also contributed), though it must be stressed that the Greeks never refrained from enslaving one another, as the pages of the historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon copiously testify. The vast majority of slaves, however, were not fellow Greeks, but barbaroi, foreign peoples imported primarily from countries to the north and the east, such as Thrace, Illyria, Scythia, Phrygia, and Syria. Again, these "commodities" were usually first "produced" by local wars and then sold to Greek slave traders in exchange for minted silver, wine and oil, or finished luxury wares. Several tribal nations were in the business of selling their surplus children for export, and the piracy that flourished in Mediterranean waters provided yet another important and steady source. In contrast, the breeding of slaves appears to have been a marginal enterprise, undoubtedly due to the costly nature of the nurturing process, the dangers involved in childbirth, and the high rates of infant mortality.33 There was, moreover, no real need to resort to any internal reproduction of the work force, seeing that the external supply remained abundant and the costs minimal: the price paid for a slave on the market averaged some two hundred drachmas in the fifth century (which roughly corresponded to seven or eight months wages for a skilled artisan, and a quarter the cost of a good mule team); the massive booty hauls of victorious armies usually brought the price down even lower. Only the very poor, in other words, would have found the outlay for an "ensouled instrument" or two beyond their means.

Is it legitimate, then, considering all the foregoing, to characterize Classical Greek society as a "slave society," as a social formation dependent upon a "slave mode of production?" Let us begin our closing summation with an observation by the social philosopher most closely associated with such views, Karl Marx:³⁴

The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labor is pumped out of the direct producers, determines the relation of domination and servitude, as it emerges directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this basis is founded the entire structure of the economic organization—which grows up out of the production-relations themselves—and therewith its specific political structure. It is always the direct relation between the owners of the conditions of production and the direct producers—a relation that always naturally corresponds to a definite

stage in the development of the means and methods of labor and consequently of its social productivity—which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation of the entire social structure, and therefore also of the political form of the relations of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state.

In applying this insight to Polis society, one must begin by stressing that the vast majority of Greek citizens were themselves autourgoi, 'selfworkers', primary producers who toiled for their own livelihood, the poorest with the aid of their wives and children, the peasant-farmer and the artisan alongside a few slaves. It was only the propertied elite—the landed aristocracy in the main—who could dispense entirely with the tasks of self-maintenance and so devote themselves fully to the edifying vocations of war, politics, and culture. By thus freeing the elite from the necessity of direct production, the institution of slavery—as it came to supplant debt bondage and dependency—provided the material basis that sustained the highest political and artistic achievements of Classical civilization. That is the sense of Marx's contention that "direct forced labor is the foundation of the ancient world," for elsewhere he fully appreciates the centrality of "free peasant proprietorship" in the social organization of the classical city-state, 35 In a world virtually empty of machines, it was the compulsory labor power of human beings that yielded the margin of surplus that made civilized existence possible, a surplus that should not be viewed exclusively in the standard material sense of producing basic staples, but also in providing slaveowners the requisite "leisure" to engage in the manifold functions of citizenship. Without the versatile services of his empsychon organon, the free citizen—whether aristocrat, peasantfarmer, or artisan—would have found the exercise of civic freedom a much more difficult privilege. That paradox was not unrecognized by the ancients themselves, a succinct formulation finding expression in a play by Euripides, now lost save for a fragmentary but most telling testament: 'For it is by the slaves, truly, that we freemen live' (douloisi gar te zômen hoi eleutheroi).36

4.II THE PERSIAN CHALLENGE: MILITARY TRIUMPH AND CULTURAL AFFIRMATION

Unlike the communities of the Greek mainland, those that had been established on the fringes of the Hellenic world—Ionia in the east, Sicily and southern Italy in the west—were early on subjected to the foreign influences of powerful neighbors. As early as the seventh century, the Greeks of the western coast of Asia Minor were involved in major defensive wars against invading Cimmerians and the expanding kingdom of Lydia,

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an effort gravely handicapped by the notorious lack of unity that plagued inter-Greek relations. During the reign of King Croesus (560–546 BC), he of the fabled riches, the Lydians eventually capitalized on this "polis particularism," and the divided Greeks fell subject to the tribute demands of a foreign overlord. Though the loss of autonomy was resented, the Lydian yoke was not excessively onerous, and both peoples appear to have benefitted from extensive economic and cultural exchanges.

During the period when the Ionians were still struggling to retain their independence against the Lydians, greater rumblings were occurring further to the east, where the disintegration of the Assyrian empire was being hastened by the expanding power of Media and by Egyptian and Babylonian resurgence. Nineveh itself was eventually sacked in 612 BC, a defeat so overwhelming that the Assyrians disappear thereafter from the historical record. A successor to their imperial status was not long in coming: in 559 BC an extraordinary warlord assumed the kingship of Persia—then a minor vassal state of the Medes—and promptly embarked on a campaign of conquest that would result in the creation of the greatest land empire the world had yet seen.2 Cyrus the Great, referred to as Yahweh's "anointed one" by the prophet Isaiah, led his bow-wielding nomads out of the Iranian plateau and quickly overran the great powers of the Middle Eastern plains. The fall of Lydia in 547 BC exposed the Greeks to Cyrus' advancing armies, and the prospects were so bleak that two communities, Teos and Phocaea, literally "packed up their poleis" and set sail for the west. Other Greek communities opted for resistance, but with the sacking of Priene and enslavement of its citizens, these efforts collapsed ingloriously, and the Greeks of Asia Minor passed into the Persian sphere of domination. For the next half century, imperial authority was exercised through local Greek agents who took their instructions from regional governors known as satraps, a patrimonial office normally filled by high-ranking members of the Persian aristocracy. Yielding tribute to the Great King and supplying his army with hoplite infantry and naval forces during campaigns constituted the chief burdens of depen-

dency.

Dissatisfaction with this "slavery"—for so the Greeks described their status—erupted in 499 BC, when the Ionians, led by Miletus, deposed their Persian-supported "tyrants" and restored democratic self-rule. Early military successes brought others into revolt, beginning with the Dorian and Aeolian Greeks of the Anatolian seaboard, followed by the Greeks of Cyprus and the Carians. Envoys were sent to mainland Greece with the aim of securing military assistance, but only two states responded favorably. Athens, as the "mother-city" of the Ionians, felt obligated to contribute a small force of twenty ships for one campaign, while an allied

Eretria sent a squadron of five vessels. Fear of Persian might and a preoccupation with several ongoing interpolis conflicts convinced the other mainland powers to stay at home.

Rebel forces managed to hold the Persians in check for nearly five years, but a major sea battle off the coast of Miletus in 494 BC ended in disaster. Hard pressed by the superior numbers of Persia's Phoenician fleet, several of the Greek commanders opted to accept Persian promises that a timely act of betrayal would free their communities from reprisals. After the debacle, Miletus was sacked and her inhabitants enslaved, thereby fulfilling, as the first historian relates it, Delphi's prophecy that the women of Miletus "would wash the feet of many a long-haired man." In the following year, all remaining pockets of resistance were overcome, and amid much destruction of homes and temples, the defeated were forced to witness the ultimate in degradation, as their fairest daughters were taken as concubines for Persian grandees while castration befell those of their sons who were consigned to serve as eunuchs.

Though the revolt had failed to restore the Greeks to freedom, the Persians were sufficiently shaken to see the necessity of revising their method of imperial control. The policy of employing puppet "tyrants" was abandoned, and in its place the Greeks were allowed to form their own cherished "democracies." Tribute and military service remained mandatory, but the granting of greater local independence was a significant concession to Ionian grievances. Foreign policy motives were also at work, for the decision had already been made that the Greeks of the mainland would have to acknowledge Persian supremacy, a conquest easier to achieve if the Hellenes could be persuaded that local freedoms would not be severely compromised. Persian ambassadors were sent westwards in 491 BC, demanding the traditional tokens of submission, earth and water, which they duly received from many Greek communities, Defiance greeted the envoys sent to Sparta and Athens, where they were unceremoniously executed, thrown into a well and a pit respectively, and instructed to "find their water and earth below." In the following year a substantial Persian fleet transporting some twenty thousand troops was dispatched to carry out the Great King's will, and after sacking Naxos and Etetria, the invasion force landed on the Attik shore above the Marathon plain. Conspicuously present on the Persian side was the aging tyrant Hippias, the former ruler of Athens whom the Persians intended to reinstate.

The ensuing battle of Marathon ranks as one of the most celebrated in world history, symbolizing to many—not least the Greeks themselves—the triumph of "freedom" over "despotism." The overwhelming Greek victory was undoubtedly a remarkable feat, with only 192 Athenian dead

compared to more than six thousand for the routed invader, whose ranks crumbled under the disciplined impact of the heavily armed hoplites. For Darius the Great King, however, Marathon was little more than a temporary setback, attributable to an underestimation of his foe's tenacity; preparations for a new, grander campaign were begun immediately, and this time the full weight of Persia's vast economic and manpower resources would be deployed.

Fortunately for the Greeks, those preparations were repeatedly stalled by the kinds of internal problems that commonly beset transnational autocracies: revolts by subject peoples and succession intrigues bred by royal polygamy. Egypt made a bid to shake off the Persian yoke in 486 BC, an action that appears to have triggered several lesser uprisings in various eastern provinces. Death of the aging Darius in the following year caused yet further delays, as did the Babylonian revolt of 482 BC. The new king—a younger son but first-born to the reigning queen—eventually managed to restore order within both palace and empire and promptly returned to the matter of punishing and subjugating the upstart Greeks. The scale of Xerxes' preparatory operations were truly monumental, the complex logistics and grandiose engineering designed not simply to facilitate the advance of his immense array, but to intimidate in the process, as captured spies were released to bear witness to the carnage to come. A canal requiring three years of forced labor was dug across the Mount Athos promontory to provide safe passage for the fleet; massive stores of food were established in depots all along the Thracian coast to provision the huge army; and two pontoon bridges were set up across the strait of the Black Sea, employing over 650 ships moored and fastened by rope cables nearly a mile long. As for the invasion force itself, Xerxes appears to have levied conscripts from all the various nations of his vast empire. Herodotus' detailed muster roll records forty-six different nationalities, including Bactrians, Ethiopians, Indians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Arabs, and subject Greeks.5 The actual size of this force is not known, but reasonable estimates have cut down the Greek exaggerations—which spoke of "millions" who literally "drank the rivers dry"-to a still massive army of 180,000 men and a navy of some six hundred ships. In the spring of 480 BC this formidable array began crossing into Europe, led by Xerxes himself, the self-described "great king, king of kings, king of lands containing many men, king in this great earth far and wide, son of Darius the king, an Achaemenid, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan, of Aryan seed."6

In the ten years since Marathon, the Greeks had done little to prepare for the coming Persian challenge, as the time-honored tradition of fighting amongst themselves continued to take precedence over any consideration of national security. In Athens, however, a stroke of good fortune and the strategic foresight of one of her leaders combined to significantly enhance Athenian military capacity. In 483 BC a rich vein of silver was struck in the mines of Laurion, yielding a substantial windfall to the treasury. Since the citizens were the "state," this surplus belonged to them, and it was customary that a share of the wealth be distributed to each citizen. This policy was opposed by Themistocles, the one leader who anticipated that the future of Athens would depend upon naval rather than hoplite superiority. Taking the speaker's rostrum in the assembly, he persuasively argued that the revenues be employed for the construction of new warships of the trireme class (fitted with three levels of oars), each vessel requiring a rowing crew of just under two hundred men. After an accelerated building program, the fleet was increased to a total of some two hundred triremes, easily the largest naval force among the Greeks.

In the autumn of 481 BC, a Hellenic congress was held at Korinth to discuss plans for a common defense. Representatives from only thirty-one poleis attended-most Hellenes signaling neutrality by their absenceand after agreeing to suspend all hostilities within their own ranks and follow Spartan leadership, an oath was sworn to destroy those who went over to the Persian side. Many communities in northern and central Greece-i.e., the direct line of the invader's advance-had in fact already given Xerxes the requested "earth and water," and a few proceeded to supply him with military support as well. Fear undoubtedly played a major role in this "Medizing," but another motive of weight was the opportunity to settle old scores against rivals within Greece. The Hellenic congress sent out ambassadors to secure assistance from other important Greek powers, such as Korcyra, Syracuse, and Krete, but in the end no aid was forthcoming. Only the Greeks of Sicily had a legitimate excuse, for they were themselves preparing to face a full-scale invasion by the Carthaginians, then the dominant power in the western Mediterranean.

Owing to Herodotus' immortal narrative, the ensuing "contest" for Greece is so well known that mere mention of the major events suffices to retell the remarkable tale: the heroic sacrifice of Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans at the pass of Thermopylae; the mass evacuation of Athens and its devastation by the Persians; Themistocles' deceptive message to Xerxes that convinced the Great King to send his fleet into the narrow straits of Salamis, waters that favored the smaller number and larger size of the Greek warships; and finally the finishing twin battles of the war, one at Plataea, where the hoplites of Greece proved their superiority over the lightly armed Persian infantry, and the other at Mycale on the Asia Minor coast, where marines of the Greek navy put to flames the

entire Persian fleet. With the defense of the homeland now over, an offensive to liberate the Greeks of the East began, and as that objective would require control over the Aegean, it was the Athenian navy—not the Spartan phalanx—that now rose to the position of primacy in Greek affairs.⁷

Tried and tested in the crucible of combat, it is not uncommon for a people to emerge from a major military confrontation with reinforced faith and confidence in the principles and ideals for which they fought, particularly in circumstances where the enemy is seen as having marched under an "alien" standard. In the crowded annals of military history, few contrasts can match the political and ideological polarity that separated the civic autonomy of Polis society from the royal absolutism of Persia's transnational empire—and it was precisely in that fashion that the Greeks came to define their great struggle against the eastern invader. When the city-states of Asia Minor fell subject to foreign domination, first to Lydian and then to Persian masters, there was but one word in the Greek political lexicon to characterize the situation: douleia, 'slavery'; and it was the opportunity "to be freemen once more" that explains why the Ionians chose to revolt against such seemingly hopeless odds.8 For the Athenians at Marathon, each hoplite in the line fully appreciated that the outcome of battle would determine whether their families and descendants would continue to live in freedom, eleutheria, or suffer enslavement to a foreign overlord.9 Monuments for those who had fallen in repelling Xerxes were equally explicit in celebrating the ideals that had carried the Greeks to victory:10

To sustain the freedom of Hellas and Megara we willingly accepted death as our fate.

If dying nobly is the greatest part of aretê, then fate has honored us above the rest; for we struggled to crown Greece with freedom, and now lie buried in ageless glory.

Stranger, we once lived in the well-watered polis of Korinth; but now we lie in Salamis, the island of Ajax; there it was we captured Phoenician ships, Persians and Medes; there we defended sacred Hellas.

Just as the Trojan War had furnished an occasion for poets and artists to create and represent a glorious race of heroes, so now did this second great triumph allow for a new celebration of valor. Though individual awards of merit were accorded to those few conspicuous for their bravery, collective modes of heroization—as befit the hoplite style of warfare—invariably took precedence. At Megara, for example, the war dead were interred in the public agora, there to bear enduring testimony to their courage and the glory of the polis and where commemorative sac-

rifices were held annually in their honor. The Athenians likewise accorded cult status to their Marathonomachai, 'the fighters at Marathon', and the city was adorned with various reminders of their heroic aretê, such as the grand fresco depicting the battle that graced the public colonnade in the agora, and the magnificent sculpted frieze of the Parthenon, whose 192 mounted figures are thought to represent the identical number of Athenians who fell in the conflict. Delphi and the other pan-Hellenic sanctuaries were filled with dedications celebrating the military triumph, and all the many statues, cachets of captured arms, and temples proudly proclaimed to each visitor the glory of those communities that had contributed in beating back the Persian menace.

Apart from this collective canonization of Greek military valor, the wars invited a deeper reflection on the nature of Polis society, its virtues now set in bold relief when viewed against the alternative way of life championed by the defeated foe. The Persian Great Kings were the very embodiment of unrestrained autocracy. As self-proclaimed earthly representatives of the creator god Ahura-Mazda, their every whim had the force of sanctioned command, and summary executions of subordinates who displeased were not uncommon—a large part of Herodotus' narrative is in fact given over to various chilling instances of despotic terror. As conquering warlords, everything that fell within the borders of their empire—from the blades of grass to the multitudes of human beings belonged ultimately to them, and even the highest ranking nobles and imperial officials were "slaves" who could be addressed in the language of servility. There was the great pomp and circumstance that exalted the majesty of the royal person and symbolically projected his immense wealth and power: the banquets that fed thousands at a time; the imposing works of monumental architecture, suitably graced by the stern visage or imperious proclamations of the supreme ruler; the hundreds of concubines who served in the royal seraglio; the extensive retinue of body attendants whose mouths were muffled lest their breath defile the sovereign King of Kings. Even more revealing was the obligatory proskynêsis, or 'prostration', that was required of all those who entered the Great King's presence—a form of abasement and dependency that the Greeks deemed inconsistent with the status and dignity of freemen. As much as any individual Greek might envy the wealth and unchecked total power of the Persian monarch, they could not help but view the entire system as a tyranny in which the absolute supremacy of one man presupposed the slavery of all the others. Given so sharp a contrast with their own form of social organization, it is hardly surprising that the Greeks tended to attribute their victory not so much to a superiority of "race" (though this was not entirely absent), but to their superior êthea, 'customs' or 'way of life'.

As befits self-governing freemen who toil on their own behalf, the Hellenes regarded themselves as warriors of valor and courage; the Persians, in contrast, were viewed as hapless slaves compelled by fear of their tyrant's possible wrath. As Herodotus trenchantly observed, "there were indeed many men in the Great King's army, but, in truth, few soldiers." 12

Such a view would even make its way into Greek medical theory, as illustrated by the famous Hippocratean treatise Airs, Waters, and Places. After noting the psychological effects of various climates, the anonymous author pointedly continues:¹³

A contributary cause of the feebleness of Asiatics lies in their customs (nomoi), for the greater part of Asia is governed by kings. Now where men are not their own masters and self-governing (autonomoi), but are ruled by despots, they are not diligent about military exercises, but rather give the appearance of being unwarlike. That is because the risks they run are not similar. For those who are subject to kings are compelled to fight and to suffer and die on behalf of their masters (despotai), far from their wives, children, and friends. All their deeds of prowess and valor redound to the advantage and advancement of their masters, while the harvest they themselves reap is danger and death. . . . Thus, even if a man is born with a naturally courageous and spirited character, his temperament is corrupted by these customs. A clear proof of this is that the most warlike men in Asia, whether Greeks or barbarians, are those who are not ruled by despots, but who govern themselves and labor on their own behalf.

Many of these ideological themes—destined to occupy a large place in the Hellenic consciousness for decades to come—received their highest cultural expression in Aeschylus' The Persians, a tragic drama performed before thousands of Athenian citizens in 472 BC, with the rising political figure of Pericles serving as the chief financial backer. The Great King's royal palace at Susa serves as the exotic setting, and the play turns on the reaction of the Persian court to their crushing defeats at Salamis and Plataea. The war is presented as a titanic struggle pitting the "whole might of the Asian races" against "the sons of Hellas," and the dominant motifs of Aeschylean tragedy-hubris and justice, excess and divine retribution—form the play's thematic core. Xerxes is presented as the paradigmatic hubristic man, whose arrogant ambition "to throw a yoke of slavery upon the Hellenes" necessarily brings down divine retribution, with Greek arms serving as Zeus' chastising instrument. But in addition to this grand morality play of cosmic justice, Aeschylus also offers his audience patriotic encomia on the Polis ideal. Thus when the Persian Queen Mother inquires of the Athenians, "Who is the shepherd they follow, who lords over their host?", she receives the stirring reply, "Of no mortal man are they called the slaves or subjects,"14 And later, after the military

disaster has become known, the chorus of Persian elders bemoan, "Now that Kingly might is perished, no longer will the tongues of men be under guard, for the people have been loosed to speak free"—an unambiguous, celebratory reference to parrhêsia, that 'freedom of speech' that formed the galvanizing current of Greek political life. Aeschylus himself, it is worth noting, fought with distinction against the Persians and chose to record on his epitaph no mention of his accomplishments on the stage, but his military service on the plain of Marathon.

The aura of victory thus came to permeate the entire cultural sphere—from the commemorative rituals of religious and political practice to stirving artistic testamonials in stone and verse. Finding affirmation above all were the central animating ideals of Hellenic culture, the correlated principles of the Polis as a self-governing koinônia of freemen, and of the citizen-soldier as a man who preserves the liberty of country and family and who protects the tombs of his ancestors and the shrines of his gods. Buoyed by their great military triumph, the Greeks—and the Athenians above all—were wellpoised to begin the "classical" age of their civilization.

4.III THE CLASSICAL POLIS: INSTITUTIONS AND NORMATIVE IDEALS

The "maturation" of Polis society over the course of the Archaic period was marked by several key developments that effectively "democratized" the social order: the transition to hoplite warfare; the supplanting of hereditary aristocracies and tyrants by broader-based constitutional governments; the codification of law; the emancipation of the citizen-peasantry from debt bondage and dependency; and the incipient emergence of a slave mode of production. By the beginning of the fifth century, and despite variations in population size, extent of urbanization, military and economic resources, and administrative specialization, a majority of Greek city-states featured a common institutional configuration, and most participated in a shared cultural heritage, bound together by ties of language, religion, sport, and the arts. If one were to chart a trajectory on that familiar historical scale known as "rise and fall," it could be said that the Polis was now entering its classical phase, the apogee in its development as a form of social organization. The unparalleled cultural vitality of this period is chief index of that fact, but no less significant are the internal contradictions or tensions that are presently mediated or held in check, and the high degree of coherence and integration that is attained at the institutional level. Since any analysis of social decline or decay requires reference to preceding conditions of stability and order, an ideal-typical

portrait of the classical Polis will be offered at this point, one that delineates the main components of its infrastructural base as well as the defining elements of its corresponding civic ideology.

The keynote for our analysis was first sounded by Aristotle, who opens his *Politics* with an observation that pointedly correlates the structural and normative dimensions of Polis life: "Every polis is a community or association of some kind, and every community is organized with a view towards attaining some good." The distinctiveness of the Polis *koinônia*, Aristotle goes on to specify, is that it features an "association of freemen," citizens, whose defining trait is their right to participate in self-government and whose highest objective is participation in 'the good life', to eu zên, the content of which is characterized in expressly civic terms. What the philosopher here identifies as criteria for classification represents, in capsule form, a historically grounded distillation of the Polis-citizen experience.

Notwithstanding its rudimentary structure, the Dark Age assembly as depicted in the epics already confirms the existence of a civic koinônia of sorts, with the entire citizen body enjoying consultation rights on ta dêmia, 'matters concerning the people'. The turbulent course of social change over the succeeding centuries was marked in large measure by political struggles to expand the level of civic participation, and by the end of the Archaic period, domination by hereditary noble clans had been forced to give way to aristocratic leadership as exercised through rationalized political organs and the rule of law. The tripartite governing apparatus of magisterial offices, council, and assembly was common to all poleis, with oligarchies and democracies differing primarily in their manner of vesting sovereign power and in the allocation of citizenship rights. As a general rule, councils functioned as the dominant governing institution in oligarchical poleis, whereas assemblies held greater sway in the democracies.2 Property requirements were used in oligarchies to restrict access to office and limit voting rights, thereby confining the citizen majority to "passive" participation in assemblies that lacked sovereign power. The governing principle in democracies was isonomia, 'equality in the affairs of state', with the majority expressing its will through a sovereign assembly empowered to delegate administrative tasks, supervise magisterial functionaries, and exercise appellate judicial responsibilities.

Though political differences between the two types of constitution were conventionally expressed in terms of property differentials—the rule of the few rich as compared to the rule of the many poor—the actual substantive determinant was military capacity, a point incisively stressed by Aristotle.³ Drawing upon the extensive research that had been car-

ried out in the Lyceum, Aristotle detected a historic correlation between military organization and regime structure. The narrowest oligarchies, he noted, tended to flourish in communities where military power was monopolized by an aristocratic minority, whose primacy rested with their exclusive ownership of arms and horses. Broadly based oligarchies and moderate democracies, in turn, were associated with the ascendancy of the phalanx of heavily armed hoplites, the majority of whom were drawn from the propertied middle strata (hoi mesoi). As for "extreme" democracies, the last to appear historically, these took form wherever the civic masses rose to military prominence, either as rowers in the fleet or as lightly armed troops. The citizen's standing as a soldier, in short, basically determined the extent of his political participation—a principle that dated back to the Homeric period and beyond.

Wealth was of course integrally related to fighting capacity, as both leisure for training and the ability to procure the instruments of war (horses and heavy armor) depended upon command over economic resources. But the sociological primacy of military performance over wealth is tellingly illustrated by the progressive democratization of political life in Athens, a process that coincided with the expansion and ascendancy of the Athenian navy. Our most revealing witness on this is the anonymous author known as "the Old Oligarch" (a cognomen indicative of his undisguised sociopolitical sympathies), whose pamphlet on the Athenian politeia, written c. 425 BC, offers a highly partisan attack on democracy, but with a frank and realistic assessment of its basis:4

It is right that the poor and the common people of Athens should have more power than the rich and noble, since it is the *dêmos* who sails the ships and thereby brings power to the polis; they also provide the helmsmen, the boatswains, the ship-captains, the look-outs and the shipwrights. It is these people who bring power to the polis much more so than the hoplites, the nobles, and the respectable citizens. And since that is way things are, it seems just that all alike should share in public offices, those selected by lot and those by election, and that any citizen who wishes should be able to speak in the assembly.

Athens was a unique city-state in many respects, not least in having the material resources to provide steady pay for the crews that manned its massive fleet. It remains a sound generalization nonetheless that the center of power within most poleis tended to revolve upon a military axis, as claims to political participation and full citizenship were justified and ultimately realized on the basis of one's capacity to fight for the civic komônia in "the great communal labor."

Notwithstanding differences in the allocation of political rights, the community principle was basic to democracies and oligarchies alike. By

belonging to the proper descent group, the normal criterion of which was having citizen parents, the newly born were ritualistically incorporated into the citizen body through various purification and registration ceremonies that publicly established legitimacy. Upon attaining maturity, usually age eighteen, all male members of the koinônia were formally vested with the privileges and responsibilities of full civic status, the high point of the ceremonial featuring an oath of loyalty and devotion to the community and its patron gods. Membership in the koinônia tôn politôn thus formed the referential and regulative context for all social activities, a circumstance that explains both the strong self-identification of the citizens with their community and the extensive claims that the Polis maintained over its members. To make these points more tangible, let us briefly examine several of the key institutions that sustained the bonding of citizen to Polis.

Though Greek religion was for the most part pan-Hellenic in theological content, civic exclusiveness tended to prevail in the domain of cultic practice, with strong taboos against "outsider" involvement. The right to share in communal sacrifice or to participate in major cults were zealously guarded privileges of the citizenry, as was access to burial grounds and even entrance to certain temples and shrines.6 Apart from the pan-Hellenic sanctuaries and several of the mystery cults discussed earlier (3.II.v), religious practice and lineage were in fact organically linked, inasmuch as each of the basic forms of religious association—the family, clan, tribe, and the community as a whole—were all founded upon blood ties, real or imagined. As the communal elements of Greek religion superseded those of the clan and tribe in the Archaic period, the "sacred" increasingly manifested itself as worship of the collective powers of the Polis, a devotion expressed primarily through monumental architectural works of great beauty and numerous ritualistic processions and public festivals. Durkheim's celebrated thesis—that religion is an indirect form of communal self-worship—is particularly suggestive for the situation in classical Greece, where the primary objects of veneration-mythical ancestors and heroes, preceding generations of deceased citizens, the community's sacred hearth, and the Olympian gods who served as patron deities—were all instrumentalities that conveyed patriotism and devotion to the Polis itself.7 Hellenic mass religiosity, in other words, was predominantly civic rather than personal in character.

Turning to the economic sphere, the material benefits that the citizenry monopolized as a closed status group were substantial and wide ranging. The Polis koinônia was itself based on an exclusive right of citizens to own land, a principle so fundamental that the foremost concern of public policy lay with preserving and reproducing the landed citizen through

war and colonization. Sparta is only the most striking example of a civic society sustained by military conquest, for warfare was endemic throughout the Hellenic world, with each community seeking to procure territories. slaves, and other forms of booty for the enrichment of its citizenry. Without the "predatory profits" derived from war, not only would the Greeks have lacked the cheap source of chattel labor that eventually underpinned their economy, they would have also found it much more difficult to raise the revenues necessary for large-scale temple construction and other prolects of civic adornment. That Ares served as a more generous paymaster than either Demeter the grain goddess or Hephaistos the craftsman's god is well attested in our sources. When, for example, the Athenians repelled the Boeotians and Chalkidians in 507 BC, they appropriated land sufficient for four thousand citizens and earned more than 140,000 drachmas in ransom payments (a drachma being the average daily wage of an artisan in the fifth century). The Greek victory over the Persians at Plataea in 479 BC garnered some 480,000 drachmas in booty, while the concurrent victory of the Sicilian Greeks over invading Carthaginians yielded millions of drachmas in captured arms, provisions, and enslaved troops. In 466 BC the Athenians netted twenty thousand slaves after destroying the Persian fleet at the mouth of the Eurymedon, and of course many thousands more—along with much additional territory—during the extended period of their maritime empire (see 4.V below).8

While warfare functioned as a medium for the citizen's material enrichment, politically mediated assistance was forthcoming through other means as well. In mineral-laden regions, for example, the resources were generally exploited as a form of communal property. Mining operations were carried out either collectively by the citizenry, as at Seriphnos and Siphnos (iron ore and silver, respectively), and possibly at Thasos (gold and silver), or through concessionary leases to individual citizens who paid over a portion of the profits to the state treasury, as at Athens (silver). Though the more spectacular contributions to state treasuries came from war revenues and mining, there existed sundry taxes, court fees, fines, import-export duties, and rents from the leasing of public lands, etc., which also enabled the Polis to carry out redistributive functions and so endow its citizenry. Some of the benefits mentioned in our sources include: the maintenance of religious cults and festivals (in which public distributions of sacrificial meats and "first fruits" figured prominently); the provision of free or subsidized grains during food shortages; procuring the services of physicians and gymnastic trainers; paying for the construction and upkeep of public buildings, roads, harbors, defensive walls, gymnasia, and water conduits; and providing financial assistance for war orphans, the destitute, and the disabled.

In the latter half of the fifth century, yet another important redistributive measure was introduced: payment for military service, initially as a nominal food allowance (sitos), and then later as an actual wage (misthos). 10 This development should not be interpreted as a step towards military professionalism, for the campaigning season remained limited in duration—days or weeks rather than months—and the rate of payment was normally less than a drachma per day. The innovation was in fact compensatory rather than remunerative, the "democratic" aim being to facilitate and extend participation in military affairs down to the ranks of the marginal and less prosperous citizenry. A more "radical" assistance measure took the form of state pay for the performance of political tasks, first instituted in Athens under Pericles, and adopted by several other democracies as well.11 Here too the objective was not to offer an alternative means of employment, but to compensate the citizen with a modest stipend (normally half a drachma or less in the fifth century) for his occasional service as an official, a council member, a juror, and in the fourth century, for attendance at the assembly. Such a measure was indispensable if the democratic program was to pass from the realm of theory to effective practice, as it enabled even the poorer members of society to participate directly in the affairs of government without economic sacrifice—a circumstance that sufficiently accounts for the rabid hostility to state pay found in conservative and oligarchical circles.

Hardline aristocrats and oligarchs were similarly incensed by another redistributive democratic practice: the assignment of compulsory leitourgia, or 'works for the people', aptly characterized by Finley as "a device whereby the nonbureaucratic state got certain things done, not by paying for them from the treasury but by assigning to richer individuals direct responsibility for both the costs and the operation itself."12 These public services ranged from financing the production and staging of tragedies, comedies, and choral performances to bearing the annual maintenance costs involved in keeping a warship in fighting trim. Some four hundred annual liturgical appointments are recorded for Athens alone (three hundred of which were for the fleet), and many of these were extremely costly, requiring expenditures of as much as a talent (six thousand drachmas) per liturgy. Though compulsory in democratic poleis, liturgical service carried a considerable honorific element, and many of the rich not only repeatedly volunteered for the assignments, but frequently spent much more than the required minimum—yet another manifestation of the ubiquitous agonal spirit. The orientation of civic-minded plousioi to the liturgical system has been well characterized by J. K. Davies: "The motivation was love of honor (philotimia), the objective distinction (lamprotês), and the reward a steady income of good-will (charis) from one's

fellow citizens, to be exploited as a lever to office and as a refuge in times of trouble."13 Not surprisingly, prominent politicians were conspicuously energetic in the performance of liturgical service, and in court cases involving the wealthy, defendants unabashedly point to their distinguished liturgical records as grounds for acquittal. Owing to the compulsory nature of the system, however, many of those not in sympathy with democratic politics were also required to pay, which accounts for the numerous "soak-the-rich" complaints to be found in our conservative sources, typified by the Old Oligarch's caustic charge that the Athenian dêmos has gone so far as to "exact payment for singing, running, dancing, and sailing on ships, in order that they may get money and the rich become poorer."14 Oligarchical hostility to these fiscal burdens occasionally provoked violent factionalism, and Aristotle records that several democracies were overthrown by "the notables" in direct response to the imposition of heavy liturgies. 15 It needs stressing, however, that what such men opposed was not the public dispensation of their wealth per se, but the manner in which this was now being carried out-by order of the dêmos, the wretched "kakoi." Public largesse was an altogether different matter in the glorious days of their forefathers, when the conspicuous display of wealth figured prominently in what Barrington Moore has called "ritualized affirmations of inequality," a means whereby the elite simultaneously demonstrated its power, legitimized its domination, and gloried in its extravagance.16

One of most important and far-reaching developments in the democratization of Greek society involved the emergence of a system of autonomous and collective law creation. With the curtailment of aristocratic power and the suspension of tyrannical rule, the Polis became in a very real sense a "law state," wherein a self-governing citizenry assumed sovereign responsibility not only for the administration of justice, but for the preservation, amendment, and creation of law as well. What had formerly been "laid down" by the powerful as themis, i.e., customary determinations of right and wrong, privilege and obligation, now became nomos, statute law as proposed and sanctioned by representatives of the citizenry or by the assembly itself. It is largely owing to that transition that classical Greece is credited with giving birth to the ideals of liberty and freedom, but it cannot be too strongly stressed that the Greek position was very far from entailing what we would today call "human rights" or "individual liberties." Such freedoms as were legislatively enshrined were drawn up to serve civic and collective rather than private interests, and the Polis exercised an intrusive, near-total control over the lives of its members. The very language of everyday political discourse reinforced that orientation, as the term idios and its cognates (conveying the notion of 'private' or 'individual') were conventionally employed with censorious, negative overtones, whereas terms like koinos or dêmotikos (the 'communal' or 'publicly' spirited) palpably resonate with moral approval and celebratory meaning. A succinct formulation of that ethos is provided by the historian Herodotus, who relates the following speech of an exiled Spartan king to the Persian Xerxes: "the Spartans are free men, but not entirely so; for they have a despotês over them, Nomos, which they fear and revere much more than your subjects do you; for whatever this masant revere much more than your subjects do you; for whatever this masant

ter commands, they perform."17 The extensive lawcodes that were promulgated during the Archaic period firmly established the Polis as the supreme normative authority, with regulative powers ranging from control over each citizen's life and property (e.g., compulsory military service, mandatory marriages in several poleis, rights of inheritance) to the supervision of personal conduct and appearance (e.g., sumptuary decrees and even the proscription of beards in a few poleis). Corresponding to the modern legal notions of "public" and "private" law, but with important procedural and substantive differences, the Greeks developed two broad forms of legal action: dêmosiai dikai ('public suits') and idiai dikai ('private suits').18 Nowhere is the narrowness of "private space" in Polis society more strikingly revealed than in the extensive range of issues that the Greeks chose to classify as "public": not only obvious matters such as treason, neglect of duty in office or in battle, "deception of the people," and impiety towards the civic cults; but also all matters involving the family and numerous interpersonal offenses, such as the mistreatment of parents, supervision of children, inheritance disputes, adultery, the squandering of one's patrimony through extravagant living, aggravated assault, theft, and the procurement of boys for prostitution.19 In all of these "public" matters, any citizen—and not just the immediate victim—was free to register an indictment, with vigilance encouraged by the prospect of receiving a portion of the fine as a reward. No less instructive is the harshness with which the Polis reacted to those who violated its laws: the death penalty was not uncommonly applied in such cases as bribing a juror, tampering with the sealed urns that contained the names of judges for artistic and sporting contests, conveying grain to foreign ports, robbery, adultery, striking a citizen hubristically, impiety, and various acts of political and military malfeasance.20 And should judicial mercy spare the offender from capital punishment, banishment normally followed, a sentence of "social death" that rendered the individual apolis, 'without a polis', and therefore politically rightless, landless, and without a share in the cults of his ancestors. Stern to those who would violate its sacred precepts, Nomos provided a bulwark for the law-abiding citizens, a resource that offered not only moral guidance and "good order," but also ensured the practical efficacy of those principles so essential to the proper functioning of the Polis *koinônia*: justice and equality among the citizenry, ideals that had been succinctly captured in Solon's celebrated declaration, "I wrote down laws for noble and commoner alike, fitting straight justice for each."

From the foregoing it is clear that the key sectors within Polis sociery—the legal-political, military, economic, religious, and kinship orders were characterized by a high degree of institutional coherence. The primary integrative link was provided by the status of citizenship, which anchored the complementary role set of warrior, landowner, direct parficipant in politics (even if only through the assembly), devotee of the communal cults, and descent-group member. Successful role performance and institutional functioning are in every society predicated upon an individual's internalization of the requisite motives, norms, and ideals that are disseminated through cultural socialization, during childhood and on through maturity. Within most complex or advanced social formations, these processes are complicated by several factors, including population heterogeneity, conflicting role demands, and institutional segregation—in sum, a situation marked by diverging interests and competing centers or agents of socialization. Owing to a common grounding in the corporate status of citizenship, there existed little if any conflict or segregation between either the primary civic roles or the basic institutions of Polis society. The citizens were, in one form, the army, in another, the cultic community; they were also the assembly and the judiciary; and they were owners of the soil. Class tensions between the aristoi and dêmos did remain a divisive factor throughout Greek history, but unless exacerbated by geopolitical pressures or the strains of interpolis warfare, violent factionalism was generally held in check by the common material and ideal interests that unified the citizenry as a closed-status group. Moreover, in the formation of the citizen as a distinctive social type, norms for external conduct and principles for inner life were both widely shared and deeply internalized owing to the marked functional coordination between the key institutional orders. Also contributing to the consolidation of a pervasive "civic culture" was the highly collective nature of Greek socialization practices, the most important of which were carried on in public settings: the gymnasia, the assembly and lawcourts, the military drills on land and sea, the festivals with their cultural and athletic contests, and an urban center bedecked with value-encoded temples, statuary, and painted colonnades. A dense semiotic web of civic ideals and principles thus framed and informed the daily life of the citizenry, a reality given succinct expression by the most renowned lyric poet of the day: Polis andra didaskei, 'the Polis teaches man'.21

Classical Greece

In addition to these nonspecialized media of socialization, the Greeks also developed formal educational practices. The origins of Hellenic "schooling" recede into the mists of prehistory, but there can be little doubt that the reintroduction of writing to Greece early in the Archaic period stimulated efforts to promote a basic literacy. Organized schools for children had certainly made their appearance prior to the close of the sixth century, as is clear from two "newsworthy" incidents recorded by later Greek historians: the tragic deaths of more than a hundred children in Chios in 496 BC, when the roof of their school collapsed; a similar occurrence following a few years later in Astypalaia, where a psychopathic boxer demolished the supporting frames of a local schoolhouse, inadvertently killing some sixty children inside.22 Attendance was neither compulsory nor universal, as teachers' fees and the loss of labor would have constituted a major barrier for many of the rural poor-whence the "illiterate rustic" as a stock figure in comedy and poetry throughout Greek history. The degree to which elementary schools were gender segregated cannot be determined, but Sappho's poetry indicates that adolescent girls from the higher strata continued their education in separate cult associations dedicated to the Muses.

From literary references and pictorial representations on vase paintings, we learn that elementary instruction centered on two types of training: "gymnastikê for the body and mousikê for the mind and soul."23 The former included wrestling, running, throwing, and jumping, with technical skills and conditioning imparted by an expert trainer known as a paidotribês. Although aesthetic considerations were undoubtedly involved—the Hellenic celebration of the human body has been rivaled by few societies—the primary aim of physical education was to prepare the youth for participation in the realms of war and sport. Under the heading of mousikê, children were taught singing, dancing, and instrumental music by the kitharistês, a lyre-playing musician, along with basic reading and writing skills by the grammatistes. Here the objective was primarily moral, though no less "civic" in orientation: to instill in each succeeding generation a resolute commitment to the twin ideals of devotion to the Polis and excellence as a citizen. In what was still a predominantly oral society, poets retained their Dark Age status as the foremost "educators of the people," and it was from their works that anthologies were composed for each child's memorization and recitation. From Homer, the preeminent "educator of Hellas," they learned of heroism and of the agonal ideal; from Hesiod the primacy of social justice. Poets such as Tyrtaios and Kallinos imparted the virtues of the communal warrior, while Solon and other sages codified the Polis ideal and the principles of good citizenship. Morally uplifting works by other poets and lawgivers also figured prominently in the early curriculum, and from this inheritance—an assemblage of socially mandated attitudes, assumptions, and standards—the child was prepared for the adult world of the citizen.²⁴

The poet whose verse best represents a classical synthesis of this cultural legacy is the aforementioned Simonides, a professional bard whose patrons ranged from tyrants and powerful aristocratic families to major city-states. In a celebrated poem written for the ruling Skopidai clan of Thessaly, Simonides attempts to redefine the nature of the agathos man and does so by ignoring old aristocratic standards like wealth and power, emphasizing in their stead the communal service of ordinary citizens:²⁵

I praise and befriend all who willingly do nothing shameful; for against necessity not even the gods contend. I am not a censorious man, since it is enough for me if a man is not base, nor excessively incompetent, but knows the justice which benefits his Polis—a sound man.

In another lyric, he diminishes or qualifies the value of individual *aretê* by suggesting that true fulfillment, *eudaimonia*, is ultimately dependent on the ascendancy or renown of one's native Polis:²⁶

For the one who wishes to live in complete happiness, of all things the most needful is a fatherland of good fame.

Armed confrontations between nations commonly provide the occasion for a crystallization and reaffirmation of core societal values, not only for purposes of present and future mobilization, but for a kathartic sanctification of the immense sacrifices normally involved. The Persian Wars provided just such a stimulus, and it was as a kind of "poet laureate" for the Greek war dead that Simonides achieved his greatest renown. Commissioned by many city-states to compose epitaphs for funerary monuments to the fallen, Simonides gave classic expression to the Poliscitizen bond, and simultaneously enshrined the hoplite code that held that the highest manifestation of excellence is attained in the act of heroic self-sacrifice for one's community:²⁷

On the Spartan Dead at Plataea

These men bestowed everblazing glory upon their fatherland, and enfolded around themselves the dark cloud of death. But though they have died, they are not dead, since their aretê which sheds glory on them from above lifts them from the house of Hades.

On the Defenders of Tegea

Because of the aretê of these men, smoke from the burning of spacious Tegea did not reach the sky; they wished to leave to their children a polis flourishing in freedom, and themselves to die in the frontranks of battle.

The ideals of martial virtue and civic devotion to the Polis were celebrated and reinforced in other cultural forms as well, including honorific hymns and dirges for the fallen. Most compelling of all were the funeral orations that customarily featured a stirring rendition of the illustrious history of the community, coupled with solemn praise for the patriots whose heroic sacrifice crowns both themselves and their native land in everlasting glory. 28 The ubiquitous statuary and commemorative paintings that graced many public buildings and walkways likewise served to remind the citizens of their martial heritage and future obligations.

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

If military concerns provided for the most intense evocations of civic responsibility, festivals honoring the gods provided the most concentrated and joyous occasion for the celebration of communal solidarity. In addition to the sacrifices and rituals that cemented the bonds of civic confraternity. numerous athletic and cultural competitions were held, with children and adults alike striving to win public recognition and wreaths of excellence. One particularly important festive artform was the dithyramb, a complex genre combining choral song and dance with a strong narrative element. and probably descended from magical-mimetic dances common to primitive agrarian religions. The versified content typically honored one or more of the gods or heroes through narration of some mythical exploit, conventionally embellished by moralistic reflections on fortitude, justice, temperance, human mortality, and the like. The dramatic qualities inherent in the dithyramb and earlier mimetic rituals were eventually perfected in the form of Tragedy, strictly speaking an Athenian creation, though various dramata ('things performed') were staged elsewhere in Greece.29 The decisive step in the creation of tragic drama was taken around 534 BC, when Thespis introduced a distinct actor to the chorus, a hypokritês, or 'answerer', thus allowing for dialogue and the representation of complicated action. Through the creative artistry of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, this cultural form became the vehicle for a profound probing of the human condition, a rich educational experience not only for contemporary audiences, but for subsequent generations of humanity as well. Although Attik tragedy contains many insights and reflections of a panhuman or existential significance, each of the poets treated their themes "in terms of contemporary language and values, modes of argument, obsessions, and occasionally even political preoccupations."30 To illustrate that point, let us briefly examine the nature of the Polis-citizen bond as it is reflected in several of the major extant tragedies.

The action in Aeschylus' Seven Against Thebes (c. 467 BC) centers around the defense of the community against an invading army, and in the opening scene the citizens are called to rally in a highly charged appeal that lays bare the essence of the Polis koinônia:31

Citizens! Come to the aid of your Polis and the altars of your country's gods, that their honor may never perish. Guard your children, and this land your mother and dearest nurse; for when you were still crawling infants, she was kindly ground, enduring all your rearing's distress. She nourished you to be founders of homes and shieldbearers, and thus made you faithful for this

Later in the play Aeschylus provides a terse but classic formulation of the responsibility that each citizen-soldier carried into battle:32

Either in death he'll repay his debt for rearing to his native land, or by conquering . . . he'll carry home the spoils of war to grace his father's home.

In the Suppliants (c. 463 BC), a play set in mythical Argos, the tragedy hinges upon the dilemma facing a king who must select one of two potentially disastrous options: either to grant religious asylum to the fifty daughters of Danaus and thereby risk war with their pursuing cousins (who seek to force them into incestuous marriages), or to refuse the right of sanctuary and incur pollution in the sight of the gods. What is most striking about Aeschylus' treatment is his blatantly anachronistic projection of democratic practices into the mythical past. Thus the Argive king responds to the appeal for sanctuary by declaring:33

You are not suppliants at my own hearth; if the Polis in common (koinon) suffers pollution, in common must the people work out the cure. I will make not pledge before all the citizens are consulted on this matter.

And although the suppliant maidens react by presenting a more realistic historical picture of kingly power:

You are the Polis, you are the people; unquestioned ruler, ... you vote alone with the nod of your head, you throned alone wield the scepter and reign over all things.

The king still defers to the koinônia:34

Choose me not as judge; as I said before, without the dêmos I will not transact this affair, even though I hold the power.

An assembly is then held in which the suppliants' cause is supported by a collective vote of the people, and again Aeschylus deliberately extols various democratic ideals, describing the entire process in such stirring phrases as: "the people's ruling hand," i.e., the show of hands as an expression of the collective will; "a free-speaking tongue," i.e., liberty of speech, the principle of parrhêsia; and most graphically of all, "the people, the power that rules the Polis," an inspiring paraphrasis of dêmokratia,

In the Eumenides (c. 458 BC), Aeschylus deals with the domain of Nomos, focusing on the transition from nonrational legal formalism, rooted in notions of taboo and tradition, to deliberative law, as expressed through the conscious will of the citizenry. Having slain his mother in through the conscious will of the citizenry. Having slain his mother in retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution, the avenging son, is retribution for her murder of Agamemnon, Orestes, the avenging son, is retribution and her response to the dilemma posed by the two conflicting rights—that her response to the dilemma posed by the two conflicting rights—that her response to the dilemma posed by the two conflicting rights—that her response to the dilemma posed by the two conflicting rights—that her response to the dilemma posed by the two conflicting rights—that her response to the dilemma posed by the two conflicting rights—that her response to the di

There are times when the fearful is good and must keep its watchful place over men's minds. It is advantageous to learn moderation and temperance from pain. That which fears nothing in its heart, man and Polis alike, how can such continue to reverence Justice?

While accepting this position in principle, Athena recoils from the Furies' blind formalism ("You wish to be called righteous rather than act so") and counters that the unjust must not be allowed to triumph act so") and counters that the unjust must not be allowed to triumph because of nonrational criteria.³⁷ The goddess declares that through her because of nonrational criteria.³⁸ The goddess declares that through her newly created system of substantive, deliberative law, the Polis will remain secure:³⁸

Here the citizens' Reverence, and her kinsman Fear, shall restrain wrongdoing both by day and by night alike, if the citizens themselves do not innovate laws; for by polluting clear water with mud and foul infusions, you will nevermore find it fit to drink. The rule "neither ungoverned nor governed despotically" I counsel the citizens to revere, and not to expel entirely that which is fearful from the Polis; for who among mortals is just that fears nothing? But if you justly stand in awe and respect of this, you shall have a bulwark of the land and a salvation for the Polis such as none of manking has.

Athena then casts the deciding vote in favor of Orestes, but rather than overthrow the old order of the Furies, she offers them a place as guardians within the new. As a number of scholars have noted, this theme of transcending the old pattern of formal justice is highly symbolic of the changes then transpiring within Athenian society, which was itself progressively dismantling the old *moira* structure—i.e., the traditional privileges of the *aristoi*—and moving towards a greater democratization and substantive equality before the law.³⁹ It is particularly significant

that only a few years prior to the play's performance, the reforming leader of the *dêmos*, Ephialtes, had been murdered by an assassin hired by oligarchs during a period of mounting tensions with antidemocratic Sparta. Against this turbulent background, Aeschylus' artistic reconciliation between old and new powers takes on greater relevance, as does his injunction against "muddying the water" with innovative laws. The *Eumenides*, in effect, offers a paradigmatic counsel of moderation to both factions, imploring oligarchs to adapt and radical democrats not to press too far in tearing down time-honored traditions. The urgency of the situation is unambiguously underscored by two appeals against *stasis* that bring the play to a close, the second of which is sung by the now reformed Furies (the *Eumenides*, or 'propitious spirits'):⁴⁰

May stasis, insatiate of evils, never roar in this Polis, and may the dust that drinks the black blood of citizens through murderous acts of vengeance never grip this Polis. Rather let them render joys to each other, let them love in common thought and hate with one mind. For of many ills among mortals, this is the cure.

Sophocles, the second great tragedian, is far less explicit on the ties between the social and the supernatural than is Aeschylus, a distinction traceable in part to differing intellectual affinities but also to certain developments in dramatic technique—the introduction of additional actors, greater realism in dialogue, declining importance of the chorus that carried tragic drama some distance from its origins in religious ritual. The Antigone (c. 441 BC), however, does contain an extensive examination of several important social themes, the most notable of which concerns the conflict between familial and communal loyalties. As the play opens, the two warring sons of Oedipus have just been slain by each other's hand, one brother defending the polis, the other attacking it. In keeping with the prevailing mores as he understands them, Kreon, the ruler of Thebes, declares that the former shall receive a state burial with full honors, while the latter—a traitor to his native land—will remain unburied, a shameful feast for dogs and birds. Of the two surviving sisters, Antigone feels compelled by sacred obligation and blood ties to defy the order against her brother's burial, thus risking punishment by death. The principal characters, Antigone and Kreon, are both shown to lack sôphrosune, 'sound-thinking' or 'temperance', a deficiency that leads to a horrific tragedy for all the parties concerned. In the course of unfolding the drama, Sophocles offers various moral justifications and judgments for the two conflicting positions:41

If anyone holds friend or kin in greater regard than his fatherland, that person has no place in my regard.

When he honors the laws of the land and the justice sanctioned by the gods, his Polis stands high, but *apolis* is the man who consorts with the ignoble by reason of his reckless daring. May he who does these things never share my hearth and may I never be of like mind with him.

The man who is of good service to his own oikos will prove just in his Polis as well. Such a man, I am certain, would both govern nobly and be willingly governed, and in the storm of spears stand firm in the ranks, a just and agathos comrade. But he who transgresses the laws by violence, or who thinks to dictate to his rulers, such a man can win no praise from me. For whomsoever the Polis appoints, that man must be obeyed, in small matters and great, in just and unjust. Anarchia is the greatest of evils. It destroys poleis and ravages homes, it brings confusing rout to the spears of battle. Of those who prosper, most are saved by obedience, and so we must assist the cause of order.

Antigone's defense appeals to the "unwritten laws" of the gods:42

It was not Zeus who was the herald of that law against the burial; not such are the laws marked out by the Justice which dwells with the chthonian gods below. Nor do I deem your decrees, made by mortals, of such force as to override the unwritten and unfailing conventions of the gods, for these are not simply of yesterday and today, but for all time to come.

Sophocles, as was his custom, does not provide a clear resolution of these conflicting claims, but he apparently believes that the collective utilization of our faculty for reason offers the most promising course:⁴³

The gods have implanted intelligence in men, the highest of all things.

If anyone thinks that he alone is wise, and in speech and sense has no peer, such a man, when laid open, is seen to be empty. No, even if a man be wise, it is not shameful to learn many things . . . and noble to learn from those who speak well.

Throughout the plays of the third great tragedian, Euripides, one finds many allusions to contemporary events, as well as a lively interest in current intellectual fashions (4.IV, below).⁴⁴ He was, moreover, a patriotic Athenian who wrote many of his plays during the Peloponnesian War, a fact that helps explains the frequent anti-Spartan, pro-Athenian commentary found in his work. In the *Suppliants*, for example, produced in 422 BC after nearly ten years of war, Euripides glorifies the political ideals and practices of his people by transforming the mythical hero Theseus into an ideal spokesman for democracy:⁴⁵

Herald: Who is the tyrannos of this land?

Theseus: You begin falsely, stranger, seeking a tyrant here. Our polis is not ruled by one man, but is free. The *dêmos* rules in succession year by year, not giving the greatest part to the rich, but granting even the poor equality (*ison*).

After the herald criticizes such an arrangement by invoking the standard oligarchical line—the "mob" rules; people are swayed and duped by clever orators who seek their own gain, poor farmers lack the leisure for wisdom and so succumb to flatterers—Theseus responds by appealing to the communal principles inherent in the Polis ideal:⁴⁶

There is nothing more hostile to a Polis than a tyrant, for first of all there are no laws in common (nomoi koinoi); one man alone rules, keeping the laws in possession for himself, bringing equality to an end. When laws are written down, however, the weak and the rich have equal rights. The weaker can, when verbally abused, rebuke the more fortunate in like manner; and the smaller can defeat the great if he has justice on his side. For this is how freedom speaks: "Who possesses some useful plan for the polis and wishes to bring it forward in public?" And he who so wishes wins distinction, and he who does not remains silent. What is more equal for a Polis than this?

Although modern literary critics have frequently found fault with these anachronistic elements, and have objected even more strongly against the interjection of lengthy political sermons they deem gratuitous and stylistically awkward, the standards they apply in such instances are themselves anachronistic. In the Hellenic world, poets ranked as the foremost educators of the people, and it was that responsibility that mandated a fusing of aesthetic and civic values in the artistic canon.

In this brief overview of the basic institutions and normative ideals of classical Polis society, we have attempted to specify those integrative linkages that promoted communal solidarity and cultural unity. Of signal importance was the fact that the status of citizenship provided a common grounding in several core social roles, which in turn formed the bases for widely shared experiences, motivations, and values. Political, military, economic, religious, and kinship structures were remarkably integrated—again through citizenship—a circumstance that resulted in considerable overlap between public and private interests, both material and ideal. The Polis as "sacred nurse," Nomos as the guarantor of equality and justice, the agathos man as one who performs manifold civic duties for the benefit of the *koinônia*—these and other normative judgments all reflect the strength and intensity of the Polis-citizen bond as it was forged by the social changes that toppled the pillars of aristocratic domination. The culture conventionally labelled "classical," its religion, art, politics, and ethics-though "universal" in many of its aesthetic and philosophical implications—thus represents a reflection upon and an exaltation of that distinctive nexus between the citizenry and their community. Look again at the statuary and the architectural monuments; attend to the histories written and the orations declaimed; note the functions of the patron deities and the modalities of religious practice; consider the ethical representations of man as a self-governing citizen, the ideals of freedom and equality. Just as the civilization of medieval Europe was fundamentally saturated by its Christian heritage, and our own by a globalizing consumer capitalism, so it can be said that the intellectual and iconographical core of Classical Greek civilization—its factual and expressive significance, its symbolic meaning—all hinges ultimately upon what can be called the Polis-citizen axis.

4.IV THE SOPHISTS AND SOKRATES: CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND THE REVALUATION OF CONVENTIONAL MORALITY

The Sophistic movement of the fifth century BC has always presented problems of interpretation and assessment, both for the Greeks who experienced it directly and for the historians and philosophers of subsequent generations.1 Extreme and polarized reactions have tended to prevail, the Sophists being either lauded as the champions of an emancipating "enlightenment" or, more commonly, condemned as the purveyors of a corrupting "subjectivity." Such a marked divergence of opinion is not uncommon in the sociology of intellectuals, for it accurately registers the ambiguities inherent in the social role of the "analytical" or "theoretical" individual, a figure whose quest for knowledge—an admirable goal in principle—invariably sacrifices much that is hallowed upon the altar of reason. While new forms of knowledge and intellectual skills may find favor within select circles or strata, public hostility is commonly directed against those whose roving intellect challenges conventions long held sacrosanct. Herein lies one of the keys to the contested legacy of the Sophists, who in addition to pioneering the first systems of advanced education in the Hellenic world, scandalized traditional sensitivities through their wide-ranging and uninhibited social criticism.

Brief mention has already been made of Greece's first wave of intellectuals, men such as Thales, Anaximander, and Pythagoras, whose bold speculations in the domains of cosmology and ontology herald the dawn of Western science and philosophy (3.II.v). Although their rationalistic accounts of earthquakes and eclipses opened a potential breach between "reason" and religion by depriving soothsayers and augurers of their divine signs and portents, the *physikoi* do not appear to have incurred much if any public censure; and that is true even of Xenophanes and Heraclitus, both of whom leveled pointedly hostile criticisms against popular religious belief and practice. Whatever the reasons for this apparent tolerance—the religious terminology that clothed many of their basic positions and the limited dissemination of the new ideas are two likely

factors—tensions between rationalistic speculation and public opinion began to mount in the latter half of the fifth century.² Conditions then prevailing were particularly conducive to heightened mass conservatism, for this was a period of considerable social turmoil, marked by protracted hegemonic rivalries and intensified civic strife (4.VI below). More immediately relevant was the fact that Sophism represented a fundamentally different form of intellectualism, distinctive both in terms of praxis and in the content of ideas. Unlike the isolated, "free-thinking" physikoi, the Sophists came to the fore as professional educators, and in that role they carried their ideas squarely into the public domain. What they communicated there was also decidedly new, for rather than focus on distant and abstruse issues involving the physical or the cosmic, the Sophists shifted their sights to the more pressing problems of life as lived within the walls of Polis society. In thus moving from a speculative to a pragmatic modality, critical rationalism announced its fateful trespass into the impassioned arena of politics and public morals.

In accounting for the rise and success of the Sophistic movement, emphasis must be placed on the social vacuum that the new intellectualism filled within Polis society.3 Lacking the kinds of educational imperatives that flow from imperial bureaucracies and priestly hierocratic institutions, the Greeks had hitherto addressed their socialization needs without much in the way of institutional specialization. Basic language skills and behavioral norms were inculcated within the domestic setting, and formal elementary schools were operational in most communities by the close of the Archaic period, offering instruction in gymnastike and mousike for those children whose parents could afford the modest fees. Once that rudimentary education had been completed, adolescents were expected to continue their paideia simply by living within the community: exercising and interacting in the gymnasia, participating in the festivals, paying heed to the laws, and attending to the poets. For sons of the aristoi, freed from the necessity of working the land or of mastering the technical skills of craftwork, added grace and refinement were to be absorbed through associations with adult males in the palaistra and symposion, a socializing arrangement that, in addition to the wider networking, typically featured some form of pederastic bonding.4

Within the context of a hierarchically stable, oral-based society, this pattern of elementary instruction/informal socialization had sufficed for transmitting the requisite values and skills to succeeding generations. With the progressive dissolution of aristocratic supremacy over the Archaic and early Classical periods, however, new opportunities were opened up for individual advancement—and it was here that the Sophists

made their mark. By offering a selective "secondary education" for those with the leisure and means to pay for advanced learning—and at a time when leadership roles could no longer be deemed part and parcel of the patrimony of the privileged—the Sophists addressed one of the most pressing demands of a society then breaking free from traditional status arrangements.⁵

The Sophistic movement can best be characterized as an effort by "moral entrepreneurs"—we know the names of twenty-six prominent Sophists, and many anonymous figures swelled the ranks during the fifth and fourth centuries—to create and establish educational practices congruent with the new-style politics that attended the democratization of Polis society. What served to unite individual Sophists was not so much any uniformity in doctrine, but their status as free-lance professional educators. Common to all Sophistic programs was a training in politike technê, conventionally translated as the 'art of politics', but the phrase connotes the more inclusive art of living successfully within the public sphere. In a relatively small-scale, face-to-face society organized and governed by the medium of direct speech, public success would depend heavily on mastering the art of persuasive oratory, a skill in demand not only in the law courts, councils, and assemblies, but also in the social and recreational associations of the gymnasia and symposia. The featured curriculum in Sophistic education was, accordingly, rhêtorikê, a science or skill that sought to systematize and perfect the techniques of effective oratory (elocution, style, mnemonics, composition). As characterized by Gorgias of Leontini, one of the most celebrated of Sophists, rhetoric is "the greatest good, at once the cause of freedom for mankind and the capacity for each man to rule over others in his polis."6 The ambiguity of that remark provides a fitting introduction to the divided spirit of Sophism, which sought to reconcile its rather naked appeal to individual or personal ascendancy with general promises of public or collective benefit.

Organizationally, the Sophistic style of education was based on collective tutoring, whereby students would attach themselves to individual mentors for a number of years, receiving instruction from lectures and training manuals as the troupe traveled from polis to polis in search of new pupils. In addition to rhetoric, students were instructed in other developing forms of knowledge, including mathematics, astronomy, and literary criticism. The principal recruiting technique featured a public display of the Sophist's *sophia*, an oratorical exhibition on some select theme, either prepared in advance or brilliantly improvised at the audience's behest. The whole movement—a "circus" of sages as it were—was charged with considerable excitement and interest, so much so that

several of the leading Sophists went on to amass immense fortunes from lecture and tuition fees, as their notoriety spread throughout Hellas.

The chief Sophistic vendible, rhetoric, was in itself simply a technique, a formal means for achieving unspecified ends through skillful oratory. As with most seemingly neutral techniques, however, this novel instrument carried considerable social and moral relevance. Indeed, effective mastery of the art invariably sacrificed at least one conventionally recognized virtue-truth or honesty-in that a speaker's opportunity for success frequently depends on selective distortion, concealment, or even outright falsehood. Particularly disturbing to conservatively minded citizens was the practice known as antilogikê, or 'antilogic', whereby some activity or object was first shown to possess one predicate (such as "just" or "holy"), and then through a series of verbal sleights precisely the opposite or contradictory predicate ("unjust" or "unholy"). Protagoras of Abdera, the celebrated pioneer of the Sophistic movement, declared that there were in fact two opposing arguments (logoi) for every issue, and his pupils were trained to argue both sides with equal facility. Thus armed with a Sophistic training, it was widely believed that one could actually "make the weaker argument the stronger," so powerful was the mesmeric impact of manipulated Logos upon human minds and emotions. Given the importance of reasoning and argument in the conduct of civic life, the social implications of the new wisdom were hardly neutral or benign. With the spread of Sophistic ideas, the public interest was seen as increasingly vulnerable to private machinations, and though leading Sophists such as Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus were honest individuals who opposed any misapplication of their skills, it was not long before others were exploiting the new methods to justify a philosophy of ruthless

The moral ambivalence of rhetoric was rendered still more suspect by a wide-ranging epistemological and sociological relativism that underpinned the Sophistic worldview. Protagoras' celebrated "man-measure" doctrine provided succinct formulation of the new perspective:⁸

Man is the measure (metron) of all things, of things existing, that [or as] they are, and of non-existing things, that [or as] they are not.

The precise meaning of this postulate is difficult to establish—like much of early Greek philosophy, the writings of the Sophists are lost save for fragmentary quotations or paraphrases preserved in later sources. Most scholars agree, however, that the "man" who serves as the "measure" is each individual person and that the subjectivity of sense perception is the point at issue. As Plato interpreted the doctrine, "each group of things is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to

you." A gust of wind seems and therefore is cold to one man, while another deems it warm; honey seems and therefore is sweet to one, whereas another finds it salty. According to a later source, Protagoras maintained that human beings "apprehend different things at different times owing to their differing dispositions," and pointedly contrasted the variegated reactions of people to identical stimuli according to differences of age, states of health, and so on.¹⁰

On the basis of this epistemological relativism, it was but a short step for Protagoras to offer a corresponding sociology of morals:11

In matters relating to the Polis, the noble and the shameful, the just and unjust, the sacred and not, such as each polis has deemed and set up as customary for itself, these are true and valid for each, and in these matters no individual or polis is wiser than another.

For what seem just and noble to each polis, are so for it, so long as it believes in these things.

From a factual point of view, these observations were not particularly radical, for the Greeks had long known of their own diversity of customs, and that other peoples, such as the Egyptians and Persians, lived lives quite different from their own. Early in the fifth century, a new literary genre appeared that contributed to this widening of cultural horizons: the travelogue, an artform combining geography with ethnographical observation—usually of the "sensational" sort—and probably descended from seamens' handbooks which offered descriptions of various ports and peoples of the Mediterranean. Around 500 BC, Hecataeus wrote an *Outline of the Earth* based on the reports of sailors as well as his own travels in Asia and Africa; sometime during the middle of the century he was followed by another great wayfarer, Herodotus, the "father of history," who spiced his narrative on the Persian Wars with innumerable digressions on the "exotic" customs and beliefs of the Scythians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Indians, and many others.

Against this background, Protagoras cannot be credited with anything so grand as "a discovery of cultural relativism"; but his contribution was decidedly original in another respect, for it was within Sophistic circles that the empirical reports of travelers and historians were first utilized to yield theoretical reflections on the nature of society. The publication that initiated this trend was Protagoras' own On the State of Things in the Beginning, a work no longer extant, but that presumably provides the basis for Plato's well-known summary of the sophist's views in the dialogue bearing his name. Protagoras is shown presenting his theory on the origins of social life in two stages, first in the guise of a mythos and then by way of reasoned argumentation, or logos. 12 The sophist begins by

postulating a primordial "state of nature" (to use the familiar Hobbesian terminology), in which human beings live separate and scattered lives. In an effort to overcome their individual limitations and find security against the depredations of wild animals, they decide to gather together and form communities. This proves unworkable, for owing to a lack of politikê technê, they continually "do wrong to each other," causing a relapse to the state of nature. Fearful of humanity's extermination, Zeus sends Hermes earthward to bestow upon men aidos and dikê ('respect' and 'justice'), so as to enable them "to create order within their poleis and a bond of friendship and union amongst themselves." The allegorical mythos thus suggests that "natural man" cannot survive without the development of a "social nature," for anthrôpos is in essence a communal animal. Protagoras proceeds to strengthen this interpretation sociologically, observing that it is society itself that imparts aidos, dikê, sôphrosunê, and all the other moral excellences to its citizenry, employing lawcodes, juridical punishments, and elementary schooling as instrumentalities toward that end. The ideological relevance of this theory for democratic politics is readily manifest, for by insisting that politikê technê is basically learned, not inborn or natural, the sophist is providing implicit justification for civic equality. These partisan implications are in fact underscored by Plato himself, who presents Protagoras' argument in answer to a challenge posed by Sokrates concerning the Athenian practice of indiscriminately "allowing cobblers, smiths, merchants, and the like to participate actively in self-government." In the history of philosophy, Protagoras' views thus stand as "the first theoretical defense of participatory democracy"; and it is perhaps worth noting that Protagoras was closely associated with no less a figure than Pericles, the democratic leader of Athens, who at one point selected the sophist to serve as a lawgiver for a pan-Hellenic colony founded under Athenian sponsorship. 13 More immediately consequential was the fact that in speculating about the origins of society, Protagoras opened a new vista on the human condition, one that would presently invite a radical rethinking of the "natural" and

As theoretical reflection deepened over the sociological diversity of customs and institutions, Greek life and morality became subjects for critical-rational inquiry. What authority or power sanctions or legitimizes custom? How did particular practices actually develop, and whose interest do they serve? How should an individual live, given the great variety of norms and values? In addressing these and related questions, the Sophists those things that appeared to exist by nomos, or 'convention', and those attributable to physis, or 'nature'. Subsumed under the former category

were all human efforts to establish normative relationships, while the latter encompassed qualities and capacities that were deemed inherently constitutive of the nature of things. Though the *nomos-physis* dichotomy was basic to Sophistic thought, interpretations differed greatly as to the relationship between the two categories. While a majority appear to have followed Protagoras in holding that "natural man" was incomplete and unviable, and that human life required the higher, civilizing contribution of *nomos* to ensure its existence and perfection, others viewed the welter of prevailing customs, laws, and beliefs as mere artifice, conventions designed to serve the interests of certain groups at the expense of naturally superior individuals. Notwithstanding that the Protagorean view was basically supportive of traditional Polis-citizen morality, both orientations were to prove disruptive of conventional beliefs.

For Hesiod, Solon, Aeschylus, and the other great moralist-educators, the Polis had been founded upon divine as well as human principles. The self-governing citizens created for themselves laws and customs, but ultimate sanction was bestowed by the gods; great father Zeus was the guardian of cosmic dikê, while the other Olympians served as patron deities of the many individual communities. The sacredness of tradition was even more strongly maintained in everyday practice: the religious ceremonies and invocations that opened each meeting of the council and assembly; the confraternal bonding as symbolized in the communal feasts and festivals; the mythic heroes and war dead who were worshipped as protecting spirits of the Polis; the obligatory sacrificial rites that were held before every major collective undertaking, from the laboring rounds of the agricultural cycle to preparations for battle. All of this ritual fusing of the religious with the communal served to raise the Polis to a quasitranscendental plane and endow its laws and customs with a distinctive sacral quality, capable of commanding heartfelt devotion as well as prudent obedience. A rational, secular theory that reduced this sacred heritage to sociology, to mere human "convention," no matter how enlightened or beneficial that convention was shown to be, could not help but loosen the bonds that bound each citizen to the wider koinônia. Indeed, by stripping the traditional moral order of its most authoritative and compelling support, "sacred custom," such views all but invited social turmoil and self-seeking, given the inherent unsteadiness and notorious subjectivity of "enlightened reason."

The moral ambiguities inherent in the sociological defense of nomos were soon exposed by those who agreed that laws and customs were relative and man-made, but who drew radically different conclusions from that fact. Leading the antinomian current of Sophism were men such as Antiphon, a noted Athenian oligarch who maintained that customary

morals and rules were "fetters on nature" and that the most advantageous policy lay in "treating the laws as important whenever witnesses are present, but the edicts of physis when alone."14 The rhetor Thrasymachus was of similar disposition, declaring in Plato's Republic that "Justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger." For Thrasymachus and the "countless others" who are said to share such views, it is the pursuit of calculated self-interest that brings the greatest gains, a reality that entitles those naturally superior to disregard the claims of nomos whenever circumstances allow. As for those who practice conventional justice, their adherence stems not from conviction, but simply because of "a lack of power to commit injustice."16 Even more extreme in his interpretation of the nomos-physis relationship is Callicles, a young nobleman (and apparently one of Gorgias' pupils) who boldly declares that "physis herself reveals that it is just for the better sort to have more than the worse, and the powerful more than the weaker," a lesson easily learned from observing "the animals and the poleis and races of mankind," all of which follow the principle that "the greater rule the lesser and take a greater share."17 To pursue one's own self-interest is the true "law of nature," and if a man has the power to defend himself against the leveling demands of the multitude, he should not consent to check or moderate his desires, but satisfy them to the full. Luxury, intemperance, and license are declared the very practices that bring "aretê and eudaimonia," while traditional moral virtues are dismissed as "the unnatural watchwords of mankind, trifles having no worth."18 In this uninhibited revaluation of conventional values, "man" has indeed become the "measure of all things," but the radical calculus now employed does not involve aidos and dikê-ideals fit for "stones and corpses" says Callicles-but self-aggrandizement and the "will to power."19

The moral uncertainties occasioned by the discovery of cultural relativism and the *nomos-physis* distinction were rendered still more controversial by the fact that religion too fell under the "conventional" side of the Sophistic ledger. We noted earlier that several of the *physikoi* had infused their cosmologies with divine attributes, deifying nature in rationalistic form, and how a few went on to subject traditional religious practices and beliefs to rationalistic criticism. The Sophists continued that trend, beginning with Protagoras' infamous book *On the Gods*, a work that opened with a notorious statement of agnosticism:²⁰

Concerning the gods, I have not the means to know whether they exist or do not exist. For many are the things hindering knowledge, both the uncertainty of the topic and the shortness of man's life.

A position both moderate and modest perhaps, but one with unsettling implications for all traditionalists, suggesting as it does that the existence of the gods is a subject much like any other, and therefore open to debate.

Other Sophists were to extend these initial probings by offering quasisociological accounts of various mythic-sacred traditions. The most prominent figure in this field was Prodicus of Keos, who suggested that religions originated out of a basic and primordial human tendency to deify those things that bring benefit and nutrition, as illustrated by the near universal worship of the sun and moon, fire and water, the forces of fertility, etc. Also enrolled among the ranks of the "gods" were the human discoverers of various practical crafts and new foods, such as bread (Demeter) and wine (Dionysus).21 A more radical theory was advanced by Kritias, Plato's uncle and one of the leaders of the oligarchical tyranny that briefly held power after the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (4.VI, below). In addition to his antidemocratic political pursuits, this many-sided man participated actively in the highest circles of learning and culture, authoring numerous works of prose and poetry. Among the latter was the Sisyphus, a satyr play that offered an ingenious "social control" theory on the origins of religion and civilization:22

There was a time when the life of man was disordered, bestial, and under the dominion of strength, when there was no prize for the good nor punishment for the bad. And then, I think, men set up laws (nomoi) as punishers, so that justice might be tyrant and have hubris as her slave; and if anyone committed wrong, they would be punished. But though the laws restrained men from deeds of open violence, still they did them in secret. And so at this time, it seems to me, some wise and clever fellow invented fear of the gods, that the bad might have some fear even if they were doing, saying, or thinking anything wrong in secret. Hence it was that the divine (to theion) was introduced, as a daimôn flourishing in undecaying life, possessing a divine physis, with his mind hearing and seeing, thinking and attending, who will hear all the things said by mortals and will see all that is done. And if anyone plans evil in silence, this will not escape notice of the gods; for their intelligence is too powerful. And by speaking these words, that man introduced the most profitable and cunning of all teachings, concealing the truth with a false logos. .

Kritias' own career of tyranny and murder is fitting testimony to the dangers inherent in such views, for as Aeschylus had counseled in the Eumenides: "there are times when the fearful is good and must keep its watchful place over men's minds," for "who among mortals is just that fears nothing?"

Hellenic polytheism-more a product of poets than priests-did not feature a systematic and coherent theodicy, but it was nonetheless widely

assumed that the gods did inflict punishment for wrongdoing, if not on the guilty directly, then certainly on their descendents (as attested by the notion of inherited blood guilt, a motif that figures prominently in Greek myth and tragedy). Also current were many views that presented Hades as a place of punishment: in the Homeric epics, for example, Zeus is said to chastise in the world below those who swear false oaths on earth; and Aeschylus maintains that postmortem sanctions await all those who are guilty of impiety towards the gods or of violent outrage against parents or guests.23 Singularly informative is the famous fifth-century painting of Odysseus' descent into Hades by the great Polygnotus, a large-scale mural masterpiece that adorned one of the public buildings in Delphi. The work, described in great detail by the second-century AD traveler Pausanias, presents a composite of several coexisting traditions regarding Hades, and thus affords rather direct access to the confused state of mind of the average Greek, who lacked the doctrinal certitude and uniformity commonly associated with corporate priesthoods and sacred canonical texts. In addition to Homeric "shades" of the dead and various mythic figures, several of whom are suffering torment for their earthly crimes, Polygnotus depicts a man being strangled by his own aged father, whom he had earlier abused and outraged, and a temple robber in writhing agony from administered poisons. In another section the artist shows a number of men and women franticly attempting to carry water in broken pitchers, a symbolic representation of those who had failed to receive purification through initiation into one of the mystery cults.24 An equally disturbing account of Hades is given in Aristophanes' Frogs (405 BC), where in recompense for their crimes the dead are immersed in slim and subjected to the terrors of the flesh-devouring monsters Empousa and Echidna. Against this tangled backdrop of myth, superstition, and religious lore, it is hardly surprising that contemporary sources testify to widespread anxiety and fear of the underworld, or that people eagerly sought initiation into mystery cults as a means of securing "better hopes" for the afterlife.

Key aspects of the traditional moral code were thus given powerful normative sanction by religious practice and belief. The laws and customs of the Polis were themselves endowed with a quasi-divine, spiritual dimension, and conventional representations of the supernatural typically featured some form of punishment-whether earthly or postmortem-for those guilty of wrongdoing. Subjecting this sacred legacy to the cold light of rational inquiry was bound to provoke a moral crisis, for if the gods and Hades were mere "convention," a "false logos" concocted by the shrewd and clever for purposes of social control, was it not the case that the only real limit to an individual's action was the extent of his own power?

Advances in knowledge and learning, and the threatening implications of that new knowledge for conventional beliefs and practices: such was the dual legacy of the Sophistic movement. In their social role as educators who taught the rhetorical skills that would enable an individual to "best manage his own oikos and the affairs of his polis," the Sophists offered a service that many agonally inspired Greeks were eager to receive.25 But in their capacity as the first "vivisectionists" of culture, the Sophists cut deeply into the body of social morality, an operation that inevitably called forth a hostile reaction from those who perceived in the "new wisdom" a threat to their traditional way of life. From the mid fifth century onwards-and particularly during the tension-ridden decades of the Peloponnesian War-we accordingly find signs of popular mistrust and disapproval of the Sophistic spirit, and at times open persecution and violent harassment.26 Several prominent intellectuals are known to have been prosecuted for asebeia, or 'impiety', during this period, beginning with the natural philosopher Anaxagoras and including Protagoras himself, who was expelled from Athens and whose books (rolled sheets of papyrus) were publicly burned in the agora following his conviction. In an effort to stifle the new rationalism in Athens, a law sponsored by a prominent diviner was passed around 432 BC that made it illegal either "to teach doctrines about astronomy" or "to disbelieve in things divine."27 Damon, the Sophist friend and teacher of Pericles, was ostracized for ten years, and other intellectuals were fined and banished as well. Summary expulsion from a city appears to have been something of an occupational hazard for itinerant Sophists, and it is on record that mounting public hostility in democratic Argos convinced Gorgias to take his wisdom elsewhere. A more common mode of chastisement took the form of a banning or forced removal from gymnasia, an indignity that is said to have befallen even the great Prodicus.

Although the antinomian doctrines of people like Thrasymachus and Callicles were intended for select circles within the symposion, many of their ideas did filter down to the general public, not only by way of the scuttlebutt carried on in such places as the public baths and the barbershops, but also through the reflections of other intellectuals—tragedians, comic poets, historians—who were themselves influenced by the Sophistic movement. Since limitations of space preclude a detailed examination of the impact of Sophistic ideas upon Hellenic culture, let us briefly consider the relevant works of two prominent figures, Euripides and Aristophanes, both of whom were keenly interested in the moral implications and social significance of the new teachings.

Ancients and moderns alike have regarded Euripides (485–406 BC) as the "philosopher of the stage," his extant plays abounding in allusions to

the intellectual debates and issues first raised by the physikoi and the Sophists. He was not, however, a shield bearer for any particular school of thought, but a creative artist who drew freely upon contemporary ideas to breathe new life into the stock of traditional myths (the raw material for tragic composition) and to explore many obscure and troubling facets of the human condition. That his public was not altogether comfortable with the directions he charted is clear from the astonishing fact that over the course of some fifty years of production, he managed to win the first prize only four times (a fifth came posthumously), whereas his main competitor, the great Sophocles, was awarded that distinction on twentyfour occasions. Euripides' lack of public success can be traced to the thematic novelties he brought to the stage (disturbing questions about the gods and the nomos-physis controversy figured prominently), and his greater realism in the depiction of character, a change that entailed a significant "deflation" of heroic qualities. Both of these developments were influenced, if not inspired, by the anthropological, "man-measure" orientation of the Sophists; and to many of his contemporaries, Euripides seemed little more than a versifying Sophist, a purveyor of atheism and a corrupter of morals. Indeed, his reflections on the gods were considered so unorthodox that he was actually indicted for impiety by Cleon, the leader of the dêmos after the death of Pericles. Though the tragedian won acquittal, he had given grounds for concern in many of his plays:28

What shall I say, O Zeus? That you look upon mankind? Or that this is a false opinion held in vain, that there seems a race of gods, while chance, Tychê, oversees all things among mortals?

The gods are strong, and so is their ruler, nomos. For it is by nomos ('convention' or 'law') that we believe in the gods and in our lives distinguish right and wrong.

If there be gods, you, being a just man, will obtain from them good things; but if there are no gods, why should men toil?

Pantheistic and rationalistic positions also found their way into his dramas:29

Zeus is aether, Zeus is earth, Zeus is sky, Zeus in truth is all things, and greater than these.

Whoever thou may be, hard to know even by conjecture, Zeus, whether necessity of nature or mind of man, to you I pray.

If the gods act basely, then they are not gods.

That last remark touches upon the major ethical limitation in traditional Greek religion, i.e., the anthropomorphic heritage of the Olympian

gods, and the corpus of mythic lore steeped in "divine immorality." Euripides frequently made full use of these tales of raping and plundering deities to portray the gods as vain or vindictive "powers," while on other occasions he offered moving protests against such traditions, dismissing them as "wretched *logoi*" sung by singers ignorant of the true nature of divinity.³⁰ It is therefore impossible to identify any consistent theology or theodicy from the content of his plays, though the form itself—the critical questions raised and the diverse interpretations presented—unquestionably served to reinforce the skepticism that had been ushered in by the *physikoi* and the Sophists.

If the role and nature of the gods in Euripidean drama caused unease, so too did the human characters. In his effort to achieve greater realism, Euripides frequently dispensed with the grand, heroic figures who typically carried the action in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and replaced them with more conventional, "all too human" types. Agamemnon, Odysseus, Menelaus, Jason, Orestes, and the other heroes from the mythic pantheon were oft depicted as ignoble opportunists or as cowardly brutes, characters far removed from the heroes whose "glorious deeds" were immortalized in the songs of singers. When Nietzsche declared that Euripides had "brought the spectator onto the stage" and had conscientiously reproduced "even the botched outlines" of human nature, he was only restating in more vigorous language the celebrated judgment of Sophocles, who had observed that while "he portrayed men as they ought to be, Euripides portrayed them as they really were."31 The harvest Euripides reaped from this device—though bitter to those who preferred their heroes on pedestals—was a greater understanding of the human psychê and a more realistic assessment of the raging inner wars between conscience and desire, reason and emotion. By fusing this psychological realism with an appreciation of the moral dilemmas posed by the nomosphysis controversy, Euripides created a dramatic style that was to profoundly influence many of the greatest artists of the Western stage, from Corneille to Ibsen, von Kleist to Brecht and Sartre.32

In the Medea, produced in 431 BC and perhaps the poet's greatest play, Euripides reveals how social conventions can lead to tragic consequences when they clash with a personality of powerful emotion. Because the hero Jason has married a noncitizen, the "barbarian" Medea, whose help had won him the Golden Fleece, his children lack the rights of full citizenship. To improve his own standing and that of his socially handicapped offspring, Jason opts to divorce Medea in favor of marriage with the daughter of Creon, the ruler of Korinth. The betrayed Medea, her love spurned and her mind wracked by uncontrollable hatred and jealousy, responds by lashing out in murderous fury. She strikes down not only the

innocent bride-to-be, but her own beloved children as well, damning both herself and Jason to utter misery. In the *Hippolytus* (428 BC), we are presented with a young man whose stigmatized status as a bastard has fostered a pathological reaction against sexual eros, the perceived cause of his illegitimacy. When confronted with the socially "unnatural" passion felt for him by his youthful stepmother, herself distraught over her heart's violation of a sacrosanct taboo, his reaction sets to wheel a catastrophe that ends in tragic death for the two sympathetic characters.

In addition to exploring these sensitive, discordant contacts between the darker side of human emotion and the conventions of society, Euripides also found occasion to express—without himself defending—various views that had been advocated by the extremist wing of the Sophistic movement. In the *Phoenician Women*, Eteocles, one of the warring sons of Oedipus, champions a ruthless "will to power" in a manner strikingly similar to that of Callicles:³³

If all were the same by nature both in wisdom and nobility, then there would be no captious strife among mankind; but as it is, human beings are neither alike (homoios) nor equal (isos), except in words; in deed this never holds.

Such being the rule of *physis*, Eteocles concludes that the acquisition of supreme power is the highest goal:

I would mount the risings of the sun and stars, would plunge beneath the earth, if this I could accomplish, and so hold Power, *Tyrannis*, the greatest of the gods . . . It is cowardice to lose the greater share, the lesser to receive.

The same doctrine of self-aggrandizement is expressed by Polyphemus in the Cyclops, a satyr-play:³⁴

Little man, wealth is the god of the wise, and the rest is mere noise and fancy talk. . . . By necessity the earth must grow grass and fatten my sheep, whether she wishes or not. And these I sacrifice to none but myself, not to the gods, but to this greatest of deities, my belly. To eat and drink each day, that is the Zeus of the wise, and be grieved by nothing. Those who set up nomoi, dressing up with fair words the lives of men, I advise you to deplore. As for me, I shall never stop doing my psychê good—and that means devouring you too!

The notion that the gods are simply a myth recurs in the *Bellerophon*, where it is associated with the reality that the strong dominate the weak, irrespective of the claims of justice:³⁵

Does anyone say that there are gods in heaven? There are not, there are not! If any man so says, let him not be so foolish as to follow that ancient fable. Consider for yourselves, do not rest your judgment on my words. I say that tyrants slaughter great numbers of men and rob them of their properties,

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they break oaths and lay cities waste. And in doing these things they are more prosperous (*eudaimonios*) than those who live piously and gently day by day. And I know of small poleis that honor the gods, but are still subject to larger, more impious poleis, having been conquered by a greater number of spears.

Finally, there were a number of epigrammatic sophistries that Euripides placed in the mouths of his many characters, their combined lyricism and immorality guaranteeing public notoriety. Upon being reminded of nonfulfillment of an oath, for example, an unscrupulous individual could henceforth respond with Euripides' shocking line: "Twas the tongue which swore the oath, my mind is unsworn." Or upon receiving the censure of elders or peers, one could brazenly reply: "What is shameful if it seems not so to those doing it?"³⁶

The response of the general public to such views was largely negative: for Euripides himself, though principally a conduit or sounding board for the new ideas, a lack of critical success and an indictment for impiety; for several of the Sophists, fines, banishments, and expulsions from gymnasia. To better understand the reasons for this hostility, one must turn to the great Athenian comic Aristophanes (c. 450–385 BC), whose wit and humor offers a revealing prism through which to view the unsettling clash of novelty and tradition.

Primitive agrarian fertility rites and songs of revelry constitute the prehistory of the comic art form, which appears to have received its decisive impetus in Greek Sicily at the end of the sixth century, when Epicharmus of Syracuse began to write short plays burlesquing traditional myths.37 The distinctive feature of Attik comedy, formally institutionalized in 486 BC as part of the annual religious festival honoring the wine god, was its combination of the narrative farce with older rituals of choral song and dance. Our only surviving examples of this genre are the eleven plays by Aristophanes, though numerous fragments from his predecessors and peers have also been preserved. As it evolved, Comedy became the licensed vehicle for a boundless lampooning of all and sundry, from prominent politicians, social institutions, and the gods (who were thought to enjoy a good joke as much as the next man!), to current events, other artists and intellectuals, and basic human relationships (male-female, husband-wife, parent-child). Parody and buffoonery, obscenities and beautiful lyrics all flow freely together with the basic aim of bringing laughter to the thousands who attended each performance. Comic drama thus serves as an invaluable barometer of popular attitudes and morals, inasmuch as success in conveying satire and humor presupposes appreciation as well as comprehension by the audience. The parodies and jibes that appear in the extant plays of Aristophanes, the most successful of the comics, can accordingly be taken as representative reflections of the lifeexperiences and prejudices of the average citizen.³⁸

The "new intellectualism" was a particularly popular target for the comics' barbs, and we are fortunate that two of Aristophanes' plays, the Clouds (423 BC) and Frogs (405 BC), deal extensively with that subject. Since we have just discussed Euripides' contacts with Sophism, let us begin with the Frogs, a comedy in which the god Dionysus, dissatisfied with the quality of the plays performed in his honor following the death of Euripides, descends into Hades to bring him back. The highlight of the comedy features an agôn between Aeschylus, defender of the old style, and Euripides, champion of the new. The two tragedians pick each other's work apart in hilarious yet sophisticated criticism (an indication of the audience's high poetic literacy), but the decisive criterion of poetic excellence hinges upon the traditional moral function: "who makes men better for the Polis?"39 In the judgment of Aristophanes, the winner on that score is Aeschylus, who is credited with imparting to the citizenry martial courage, a yearning after noble deeds, and moral decency. Euripides, in contrast, is censured for having corrupted the Athenians with subtle sophistries, atheism, and immoral relativism. As the Aeschylus-character declares:40

Consider the manner of those he received from me, noble men and six-footers too! Not citizens who evade public duties, not agora-hucksters or buffoons, not unscrupulous rascals, as is the case today, but men breathing of the spear, the javelin, white-crested helmets, and greaves, men with hearts as sturdy as a shield of seven ox-hides.

And what is Euripides' legacy? He has taught the people "to babble, to think, to see, to understand, to love to twist, to contrive, to suspect all and consider things from every angle"—in short, a hyperintellectualism that is perverting the standards that gave the Athenians their victory at Marathon. Such, at any rate, is the judgment Aristophanes renders, and the play ends with Dionysus selecting Aeschylus as the superior poet, the one who will exit Hades and save Athens with his wise counsels. An indignant Euripides bitterly protests that Dionysus had originally pledged to retrieve him, but the wine god counters "Twas the tongue which swore..." And when asked if he is not ashamed by such deceit, the god cleverly slips away with "What is shameful if it seems not so to those viewing it?"

In the earlier Clouds, Aristophanes had taken on the Sophists directly, with Sokrates misleadingly cast as the leader of the movement. Historical accuracy was of course never mandatory on the comic stage, and the distinction that Sokrates and his followers sought to make between true

philosophy and sophistry was probably regarded as idle hairsplitting by Aristophanes, and it was certainly unclear to the citizens who filled the theater. After all, philosophers and Sophists alike were purveyors of new ideas, many of them highly critical of traditional standards—that was the reality Aristophanes played to. As an Athenian citizen, and a conspicuous one at that, Sokrates was probably the "wise man" best known to Aristophanes' audience, and therefore the figure who could best serve as lightning rod for the comic's general attack on the new intellectualism.

The play opens with Strepsiades, a rustic farmer married above his station, in great alarm over the many debts he has incurred through the aristocratic life-style pursued by his son Pheidippides: a stable of horses, a fine chariot, elegant clothing, and nonstop high living. As creditors will soon be demanding payment, Strepsiades comes up with an ingenious plan to avert disaster: he will send his son to the *phrontistêrion*, "the thinking-shop of wise souls," and there learn the "new wisdom" that will enable Strepsiades to repudiate the debts:⁴²

They have there, it is said, two Logoi, the better, whatever that is, and the worse. This latter Logos, the worse, they say will allow one to triumph even with the more unjust case. If you learn this unjust Logos, I will not have to pay the debts which I owe on your account.

The son balks at the idea, repulsed not only by the dubious ethics, but also by the Sophists' "pale skin" and "bare feet." The father thereupon decides to enroll and learn the "sharp subtleties" for himself. He starts off badly, as his loud knocking at the Thinkshop's door causes one of the pupils to suffer a "miscarriage" of his thoughts (a clever allusion to the Sokratic metaphor of intellectual midwifery, i.e., the bringing forth of reason through discourse). The school members announce that they have been concerned of late with two very important and mysterious subjects: measuring the leaping ability of fleas relative to their own size (a parody of Protagoras' man-measure doctrine) and determining whether the gnat's hum is an oral or rectal emission. A map of the world and various astronomical devices are presented to the prospective pupil, and Sokrates himself makes his grand entrance in an elevated basket, "contemplating the sun" and "mingling his intellect with the rarefied aêr to which it is akin."43 After a brief interview, Strepsiades submits to the school's initiation ceremony honoring the Clouds, who are said by Sokrates to be "the only gods." When questioned about Zeus, the god of rain, thunder, and lightning, Sokrates declares "there is no Zeus" and explains these phenomena in naturalistic terms. The bewildered Strepsiades clings to one last straw, that it is surely Zeus who launches fiery bolts at perjurers, but again Sokrates overturns the conventional wisdom:44

Oh Fool, reeking of ancient and dated views, if Zeus threw at oath-breakers, why has he never blasted Simon, Kleonymus, or Theorus, known perjurers all? And instead strikes his own temples . . . and the tallest oak trees! Wherefore? Oaks break no oaths.

Strepsiades is persuaded but turns out to be a very poor pupil, incapable of mastering the subtleties of measurement, language, and dialectic that Sokrates maintains are "necessary preliminaries" to learning the "unjust Logos." Strepsiades is duly expelled and advised by the Clouds to send his son instead. Pheidippides finally bows to his father's demands, and Sokrates takes the youth in after a reminder from the father that he must teach the ability "to refute all justice." There then follows the famous agôn between the "two ways," the one representing traditional morality, the other the new sophistic orientation.

The Just Logos begins by discussing the merits of the archaia paideia, the 'old education', when martial vigor, sôphrosunê ('temperance'), and just dealings were still valued. Those ideals, he declares, "nourished" the men of Marathon and, if followed today, would similarly bestow "a stalwart chest, a bright complexion, broad shoulders, a short tongue, massive buttocks and a little front-piece." The new sophistical education, on the other hand, results in "a pale complexion, narrow shoulders, a puny chest, a long tongue, tiny buttocks and a big rod." Even worse, it seduces people into believing that "the shameful is entirely noble, while the truly noble is what's shameful!" The Unjust Logos is ready for all this, however, and has no difficulty tearing the old principles to shreds, primarily by pointing to various gods and mythic heroes who fared well by disregarding such precepts and to others who suffered ill through adherence. The clinching refutation invokes the hedonistic principles of physis-egoism: 6

Just consider, young man, all that is involved in being temperate, all the pleasures you will be robbed of: boys, women, games, good food, drinks, giggles. Indeed, what value is there in living, if you are deprived of these things? . . . No, best to associate with me and indulge nature: dance, laugh, and believe nothing is shameful.

After such an onslaught, it comes as no surprise that the Just Logos is driven from the stage in defeat, whereupon the transformation of Pheidippides into a "shrewd sophist" begins. Some time later, the young man is returned to his father, and when creditors arrive demanding payment, they are easily routed by clever sophistries. As it turns out, however, Strepsiades has brought a viper into his own den, for it is not long before the son's antinomian poison lays claim to the father as well. In the last act, the son administers a thrashing to his father and defends the outrage on sophistic grounds:

Classical Greece

Do not fathers beat their children? Yes, but out of care. Well then, since old men are children twice over, it is even more fitting to chastise them.

And when Strepsiades protests that the law does not allow fathers to suffer so, the son retorts:⁴⁷

Was it not a man, just like you and me, who first set up this law and persuaded the ancients to follow it? What then, have I less right to set up a new law for the future, one allowing sons to beat their fathers in return?

That, after all, is the lesson to be learned from nature:

Consider roosters and other beasts, do they not fight with their fathers? And how do we differ from them, except that they do not write up decrees?

Himself now victimized by the unprincipled intellect, Strepsiades recognizes the error of his ways, the immorality of the Unjust Logos, and his "madness when he threw out the gods because of Sokrates." In the concluding scene, he attempts to set things right by burning down the Thinkshop, with Sokrates and his disciples still inside, choking on smoke and cinged by the enveloping flames.

Both comedies, Frogs and Clouds, thus bring to light the darker side of the Sophistic movement, as it was perceived by ordinary citizens: the scandal of atheism and the denial of divine retribution, the immoral use of rhetorical skills, the justification of self-aggrandizement through appeals to "nature," and the corrosive assault upon the sanctity of law and custom, now relativized as "man-made" and inherently partisan. The comic's own solution to this moral crisis is nostalgic: bring back Aeschylus, restore the archaia paideia, return to the principles that were sanctified on the plain of Marathon. Proposals of that kind are always unworkable, for it is quite impossible to return the rationalistic genie to its bottle once released, and the paralyzing discovery of cultural relativism can never be undone by any simple declaration of faith in the crumbling certainties of the past. It is more than a little ironic, then, that the individual who first seriously attempted to overcome the dilemmas posed by the new wisdom was the very man Aristophanes had left burning in the Thinkshop.

Both as a historical personage and as a watershed figure in the history of philosophy, Sokrates has remained perennially "elusive." Owing to the fact that his contributions to the political life of his native city were not uniformly appreciated—hailed by his supporters as the noblest man who ever lived, but tried, convicted, and executed by the Athenians as a public threat in his seventieth year—the biographical tradition is fraught with conflicting interpretations. Nor is it much easier to turn from the

man to his ideas, for the sage himself shunned the written word as a vehicle for his renowned dialectic, and we are forced to rely on the partisan reports of critics and followers to reconstruct the content of his thought.⁴⁹ Many important questions about the man and his message are accordingly difficult to answer, though much that is implausible and tendentious can be cleared away if one proceeds from certain reasonably established facts regarding his life, his philosophical pursuits, and the society that framed his experience.

Sokrates was born in or around 470 BC, only nine years after the invading Persians had been driven from Greece—his early life thus coinciding with the glories of the Periclean era. One of the more vexing biographical problems concerns his social background. For a time it was widely believed that Sokrates was a stonemason, a position he is said to have inherited from his father. But that tradition has been called into question by several scholars, who observe that neither of our two most important sources, Xenophon and Plato (disciples of Sokrates in his old age), make any mention of the artisan connection. 50 In Plato's Apology, generally regarded as one of the more historical of the dialogues, Sokrates expressly states that he has no direct knowledge of the technical skills of craftwork, and elsewhere he is consistently presented as a man of leisure. 51 Of his father it is said in the Laches that he was an ariston man and a close friend of one of the leading aristocratic families in Athens. It is well established that Sokrates served as a hoplite on at least three separate campaigns during the Peloponnesian War and accordingly owned sufficient property or income during that period to be ranked among the wealthier third or so of the citizen population. That he was able to pursue a life of philosophy without the constraints of personally securing a livelihood—a picture that emerges from all the early sources—is perhaps best accounted for by Demetrius of Phaleron, a Peripatetic philosopher and politician of the early Hellenistic age, who reports that Sokrates was a rentier, having inherited with his ancestral oikos a capital sum of seven thousand drachmas that was loaned out for him by his friend Crito.52 As for the mason theory, it probably derives from the playful comment by Sokrates that Daedalus, a legendary figure who made magical statues, was his ancestor; Hellenistic scholars mistook that to mean that Sokrates was himself a worker in stone, and for confirmation pointed to a number of statues on the acropolis that had been made by someone named Sokrates (a not uncommon name, and it now appears that these statues date from before the philosopher's own lifetime). Interest in the issue is perhaps excessive, for whatever the case may be concerning the man's social origins, it is indisputable that during his adult life, Sokrates moved within the highest circles of Athenian society and that, of his devoted

followers, virtually all were drawn from the ranks of the kaloikagathoi,

'the noble and the good'.

Our earliest source on Sokrates is Aristophanes' Clouds, performed when the philosopher was nearly fifty years old and when Plato and Xenophon were still small children. As we have seen, the comedy presents Sokrates at the head of a Sophistic "school" that is engaged in scientific research and teaching for pay, with cosmology, meteorology, biology, and immoral rhetorical skills among the more prominent subjects. The Sokrates we know through Xenophon and Plato, however, has no "Thinkshop" (any informal gathering in the agora, palaistra, or symposion will do), receives no pay, is basically unconcerned with physics, and stands opposed to Sophistic relativism. If we keep in mind that Aristophanes was primarily interested in caricaturing a type rather than an individual, and was endowed with considerable comedic licence, the lack of fit between the burlesque and the disciples' dialogues need not cause too much unease. The most important difference calling for comment is Sokrates' ethical philosophy, absent (or rather perverted) in the comedy, but the focal point of his life's work according to all other sources. To state the matter directly, how could Aristophanes possibly mistake Sokrates for an "amoral" Sophist? One obvious explanation lies in the formal similarity of their activities: both were engaged in rationalistic speculation, and both served as teachers of the young. If the intellectual content differed in key respects, that may have been apparent only to insiders, and in any case both were responsible for introducing disturbing ideas and habits. Even in Plato's early dialogues, Sokrates is presented as an admirer of Sophists such as Protagoras and Prodicus, and though selectively critical of their views, he is concerned with many of the same subjects. Moreover, in his own spirited pursuit of wisdom, Sokrates frequently manifests that argumentative dexterity that was the hallmark of Sophism, a style he himself conceded gave offense to many. Indeed, in his self-appointed role as a "gadfly" on the neck of the Athenians, Sokrates seems to have unsettled more than he enlightened, particularly as many of his discussions never transcended the stage of refuting the conventional judgments of others.

The Sokratic method of question and answer was never purely destructive, however, even when it ended in refutation or aporia, 'difficulty' or 'uncertainty'. For Sokrates was convinced that the elimination of false opinions constituted the requisite first step towards enlightenment and moral advance. The method itself thus discloses the basic aim of his philosophy: to achieve a clearer and ultimately correct understanding of "the way in which a person ought to live." It was on that subject above all that Sokrates was to clash with the Sophists.

The legitimacy and sanctity of traditional morality had been profoundly shaken by the discovery of cultural relativism and the "conventionality" of social institutions and values. If law and custom were "manmade" conventions, was it not the case that justice, temperance, and other normative ideals were mere "embellishments," fancy words that veiled the partisan interests of select groups or individuals? And as sovereign Nomos has been dethroned, stripped of transcendent authority and validity, should not the higher law of physis be followed, which teaches that "the strong rule the weak and take a larger share?" Sokrates did not concur, and in a number of Platonic dialogues he is shown waging a two-front campaign, one against the general principles of Sophistic relativism, the other against the antinomian doctrines espoused by the cham-

pions of physis.

Sokrates' initial and basic strategy entailed a mutual examination of moral terms and ethical actions, the principal objective being the discovery of some common or universal quality within them.53 Various early dialogues thus feature extended reflections on the nature of justice, temperance, courage, and so on with the other primary virtues. Often the inquiry ends without any definitive answer, i.e., aporia, though much misconception is cleared away and the solution offered in the later dialogues is typically adumbrated. That solution, suggested rather than dogmatically asserted, is the famous Sokratic equation of virtue and happiness with the possession of knowledge or wisdom: aretê = eudaimonia = epistêmê, 54 What is purportedly common to all the varieties of moral excellence—and so constitutive of aretê—is some form of knowledge (epistêmê), sometimes also referred to as wisdom (sophia) or practical insight (phronêsis).55 The inverse analogue of the virtue-knowledge equation is the vice-ignorance formula, which holds that all moral transgressions and vices (kakôn) are manifestations of corresponding forms of ignorance. A person is courageous, for example, when one's actions are based on a knowledge of what should and should not be feared, cowardly when one foolishly wilts before things that should be faced, and rash when one unwisely confronts dangers that should be avoided. Sokrates frequently attempts to establish this general principle by analogy, noting that the excellence, or aretê, of cobblers, doctors, and other craftsmen is dependent on the acquisition of technical mastery, or epistêmê, within their own particular arts. Philosophy, as Sokrates understands it, is concerned with the art of living well generally, from which it follows that the aim of the philosopher is to attain knowledge regarding good and evil, right and wrong. Sokrates further suggests that all the moral excellences are in some sense one, parts of a single whole that he calls "true aretê," with each particular aspect marked by distinct capacities or functions. 56 The rather striking conclusion

he draws from this is that a person who acts justly will also act temperately, bravely, and so on—a uniform pattern of conduct, in other words, based upon rational insight. Knowledge of this overarching "true aretê" is therefore the ultimate objective of the philosophic enterprise, for through its acquisition one will attain ho tropos aristos tou biou, 'the best way of life' possible. "Unfortunately, Sokrates himself is unable to fully specify the content of this knowledge, and so must measure his success by the extent to which he can convince his audience that it is the highest ideal toward which they should strive. The exploratory nature of his philosophy, however, does not obviate the fact that amid a stormy sea of relativism, Sokrates has found an anchor in the discovery that moral conduct is somehow based upon rational insight or knowledge.

Sokrates' second line of argument against the Sophistic challenge entailed nothing less than a fundamental redefinition of the true nature, or physis, of man. As we have seen, the notion that the royal road to "wellbeing" is paved by a maximal gratification of one's desires found open expression in the extremist wing of the Sophistic movement, often through appeals to the hierarchical patterns found in nature or to the unrestrained conduct of notorious tyrants. For men such as Antiphon, Callicles, and Thrasymachus, the moral and legal conventions of society were "fetters on nature," obstacles to be overcome by superior individuals whose talents entitle them to a greater share of life's bounty, in wealth, power, and sensual delights. If the frankness and intellectualist content of these views were novel, there was a line of affinity here between the doctrines of physis-egoism and certain elements of the heroic, self-assertive ethos of the earlier warrior-aristocracy (the most notable difference being the latter's preoccupation with public honor, a concern that necessarily fostered greater respect for themis and nomos).58 In attempting to establish philosophical reason as a foundation for morality, Sokrates was thus constrained to oppose not only certain Sophistic ideas, but also various traditional views, many of which were particularly dear to the aristocrats whose company he kept.

In the debate that ensued, it was *eudaimonia*—its very content as well as the means whereby it could be achieved—that formed the contested ground. In the long tradition of Greek ethical reflection that began with the epics, *eudaimonia* had always been defined primarily in terms of prosperity and advantage, "doing well" with reference to wealth, power, and honor, rather than to "internal" states of happiness or bliss, which were generally thought to attend upon the more tangible public successes. Certain patterns of conduct rooted in the status of citizenship and the core social roles of warrior and landowner specified the appropriate means of success, while deviations were publicly censured as shameful, impious, or

hubristic. The advocates of *physis*-egoism dismissed these normative conventions as mere artifice and offered in their place sundry rationalistic justifications for self-centered aggrandizement. The moral problem posed thereby was indeed daunting, for with the claims of religion and community rejected outright, and the impulses of one's own nature alone recognized as valid criteria for action, the only possible line of refutation was to meet the immoralist on his own ground—the monadic self or ego—and there demonstrate that self-interest could best be served by ethical conduct.

In taking up that challenge, Sokrates acknowledges that a desire for personal well-being is a basic fact of human existence. But as to the true nature of eudaimonia, that is an altogether different matter, as Sokrates proceeds to demonstrate in a series of Platonic dialogues that pointedly assail both traditionalist and intellectualist misconceptions. Wealth, power, somatic pleasures, and all the other conventional "goods" are shown to be insufficient to bring about happiness, inasmuch as each is susceptible to misuse—typically through excess—and thus personal injury or harm. Since there can be no proper use of anything without relevant knowledge of its particular nature and functions, it follows that wisdom or knowledge must in some way constitute the defining attribute of true eudaimonia. Various craft analogies are employed to illustrate and confirm the basic principle: the physician must possess medical knowledge if he is to bring about the good of health in his patients, just as the navigator must possess knowledge of seamanship if he is to preserve cargo and crew. In analogous fashion, Sokrates reasons, the good of eudaimonia must depend upon a knowledge of the things and actions that are suitable or beneficial for human beings. Such knowledge necessarily presupposes a correct understanding of the physis of man, for it is the nature of a thing that determines its particular excellence or aretê, and therewith its proper functions and uses.

What, then, is the true nature of man? In providing his answer to this most fundamental of questions, Sokrates was to initiate a momentous transvaluation in the history of ethical discourse: for rather than locate the keys to human nature in our material or somatic dimensions, Sokrates chose to stress the primacy and uniqueness of the human psychê, a concept already overlaid with the varied marks of a complex history. 59

In the Homeric epics, the psychê was simply a "life-force" that left the body with the last gasp of breath, or pneuma, and fluttered down to Hades, the place "where senseless dead men dwell, mere images of perished mortals." With the advent of the mystery cults and their teachings of a more positive afterlife, the psychê began taking on the attributes of the essence of the self, a trend that was deepened by Orphic-Pythagorean

notions that the psychê was a "fallen spirit" entombed within the body, requiring both ritual purification and ethical conduct if it was to achieve deliverance from the wheel of rebirth and reunion with the Divine. By the Classical period, the psychê was typically regarded as the seat of emotion and thought, in contrast to the Homeric and Archaic tendency to localize such forces within separate physical organs, such as the thumos, kardia, and phrenes (each vaguely and variously referring to the midriff complex of heart, lungs, stomach, and diaphragm). The fifth-century Athenian law for homicide, for example, demands forfeiture of "the psychê which did or planned the deed." Sokrates furthered these developments by arguing that the psychê was in fact the true self, the conscious personality, that part of the human organism that has the capacity to reason as its distinctive and highest function. To what extent he was influenced by the sôma-sêma doctrines of the Orphics and Pythagoreans is an open question (many scholars believe that the presentation of such views in the dialogues are more Platonic than Sokratic); but Sokrates certainly adhered to a hierarchical ordering whereby the psychê stood above, if not opposed, to the nonrational body. 60 As the essential self and the highest, "most divine" part of man, Sokrates maintained that the psychê should constitute the principal concern of human existence. 61 And since the distinctive excellence of the psychê is wisdom and knowledge, it necessarily follows that eudaimonia will best be achieved by attending to the dictates of reason rather than by engaging in any indiscriminate gratification of the desires, impulses that Sokrates traces to the nonrational body. 62

The bearing of these considerations on ethical conduct is direct: since each of the varieties of moral excellence has been shown to consist in some form of wisdom or knowledge, the proper activity of the *psychê* is of necessity moral. Conversely, immoral actions—as manifestations of ignorance—will necessarily entail damage and harm for the *psychê*, the very opposite of well-being, or *eudaimonia*. The philosophy that equates aretê with knowledge, and knowledge with *eudaimonia*, thus culminates in the simple message that each person should "care for the *psychê*," a precept that calls for the exercise of reason and, consequently, the practice of virtue.⁶³

A detailed examination of the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments would be out of place here, but brief mention must be made of the position that caused the greatest controversy in Sokrates' own day: the famous paradox that "no one willingly does wrong, or willingly perpetrates any evil or shameful act," a thesis that followed from the virtue-knowledge, vice-ignorance equations. Inasmuch as human beings naturally seek what is good and beneficial for themselves, Sokrates believed that knowledge of the good provided sufficient cause for doing or pur-

suing it; it would not be possible, in other words, for someone to know the good, yet still choose the contrary. Whenever any immoral action is perpetrated, the actor does so from ignorance of what is truly good, the particular vice being chosen under the misapprehension that it is good for him to do so. Strictly speaking, then, no one willingly commits evil, knowing it is evil, but only by thinking that it is somehow personally good or beneficial—the mistake is involuntary. Intellectual error therefore lies at the root of all evil, and the commonsense notion that human beings typically know what is good and right, evil and wrong, yet choose the latter because they are overcome by anger, desire, or some other affectation, Sokrates rejects on the grounds that in each case the individual is consciously preferring some immediate, apparent pleasure (or release from pain) over more painful distant or long-term consequences; e.g., indulging the cravings for drink, sex, and luxury even though such a lifestyle eventually ruins one's health and estate, to say nothing of damaging the psychê. 55 What is needed, Sokrates contends, is a more accurate "science of measuring" good and evil, and that technê metrêtikê, not surprisingly, turns out to be philosophy, the love of wisdom.

Given the sociological concerns of our study and the remarkable manner of his death—executed in his seventieth year on a public charge that he had contravened traditional religious belief and corrupted the young—it is essential that we examine Sokrates' relationship to his native polis. Caution is in order, however, for this is a subject that has been marked-marred-by a great deal of wild speculation upon a rather slim and ambiguous factual record. As a pivotal figure in the history of Western thought, it is not surprising that the Sokratic legacy has become contested terrain for rival ideologies of later vintage, but such a fate has served to deflect critical energies away from the primary goal of historical veracity. For quite some time now, the prevailing orientation in the "sociology of Sokrates" has sought to portray the philosopher as an archconservative-largely on the basis of his well-known criticisms of democracy—and hence as a "protagonist of landed reaction," a "saint of counter-revolution."66 At the other end of the ideological spectrum stands the interpretation first championed by Nietzsche, who quite correctly noted that the sharpest thrusts of the Sokratic dialectic were typically aimed at various traditional elites, whose inconsistent and fumbling answers readily exposed both their cognitive ignorance and the unhealthiness of their pursuits. In light of the sage's own humble life-style and apparent mason origins, Nietzsche-ever keen to link biography and philosophy—concluded that Sokrates' critical rationalism represented a sublimated form of "plebeian ressentiment" against the aristocracy.67 Though it might appear difficult to reconcile these rival readings, if one proceeds

from the accepted facts contained in the above positions, namely, that Sokrates was a critic of both ancient democracy and sundry aristocratic proclivities, then perhaps a more reliable portrait of the man and his message can be drawn.

Rather than assume at the outset that philosophy is politics or economics conducted by other means (without denying the occasional merit in such assumptions), it is preferable to begin with an examination of the relevant intellectual arguments on their own terms. In the case of Sokrates, the documentary evidence suggests that his criticisms of democracy were logical extensions of his basic philosophical positions, and not the latter's raison d'etre. Sokrates' core teaching involves "care for the psychê," a type of existential practice that is to be based on rational or philosophical insight into the nature of good and evil, right and wrong. A succinct self-description of his calling is provided in Plato's Apology:⁶⁸

For I do nothing else but go about trying to persuade you, both young and old, not to care for your bodies or possessions first and foremost, nor excessively, but rather to take care that your *psychê* becomes the best possible; saying to you as I go, "Not from possessions does *aretê* arise, but from *aretê* possessions and all the good things among mankind, both for the individual and for the public."

Excellence, or aretê, in any activity or craft requires expertise, specialized knowledge; since politics is a type of activity, a technê, it follows that the art of politics should be conducted by those with the requisite knowledge. Even prior to establishing what the nature of political wisdom might be, it should be readily manifest why democracy did not conform to the Sokratic ideal of proper governance. Far from establishing a rule of experts, ancient democracy allowed any citizen whatsoever irrespective of whether he be "blacksmith or shoemaker, merchant or shipowner, rich or poor, high-born or low"-to not only offer advice and vote in the assembly, but to hold high office as well, often through the nonrational mechanism of the lot.69 By the same token, however, Sokrates concluded that oligarchies of birth and wealth were also improper politiical forms, and if he (or is it Plato?) shows greater tolerance for the predemocratic phase of Athenian politics, might this not be due to the his torical circumstance that traditional elites were more educated and cultured than the civic masses? The standard for Sokrates, in other words, is not landed wealth or noble birth, but knowledge and education. Particularly revealing in this regard is an incident preserved by Xenophon in his Memorabilia, where Sokrates humorously demonstrates to Glaucon, Plato's elder half-brother and a young man of the highest birth and wealth, that his social advantages alone do not make him an able statesman, but that, as in all things, he must acquire the requisite knowledge. Such a position hardly constitutes a defence of "landed reaction" or an intellectual "counter-revolution" in favor of the old aristocracy! Indeed, what Sokrates actually offers is a philosophical critique of conventional politics in general, a point that becomes even clearer in light of his unique conception of politics as a technê concerned with "proper care of the psychê." Political knowledge, "in the true sense," is thus held to be commensurate with philosophy itself, as tendance and concern for the Polis koinônia resolves itself into "making the citizens as good as possible." Hence the ultimate in Sokratic irony: the contention that while he himself was not a politikos man in the conventional sense, as a lover of wisdom seeking the moral betterment of himself and his fellow citizens, he alone of his contemporaries was "engaged in the true art of politics."

If the philosophy is thus fundamentally "apolitical," what is one to make of Sokrates' closest associates and disciples, many of whom were in the forefront of various reactionary efforts to either subvert or discredit the Athenian democracy? Men such as the mercurial Alcibiades, who in his day alternately both saved and betrayed his native land on several occasions; or the notorious Kritias and Charmides, high-born nobles who presided over a murderous white terror during the short-lived oligarchy that followed the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Surely it would appear that the ideas and practices of certain members of the Sokratic circle betoken much more than any benign "care of the psychê?" These facts are rather disturbing for those of us who reserve an honored place for Sokrates in the pantheon of intellectual heroes, but they are facts nonetheless, and therefore require interpretation. The most generous accounts usually seek to absolve Sokrates from the iniquities committed by certain of his followers and associates by pointing to his own stellar conduct. His distinguished war record; his lone and principled opposition to an illegal decision by the council to execute several military commanders for their part in a naval defeat; and most significantly, his courageous refusal to obey the threatening commands of Kritias and the oligarchs to arrest an innocent man during their reign of terror after the war. 74 Sokrates, quite clearly, did not simply preach an inspirational morality, he put it to practice in his daily life. As for the question of whether the teachings of Sokrates were in some way responsible for the conduct of Alcibiades and Kritias, most scholars would agree that both of these men were highly independent spirits, the one impossible to tame owing to his unstable personality and surfeit of natural talents, the other an original thinker in his own right and not, strictly speaking, a follower of Sokrates.75

There remain several marks on the other side of the ledger. For starters, Sokrates is said to have personally encouraged Charmides—

another of Plato's uncles—to take up politics, which the young man proceeded to do with a vengeance as Kritias' chief henchman during the oligarchical tyranny.76 Perhaps more to the point is the fact that Sokrates himself repeatedly criticized the Sophists for imparting potentially dangerous ideas to their students; to grant the philosopher a whitewash under such circumstances would be highly illegitimate. To be sure, his criticisms of democracy were sermons to the converted, but the sons of the kaloikagathoi undoubtedly enjoyed the comparison of democratic leaders to pastry cooks who preferred to fatten the dêmos on luxurious dainties rather than subject them to a regimen of discipline and justice.77 Similarly abusive and amusing were the jibes that pointed out that while no self-respecting carpenter would ever dream of taking advice about woodworking from a smith, or a farmer listen to a shoemaker discourse on husbandry, these very same citizens deem it quite natural and proper that they have "equal say" in the management of the greatest affairs of all, those of their Polis. Sokrates was also notoriously known to have been an admirer of Sparta—so much so that Aristophanes, in his Birds (414 BC), actually coined a new word, sôkratein, 'to Sokratize', as a way of characterizing those who imitated and idealized Spartan customs.78 And though Plato's dialogues make it plain that Sokrates was impressed by the form of Spartan society-i.e., the systematic training of the individual for communal service—and not the militaristic content, such a position was hardly reassuring in a society where being pro-Spartan normally entailed both admiration for the enemy and opposition to the democracy. In short, with respect to practical politics, Sokrates was known by the company he kept, the most conspicuous of whom turned out to be traitors to their native land, men who when granted the opportunity to take control of the state, endeavored "to make the citizens better" by a culling slaughter of some fifteen hundred innocent lives. In light of such a bloodstained record, it can be safely assumed that when the five hundred and one Athenian jurors sat down in 399 BC to try Sokrates on the charge of impiety, a good number of them simply judged the old man as "a teacher of tyrants," a charge that would certainly have been included on the indictment had not an amnesty decree proscribed all such references to the recent events involved in the temporary overthrow of the democracy.79

Any attempt to reconstruct the political biography of Sokrates thus resolves itself into one fundamental problem: how to reconcile or explain the glaring incompatibility between the immoral, murderous conduct of certain of his associates on the one hand and his own exemplary life and philosophy of moral excellence on the other. Turning a blind eye to either of these sides invariably yields distortions, as in the familiar portrait of the

philosopher as a saint sundered from the turmoils of his day, a font of timeless truths; or, alternatively, as the ideologue whose call to virtue cunningly promotes the vested interests of the aristocracy. Because our information is entirely indirect, mediated by the various interpreters of Sokrates, we are in the unhappy position of being interpreters of the interpreters—never known as an ideal vantage for discerning reality. Despite these difficulties, the case for Sokrates "the political partisan," the reactionary who contoured his philosophy to conform to his political prejudices, unquestionably places far greater strains on the evidence than does the position that stresses the primacy of his philosophical activities and his moral rectitude. Sokrates was far too independent of mind to conform to any narrow party line—as attested by his conflicts with both democrats and oligarchs—and his conception of politics as "care for the psychê" hardly constitutes a blueprint for reaction. In the Sokratic scheme of values, philosophy was a higher-order activity than day-to-day politics. and though his reflections were politically relevant—as well as challenging to the conventional practice of politics—the "will to power" or class domination were simply not the kinds of ideals he subscribed to. On the contrary, the Calliclean doctrine of unlimited rule by the naturally strong over the weak, the grasping of a greater share, all this he revealed as the highest social injustice and as the greatest evil for one's true self, the psychê. As for his wayward associates, perhaps the only certainty they reveal is the one that many readers of the dialogues themselves discover, namely, that it would take a very exceptional human being indeed—someone like Sokrates himself—to live up to the exacting moral standards of his philosophy.80

This view of Sokrates as a philosopher essentially beyond partisan politics finds further confirmation in Plato's Crito, a dialogue in which Sokrates reflects on the basic nature of the Polis-citizen bond. The positions therein expressed are rather striking—not for their originality, but for their fundamental conformity with the views of Solon, Aeschylus, and the other great codifiers of the Polis ideal. The dialogue is dramatically set in the prisonhouse where Sokrates awaits the day he must drink the hemlock. His execution has been delayed for nearly a month because of state religious activities, but that respite is now almost over, and the friends of Sokrates are ready to carry out their plan for his escape. Upon receiving this information from his old disciple Crito, Sokrates launches into a discussion on whether such an action would be just and in conformity with his long-held principles. Crito defends the proposal on the grounds that to die at the dictates of an unjust verdict is itself a form of injustice. Other rationalizations are offered, including the fact that Sokrates' young sons still need parental care and that his friends will suffer great sorrow at his death. As a final consideration—hardly negligible in the shame-culture world of the Polis—there is the apparent absurdity of passively accepting death at the hands of one's enemies: by allowing himself to be executed, Sokrates will appear a laughable simpleton in the eyes of many, while his friends will be judged rank cowards who failed to rescue him. Listening to it all with a bemused smile, Sokrates thanks Crito for his sincere concern, but insists that he must remain true to his life's basic principle, that of following the course reason, logos, suggests.81

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

After several preliminary arguments that demonstrate that it is "never noble or good to do wrong" and that "one ought never return a wrong or do harm to another person, not even if one has suffered such things from them" (an anticipation of Iesus's more celebrated "turning the other cheek"), Sokrates proceeds to the main subject, the Polis-citizen bond. 82 His examination takes the form of a hypothetical dialogue between himself and the personified "laws and commonweal of the polis," which open the debate by inquiring of the prospective escapee:83

Tell us, Sokrates, what is it that you now intend to do? Is it anything other than this, that by the deed you are contemplating, to destroy us, the laws and the entire polis, so far as you are able? Or does it seem to you that a Polis can continue to exist and not be turned upside down if the legal judgments which are pronounced in it have no force, but are nullified and destroyed by private persons (idiôtai)?

In reply, Sokrates offers the answer favored by Crito and his other friends, namely, that since the polis committed a wrong by unjustly condemning him to death, he now has a right to violate the law. For the Nomoi, however, such an argument misses completely the true nature of the Polis-citizen relationship, which they proceed to characterize through the traditional emotive metaphors of the Polis as parent and nurse of its citizenry:84

Since you have been born, reared, and educated [because of our laws and customs], can you deny first of all that you are our child and slave, both you and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you imagine that there is an equality of right between you and ourselves, and that whatsoever we try to do to you, you think it right to retaliate? You did not have equality of rights with your father, to answer back when scolded, to hit back when beaten . . . Do you expect to have such license against your country and its laws? . . . Are you so wise as to have forgotten that compared to your mother and father and all your other ancestors, your country is something far more precious, more venerable, more sacred, and held in greater reverence both among the gods and reasonable men? Do you not realize that you are even more bound to respect, endure, and placate the anger of your country than that of your father? And that if you cannot persuade your country otherwise, to do whatever it commands?

The Nomoi go on to observe that even though the Polis collectively nurtures and educates the citizenry, giving them all a share in the good things it has to offer, each citizen has the right to take up residence elsewhere. For those who remain, a tacit, voluntary "agreement" or "covenant" must surely exist, "in deed if not in word," mandating obedience to the laws of the land, a precondition for the very existence of the civic koinônia. Moreover, since the Polis is a community of self-governing freemen, each citizen has the additional right that he may "attempt to persuade his fellow citizens" if he considers their decisions or actions improper. Failing that, the loyal citizen must abide the commands of his Polis.85

In short, were Sokrates to run away now, breaking his covenant with the Polis after a lifetime of faithful service and affection for his country, not only would he be acting like the most wretched of slaves, but, as a lawbreaker, he would be viewed as a potential enemy in any other wellgoverned community he might enter. "Or do you intend," the Nomoi inquire, "to avoid well-ordered communities and the most disciplined and decent of men? And if you do, will life then still be worth living? Or will you approach these people and have the impudence to converse with them-with what arguments, Sokrates? Those you used here, that aretê and justice, customs and laws, are the things of greatest value among mankind?"86 The question so posed requires no answer, and even Crito is forced to concede that the Nomoi have spoken properly and true. The escape plan is accordingly dismissed, and when the appointed time arrives, Sokrates will drink the hemlock, remaining true not only to his rational psychê, but to the sacred polis that bore and reared him.

The publicly decreed execution of Sokrates was carried out in 399 BC, but the spirit of the man found continuing life in the spoken and written words of his many followers. In certain respects, the posthumous existence was even more remarkable than the one that preceded. As a martyr for the causes of truth and reason, a seeker after wisdom who avoided the opposed pitfalls of dogmatic arrogance and skeptical despair, Sokrates quickly became recognized as the patron saint of philosophy, and thus a symbol for issues far larger than his own person. 87 His importance in the history of philosophy is such that we conventionally refer to his many predecessors as "pre-Sokratics," and though various Sophists also deserve credit for redirecting the spirit of inquiry from the cosmos to humanity, it was Sokrates above all who expressed the new rationalism in its most comprehensive form. Philosophical ethics can therefore be said to begin with Sokrates, but since he himself produced no finished system, his legacy—essentially a way of life and a habit of mind—was variously appropriated by his disciples, men of disparate talents and aptitudes, each seemingly struck by different aspects of the great sage's character and

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thought. Before examining his fourth-century successors, however, it is necessary to retrace our steps and return to the aftermath of the Persian Wars: the intellectual ferment we have just explored takes on added meaning when set against the background of the rise of the Athenian Empire and the great war for Hellenic hegemony.

4.V DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM AND THE EXPANSION OF ATHENIAN POWER

The period between the Greek victory over the invading Persians in 479 BC and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 is conventionally known as the Pentekontaetia, the 'time of fifty years', so named after Thucydides' brief excursus on the major events that presaged the ruinous armed conflict between Athens and Sparta. The most important development of that period was the rise of the Athenian Empire, which not only enabled Athena's city to sustain an unparalleled cultural flowering, but also extend its system of participatory democracy, both domestically and abroad. The geopolitical realignments entailed in the latter process would in due course trigger the internecine conflict between the two leading powers, for as Thucydides observed, it was "the growing power of the Athenians, and the fear this caused among the Spartans, that forced them to go to war." To appreciate the cogency of the historian's judgment, we must first attend to the dynamics of the Athenian ascendancy, a development that was to transform not only the imperial polis itself, but the wider Hellenic world in the process.2

With their decisive victories over the Persians at Plataea and Mycale, the Greeks of the mainland had managed to preserve their cherished freedoms, and the stage was now set for a counteroffensive that would restore the Greeks of Asia Minor to independence. Persian strongholds still gripped Thrace and the Hellespont, however, and the longterm geostrategic position of the eastern Greeks was less than promising given the proximity of their former overlords. The Spartans in all seriousness proposed a mass Hellenic evacuation from Asia, offering to resettle the refugees on lands to be confiscated from those in northern and central Greece who had "Medized" with the Persians. The plan fell on deaf ears, for the eastern Greeks were in no mood to surrender their ancestral lands now that Persia's grand army had been routed and a Greek fleet commanded the Aegean. The Spartans reluctantly assented to calls for a war of liberation, but unaccustomed to naval campaigning and finding it difficult to impose their brand of discipline on others, they returned home, fatefully leaving the mantle of leadership to the Athenians. Their own city still in ruins, the Athenians were nonetheless keen to launch an offensive against the Great King, animated no doubt by motives of revenge, but also allured by the very real prospects for plunder, prestige, and power.

In the late summer of 478 BC, the Athenians and eastern Greeks instifutionalized their respective interests by forming an alliance under Atheman leadership. The sacred isle of Delos was chosen to serve as a place for meetings of the allied council and for housing the treasury. Each member state was granted an equal vote, but it is uncertain whether Athens voted on equal terms with the rest or, as hêgemôn, was privileged with a vote equal to all others combined.3 In any event, the Athenians controlled all proceedings within the alliance—conventionally known as the Delian league—which in the early years may have numbered as many as 150 communities, all situated on islands or coastal areas. Member states were required to contribute warships and crews or stipulated sums of money, apparently based on the ability to pay. The Athenians supervised these arrangements, which at the outset saw the larger communities provide naval forces, while others contributed financially. Supreme military command rested with the Athenians, who also supplied treasurers for the league's war fund.

During the first few years of the alliance, three basic policy aims—to drive the Persians from Hellenic lands, to plunder the Great King's territories, and to secure freedom for the eastern Greeks—were pursued with considerable success. The allies benefitted collectively from these triumphs, but the Athenians, given their preponderance in military strength and manpower resources, were best able to capitalize on each advance. Several Athenian colonies were early on established in conquered lands, while the league's swelling treasury contributed to a massive buildup of the Athenian fleet. As the costs of maintaining warships and crews ran quite high—one ship alone required roughly a talent outlay per month of service (roughly the equivalent of fifteen years' wages for a skilled craftsman)—many communities opted to switch from naval to monetary contributions, thereby expediting an ever-widening power disparity between hêgemôn and league. In due course that imbalance began to distort the alliance's internal dynamics, as the Athenians, in Thucydides' words, became "very exacting and severe over the obligations, using compulsion on men who were neither accustomed nor willing to endure hardships."4 In the parlance of modern social science, a spiraling extractioncoercion cycle was now underway.

On at least one occasion during the early years, the Athenians forced a community, Karystus, to join the league by an act of war, and presumably many others enrolled more from fear than volition. Around 467 BC, Naxos attempted to secede from the league, but was forcibly "repatriated" after the Athenians besieged and subdued the island city: "the first

allied polis to be enslaved contrary to the established agreement" is Thucydides' vivid characterization, "slavery" here referring to the loss of polis autonomy, rather than the actual sale of citizens into bondage.5 Another secession followed two years later on Thasos, an island community off the Thracian coast richly endowed with mineral and timber resources. The revolt seems to have been sparked by a conflict with Athenians who were encroaching upon trading posts and mines in the area, and the close proximity of a proposed Athenian colony. The hêgemôn promptly dispatched the fleet and subjected the city to siege. When the Thasians succumbed two years later, the Athenians chose to set an example: the "rebels" were ordered to pay reparations, relinquish their warships, dismantle all defensive walls, and surrender ownership of their mainland territories and mines. As a further check, the Athenians took the opportunity to replace the troublesome Thasian oligarchy with a more pliant democratic government. If there had been doubts regarding the Athenian conception of the alliance before, there were surely none now: the Delian League was first and foremost an instrument in the service of Athenian interests.

As the transition from alliance to empire proceeded over the course of the next two decades, the Athenians devised a number of strategies to tighten and extend their imperial control. The league treasury was early on relocated to Athens, and Athenian magistrates were installed with supervisory powers in most of the allied cities. It soon became mandatory that major legal cases be transferred to Athens for trial before Athenian juries, while decrees passed in the Athenian assembly became sovereign over the internal affairs of each member state. Suspect or troublesome allies found their cities garrisoned and, in some cases, their lands confiscated and resettled with Athenians. Member states lost the right to issue their own coinage and were forced to adopt the Attik standard. Local factions loyal to the hegemonic power were everywhere cultivated and promoted, with support often extending to the formal establishment of democratic constitutions. The Athenians also made a concerted effort to build religious and cultural solidarity within the alliance, as indicated by the founding of a common cult of Athena and the promotion of shared worship for several mythic Ionian heroes. Not least, the formidable Athenian fleet patrolled the Aegean on a regular basis, its operations holding the Persians in check and simultaneously cooling the ardor for revolt among the more recalcitrant members of the now "imperial" alliance.6

Most of these coercive measures violated not just the letter, but the spirit of the original alliance, which had been based on a voluntary association of independent communities under the military command of a preponderant power. Heavy-handedness by the *hêgemôn* naturally bred

disaffection among the subjugated allies, but the social consequences were generally mediated by one overriding factor: the class divide that ran like a fault line throughout the Hellenic world.

As the preeminent democratic city, the Athenians naturally gravitated towards a policy of promoting democratic forces in most of the communities under their control, a course of action that comported with their own ideological commitments as well as the needs of empire. Transgressions against the sacred principles of Polis autonomy stirred resentment among the allies, but in many cases the citizen masses appear to have preferred a "subject democracy" to a "sham independence" under oppressive oligarchs. The Athenian protectorate thus offered more than just a shield against the external Persian threat, it secured greater legal and political equalities for the dêmos within their own communities. Nor was it unappreciated that many of the poor found desperately needed employment as rowers in the Athenian fleet, or that ruinous interpolis warfare between member states was now held in check by the imperial power. As for the more onerous aspects of Athenian rule, these fell mainly on the rich and powerful. Tribute quotas were fixed on the ability to pay, with the consequence that the heaviest burdens in each community fell upon the wealthier citizens. A similar situation obtained in the political domain, where Athenian interference and control typically entailed a loss for the old hereditary elites, whose traditional hold on office and privilege now gave way to greater democratization. A unique capacity to wed prejudice with realism once again makes the Old Oligarch an ideal witness on the general character of Athenian policy (though it should be noted that the harsh practices he cites were reserved for those who revolted or persistently stirred up trouble—the few allied oligarchies that did remain loyal were not persecuted):7

Concerning their allies, it is clear that they sail out and bring charges against the *chrêstoi* (the 'useful' and 'respectable' people) and hate them, realizing that it is inevitable that a ruling power will be hated by the ruled, and that if the rich and the powerful in the subject poleis are strong, the rule of the Athenian *dêmos* will last only for a short time. Because of this, they dishonor and disfranchise the *chrêstoi*, confiscate their wealth, exile and kill them, while they exhalt and promote to honor the *ponêroi* (the 'worthless' and 'bad').

Echoing the aristocratic resentments of his forerunners Theognis and Alkaios, the Oligarch nonetheless concedes the perverse rationality of the Athenian course:⁸

If they supported the best people, the *beltistoi*, they would not be supporting those with the same views as their own. For there is no polis where the

beltistoi are well-disposed to the Athenian dêmos; but everywhere the worst people, the kakistoi, are well-disposed to them. After all, like favors like. And because of this the Athenians support those who are akin to themselves. Whenever they did attempt to support the beltistoi, this did not profit them: within a short time the dêmos in Boeotia was enslaved; and when they supported the beltistoi in Miletus, within a short time these revolted and cut down the Milesian dêmos.

Hence the evolving Athenian policy of "fusing" democratic and imperialistic objectives: support for the local *dêmos* was ideologically compatible with deeply felt Athenian political values, and it also served to win for the empire a certain measure of support and legitimacy. Not only does this differential treatment along class lines help account for the remarkable loyalty that many subject communities demonstrated throughout the league's existence (even in times when Athens itself was on the brink of disaster, as during the war with Sparta), it also explains why virtually all of the known cases of allied revolt were staged by oligarchical factions. As Ste. Croix concluded in his insightful study on the classbound character of the empire: "In almost every case in which we do have detailed information about the attitude of an allied city, we find only the Few hostile; scarcely ever is there reason to think that the *dêmos* was not mainly loyal."

As imperial politics thus contributed to the strengthening of democratic forces abroad, the Athenians were simultaneously engaged in the extension and deepening of their own democracy at home. Ruling a grand "alliance" of as many as 180 communities at its peak required not only a massive expansion in the military capacity of the imperial polis, but also a significant upgrading of the administrative apparatus. The Old Oligarch's observation that the Athenians "conduct more public business than all the rest of mankind combined" was caustic hyperbole, but management of a maritime empire undoubtedly created a tremendous work load for the self-governing citizenry. 10 To meet the organizational and logistical challenges thereby posed, it followed that a wider body of the civic population would have to assume greater political responsibilities. A solution to the traditional problem of recruitment for state service was therefore essential, for hitherto only those with independent means could afford to devote themselves fully to public affairs (the time-honored rationale for aristocratic and oligarchical governance). As a way of overcoming this material barrier to true democracy, the Athenians introduced a system of publicly funded payments for state service. Henceforth, magistrates, council members, jurors, and other lesser officials and administrators would be granted modest stipends in their capacity as public servants.

This radical innovation, introduced by Pericles c. 460 BC, was a decisive step in the history of Athenian democracy, for by enabling the majority of citizens to assume a full and active role in self-government, it transformed the ideal of *Isonomia* into a working reality. To resentful oligarchs who needed no monetary payments for their services, the entire practice naturally smelled of agora-hucksterism, a means whereby democratic politicians secured their ascendancy by transforming the polis into a commercial operation that put silver into the pockets of the rabble—silver, moreover, that was being dishonorably extorted from subject allies. There was truth to the latter charge, in that the funds allocated for state pay did come from a treasury swelled by allied tribute, which perhaps made up as much as half of the total.11 What the oligarchs completely misrepresented was the nature and purpose of the pay mechanism itself. That it could hardly qualify as an alternative or permanent means of employment is clear from the fact that most major public offices were annual and nonrenewable, while daily court service was a chance prospect, with jurors selected by lot. More importantly, the wage scale was such that its compensatory or supplemental intent was manifest to every citizen. In short, the real source of the oligarch's animus was not the few obols of pay doled out to his poorer neighbors for their public service, but the fact of that service itself—and the crisis that it posed for the oligarchical world view. Once again the forces of change were undermining the traditional ideological representation of power and privilege, for just as the abusive term "kakoi" had lost much of its substantive sting when prosperous commoners began entering the ranks of the hoplite phalanx, so now the introduction of compensatory pay was enabling worthless ponêroi to become chrêstoi, 'useful' to the Polis.

The one area in which the empire can be said to have contributed to something like full employment was its chief instrument of compulsion. Throughout their imperial heyday, the Athenians maintained an active navy of one hundred warships, with two hundred more in drydock for emergencies. With each warship carrying a crew of approximately two hundred men for an eight-month sailing season (winter seas were generally unnavigable), some twenty thousand men secured a steady income at a wage rate that fluctuated from a half to a full drachma per day, supplemented by any booty won during the many campaigns. For the lowest class within the citizen-body, the *thêtes*, naval service provided a means of livelihood, and given the fleet's huge manpower demands—especially in times of war, when the Athenians augmented the fleet—the poor from many of the allied states were able to hire on as well. The creation and maintenance of an imperial navy also enhanced employment opportunities for artisans and laborers in the shipbuilding trades, and a boon for the

merchants whose vessels imported flax and hemp for the sails and rigging, timber and pitch for the hulls. Indeed, the activities at the port of Piraeus became so congested by the new construction and commerce that in 450 BC, Pericles commissioned the celebrated urban planner Hippodamus to remodel the harbor district and its facilities.

Massive expenditures on the Athenian navy constituted a legitimate use of allied tribute; but the decision to beautify the city of Athens from the same source could hardly be reconciled with the original goals of collective security. When open hostilities with the Persians were momentarily suspended in 449 BC, the Athenians seized on the respite to embark upon a building program that was to transform the appearance of their city. Pericles was again the directing force, and it was at his initiative that league funds were directed towards defraying the construction costs. Over the next several decades, the Parthenon, the Propylaea, the temple of Poseidon at Sunium, and many other magnificent temples, public buildings, and cult statues were chiseled from marble and stone, providing a lasting testament to the power and glory of the imperial city, as well as steady employment for scores of craftsmen, architects, engineers, artists, and day laborers. The sums of money involved were enormous: during the height of the construction period, from 447 to 431 BC, it has been estimated that something on the order of eight thousand talents, i.e., fortyeight million drachmas, were expended on projects of civic adornment and fortification.12 The intimidating presence of the imperial fleet naturally muted the outcry from the abused allies, but Athenian oligarchs lost no time in protesting against this misappropriation of league resources, charging Pericles and his associates with "shamefully gilding and beautifying the polis as if it were a wanton woman, decking her out with precious stones, statues, and thousand-talent temples."13 The Athenian dêmos, the chief beneficiary, judged otherwise, and registered its mood by ostracizing the leading oligarchical politician in 443 BC. The Periclean formula wedding democracy with imperialism was simply too successful and too deeply rooted in the material and ideal interests of the citizenry to be challenged effectively from within.

Although the evolving Athenian empire was a hegemonic rather than a conquest-territorial power, expansionary practices played a key role in the Athenian ascendancy. Several colonies were established abroad under the aegis of the fleet, either by settling vacant territories or by conquest, and a number of military settlements or klêrouchiai were imposed on lands confiscated from troublesome allies. Our incomplete sources record twenty-four such cases of expansion, and it appears that some ten thousand Athenians—roughly a quarter of the adult male citizenry—acquired land over the course of the imperial period. In addition to alle-

viating the ever present problem of land hunger among the poor, these expansionary practices addressed several vital geopolitical concerns. Most important was the strategic placement of several colonial settlements in Thrace and the Hellespont region, which served to safeguard Athenian access to the Black Sea grain supply. As for the kleruchs settled on allied lands, they served as local "policing" instruments in the subject communities, ensuring order and providing invaluable surveillance. Nor was it overlooked by the Athenian leadership that the overall economic and military strength of the polis would be enhanced by a policy that transformed landless thêtes into self-equipped hoplites through the mechanism of land allotments overseas.

Imperial arrangements of coercion and exploitation invariably lead a dual existence, one above ground, official and public, and another that flourishes below, a secretive realm of graft and corruption. It is in the nature of the case that evidence for the latter is hard to come by, but fragmentary indications of unofficial Athenian extortion have survived. An inscription pertaining to the punishment of a coterie of prominent and wealthy Athenians-convicted of a sacrilege loaded with antidemocratic overtones—discloses that these men had managed to acquire substantial private holdings in allied territories. Since land ownership was an exclusive right of citizens, waived only by special dispensations, it appears that these properties were secured through dubious means, perhaps bribery or intimidation. That shadowy practices of that sort were more widespread and serious than our sources indicate is strongly suggested by the accord that led to the formation of second Athenian League in 378 BC. The founding decree of the renewed alliance pointedly insisted that "no Athenian may privately or publicly acquire either a house or land in the territories of the allies, whether by purchase or by foreclosure or by any other means whatsoever."14 Given the comprehensive language of this proscription, it is obvious that the legacy of the first "alliance" stirred bitter memories, and that the offense of greatest concern had been expropriations of allied soil by Athenians using both public and private means.

The foregoing "balance sheet" of the empire confirms the general validity of Max Weber's remark that the Athenian dêmos "lived off war," directly through the proceeds of plunder, territorial conquest, and wages for naval service, and indirectly through state pay, tribute-financed building programs, and a militarily sustained boom in various trade and craft sectors. Benefits flowed even more freely into the hands of the powerful and privileged, as imperium multiplied the honors and emoluments to be won from military command and political service, and greatly increased the opportunities for commercial gains, legal and illicit. It is accordingly worth stressing that the oligarchs who criticized the policies of

Pericles did not oppose the empire per se, but rather the consequent elevation of the "kakoi" at home and abroad, i.e., the coupling of imperialism with democracy. Indeed, in the pre-Periclean years of the Delian League, it was pro-Spartan noblemen like Aristides and Kimon who were the makers of Athenian policy, and it was they who initially fashioned and consolidated the empire, readily embarking upon such measures as the forcible reduction of rebellious allies like Naxos and Thasos. There were, in short, few Athenians who seriously questioned their right to rule over the subject allies and exact tribute (after all, they did the bulk of the fighting against the Persian); what disagreements there were concerned methods and the more weighty matter of which faction should hold supreme authority. Given that the Greek Polis was in essence a military-political koinônia, with the citizenry an exclusive status group monopolizing various privileges and rights against all "outsiders," the rise to imperial status was simply an accentuation and fulfillment of certain dispositions latent within the Polis form of social organization.

Empire-building is never a pacific enterprise, and in due course the Athenians found themselves embroiled in numerous armed conflicts, with local rivals and with foreign powers abroad. Tensions between rich and poor within the Hellenic world were to fuel many of these confrontations, as oligarchical factions tended to look to Sparta for domestic support, while democratic forces appealed to Athens. When oligarchical Thasos revolted from the Delian League, for example, a secret appeal was sent to Sparta for assistance, which the latter promised but could not carry through owing to a major revolt by its Helot population. As it turned out, this rising of the Helots, triggered by a devastating earthquake in 464 BC, was so serious that the Spartans felt constrained to request Athenian assistance. The pro-Spartan nobles who were still directing Athenian affairs promptly dispatched a contingent of four thousand hoplites under Kimon, but this rescue operation was to prove doubly disastrous for the conservatives. Seizing upon the temporary absence of Kimon and the hoplite vanguard, the radical democrat Ephialtes managed to secure a majority in the assembly for his reforms that curtailed the powers of the aristocratic council, the Areopagus. The second setback was inflicted by the xenophobic Spartans themselves, who grew unsettled at the presence of so many "daring and innovative" Athenians on their native soil. Pathologically alarmed by the unlikely prospect that their invited guests might actually assist the rebellious slaves, the Spartans ungraciously requested the removal of Kimon and his volunteers, alone among those communities providing assistance. After such a humiliating debacle, Kimon's political stock fell rapidly (he was ostracized in 461 BC), and the Athenians signaled a new turn in foreign policy by forming defensive alliances with Thessaly and Argos, the latter Sparta's traditional foe in the Peloponnese.

War between the former "yoke-fellows" was not long in coming, The Megarians, desperate over repeated border encroachments by the Korinthians, their rival and fellow member in the Peloponnesian League, bolted from the Spartan alliance in 459 BC and joined the Athenian protectorate. That action touched off a series of naval and infantry engagements, with Athenian-led forces generally getting the better of the Peloponnesians-most notably in the conquest of Aegina and its forced enrollment in the Delian League as a tributary member. Concurrent with these opening skirmishes, the Athenians undertook a massive campaign in Egypt, then in the act of rebelling against Persian domination. Successes came early, but the Persians and their supporters managed to fortify themselves in the citadel in Memphis, and the war bogged down to a lengthy siege. Closer to home, the Spartans made an effort to fashion a possible counterweight against the Athenians by marching into central Greece and restoring Thebes to the leadership of the Boeotian League. More directly, the Spartan command had entered into secret contact with a cabal in Athens intent upon subverting the democracy. News of the conspiracy was uncovered, however, and the Athenians took the offensive by invading Boeotia with a large contingent of citizens and allies. The two armies met at Tanagra in 457 BC, where a fierce battle ensued; each side suffered a severe mauling from the other's phalanx, but the Atheniansbetrayed by their Thessalian allies-were compelled to withdraw, thereby allowing the Spartans to claim victory. It proved a meaningless triumph, for the Spartans were so weakened by the encounter that they abandoned all operations and returned home. In a stunning counter two months later, the Athenians marched back into Boeotia and inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Theban-led League, which they immediately dissolved through a series of separate alliances with the many Boeotian poleis. For a time, the Athenians allowed local oligarchs to retain political control, but after the Boeotian beltistoi "enslaved" the dêmos, the Athenians intervened and established democracies. In 455 BC the Athenians launched a naval expedition around the Peloponnese that carried out the burning of Sparta's port at Gytheon and several plundering forays into Lakonian territory. This string of modest victories had one notable result, in that it convinced the communities of Achaea to form an alliance with the ascendant Athenians. The position of the imperial city now seemed unassailable, for in addition to hegemony over a commercially dynamic maritime empire, it exercised political control over much of central Greece and had contracted several strategic alliances in the northern Pelopon-

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nese—with Megara, Argos, and Achaea—that did much to constrain the actions of its principal rival.

Overextension is the usual nemesis of empire, and the first clear sign that the Athenians had transgressed the effective limits of their power came with the news of disaster in Egypt. The Persians had initially sought to relieve the situation there by plying the Spartans with gold for an invasion of Attika, but as the Spartans took the payments without moving, the policy was discontinued. The Persians proceeded to muster a large land and naval force of their own, which entered Egypt sometime in 457 BC. The besieging Athenians presently found themselves besieged, and by the summer of 454 BC their forces had been virtually annihilated. The scale of the disaster is a subject of dispute among scholars, as it is uncertain whether the Athenians had maintained their original contingent of two hundred warships throughout the six years of operations. Even on the minimalist view that less than half that number and their crews were destroyed, Egypt would still rank as a heavy defeat—a fact borne out by the events of the next few years. Retrenchment replaced expansion on the foreign policy agenda, as the Athenians began scaling back their offensive operations and sought an end to hostilities with Sparta. By special decree, the philo-Lakonian Kimon was recalled from exile in the hope that he could facilitate a truce, which he apparently managed, as an agreement to a five-year armistice was reached in 451 BC.

The Egyptian disaster also left its mark on the affairs of the Delian League, as a weakened hêgemôn was confronted almost immediately by the challenge of allied disaffection and defiance. The Milesians are conspicuously absent from the tribute list of 453 BC, and a later decree suggests that an Athenian garrison had to be imposed the following year. The oligarchical government was left in charge, however, and the crisis soon flared into open revolt and fratricidal class warfare, the beltistoi initiating proceedings by "cutting down the Milesian dêmos." When the Athenians regained control of the situation in 446 BC, the oligarchy was overturned and replaced by a subject democracy. In the interim, the fires of rebellion had spread. A revolt to break free from the league was staged in Erythrae around 450 BC, organized by oligarchs who drew material assistance from the Persian satrap in nearby Sardis. The Athenians eventually restored order with the forcible establishment of a democracy and installed a garrison to protect the community from exiled oligarchs who had taken refuge with the Persians. A contemporaneous revolt in Kolophon likewise featured the collusion of oligarch and Persian, and again the Athenians were compelled to impose a democratic government. Given the difficulties in suppressing these secessions—so costly in lives, material, and goodwill—it is readily understandable that the Athenians attempted to forestall future defections by intensifying their program of military colonization, ringing the strategic points of the Aegean with settlements of imperial kleruchs.

Further setbacks for the Athenians were in store on the Greek mainland, as exiled Boeotian oligarchs regained power in several communities around 447 BC, and then defeated the Athenian troops sent in for the restoration. Terms for the recovery of captured prisoners stipulated a total evacuation from Boeotia, and therewith the passing of the brief Athenian hegemony. More troubles followed, for prominent among the supporters of the Boeotian oligarchs were a number of exiles from Euboea, a large island just off the northeastern coast of Attika. Buoyed by the success of their political kin in Boeotia, Euboean oligarchs now made a bid to "free their cities from enslavement," sparking an island-wide revolt in 446 BC. Pericles responded by crossing over with a large army, but was immediately recalled by news that a revolt had broken out in Megara, accompanied by the massacre of an Athenian garrison; more ominously, a Peloponnesian army was said to be on the march. This massive Spartan-led force proceeded to cross into Attika, but to everyone's amazement, it declined battle and retired. The preferred explanation for this mystery is that Pericles had managed to dissuade the Spartan king by the offer of a large monetary bribe and a promise for negotiations. So much is indicated by the fact that the king and his advisor were promptly exiled upon their ignominious return to Sparta. Whatever the truth of the matter, Pericles used the opportunity to quell the revolts in Euboea and reinstate Athenian control; the 'horse-rearing' aristocrats of Chalkis, the Hippobotai, were dispossessed and exiled; the inhabitants of Histiaea were summarily expelled to make room for some two thousand Athenian settlers; and a colony was founded upon expropriated Eretrian territory. Oaths to "obey the Athenian dêmos" were extracted, and pro-Athenian forces were placed in positions of authority. As an added safeguard, serviceable to both imperial and local pacification, the Athenians decided to take hostages, selecting for that honor "the sons of the wealthiest citizens."

Continued confrontation at this point served neither the Athenian nor the Spartan interest, and in 445 BC the two parties reached agreement on a thirty-year truce that basically recognized the status quo. The next decade was one of relative calm, as the rival powers sought to consolidate for the coming clash. The Athenians, in the high tide of their magnificent cultural effusion at home—this was the age of Sophocles and Euripides, the Parthenon and the Sophists—were compelled on occasion to put down revolts among subject allies, but apart from one near-calamitous exercise, imperial affairs proved manageable in the absence of direct Spartan pressure.

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That lone exception was the bitter struggle against the Samian oligarchs, which had its precipitating cause in a long-standing dispute between Samos and Miletus over rival claims to territory on the Anatolian seaboard. Armed confrontation erupted in 440 BC, and, losing out in the encounter, the Milesians sent a delegation to Athens for assistance. More significantly, Thucydides adds that a number of private Samians were party to this appeal, "wishing to revolutionize the politeia." The Athenians could scarcely resist the offer to intervene on behalf of prodemocracy forces and dispatched a fleet under the command of Pericles. He quickly overturned the Samian oligarchy, placed hostages in confinement, and garrisoned the city. Many oligarchs managed to avoid capture, however, and these immediately turned to Sardis for assistance. Plied freely with Persian gold, the oligarchs secured a mercenary force of seven hundred men and launched a surprise counterraid that restored them to power. The war with Miletus was rejoined, and envoys sent to Byzantium succeeded in winning the city to the cause of rebellion (appeals were also sent to Sparta, but it opted to abide by the truce). The Athenians now mobilized a massive fleet and proceeded to blockade Samos. After a lengthy siege marked by fierce fighting and mutual acts of brutalityduring one phase, prisoners on both sides were branded—the Samians capitulated. The terms of surrender were uncompromising: the powerful Samian fleet was confiscated, defensive walls were pulled down, hostages were taken, and a huge war indemnity was imposed. A democratic politeia was established, much to the satisfaction of those "private" Samians who had earlier agitated for Athenian intervention. Byzantium was forcibly brought back into the imperial fold as well, and as a further move to strengthen their strategic position, the Athenians planted a number of additional colonies in Thrace and the Black Sea region.

The ebb and flow of events we have here recounted took their direction and meaning from one overriding reality: the evolving interplay between geostrategic ambitions and domestic politics, i.e., the dynamic of states and social classes. Because of the polar political ideals and practices of the two preponderant powers, Athens and Sparta, their struggles for hegemony invariably assumed a "social" or class character, the one espousing the cause of democratization, the other the principle of conservative "good order." Not only did such a circumstance contribute directly to a widening domestic rift between rich and poor, the few and the many, it was in turn fueled by that very same division. For just as the two dominant states jostled to extend their spheres of influence by promoting sympathetic parties within the various poleis, so these local factions sought their own advancement through timely interventions by the outside pow-

ers. As a consequence of this nexus of inner and outer politics, the ideals of Polis *autonomia* and of *koinônia* within the citizen-body were subjected to a two-fold pressure, racked from without by an escalating militarism, and riven from within by a mounting civic factionalism. What is sociologically distinctive about Greek history in the latter half of the fifth century is that these two disruptive patterns were to fuse on a near pan-Hellenic scale, thereby setting to motion those processes of disorder and change that were to prove ultimately fatal to the Polis form of social organization.

4.VI THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, CIVIC FACTIONALISM, AND THE RUPTURING OF POLIS COMMUNALISM

In the opening remarks to his immortal history of the great intra-Hellenic war, Thucydides attempted to place his subject in perspective:

The greatest struggle in previous times was the Persian War, and yet the decision was reached quickly through two naval engagements and two land battles. This War, on the other hand, lasted for a long time, and throughout its course brought unprecedented sufferings upon Hellas. Never before had so many poleis been seized and devastated, whether by barbarians or by the Hellenic combatants themselves . . . Never before had there been so many exiles, never before so much slaughter, both in the actual war and through factional strife (stasiazein).

The historiographic masterwork that Thucydides composed to retell this tale of national self-ruin documents the validity of his opening observation in vivid detail, as the historian traces the course of the war from campaign to campaign, noting along the way the shifting tides of political fortune, the entrances and departures of major personalities, and not least the social-psychological impact of the war on the participating communities. For our part, we will refer to the chronology of events only in broadest outline and focus on the two points that Thucydides highlighted as distinctive features of the Peloponnesian War: the scale and duration of its military operations, and the frequency and intensity of its factional violence. Both of these developments were to dramatically transform the institutional framework of the classical Polis.

The immediate events that triggered the renewal of fighting between Athens and Sparta were caught up within the maelstrom of interpolis rivalry and civic factionalism. Epidamnus, a Greek colony on the southeastern entrance to the Adriatic Sea, had long been embroiled in a ruinous struggle with her "barbarian" neighbors, the Illyrians. The unsatisfactory course of the war aggravated class hostilities within the community,

leading to the eruption of stasis in 435 BC and the forced expulsion of the oligarchical faction. The exiled party immediately joined ranks with the Illyrians and proceeded to attack Epidamnus by land and sea. Both sides sent appeals to their "mother-polis" Korcyra (present-day Korfu), but owing to ancestral ties and political sympathies, the Korcyreans—themselves under an oligarchy—opted to restore the exiles. The beleaguered Epidamnian dêmos then appealed to Korinth, Korcyra's bitter rival for control of the territory and trading resources of the Adriatic region. Korinth responded by strengthening Epidamnus with new settlers and a garrison, an action that incited the Korcyreans to besiege the colony. A naval engagement soon followed in which the Korcyreans vanquished the Korinthians and proceeded to ravage the territories of Korinth's allies in the area. Shortly thereafter Epidamnus fell to Korcyra and the exiles.

Over the next two years the Korinthians devoted their energies to the construction of a massive fleet. Alarmed by these preparations, Korcyra appealed to Athens for an alliance, and after some hesitation about risking a possible truce violation with a Peloponnesian League member (Korinth), the Athenians opted for a purely defensive pact, sending a small fleet for Korcyra's protection. In the fall of 433 BC the Korinthian and Korcyrean fleets engaged in a major sea battle, and though the outcome proved indecisive, Athenian ships had entered the fray. This open breach with Korinth raised Athenian concerns about the loyalty of subject-allies in the Chalcidic peninsula, and as a precautionary move, Potidaea, a Korinthian colony, was ordered to pull down a section of its walls and dismiss visiting Korinthian officials. The Potidaeans balked at these demands, their resolve strengthened by knowledge that a general revolt of the Chalcidic communities was already in preparation, galvanized by a pledge of assistance from both Korinth and Sparta. In the fall of 432 BC, Potidaea, Olynthus, Spartolus, and other smaller communities revolted, and the Athenians dispatched an army for their reduction. Korinth responded by sending an "unofficial" army composed of citizen-volunteers and hired troops from the Peloponnese-the designation "unofficial" being a crude ploy to avoid violation of the thirty-years truce. The Athenians beat back the Korinthian force (in a battle best remembered today for Sokrates' heroism in saving the life of the young Alcibiades), and laid Potidaea to siege (432 BC). A meeting of the Peloponnesian League was hastily convened, and after strong remonstrances by Korinth and other allies, the Spartans voted for war.

The opening move came in the early spring of 431 BC, when an oligarchical faction in Plataea (a small Boeotian community but a longtime ally of Athens) attempted to betray the city to the Thebans. These oligarchs, revealingly characterized as "the first men in wealth and descent,"

opened the gates to a Theban contingent of three hundred hoplites, where-upon the Thebans—ignoring the advice of the conspirators to first "remove" their political opponents—called on the Plataeans to reclaim their old status as a member of the Boeotian League. This was a fatal miscalculation of the mood of the pro-Athenian "multitude," who upon discovering the paucity of the Theban contingent (the affair took place in late evening), launched an attack that resulted in the capture of one hundred and eighty men and the deaths of all but a few escapees. The next morning the main Theban army approached, but were met by a Plataean herald who advised them to withdraw if they valued the lives of their captured fellow citizens. Once the invaders had departed, the Plataeans gathered their belongings from the countryside and fortified themselves within the city walls. Their ancient hatred of the Thebans was then vented by a callous execution of the hapless prisoners, an act of savagery presaging the many that were to follow.³

As the grain and pulse crops were ripening towards the end of May, the Spartans invaded Attika with a massive Peloponnesian army and began systematically ravaging the countryside; their Boeotian allies doing likewise in the north. The Spartan king, Archidamnus, anticipated that the sight of such destruction would compel the Athenians to issue forth and engage in a traditional hoplite encounter, which is what would have occurred had Pericles not been in charge. It was his strategy to avoid all such confrontations with the Peloponnesians, the superior land power, and to rely instead on the manifold strengths of the Athenian navy. Securely protected behind the famous Long Walls (which extended down to the Piraeus harbor), Athens would utilize its control of the sea to secure importation of necessary resources, while blocking or hampering all enemy trading efforts. Offensive operations would exploit the advantages of surprise and mobility, in the form of seaborne raids against Peloponnesian coastal territories. Given their extensive trading networks and the steady flow of allied tribute, the Athenians could afford to forego the harvests of their countryside so long as they maintained dominion over the sea, their real lifeline.

The operational capacities of the Peloponnesians and Boeotians were radically different. Since most alliance members were self-sufficient agrarian communities, the requisite financial resources for continuous mobilization were sorely lacking. As Pericles astutely perceived, the enemies of Athens were indeed formidable in the traditional hoplite encounter, but if forced into a protracted, multifront struggle, and compelled thereby to finance lengthy, long-distance campaigns while simultaneously guarding against lightning raids against their coasts, both their ardor and capacity for war would wane inexorably. The one potential vulnerability in the

Periclean grand strategy—the status of the tribute-paying allies—was admittedly a serious matter, but so long as the Athenians could preserve a modicum of loyalty through the "democratic connection," or the requisite intimidation and deterrence through the retaliatory power of the fleet, the overall risk assessment did not appear unduly optimistic. Spartan landlubbers could hardly pass as ideal liberators for the island and coastal communities that comprised the Athenian empire.

Despite the cogency of the Periclean strategy, the Athenians were greatly distressed by the devastation of their ancestral homes in the countryside, where a majority of citizens had in fact hitherto resided. Thucydides describes how heated crowds gathered in the streets and abused Pericles for not defending their lands, but the leader remained firm. The Peloponnesians and Boeotians continued ravaging Attika until their provisions ran low, whereupon they returned home, most of them directly to their farms to take up the pressing tasks of getting in the harvest and preparing for the coming season (the Spartans being spared these labors by their Helots). In an effort to relieve some of the congestion—and tension-within the city, Pericles expelled the Aeginetans from their island and resettled it with Athenian kleruchs. In the fall, he gave the hoplites a chance to vent their frustrations by invading Megara and devastating the isthmian territories. The essential pattern for the initial phase of the war was thus set: with the arrival of spring, the Peloponnesians would invade, ravage the countryside, and depart, whereupon the Athenians would launch coastal raids and invade the Megarid. Far more consequential than these limited sorties was the outbreak of a horrific epidemic of smallpox in Athens during the second year of the war, which for two successive years filled the streets and temples of the crowded city with thousands of corpses (flaring up again briefly in the winter of 427 BC). Something like a quarter of the total population was carried off by the disease, including the great leader of the people. It would take nearly fifteen years before the Athenians regained their strength in manpower, but the loss of Pericles was to prove irreplaceable.

In light of the differing military capacities of the contending powers and their antithetical strategies, the deadlock that ensued is not surprising. The Peloponnesians, to secure their geopolitical ends, were required to take the offensive; and if they were to attain more than ephemeral advantages, they would have to challenge Athenian mastery of the sea and foment defections by the subject-allies. The first objective was hampered by two fundamental limitations: the relative inexperience of the Peloponnesians in naval warfare and their lack of funds for maintaining a competent fleet. The second objective, the dislodging of Athenian tributaries, was circumscribed accordingly, for the lack of a strong navy all but

precluded moves into the Aegean, leaving only Chalcidice and Thrace as realistic possibilities for subversion. Even those regions posed serious logistical problems, for they were situated far distant to the north, and therefore beyond the effective campaigning range of most citizen-soldiers who, as autourgoi, needed to tend their fields on a regular basis.4 The Athenians, in contrast, were far more versatile in their operational range, possessing a proficient infantry as well as superior naval forces. In geopolitical terms, however, they needed but to defend and preserve to emerge victorious. Appreciative of the comparative disadvantage of engaging the Peloponnesian phalanx in an open confrontation, the Athenian leadership opted to wage a war of attrition, a test of financial and psychological stamina rather than a direct contest of arms. With rivals so matched, the most unusual fact about the war—that throughout its long duration, only two conventional hoplite battles took place—becomes readily understandable. The traditional style of warfare, featuring a set engagement between two heavily armed infantries composed of the more prosperous third or so of the citizen population, and usually conducted over border territories during a lull in the agricultural cycle, was no longer strategically decisive.

New and emerging styles of warfare are never easy to adopt, however, even apart from the inherent conservativism that prolongs the longevity of hallowed military practices beyond their manifest utility. The traditional hoplite encounter was in every sense a logical expression of the Polis form of social organization. Fought by self-equipped citizens momentarily released from the seasonal imperatives of agricultural activity, this was a style of warfare that imposed no strains on either the fiscal or manpower resources of the "classical" city-state. An altered military format—with enhanced operational capabilities mandating greater professionalization—would require corresponding institutional changes, and therewith a fateful transformation of the Polis-citizen bond, Consider the sociological ramifications of first notable shift, the growing importance of naval power. Since the construction and maintenance of a large fleet required huge and continuous capital expenditures, only the most commercially dynamic of states could be expected to compete in this arenaa reality difficult to countenance from the traditionalist stance of agrarian self-sufficiency and its military complement of sturdy yeoman hoplites. Moreover, as a consequence of the increasing manpower demands of larger fleets, the recruitment of noncitizens to supplement citizen-crews became a military necessity. Although the social-psychological impact of this practice is difficult to assess, the hiring of outsiders invariably compromised and diluted the Polis-citizen bond in the domain of war, as increasing numbers of men were now regularly offering their lives for

communities other than their own in exchange for pay (the wider implications of civic demilitarization are addressed in 5.II and V, below). Developments in land warfare were no less disruptive of traditional arrangements: with the decline of the all-out phalanx encounter, armies were required to spend more time in the field, either carrying out limited operations in distant peripheral regions, or engaging in blockades that were quite lengthy owing to the primitive state of siege technology. Not only did this increase dramatically the cost of campaigning, it seriously undermined the usefulness of the traditional citizen-soldier, who found it more and more difficult to participate in campaigns that required extended absences from his klêros. This rising importance of mobility and maneuver likewise began to expose the inadequacies of the limited training and tactical skills of civilian-warriors and placed new premiums on the development of professional leadership and command. More immediately pressing, however, was the sudden primacy of fiscal resources, which alone made possible and sustained the new patterns of warfare. One need only reflect on the two-year Athenian siege of Potidaea (432-430 BC), an ultimately successful action that drained the treasury of the enormous sum of two thousand talents, fully one-third of the reserve fund that had been carefully accumulated in the prewar years!5 Pericles had correctly perceived that finances would hold the key to military success; what he had not realized is how rapidly even his own state's bounteous revenues would be consumed.

In responding to these unanticipated financial and manpower pressures, the protagonists devised a variety of practices that corresponded to their respective situations. We know relatively little about the mechanisms whereby the Peloponnesians financed their war effort, but it appears that emergency property taxes on the citizenry, known as eisphorai, provided the bulk of the revenues.6 An inscription reveals that Sparta also received secret donations of food, supplies, and money from several "neutral" communities, as well as from oligarchical "friends of the Spartans" among the subject-allies of the Delian League. The Peloponnesians remained chronically strapped for funds, however, which partially explains both the comparative inactivity of their fleet and the limited nature of their offensive ground operations. The one source that could (and eventually did) remedy this situation was Persia, but until the concluding phase of the war, the asking price—gold in exchange for restored dominion over the Asiatic Greeks—was too high for the Spartans, who after all had entered the fray as "liberators of the Hellenes." The second strategic dilemma facing the Peloponnesians—the limited campaigning range of their farmer-hoplites—was more satisfactorily addressed. Whenever citizen-soldiers were deemed inappropriate for the task, recourse

was made to two alternative types of troops: paid volunteers from allied states ("home-grown" mercenaries, as it were), and recruits from the Helot population. The latter move is intriguing sociologically, but our sources convey no more than the familiar general principle, whereby the oppressor secures valuable services by offering positive differential treatment to select members of the subject population. In this case the Spartans transformed slaves into soldiers, creating an intermediate status within the social order composed of newly liberated Helots—the neodamôdeis who thereafter served in the infantry as members of the Spartan community, though without full citizenship rights.

As for the Athenians, their war effort depended almost exclusively on the imperial city's extraordinary revenues, for it was the wealth derived from trade and tribute that maintained the fleet, paid the crews, financed the sieges and infantry sorties, and underwrote abandonment of the Attik countryside to the seasonal ravages of the enemy. The scale and duration of these activities devoured the revenues at such an alarming rate, that the Athenians were compelled to introduce sundry emergency measures. The immediate reaction to dwindling reserves was an increase in the tribute quotas imposed on the allies, and we hear of additional exactions "over and above" the regular tribute. A concerted effort was made to increase the number of "allies" contributing to the treasury—the tribute list of 425 BC reveals that the empire more than doubled its membership during the early years of the war (from 180 communities to more than 380).8 The vast majority of these new dependencies were extremely small-hence easy to coerce into joining-but their collective contribution to the imperial fisc was not negligible. A fourth measure was one the Athenians periodically imposed upon themselves: the eisphora or emergency property tax, usually at rates of one or two percent. Recourse to these fiscal exigencies kept the fleet afloat and the citizenry fed, but there was a price to pay in social terms; increased exploitation of subject-allies bred resentment and fueled the fires of rebellion abroad; while at home, propertied oligarchs (who bore the brunt of eisphorai) found in the war tax still another reason to favor the overthrow of the hated democracy.

With the contending hegemonic powers reluctant to venture beyond the security of their own preferred rules of engagement-the Athenians choosing to avoid major clashes with their principal foe on land, the Peloponnesians steering clear of confrontations at sea-the two rivals were led to conduct much of the war indirectly, by striking at their opponent's allies. For their part, the Athenians directed considerable effort against both the Korinthian Gulf region and Boeotia. While generally successful in their various gulf campaigns, the results did little to shift the overall strategic balance. Boeotia proved to be the scene of a major Athenian setback. At the request of Boeotian democrats eager to overthrow their oligarchical rulers, a strategem was devised whereby two Athenian armies—one from the western end of the gulf and another from Attika would invade simultaneously, while local democrats would open city gates and incite a general uprising. Word of the plot was uncovered in several cities beforehand, thus throwing off the timing and enabling the Boeotians to mobilize for a countering intercept. Their army fell upon the retreating Athenians just inside the Boeotian border, near Delium, there to initiate the first real hoplite engagement of the war (424 BC). Some seven thousand hoplites on each side clashed in a fierce, evenly fought battle, eventually turned for the Boeotians when the Theban contingentamassed in a unique formation twenty-five rows deep rather than the conventional eight-shattered the Athenian phalanx and precipitated a mass flight. This heavy defeat, tolling more than a thousand Athenian dead, basically offset earlier advances in the Gulf, thereby maintaining the overall military stalemate.

Spartan efforts to break the deadlock were similarly mixed. With their Boeotian allies they captured and destroyed Plataea in 427 BC after a two-year siege, but then suffered a paralyzing blow in 425 when the Athenians overcame a Spartan force at Pylos in the southwestern Peloponnese, taking nearly three hundred men hostage. This temporarily suspended Spartan invasions of Attika, for the Athenians threatened to execute the prisoners if such actions continued. The Spartans rebounded the following year, when they sent a contingent of seven hundred Helots under Brasidas, Sparta's most effective general, to Chalcidice and Thrace with the aim of fomenting revolt among Athens' subject-allies. Over the next two years, Brasidas managed to win over a number of Athenian dependencies, often through the aid of local oligarchs opposed to democracy and Athenian rule. More importantly, he secured the vital Athenian colony of Amphipolis, a major provider of timber for the fleet and silver for the imperial treasury. Athenian reinforcements presently recovered several of the smaller communities, but the Spartans held on to most of their recent gains. The ruinous strategic impasse thus continued, for despite these and many other peripheral campaigns too numerous to mention, neither side had discovered the means to inflict a mortal wound upon the other.

As a number of incidents already surveyed have made clear, the contest between Athens and Sparta was integrally tied to another form of warfare: the domestic variant of rich against poor, oligarch against democrat. In forging and maintaining their empire, expediency and principle inclined the Athenians to interventions that favored the local dêmos against the

beltistoi, "the first men in wealth and descent." Spartan interests, in contrast, were best served by collusion with the few rather than the many, with the consequence that they seized upon every opportunity, in Thucydides' words, "to make sure that their allies were governed by oligarchies serviceable to Sparta." Such being the affinities and realities of power, it followed that when hostilities broke out between the hegemonic rivals, the course of war would not be conducted solely beyond the walls of Polis society, but within them as well.

Strategically limited in their capacity to strike at each other directly, the two "superpowers" turned increasingly to subversion as a means of breaking the impasse—more often than not at the behest of some embittered or ambitious local faction, keen to strike down their opponents with the aid of foreign troops. 10 It was characteristic of the ensuing triumph of faction over community that it was accompanied by unprecedented savagery, replete with the wholesale murder of opponents and the enslavement of women and children. The outbreak of stasis in Korcyra in 427 BC served Thucydides as a paradigmatic case, his detailed exposition relating how the demos, aided by the Athenians, and the wealthy oligarchs, abetted by Peloponnesians and hired mercenaries, engaged in treacherous mutual slaughter. Foes seeking asylum were sacrilegiously murdered in the temples; slaves were liberated to join in the struggle; fathers slew their own sons; sons, their own fathers. With the arrival of an Athenian fleet, the democratic faction proceeded "to butcher those of their fellow-citizens whom they regarded as enemies, on the charge that they had attempted to destroy the dêmos; some, however, were put to death simply because of personal hatreds, and others were slain by their debtors over the monies owed to them." To escape the fury of the masses, many of the oligarchs preferred suicide, "some hanging themselves from trees, others by whatever means possible."11

Under the pressures of a war unprecedented in its scale and style of operations, the communal ideals that had triumphed with the transition to hoplite warfare and the codification of law now gave way to renewed and heightened hostilities between rich and poor, the few and the many. The definitive sociology of this corrosive fusing of polemos and stasis has been provided by the great historian himself:¹²

Virtually the whole of the Hellenic world was convulsed by stasis, for with rivalries existing everywhere, the leaders of the dêmos attempted to bring in the Athenians, and oligarchs the Spartans. In time of peace there would have been neither the motive nor the readiness to call them in, but in time of war, when each faction could always count upon an alliance to harm their opponents and at the same time advance themselves, anyone wishing to overturn the existing state of affairs readily contrived these interventions. Many harsh

sufferings fell upon the poleis through these factional struggles, as happens and will always happen, so long as the nature of men remains the same, though in severer and milder forms, varying according to particular changing conditions imposed by circumstance. For in peace and prosperity, both states and individuals display better judgments, because they are not constrained by necessity into involuntary actions. But war, which steals the resources of daily life, is a violent teacher and brings the temperaments of many into a likeness with their reduced circumstances.

Stasis thus raged among the poleis, and in places where it erupted later, news of earlier struggles carried the plans of the conspirators to new and greater excesses, as revealed in the cunning of their attempts at power and in their unnatural reprisals. Even the customary meaning of words changed, as men claimed the right to use them as they would to suit their actions. Thoughtless daring was considered courage in loyalty to a comrade; cautious forethought was specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; and the ability to see all sides, the inability to act . . . The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy, he who spoke against them suspect. To plot successfully was to have intelligence, and to expose such planning more clever still. But to try and provide against the need to do either, this was to break up one's own faction and to be frightened of the enemy . . . Even the ties of kin had less claim than those of the hetaireiai, owing to the readiness of comrades to venture any action without excuse; for these associations were not formed for the sake of mutual aid under the existing laws, but for gain by illegal means . . . And of all these evils the cause was the pursuit of power, in the interests of greed (pleonexia) and love of honor (philotimia), from which proceeded the zeal for strife. The leading men on either side armed themselves with fine-sounding words: isonomia, equality for the mass of common citizens, or sôphron aristokratia, prudent rule by the best men. But the commonweal which they served only in word was a prize they sought for themselves; and using every means to prevail they contended with each other, boldly executing villainous outrages and even more villainous acts of revenge, not stopping where justice or the interests of the Polis demanded, but limiting themselves only by their own pleasures. And so, either by condemning their enemies by means of an illegal vote or by seizing power with a violent hand, all were equally ready to satisfy their thirst for victory. Neither side believed in piety, but any fine-sounding phrase that justified some malevolent action was readily attended to. As for those citizens who remained neutral, they were destroyed by both factions, either because they would not join in the struggle or from sheer envy that they might survive.

Thus did every form of evil take root in Hellas by reason of stasis, and that ancient simplicity of which a noble character is the greatest part was laughed down and disappeared, as lack of trust gained the upper hand among the opposing factions. For no word was strong enough, no oath solemn enough, to reconcile them; and upon gaining mastery all alike calculated that permanent security was not to be hoped for, and so, incapable of trusting the other side, provided against dangers to themselves.

From this contemporary, authoritative testimony, it is clear that the most significant losses occasioned by the Peloponnesian War were not, sociologically speaking, those measured in material terms, i.e., the destruction of property and the immense human casualities. Far more consequential was the spiritual catastrophe, as measured by the manifest erosion of communal solidarity and of devoted commitment to the Polis ideal. New generations do arise, houses are rebuilt and lands reclaimed; but a legacy of civic hatred and imprinted memories of betrayal and murder persist for decades to come as enduring obstacles to any attempted reconstitution of a now shattered communalism.

Mutually drained by the inconclusive and ruinous process of their struggle, the Athenians and Spartans reached an agreement in 421 BC, calling for the return of captured territories, the release of the Spartan prisoners, and a fifty-year truce. Terms of the armistice did little to please Sparta's major allies, the Korinthians and Boeotians, whose interests were shabbily disregarded by the Peloponnesian hêgemôn. A realignment of power blocks promptly ensued. Athens and Sparta actually formed an alliance with each other, one of the more interesting clauses of which addressed the overriding and perpetual Spartan fear: "Should the slave population [the Helots] rise in insurrection, the Athenians shall give armed assistance to the Spartans according as their strength allows." Korinth, Elis, and Mantinea duly bolted from the Peloponnesian League and formed alliances with Argos and the Chalcidians.

After a period of political maneuvering and growing suspicion between Athens and Sparta over their mutual failure to implement territorial exchanges, the Athenians formed a defensive pact with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea in 418 BC. A year later the plain of Mantinea served as the site for a massive hoplite confrontation between the rival coalitions, as Sparta and a few of its remaining Peloponnesian allies clashed with contingents from Argos, Mantinea, and Athens. The Spartans won an overwhelming victory, thereby restoring their tarnished authority throughout the Peloponnese. After imposing an oligarchy in Sikyon, they promptly answered an appeal by the oligarchs of Argos to overthrow the existing democracy. The imposed order was quickly overturned, however, as the Argive dêmos rose up in the following spring, slaughtering and banishing their oligarchical opponents. The next few years witnessed no major confrontations between Sparta and Athens, as the two rivals limited themselves to minor peripheral campaigning and political interventions.

The turning point came when the Athenians attempted to break the deadlock by invading and conquering Greek Sicily. Invited in by one of the communities fearing subjugation to democratic Syracuse, the island's

dominant polis—and in size and wealth one of the foremost powers in the Hellenic world—the Athenians mobilized a massive invasion force in 415 BC. Their strategic aims were twofold: to strengthen the empire by the incorporation of an island rich in resources and to cut off all exports of materials and possible military aid to Sparta (several Sicilian poleis, including Syracuse, were Dorian, and hence favorably disposed to their kinsmen in the Peloponnese). Thucydides pointedly adds that self-seeking politicians promoted the ill-fated venture in the hopes of acquiring glory and renown for themselves, while "the great multitude and the soldiers" were animated by the prospect of "silver-coins for the present and, from the forthcoming conquest, an everlasting fund of wages for the future." ¹⁴

Before the invasion force set sail, a major scandal convulsed the city: nearly all of the stone busts of Hermes, which stood guard in the doorways of houses and in sanctuaries, were desecrated in an act of nocturnal vandalism, generally believed to be the work of oligarchs opposed to the war and the democracy. Though Alcibiades had been a chief advocate for the Sicilian expedition, and had been granted a military command, his opponents seized on the chance to implicate him in the sacrilege. As a high-living young nobleman and disciple of the "atheistic sophist" Sokrates, their charges had a ring of plausibility; and though undoubtedly innocent of defacing the Hermae, a drunken Alcibiades was known to have participated earlier in a notorious symposion that had parodied the Eleusinian Mysteries. Upon arrival of the fleet in Sicily, Alcibiades was ordered to return home for trial; weighing his options, he decided to seek refuge with the Spartans. As for the expedition itself, it ended in complete disaster after two years of operations, largely through ineptitude on the part of the divided Athenian command and stout resistance by the Syracusans. Some two hundred warships were captured or destroyed, and perhaps as many as forty thousand of the invaders-Athenians and allies—were killed or sold into slavery. As Thucydides tersely observed, the Sicilian affair was "the most brilliant of successes for the conquerors, and the most calamitous of defeats for the vanquished."15

Compounding Athenian miseries was the sudden resurgence of Sparta, for just prior to the crippling denouement in Sicily, the Spartans had acted on Alcibiades' advice to set up a permanent fortress within Attik territory, at Decelea. From there they denied the Athenians all access to their fields and provided refuge for more than twenty thousand runaway slaves, most of them skilled workers. The presence of the Spartan forces severely curtailed the procurement of food supplies from Euboea and prevented work in the silver mines, a primary source of Athenian revenues. When word of the Sicilian disaster carried eastwards, the oligarchs among Athens' subject-allies lost little time in com-

municating to Sparta their readiness for revolt. Conducting military operations in the eastern Aegean still posed serious logistical problems, but given the sudden deterioration of the Athenian position, the Peloponnesians decided for an all-out effort. The Spartans issued a requisition to their allies for the construction of one hundred warships and coordinated oligarchical uprisings among the subject-allies. Chios, Erythrae, Klazomenae, Teos, and Miletus revolted in the early spring of 412 BC, several of them receiving direct guidance from a small Peloponnesian contingent led by Alcibiades (whose departure from Sparta had been hastened by his most recent misadventure: the seduction of king Agis' wife). In midsummer the "pact" so long resisted was finally forged between Sparta and Persia, the one dependent on the other's gold to sustain the war effort, the latter requiring the former's military assistance to regain dominion over the Anatolian seaboard. The Spartans apparently viewed this "sellour" of the Asiatic Greeks as a temporary ploy, but that did not prevent several Ionian poleis from forcibly expelling imposed Persian garrisons.

Relations between Sparta and her Persian paymaster remained uneasy, thus providing an opening for the protean Alcibiades to stage his eventual return to Athens. Sensing that his talents were rapidly losing their appeal to the Spartans, he began intriguing with Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap at Sardis. The Athenian urged a "mutual exhaustion" of the Great King's opponents, to be achieved by continued financing of the Spartans, but only so as to enable them to fight, not defeat, their Greek rival. Temporarily safe behind his latest screen, Alcibiades made contact with his aristocratic supporters in the Athenian fleet then operating along the Anatolian coast. He sent word that if the democracy in Athens were to be replaced by an oligarchy, he could assure Persian support against the Spartans. This message was conveyed to the assembly back home, and various oligarchical hetaireiai banded together and imposed an oligarchy in 411 BC, playing upon the war fears of the people and using intimidation and murder against prominent democrats. Envoys were immediately sent to the fleet at Samos to reconcile the crews to the new government, but the seamen refused compliance. In yet another of his many reversals, Alcibiades, who had not been recalled by the oligarchs in Athens (undoubtedly fearful of his unstable charisma), now joined the democratic fleet in Samos and proceeded to shore up the crumbling Athenian empire. Meantime, the oligarchy at home began to disintegrate as the extremist wing clashed with moderates who were desirous of a broaderbased hoplite constitution. Within two years the full democracy was restored, the confidence of the dêmos reviving as the fleet under Alcibiades reclaimed rebellious allies and won victory after victory over the Spartan fleet. By 407 BC Alcibiades was able to return to a hero's welcome in

Athens—all past sins momentarily forgiven, but not forgotten—and was granted supreme command for the conduct of the war.

In the following year, the Spartans began yet another comeback, having at long last found a military commander who could win at sea, the able and ambitious Lysander. The new Spartan admiral defeated an Athenian fleet off the coast of Ephesus, and as this contingent had been ineptly commanded by one of Alcibiades' personal friends, the leader's star quickly dimmed. When new generals were appointed back in Athens, Alcibiades took warning and withdrew to his private castle on the Chersonese peninsula, where he was subsequently murdered. The Spartans and the Persians now made a concerted effort to wrest control of the Hellespont from Athens, thus cutting her access to the wheat granary of the north. The Athenians made one last desperate bid to recover, even manumitting slaves to serve as rowers in a newly outfitted fleet, but after a few successes, they were decisively beaten when Lysander captured virtually the entire Athenian fleet in a surprise raid at Aegospotami in 405 BC. Every remaining allied community except Samos now revolted and went over to the Spartans, who proceeded to envelope Athens by land and sea. Famine gripped the besieged within their walls, but fearful of the fate of Melos and Scione, cities they had obliterated when the power was theirs, they vainly tried to induce more favorable terms. In the spring of 404 BC the Athenians surrendered unconditionally.

Considering that many of Sparta's allies, most notably Korinth and Thebes, demanded utter annihilation for the Athenian people, Sparta's policy towards its vanquished foe was remarkably mild: the defensive walls around the Piraeus were destroyed, all warships save a limited patrolling force were confiscated, all kleruchies and colonies were forfeited, and an oligarchy subservient to Spartan bidding was to be established. Thirty Athenian oligarchs under Kritias' leadership were selected to prepare a new constitution, allegedly to be modeled after the predemocratic "ancestral politeia." After introducing several moderate reforms, the rule of the Thirty quickly degenerated into a reign of white terror. Democrats, wealthy metics, even moderate oligarchs were condemned and executed or murdered outright, their properties confiscated to help pay for a Spartan garrison that had been installed to hold down the dêmos. As the death toll mounted—eventually reaching some fifteen hundred victims—a number of moderates and democrats went into exile to prepare for a counter-revolution. The Thirty itself split into a radical wing (headed by Kritias) and a group that favored extending the franchise to all of the kaloikagathoi, the hippeis and the leading hoplites. Internally divided and facing mounting pressure from the democratic exiles, the dictatorial regime finally fell after Kritias, Charmides, and a number of their supporters were killed in battle against the returning exiles. At this juncture the Spartan king intervened and—overruling Lysander, a partisan for oligarchical extremists—established an armistice and amnesty that eventually led to the restoration of the Athenian democracy in the summer of 403 BC. It was a democracy, however, that would have to learn to live under greatly reduced circumstances. After decades of destructive warfare and factionalism, the same was true for much of the rest of the Hellenic

Fourth-Century Greece and the Decline of the Polis

There is widespread agreement among historians that the Hellenic world entered a protracted phase of internal "decay" in the aftermath of the ruinous Peloponnesian War, a process that would eventually culminate in the extirpation of Greek autonomy by external military powers. But if the direction of the trend is not in doubt, the social circumstances occasioning the Greek decline—its nature, extent, and chronology—all this remains subject to frequent debate and revisions in interpretation. Much of the dissensus stems from conceptual imprecision—the use of terms like "decline" and "decay" is notoriously subjective—and from various analytical inadequacies, such as a singular devotion to battlefield results or political developments. Misleading analogies, both ancient and modern, further muddle the subject, as does a tendency to overgeneralize from Athenian conditions to those in the wider Hellenic world. The preceding chapters of this study were written with these problems in mind, and it is hoped that information that may have appeared incidental in its initial presentation will now take on referential significance as we attempt to provide a sociologically comprehensive explanation of the so-called crisis of the fourth century. Having traced the emergence and maturation of the Polis form of social organization in some detail—the evolution of its basic institutional structures, class relations, social roles, and cultural ideals—the task of analyzing its decomposition should be easier to achieve.

5.I HEGEMONIAL RIVALRIES, CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE DEEPENING CRISIS OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

The defeat of Athens and the collapse of its maritime empire gave immediate opportunity and scope for expansion by Greece's other aspiring hêgemôn. Even prior to the termination of the war, the Spartans had been forging the instruments of a new imperial order: communities that had been dislodged from Athenian control were promptly saddled with pro-Spartan oligarchies, while elsewhere the "liberators" chose to rule directly, imposing garrisons in places of strategic value or wherever local oligarchs needed the presence of Spartan arms to inhibit domestic oppo-

sition. Sparta was singularly ill suited, however, to play the role of Hellenic hêgemôn: an insular, self-sufficient agrarian community, sustained by the enforced labors of a captive subject population, Sparta was deficient in precisely those forms of power that had made Athenian imperialism possible. The financial resources to sustain an empire on land and sea were plainly lacking, as confirmed by the earlier humiliating dependence on Persian gold. Manpower to control distant territories was likewise inadequate, seeing that the wartime expedient of freeing Helots for hoplite service could not, for rather obvious reasons, be continued indefinitely. Sparta's authoritarian customs were an additional liabilty, rendering it unprepared for the kind of diplomatic propriety with outsiders that is generally required of those aspiring to empire. Force rather than consensus proved to be the hallmark of Spartan domination, with tribute reimposed and a free reign given to local oligarchs, many of whom promptly engaged in murderous purges of their political opponents. Such practices dissipated whatever goodwill the Spartans had won in curtailing Athenian dominance, and in short order the self-proclaimed "liberators of Hellas" came to be viewed as oppressors more onerous than their defeated predecessors. As discontent mounted over the harshness of the new order, forces were set in motion that led to a partial revival of Athenian power and the unexpected ascendancy of Thebes. The complicated history behind those two developments, the shifting political alliances and the incessant military campaigns, need not be chronicled here; but a prefatory survey of the major geopolitical trends should help contextualize our attempted sociology of the "decline" of Polis society.

A succession crisis in Persia occasioned the first episode of note, in 401 BC, when Cyrus attempted to unseat his elder half brother with the aid of some ten thousand Greek hoplites, mercenaries recruited with Spartan assistance and attracted by the lucrative pay scale offered by the Persian prince. Xenophon, a young Athenian nobleman and disciple of Sokrates, served as a commander and chronicler of the campaign, his stirring narrative, the Anabasis, providing a detailed and glaring account of Persia's geostrategic vulnerabilities and military limitations. Owing to the tactical superiority of his hired Greek infantry, Cyrus' rebel army managed to penetrate deeply into the Persian realm; but the prince was killed in action just outside Babylon, leaving the Ten Thousand without a cause and, more importantly, without a paymaster. Stranded in a vast and unfamiliar land, and facing opposition from all quarters, the Greeks managed to fight their way back to the coast and to eleutheria, 'freedom', a remarkable feat that would stir Hellenic ambitions for generations to come.

The Spartans were first to exploit this confirmation of Persian vulnerability, dispatching in 396 BC an army of Peloponnesians and manu-

mitted Helots to liberate the Asiatic Greeks and plunder Persian lands. Joined by many of Cyrus' former mercenaries as well as by local Greek troops, the Spartan-led force ravaged the Great King's dominions for several years, hauling in great quantities of booty in the process. Unable to defeat the invader in battle, Persia resorted to the strength of her purse: envoys ladened with gold were sent out to stir up war against Sparta back in Greece. As resentment against Spartan heavy-handedness was already strong, the offer of Persian assistance produced immediate results: a border dispute in central Greece occasioned the formation of an anti-Spartan coalition headed by Thebes, Athens, Korinth, and Argos. This socalled Korinthian War (395-387 BC) was marked by much inconclusive campaigning, but ruinous losses in lives and property. Both Sparta and Persia eventually came to appreciate the mutual advantages of peace, and together they imposed a treaty on all the weary parties, the key clauses of which read as follows:2

King Artaxerxes thinks it right that the poleis of Asia and the islands Klazomenae and Cyprus shall be his, and that all the other Greek poleis, great and small, shall be autonomous. . . . If any refuse this peace, on them I shall make war in concert with those who are of similar mind, both by land and sea, with ships and money.

This King's Peace, as it came to be called, basically revived the earlier "compromise" that had authorized Persian supremacy over the Asiatic Greeks in exchange for Spartan dominance over its rivals at home. Though most Greeks felt humiliated by the reality of Persian arbitration and continued imperium, weakness and exhaustion mandated compliance.

The Spartans were not slow in exercising their restored hegemonial prerogatives: democracies in Mantinea, Korinth, Phlius, and elsewhere were put down and replaced by pliant oligarchies, and the earlier network of garrisons and military governors was reestablished. A particularly blatant violation of the King's Peace occurred in 382 BC, when an extremist faction in Thebes conspired with a nearby Spartan army to seize the citadel and impose a pro-Spartan dictatorship.3 Some fifteen hundred Spartan troops garrisoned the city and maintained order for the oligarchs, who unleashed a campaign of terror and political murder. Theban moderates who managed to escape fled to Athens, and upon liberating their city in a daring assassination coup three years later, they reorganized the Theban constitution on a democratic basis that owed much to the Athenian example.4 That political shift triggered a violent upheaval throughout the region, for in the name of liberation from Sparta's oligarchical yoke, the Thebans now championed the democratic forces throughout Boeotia. Sparta responded with repeated invasions, to overturn Thebes and to

defend Boeotian oligarchs, but the Thebans and their Athenian allies withstood each onslaught and gradually freed the region from Spartan domination. By 375 BC the Boeotian League was fully reconstituted, led by Thebes and featuring a new democratic federal assembly and a collective seven-man board of officials who managed foreign policy and exercised military command.

With Spartan repression now the overriding concern, the Athenians were able to find support for the restoration of their naval League in 378 BC, significantly remodelled, however, so as to prevent the easy transition from alliance to empire that had occurred in the fifth century. A bicameral arrangement consisting of the Athenian assembly and a separate allied council was established, with both parties exercising an equal vote and right of veto. The Athenians again provided military leadership, but the acquisition of land in allied territories was now legally proscribed.5 The basic objective of the revived League is succinctly stated in its founding decree: "To force the Spartans to allow the Greeks to enjoy peace in freedom and autonomy, possessing all their lands in security." After several naval victories over the Spartans, League membership swelled to some seventy poleis, and included Chios, Lesbos, Rhodes, Byzantium, Euboea, and the Chalcidians. In military terms, however, this second Athenian alliance remained a mere shadow of its former self, incapable of outfitting more than seventy ships after maximal mobilization, and even then subject to fiscal limitations that precluded sustained operations. When the Spartans expressed interest in a renewal of the King's Peace in 371 BC, the Athenians, financially strapped and increasingly concerned over the waxing might of Thebes, readily concurred.

The stage was now set for a Spartan-Theban showdown. On the pretext of liberating the Boeotians from Theban domination, a Spartanled Peloponnesian army entered Boeotia in early summer. After manipulating the oracles and other religious symbols to bolster the confidence of their troops, the Theban leaders Epaminondas and Pelopidas initiated an engagement on the plain of Leuctra that forever ended Spartan hopes of hegemony.6 Significantly outmanned (some eleven thousand to six), the Thebans owed their triumph to innovative tactics and inspired command. Building upon earlier experiments, Epaminondas altered the conventional phalanx engagement by massing on his left wing-traditionally the weaker side—a formation fifty shields deep, which spearheaded the attack while the center and right held constant. The irresistible weight of the enhanced left wing was further augmented by an elite corps that led the charge, the so-called Sacred Band composed of three hundred men specially trained at public expense and uniquely bonded in the form of homoerotic dyads. After fierce resistance, the Spartans were driven from the field with heavy losses, including four hundred full citizens at a time when the total number of Homoioi, or 'Peers', may have been less than fifteen hundred. Leuctra was thus a stunning and crippling disaster, so much so that the Thebans henceforth assume the role of aggressor and invade the Peloponnese almost annually for the next decade, while a desperate Sparta has all it can do to stave off annihilation—on one occasion pledging freedom to thousands of Helots for their assistance in repelling the foe from barricaded streets.7 Under the repeated hammer blows of Epaminondas' massed phalanx, Sparta's centuries-old power base in the Peloponnese crumbled away, as long suppressed democratic forces seized the opportunity to overthrow their pro-Spartan oligarchies. More disastrous still was Theban liberation of Messenia, that ancient land "good to plough and good to plant" that had been conquered by the Spartans in the eighth century and had thereafter provided Sparta with servile labor and surplus land, the economic pillars of its military supremacy. Under Epaminondas' direction, a formidable citadel was constructed on the slopes of Mount Ithome to serve as capital for the liberated Helots and perioikoi, while those who had been scattered during the Messenian diaspora streamed back to their ancestral homeland in great numbers, thereby constituting a permanent obstacle to any resurgence of Spartan power.

In 362 BC the formation of an anti-Theban coalition of Sparta, Athens, Elis, Achaea, and several lesser states triggered yet another invasion of the Peloponnese by Epaminondas, who was joined by his allies from northern and central Greece as well as by contingents from Argos, Arkadia, and Messene. The titanic battle that ensued on the plain of Mantinea reaffirmed the tactical mastery of the Theban forces, but victory in the field could not offset the death of Epaminondas, a loss that deprived Thebes of the gifted leader who had harnessed its resources and guided its remarkable rise to power. As Xenophon notes in the despairing coda of his *Hellenika*, a narrative history of the period, the results of Mantinea confounded all expectations:⁸

For with nearly all the Greeks gathered and arrayed against each other, there was no one who did not believe that if a battle took place, the conquerors would rule and the conquered would become their subjects. But God so arranged it that both sides set up trophies as for victory, . . . and both asked for a truce to take up their dead as though defeated. Each side claimed victory, but neither could display any more territory or a city or power than they had before the battle. Rather, there was even greater confusion and disorder in Greece after the battle than there had been previously.

The four decades that followed the Peloponnesian War were thus marked by a virtually uninterrupted cycle of interpolis warfare and con-

tinued factional strife. Sparta's authoritarian hegemony and support for local oligarchs had from the outset provoked armed responses throughout mainland and eastern Greece, affording scant opportunity for any significant recovery from the material devastation and psychological damage that had been wrought by the preceding Spartan-Athenian struggle. Far from establishing any kind of geopolitical equilibrium, the eclipse of Athenian power had only served to widen the scope for regional ambitions, which in turn deepened the fissures of faction at the local level. The inevitable by-product of these interwoven instabilities was a manifest and deepening social crisis.

Among contemporaries, there was little doubt that the primary cause of current difficulties was unrestrained warfare. One need only consult the writings of Xenophon, Isocrates, and Diodorus, our principal historical sources for this period, to enter into a world where a cancerous militarism rages unchecked throughout the body social. Passage after passage is given over to the chronicle of armies on the move, of soldiers crossing borders and devastating territories, looting homes and livestock, and enslaving the vanquished. To convey something of nature of these localized but debilitating conflicts, let us briefly examine several select cases.

One of Sparta's first acts of aggrandizement in the aftermath of the victory over Athens was an attack in 399 BC on democratic Elis, a prosperous agrarian community in the western Peloponnese. Following the customary offerings to the gods, the Spartan king led his army and a number of allies into Elean territory, cutting down fruit trees and burning crops along the way. As Elis had not suffered a breach of its borders for some two decades, the plunder was exceedingly rich:

Very great numbers of cattle and very great numbers of slaves were captured in the countryside, with the result that as others heard about it, many more of the Arkadian and Achaean allies came as volunteers to get a share of the plunder. And so this campaign turned out to be a kind of restocking of the Peloponnese.

Upon reaching the urban district, additional properties were looted and destroyed, including the splendid gymnasia. At this point the typical "internal" response to external pressure supervened, as Elean oligarchs—emboldened by the proximity of Spartan arms—rose to overturn the constitution. Their success was limited to the butchering of a number of their political opponents, whereupon they were forcibly driven from the city. As the Spartan-led invasion force departed with its rich booty, a garrison commanded by the exiled oligarchs was set up in one of the nearby towns to serve as a base for continued plundering raids through-

out summer and winter. Their food supply gravely threatened, the Elean dêmos had no option but to settle on Spartan terms in the following spring.

In 389 BC the Spartans and their allies launched an attack on Akarnania, a region of minor walled settlements and villages on the western coast of central Greece.10 The invasion force proceeded at a restrained pace, methodically devastating the countryside as it advanced a few kilometers each day. Two weeks of systematic destruction followed, whereupon the Spartans abruptly quick-marched to the interior and there captured nearly all of the livestock that the Akarnanians had corralled for security. Xenophon records that the Spartans "seized numerous herds of cattle and horses, and all kinds of other animals and many slaves." Lacking effective siege equipment, however, the Spartan king failed to take any of the fortified settlements, and as autumn approached he prepared for withdrawal. Requested by his allies that the army "stay long enough to prevent the Akarnanians from sowing their seed," the king displayed superior strategic foresight: "the more these people sow," he observed, "the more they will yearn for peace" when the campaigning season begins anew in the following spring. Fearing a successive loss of their harvest, Akarnanian ambassadors presently arrived in Sparta and capitulated to the aggressor's demands.

In 373 BC a Spartan army accompanied by mercenaries sailed for Korcyra, and on landing unopposed, proceeded to ravage "the well cultivated and very beautifully planted countryside."11 Unwilling to give battle, the Korcyreans opted to remain behind their city walls as the invaders "seized great numbers of slaves and cattle from the fields, and plundered all the magnificent country houses and their well-stocked wine-cellars." It was alleged that the soldiers became so spoiled by this luxury that they soon began spurning any vintage that "lacked a fine bouquet." The besieged Korcyreans, in contrast, were reduced to a famine so desperate that many began deserting to the enemy, preferring slavery to starvation. These desertions reached such numbers that the Spartans began driving them back with whips, only to find that those inside the walls refused to readmit their fellow citizens, many of whom were simply left to die. Upon learning that an Athenian squadron was sailing for Korcyra's relief, the invaders filled their transports with the captured booty and departed, leaving in their wake a wasteland of death and destruction,

Of the cases just reviewed, only one aspect can be judged unusual or distinctive: in comparative terms, these were among the more fortunate of communities! Elis, Akarnania, and Korcyra, being situated on the fringes of the main theaters of war, were not subject to the repeated invasions that befell Korinth, Phokis, Thessaly, Sikyon, Lokris, Argos, Olynthus,

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Arkadia, Sparta, and many other core communities. As the evidence reviewed clearly indicates, however, the destruction of property and losses in livestock, slaves, and crops that could result from even a single campaign represented a life-threatening challenge to the typical agrarian Polis, which depended heavily on the seasonal yields of the countryside for its survival. ¹² Given that fundamental reality, any discussion of the "decline" of Polis society must begin by examining the consequences of the spiraling cycle of intensified military conflict, a process that began with the pan-Hellenic Peloponnesian War and continued virtually unabated well into the fourth century.

In a country of light soils and rainless summers, most Greek communities were sustained by a rather slender margin of agricultural surplus. one that could be easily lost, either to drought and pestilence or to the human scourge of war. As the entire political and cultural edifice rested upon this precarious base, any circumstance which curtailed agricultural production would necessarily strain existing social arrangements. 13 From the very inception of Polis society, the safeguarding and acquisition of arable farming land through military means constituted what Marx called "the great communal labor," the basic collective activity whereby the very existence and livelihood—the bios—of the landowning citizen-soldier was secured. The emergence of a distinctively Greek "way of war," featuring the heavily armed hoplite warrior and phalanx tactics, is largely explicable in terms of this need to defend or acquire the precious few alluvial plains that could sustain production in an otherwise mountainous terrain better suited for mobile, lightly armed fighters. The fact that the majority of hoplites were themselves autourgoi, self-working peasantfarmers, also accounts for the traditional confinement of major military operations to border engagements during the brief spring and summer lulls in the agricultural season. This circumscribed style of "agonal" warfare began to change with the Peloponnesian War, which introduced or expanded on a pan-Hellenic scale the role of long-distance campaigning, mercenary forces, sea power, and siege operations. Ritualized combat, in short, was rapidly giving way to rationalized forms of military efficiency. With the resulting intensification of interpolis warfare, greater strains were placed on the agrarian base of the economy, particularly as the strategic value of set phalanx engagements declined in favor of lengthier campaigns that afforded greater scope for systematic ravaging of the countryside.

The immediate effects of invasion on the local economy were typically threefold: the basic means of production—land, livestock, slaves, and farming implements—were plundered or destroyed; much of the wealth of a community, as measured by the capital worth of the pro-

ductive apparatus, foodstocks, terra-cotta storage vessels and tiling, building timber, and personal property such as clothing and furniture, was depleted; and, in consequence, the normal patterns of exchange between the rural oikos and the urban craft and commercial sectors suffered disruption. The nature of the damage inflicted by large-scale assaults on the countryside, moreover, did not generally allow for rapid recovery of the productive base. The legacy of invasion was in most cases not only immediate but long-term hardship, for of the three main crops-grain, grapes, and olives—only the former was sufficiently resilient to rebound from thorough destruction and so yield a consecutive harvest, though even that would prove meager given the greatly diminished seed inventory, the loss of fertilizer from the stolen animals, and the labor inefficiencies caused by the loss of plough oxen and slaves. The destruction of vineyards and olive groves entailed more lasting damage: vinestocks would require several years of labor intensive tendance before grapes could once more be profitably gathered; while new olive trees would not produce a mature crop for some fifteen years, though the practice of grafting cuttings onto damaged trunks or stumps might yield limited fruit after six or seven.14 Since the easily transportable and much-valued products of the grape (wine) and the olive (multipurpose oil used for cooking, soap, and fuel for illumination) were important elements in both local and seaborne trade, a decline in their production spanning several years would undoubtedly result in economic dislocation, particularly for smaller producers who could ill afford any reduction in income. To replenish plundered herds of livestock and captured slaves would require either considerable capital outlay or comparable successes in war, which would of course only perpetuate the cycle of ruinous violence.

As economic distress deepened with the intensification of interpolis warfare, political and social tensions between rich and poor mounted accordingly. Though the wealthy were not spared the ravages of invasion, those hit hardest by the devastation of the countryside were generally subsistence producers, small peasant-farmers who lacked the resources either to survive consecutive lean years or to restore their damaged klêroi to productive viability. Attempts to remain on the land often resulted in indebtedness, with the consequence that many lost their lands and were driven into precarious forms of tenancy or debt bondage. Others were simply forced by the grim economic reality to sell their lands at depressed value, henceforth to toil as laboring thêtes or to earn their livelihood in the rapidly expanding profession of mercenary service. The depression in material standards for the peasantry ("dikaios men for whom there is no daily bread," is the last lament of Aristophanes) and the threat of displacement from the land that sustained their status as full citizens thus

combined to create conditions for armed confrontations within the citizen-body itself, and hence for a further rupturing of the Polis koinônia.

Given the ubiquity of interpolis warfare from the late fifth century onwards, it should come as no surprise to learn that there were few communities that escaped the evils of *stasis* during this period, and that a good many suffered through repeated eruptions of class violence and protracted turmoil. Since the number of known cases of civic discord is considerable (there are nearly forty instances recorded in Xenophon's *Hellenika* alone), let us survey, in "headline" fashion, several cases that illustrate the intensity of the struggle and its basic patterns.¹⁸

In 401 BC an uprising by the masses in Cyrene resulted in the execution of five hundred of the "most powerful" citizens, followed by forced exile for many of the so-called "men of refinement." In 392 BC the beltistoi of Korinth, weary of the current war against their longtime ally Sparta, began agitating for peace, whereupon "those desiring dêmokratia" rose up during a religious festival and massacred their opponents, their hatred so intense they willingly incurred pollution for the satisfaction of butchering those of their enemies who had fled inside the temples for asylum. In 391 BC the pro-Spartan oligarchs of Rhodes received armed support from a Spartan fleet and promptly overturned the Rhodian democracy amid mass expulsions and slaughter of the dêmos. In 379 BC Theban exiles liberated their polis by assassinating the leading oligarchs and expelling the pro-Spartan garrison, after which they treacherously murdered their rivals, notwithstanding a sacred pledge that had offered safe passage into exile. An instance of stasis still more horrific was the notorious skytalismos affair in Argos, triggered in 370 BC when "the men of outstanding repute and property" decided to overthrow the democracy, allegedly owing to the slander of demagogues inciting "the multitude" against the megaloploutoi, or 'superrich'. Whatever the motives, the plot was uncovered and thirty conspirators executed, an action that only whetted the appetite for more "class justice." Inflamed by continuing demagogic agitation, the masses launched a murderous assault on the entire order of megaloploutoi, clubbing more than twelve hundred of them to death with cudgels (skytala) and confiscating their property. The frenzy of the mob was such that eventually even the demagogues were turned upon and killed. That same year, in the wake of the shattering defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra, stasis erupted throughout the Peloponnese, as long repressed democratic forces rose up and violently overturned Spartan-supported oligarchies, "exiling many agathoi" and "confiscating their property for the demos." In Tegea this uprising culminated in a mass execution of the leaders of the oligarchical faction, who had initially sought refuge inside a temple, but were sacrilegiously seized and put to death. Similar horrors were perpetuated elsewhere—in Elis, in Sparta, in Paros, in Mantinea, in Phlius, in Pharsalus, in Megara, in Sikyon, to list only a few better-known cases—a pattern of violence that confirmed Thucydides' grim prophecy that *stasis* would continue to rage and bring suffering, "so long as the nature of men remains the same" and so long as war, "a violent teacher which steals the resources of daily life," continues to transform "the temperaments of men into a likeness with their reduced circumstances." 19

Though commonly bound up with wider geopolitical concerns, these fratricidal struggles for control of the politeia were ultimately rooted in the economic differentiation between rich and poor, the "notables" and "multitude." That much is confirmed by the fact that risings by the masses invariably called for cancellations of debt and redistributions of land, whereas the coups of oligarchs were typically motivated by a desire to preserve wealth from heavy liturgical and tax burdens, and property from confiscations initiated by demagogues.20 Plato and Aristotle, alike students of history and keen observers of the contemporary scene, both affirm that the primary causes of factionalism lie in pronounced material disparities: the former expressly noting that in every existing polis there are in fact "two communities, one of the poor, the other of the rich, and they are at war with each other"; a view endorsed by Aristotle, who concludes that the political rivalry of oligarch and democrat is, at bottom, a struggle of classes, between "those who have property and those who lack it."21 Plato even goes so far as to argue that neither oligarchies nor democracies merit the appellation "constitution," seeing that they do not constitute true civic communities, politeias, but stasiôteiai, or 'faction states', marked by the domination and exploitation of one class by another.22 Wherever the rich rule, they "insert the wounding sting of their money" into their fellow citizens and "carry off from them interest many times greater." From this extortionate yield flows poverty and class hatred, as "some become burdened with debt and others are disfranchised," victims of greed who will henceforth "long for revolution, hating and conspiring against those who have acquired their estates." Where the poor hold power, it is the wealthy who are exploited, "yielding an abundant supply of honey for the drones," the demagogues who "deprive the rich of their properties" and distribute a portion of this "honey" to the dêmos while retaining the largest share for themselves.23 In more prosaic terms, Aristotle correspondingly holds that if the politeia gives supremacy to the wealthy, "they seek to behave hubristically and grasp more than their share (pleonektein)," whereas in extreme democracies, the poor seek to despoil the plousioi, "committing injustice by confiscating the property of the rich minority."24

The normative culture that "legitimized" this recourse to political violence was, paradoxically, a logical extension of the traditional ideals of Polis communalism, which alloted to each citizen sundry rights and privileges on the basis of membership in the hereditary koinônia. Given the prevailing ethos of equality among the citizenry—an ethos fostered by the land-citizen linkage, cultic confraternity, the highly public nature of Greek socialization practices, and the experience of civic self-governance—any glaring inequities or violations of the rights and privileges of commune members invariably sparked protests and efforts at relief or redress. These exalted ideals of civic egalitarianism, however, periodically foundered upon the relatively undeveloped and inelastic agrarian base, an economy that lacked the capacity to significantly expand the supply of material goods and resources for its citizenry. So constrained, domestic political struggles tended to degenerate into zero-sum contests, wherein one faction could gain only at the expense of another, excepting those instances where acquisitive imperatives could be satisfied externally through the medium of warfare.

During its fully developed, "classical" phase, the stability of Polis society had been founded upon a high degree of functional integration between its major institutional sectors—military, economic, legal-political, religious, and kinship-which in turn provided for a basic complementarity in the role set characterizing the status of citizenship: warrior, landowner, direct participant in politics, devotee of the communal cults, and descent-group member. Because the citizenry constituted, in Max Weber's terms, a "political guild," a closed status group monopolizing various rights and privileges denied to all outsiders, collective action as mediated through the institutional structures typically benefitted the civic population as a whole, thereby sustaining a high level of complementarity between public and private interests. To be sure, antagonisms between the aristoi and the dêmos were never fully bridged and remained a permanent rift within the koinônia. During the dynamic period of economic expansion in the sixth and fifth centuries, however, the material causes of class tension were greatly reduced, particularly as the heaviest burdens of exploitation were shifted from citizen-peasants to slave-outsiders. A balance was similarly achieved in the political arena, where the aristoi generally retained their honors and leadership positions in exchange for liturgical and public services, and an acceptance of legal isonomia and greater political participation for the dêmos.

In true dialectical fashion, however, the development of the objective conditions upon which the commune was based eventually transformed the traditional social organization, a point brilliantly discerned by Marx in the *Grundrisse*:²⁵

The aim of all these communities is preservation; i.e. reproduction of the individuals who compose it as proprietors, i.e. in the same objective mode of existence as forms the relation among the members and at the same time therefore the commune itself. This reproduction, however, is at the same time necessarily new production and destruction of the old form. For example, where each of the individuals is supposed to possess a given number of acres of land, an increase in population constitutes an impediment. If this is to be managed, then colonization, and that in turn requires wars of conquest. With that slaves etc.

Stability and order within the ancient city-state, as with most agrarianhased societies, rested upon a continuing balance of land and population: hence the "bellicose organization" of the commune and the prominence of military concerns in daily life, above all the preoccupation with territorial defense and expansion. Where proprietary access to the soil is mediated by membership in the civic koinônia, the citizen's "surplus time," notes Marx, "belongs precisely to the commune, to the work of war," and "his own sustenance as such is likewise the sustenance of the commune."26 But the warfare necessary to continually reproduce the landed citizen—i.e., to maintain the land-population ratio that preserves civic communalism—eventually erodes the traditional structure: in the successful conquest state of Rome (Marx's principal example), by the tremendous accumulation and concentration of landed property and wealth, the massive influx of slaves, the professionalization of war, and the transformation of the small peasantry into a dependent urban proletariat; in Greece (whose fate Marx does not examine), by repeated failures to sustain hegemonial expansion, and the economic and social dislocations thereby engendered.

In this and the preceding chapter we have shown how the rise of Athens as an imperial power and the ensuing Peloponnesian War set in motion several developments that began to undermine the "classical" institutional matrix, chiefly through the prolongation and intensification of interpolis warfare and the attending explosion of domestic factionalism. With the continuation of hegemonial rivalries in the fourth century, the dislocating effects of polemos and stasis—ramifying throughout the social order—were extended to such a point that Polis society manifestly entered a phase of crisis, the depths of which can be gauged by the chorus of despair sounded by contemporaries. In contrast to the real and idealized glories of the previous age, the present era is decried as a time of disarray and desolation, an epoch plagued by 'innumerable evils' (anêrithmeta kaka), 'confusion and disorder' (akrisia kai tarachê), and 'common anarchy' (koinê anarchia).²⁷

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The observer providing the most comprehensive account of these unsettled times is the educator and political "journalist" Isocrates (436–338 BC), whose published works include several lengthy pamphlets that purport to offer remedies for "the present evils of Greece." His inventory of the "diseases" and "disasters" then besetting the Hellenic world documents extensive social disorganization: rampant 'wars' (polemous) and 'factional strife' (staseis); the 'unlawful exile of citizens' (phugai anomoi) and 'massacres' (sphagai); 'the plundering of property' (harbagai chrêmatôn); the 'subversion of laws' (nomôn sugchuseis) and 'revolutionary changes of constitutions' (politeias metabolai); 'destruction of the land' (chôra diaphtheirein) and ensuing 'poverty' (aporia); the insecurity of the wealthy caused by the 'abolition of debts' (chreôn apokopê), 'land redistribution' (gês anadasmos), and the 'confiscation of estates' (dêmeuein tas ousias).28 All of these many evils Isocrates traces to a single root cause: the escalating cycle of interpolis warfare, which he characterizes as "our madness against each other."29 In a brief historical review spanning the first half of the fourth century, he notes that each of the major Hellenic powers—Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes—has been "reduced to hardship through war," having suffered great losses in life, the devastation of their lands, and enmity within the citizen body.³⁰ To rectify the plight of these and all the other war-ravaged communities, Isocrates counsels a pact of homonoia, or 'concord', among the Hellenes themselves, to be coupled with an imperialist crusade against the barbarian. His clarion call is first sounded in the Panegyrikos, published in 380 BC, the contents of which furnish a trenchant overview of the fourthcentury crisis.

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

The stated aim of the discourse is to garner pan-Hellenic support for an invasion of Persia under joint Athenian and Spartan leadership, the premise being that this is the one policy that can "deliver us from our wars against each other and our domestic disorders, the greatest evils of the day."31 The deteriorating situation in Greece is presently such that "pirates encompass the seas and mercenary garrisons occupy our poleis;" where citizens, instead of warring against the enemy in defense of their lands, are fighting amongst themselves within their own walls." Indeed, revolutions now "follow so thickly upon each other that those who reside in their own communities are more despairing than those who have been punished with exile, being fearful of future disasters."32 Amidst the anarchy of war and factionalism, all security and solidarity is lost:33

Citizens are being put to death illegally in their own communities, while oth ers are wandering with their women and children as exiles in foreign lands; many, compelled by a lack of life's daily necessities, are forced to become mercenaries, and are being slain fighting for their foes against their friends.

There is, fortunately, a "simple solution" to this litany of woe:³⁴

It will not be possible for us to secure a firm peace unless we wage war against the barbarian in common, nor for the Hellenes to attain concord until our benefits are drawn from the same ventures against the same enemy. Once these things occur, and our want of life's necessities has been removed—the poverty which tears friendships asunder, perverts the feelings of kinship into enmity, and plunges all mankind into war and faction—then surely we shall have concord of mind and true goodwill towards ourselves.

No less important, such a policy would greatly reduce class tensions within the civic community, thereby restoring that lost asphaleia, or 'security' for the wealthy of which Isocrates, himself a member of that group, was so solicitous:35

For this war alone is better than peace, more like a sacred mission than a military campaign, as it will benefit both those who lead the quiet life and those who desire war. For it will allow the former to enjoy the fruits of their own possessions in abundance, and the latter to gain for themselves the great riches of foreigners.

In short, "by transferring the prosperity of Asia to Europe" (broadened in subsequent speeches to include outright colonization), the interpolis wars and factional struggles that presently drain the strength and resources of Greece will be ended, and citizens will once again enjoy the blessings of their communities in concord and security.36

Despite the pronounced "conservative" coloring, Isocrates' diagnosis of the maladies then plaguing Greece was fundamentally sound. He correctly perceived that the demise of the Athenian empire "coincided with the beginning of evils for the Hellenes," ushering in the brutal domination of Sparta and the subsequent hegemonial rivalries that brought economic ruin and intensified civic violence. As for the notion that stability at home required expansion abroad, this was simply a matter-of-fact recognition of the direct linkage between poverty and stasis, and of the time-honored function of war as a primary means of material acquisition. Where Isocrates' pan-Hellenic policy lacked realism was in its assumption that the Greeks could ever lay aside their traditional rivalries and act in concert, something they had failed to achieve even during the invasions by Darius and Xerxes. National action would require something like nationstate institutions, but developments in that direction were basically incompatible with the fundamental nature of Polis society, a point cogently explained by Max Weber:37

[A]ll ancient hoplite communities shared the disinclination, based on the self-interest of powerful, economically profitable political monopolies, to open the citizens' association by relaxing restrictions on membership and

merging their civic rights with those of a number of other individual polis communities into a universal citizenship of an empire. All incipient developments toward inter-city community formation and citizenship rights could never quite overcome this basic tendency. For upon the individual's membership in the military citizen-guild depended all his rights, his prestige and ideological pride in being a citizen, as well as his economic opportunities. The rigid mutual exclusiveness of the cult-communities was a further powerful check on any unitary state formation.

By the mid fourth century, however, as our review of that era's "innumerable evils" clearly indicates, the Polis form of social organization had reached an impasse, a crisis stage that the citizen was singularly ill equipped to resolve. Not surprisingly, therefore, when Isocrates' dream of a crusade against Persia became a reality, it was led not by a coalition of Greek poleis and their citizens, but by a Macedonian king and his professionally trained warrior-subjects.

5.II MERCENARIES, MILITARY MONARCHS, AND THE EROSION OF CITIZEN POLITICS

As interpolis warfare became subject to the imperatives of rational military efficiency, the ensuing intensifications ceased to be "socially containable" within the traditional parameters of Polis society, occasioning disruptive changes both structural and normative. The devastation of the countryside and the plundering of livestock and slaves by invading armies dealt crippling blows to the productive base of the typical agrarian Polis, which in turn deepened the social cleavages between rich and poor. As sections of the yeoman-peasantry were threatened with displacement from the soil, and as their less fortunate neighbors were expropriated through foreclosures, debt bondage, and outright poverty, mobilization around the demands for "debt cancellation" and "redistribution of the land" sparked violent confrontations within the citizen-body and frequent armed seizures of the politeia. During this extended period of civic polarization, the sacral legitimacy of the legal-political apparatus and the traditional ideals of Polis loyalty and homonoia were increasingly rendered hollow by the violent course of events and the triumph of narrow partisanship.

The most striking evidence for the decomposition of the Polis-citizen bond is furnished by a most unusual source: a military handbook on siege operations, written by the strategist Aeneas "Tacticus" sometime around 360 BC. As one would expect given the subject matter, the treatise abounds in various tactical and logistical stratagems for Polis defense; totally unexpected is the fact that more than half of the recommended ploys are

directed not against external foes, but towards forestalling treachery and revolution from within! Among the more revealing recommendations are those dealing with the security of perimeter walls and city gates. Tacticus repeatedly counsels that only the most "trustworthy" of citizens should be placed in charge of such positions, and these he identifies as the plousioi, wealthy family men who "have a stake in the Polis" and who would "lose out" in any metabolê, or 'change' in the constitution.2 Another admonition cautions against allowing weaponry to be displayed or sold in bulk in the agora, for in such cases "those wishing a revolution" might seize the stockpile and overturn the politeia.3 More revealing still is Tacticus' advice on securing concord within the Polis: it is of "greatest necessity," he stresses, that "the multitude be won over to homonoia," and this can be done in the case of debtors-described as "men much to be feared"-only "by the reduction or complete cancellation of interest, and in situations of extreme danger, by cancelling some part of the principal, or even all of it whenever that is necessary." He further counsels that "those who are in want of necessities must be restored to sufficiency" but only through such means as will "not give pain to the plousioi." Although Tacticus claims to have provided solutions to this delicate problem in his book On Procurement (unfortunately lost), other sources strongly suggest that civic cooperation between rich and poor was an ideal long since shattered by war and stasis. In fourth-century Greece, "the enemy within" was in many cases more greatly feared and hated than the foe without, a condition that underscores the growing incapacity of Polis society to satisfy on a communal basis the material and ideal interests of its citizenry.

The growing strains of enmity and desperation are also visible in the religious sphere, where the savagery of interpolis warfare and class conflict frequently transgressed sacred taboos and norms. Though a crime of unparalleled pollution, the slaughtering of opponents who sought asylum in temples was not unknown, nor were certain parties averse to using the cover of religious festivals for murderously striking down their unarmed and unsuspecting rivals. In 364 BC the Eleans and Arkadians actually fought a pitched battle on the sacred grounds of Olympia, sacrilegiously violating the traditional truce and outraging popular sentiment by staining the sanctuary with the carnage of war. This impiety was followed by yet another, as the victorious Arkadians began making free use of Olympia's sacred treasures for the purpose of maintaining their federal army. From Xenophon's account we learn that this act of spoliation was integrally linked to class divisions within the newly formed Arkadian League, for once use of the funds was voluntarily ended by a vote of the assembly (fearing retribution from the gods), the poorer members of the army who could not afford to serve without pay were forced to retire. The

resulting social imbalance eventually provoked both open warfare between and factionalism within various poleis of the League.

Historians of religion have also surmised that the sudden introduction of several foreign gods during the Peloponnesian War and the early decades of the fourth century betokens mounting anxiety over the anarchy and disorganization within Hellas, as does the apparent recrudescence of superstition and magic, 6 These new gods—Cybele, Bendis, Sabazius, Adonis, and others—were typically worshipped in highly emotional, orgiastic fashion, a form of "release" commonly associated with stressful social conditions. Another novelty was the transformation of Asclepius the "healer" from a minor mythic hero to perhaps the most popular god of the period, supplanting Apollo as the patron deity of healing, and bringing comfort to thousands of individuals who flocked to his shrines seeking magical cures for distress and suffering. Cults of deified abstractions—Peace, Wealth, Hope, Fortune, Opportunity—became increasingly popular, while several of the Olympians receded in importance. Most surprising of all perhaps is the marked decline in votive offerings to Athena in Athens, which Nilsson interprets as a sign that the goddess had become too exalted and remote from the needs of the common citizenry, though declining patriotism in the afterglow of a shattered imperialism is a more plausible inference.7

There is striking evidence for increased tensions on the interpersonal level as well. Numerous "curse tablets," most dating from the fourth century, have been unearthed by archaeologists, upon which are inscribed requests for various underworld powers to inflict other people with disease, death, or some other form of harm. That this magical practice was not confined to the lower strata is suggested by the fact that many of those named as victims in the curses are prominent historical figures, citizens noted for their wealth, power, and prestige.8 Indeed, Plato specifically mentions that it is "at the doors of the rich" that wandering magicians and seers find employment, offering to expiate pollution or injure personal enemies through incantations and magical spells.9 The precise significance and meaning of these religious developments is difficult to determine, the evidence being slender and capable of sustaining diverse interpretations. But given the inherent conservatism of religion, a conclusion that these changes were somehow rooted in the unsettled conditions of the time is not unreasonable: as disorder gripped the Polis, confidence in the traditional state gods and cults was shaken as well, occasioning a search for alternative sources of comfort and deliverance.

Crisis conditions, where they do not lead to societal collapse, typically hasten the emergence of new social forces and practices. As established

institutional arrangements prove incapable of responding to changing circumstances, innovations will occur, or practices that had been marginal may suddenly rise to unexpected prominence. Such a situation obtained in fourth-century Greece, for amidst the dislocations caused by a spiraling warfare-factionalism cycle, two new "players" were to force themselves onto the stage of Hellenic history: the professional mercenary and his usual paymaster, the military autocrat. As "outsiders" or "marginals" within the framework of the traditional Polis-citizen nexus, these two figures will join forces to bring down the old order, the one by upsetting the balance of power on the field of battle, the other by exploiting that imbalance so as to override hallowed principles of civic self-governance.

The practice of selling one's martial prowess to foreign employers was not in itself new. Greeks had served as mercenaries for pharaohs and kings as far back as the eighth century, and one finds them in Hellas as well, functioning on occasion as bodyguards for the early tyrants or assisting neighbors in interpolis conflicts. During the Peloponnesian War, Spartans and Athenians alike employed noncitizens in their operations (primarily as rowers in the fleets), though most of these were citizens of "allied" poleis rather than full-fledged mercenaries. Instructive is the terminology used for designating the hired warrior: from Homer's day until the end of the fifth century, mercenaries are invariably styled epikouroi, 'helpers' or 'assistants', but thereafter as misthophoroi, 'bearers of pay' or 'wage-earners'. Behind that lexical shift lies the sociological transition from incidental service to careerism, characterized by the emergence of full-time professionals whose skills are sold to the highest bidders." The decisive turning point was the Peloponnesian War, the long duration of which not only accustomed large numbers of men to the practice of war, but owing to the devastation inflicted on the countryside, created the poverty that compelled so many to turn to the mercenary profession as their sole means of livelihood. It was then, too, that certain operational and tactical limitations of the citizen-hoplite began to appear as major liabilities in the conduct of war, thereby providing a positive stimulus to the development of more flexible military forces.

The set phalanx engagement for control of the agricultural plain was the citizen-soldier's raison d'etre; as this form of battle declined in strategic value, new tactics were adopted that curtailed the heavily armed hoplite's dominance in warfare. The gradual lengthening of the campaigning season put severe strains on the citizenry's capacity to serve, while the increasing tactical importance of foray and retreat, flanking, ambush, and siege operations called for skills and functions that could not be readily attained through the limited training practices of citizen-soldiers. Speed and flexibility in maneuver, particularly over unlevel ground,

became increasingly decisive in the new patterns of warfare, and these were tasks that could best be realized by soldiers less burdened with armor and by formations less compacted and uniform than the traditional phalanx. Hence the rising military value of lightly armed infantry or "peltasts" (so named for the much smaller shield they employed, the peltê), and the gradual emergence of formations composed of diversified tactical units—hoplites, peltasts, cavalry, archers, slingers—whose coordination on the field of battle henceforth held the key to victory.

Sparingly employed as a skirmisher and harrier in Greek warfare until the end of the fifth century, the lightly armed soldier-a role for those lacking the resources for a full panoply, and disesteemed accordingly-suddenly emerged as a deadly offensive threat during the Korinthian War (395-387 BC), when citizen and mercenary peltasts began inflicting heavy losses on hoplite contingents that were caught traversing uneven terrain. The most celebrated demonstration of peltast prowess occurred in 390 BC, when a Spartan hoplite force was enveloped and nearly annihilated by lightly armed troops, whose deadly hail of javeline raked the ranks while their mobility enabled them to easily evade the countercharges of the slower hoplites.13 A revolution in military tactics was thereby initiated, and over the course of the fourth century lightly armed troops were to play an increasingly significant role in the conduct of war. In addition to limiting the hoplite's operational range, the expanding role of the light-armed soldier also modified the established equation whereby military prominence had been roughly proportional to social and economic standing—the well-to-do yeomanry having formed the core of the classical phalanx. Unlike the costly hoplite panoply, an investment of several hundred drachmas (i.e., many years of frugal saving by a farmer or skilled artisan), the peltast's basic arms of wicker shield, javelins, and dirk were all readily affordable, a circumstance that explains why so many impoverished citizens found the transition to mercenary service within their means.

As coordinated tactics employing diversified units and complicated maneuvers became ever more imperative for military success, the restricted performance range of the citizen-soldier became a mounting liability. Gymnastic exercise in the palaistra, athletic competition, and occasional formation drills—suitable in an age of ritualized, agonal warfare—no longer sufficed for the increasingly rationalized forms of combat now emerging. A turn to professionalism, however, would require farreaching changes in social organization. One need only reflect on the situation in Sparta—where martial superiority had been sustained by the Helotage system and a full-scale militarization of social life—to see the implications of intensified training and discipline for the traditional Polisimplications of intensified training and discipline for the traditional Polisimplications.

citizen bond. A number of city-states responded to these exigencies by creating select companies of full-time warriors maintained at public expense, elite corps such as the Argive One Thousand, Thebes' three-hundredman Sacred Band, the several-thousand-man Eparitoi of the Arkadian League, the Elean Three Hundred, and the Phliasian Epilektoi. Major moves in this direction were precluded, however, by two obstacles, one structural, the other normative. The provisioning and maintenance of large-scale standing armies presupposes not only surplus-generating economies, but also bureaucratized, revenue-extracting polities; even the most populous and wealthiest of Greek city-states—largely self-sufficient agrarian communities featuring private civic ownership of the means of production, rainfall agriculture, and collective self-governance—were incapable of fulfilling those requirements. Nor was the sovereign citizen particularly keen or disposed to sacrifice his rich and manifold public existence for the monotony of the barracks and parade ground. The employment of mercenaries presented a more feasible and attractive alternative on both counts, for these were soldiers whose services could be hired at lower rates and for limited contracts, and who, as noncitizen "outsiders," were not entitled to share in the civic life of the Polis koinônia in any event.

The extensive economic ruin caused by decades of war and factionalism did of course place financial constraints on the capacity of most poleis to employ mercenaries, notwithstanding the low pay scale that such men commanded (bare subsistence rates of less than a drachma per day).14 But depleted treasuries did not prove as grave a procurement handicap as one might imagine, for the prospect of financing the operations of war through brigandage and plunder was sufficient in most cases to attract bands of the desperate to service. Our fourth-century sources present a consistent picture of mercenaries receiving small initial advances and left thereafter to their own devices to secure whatever they could by operations in the field. Indeed, this method of "plunder provisioning" came to apply to citizen troops as well, who were regularly sent out on campaigns without funds adequate for the task but with the expectation that the booty to be won would sustain the operation. Such haphazard methods invariably reduced military efficiency and planning, problems compounded whenever mercenaries were involved, since they could be "bought off" by the enemy or, as frequently occurred, would simply disregard the mission and pursue the best available prospects for plunder. This latter habit, coupled with the mercenary's customary biographical stigmata of low birth, poverty, and noncitizenship, accounts for the fact that mercenaries were generally reviled by the citizenry, and branded "the common enemies of mankind" by intellectuals like Isocrates and

Plato.15 Hostile appraisals of that sort could not override the changing exigencies of war, however, which decreed the employment of mercenaries in ever-increasing numbers, primarily for long-distance campaigns and for extended services such as siege operations and garrison duty. Nor was the demand for mercenary talent restricted to the rank and file, for as the art of command became increasingly complex, poleis were oft compelled to hire mercenary generals to plan and conduct their campaigns-yet another encroachment on the ancestral prerogatives of the aristoi.16

The numerical mix between mercenary and citizen troops in any particular operation varied according to sundry strategic and logistical considerations—the duration of the campaign, the immediate financial situation, etc.—but the general trend was away from citizen-soldier exclusiveness and towards greater professionalism. Between 399 and 375 BC, it has been estimated that there were never fewer than twenty-five thousand mercenaries in active service, with the average rising to around fifty thousand after that period.¹⁷ To appreciate the significance of those figures, keep in mind that even for major city-states such as Korinth, Thebes, and Byzantium, the number of adult male citizens was only on the order of ten thousand, while a mere five thousand or less was the norm for conventionally sized communities like Megara, Sikyon, and Elis. A floating population of 30 to 50,000 armed men-lacking all ties to Polis law and tradition—constituted a destabilizing element indeed.

In circumscribing the citizen's role on the battlefield, the mercenary also began undermining that most intensive of psychic supports for Polis communalism: the corporate bonding of the citizenry as forged through the crucible of military service. From its origins in the turbulent aftermath of the Mycenaean collapse, the Greek Polis had been organized as a military koinônia, a warriors' guild wherein status and political power were largely determined by one's capacity to protect and acquire the territory that sustained the commune and its individual members. The full citizen was first and foremost a warrior for his community, as evidenced by the fact that the operative realization of communalism in the political sphere was occasioned by a broadening of the social composition of the warrior group, i.e., the transition from "Homeric" to "Hoplite heroes." This centrality of the warrior role in the institutional life of Polis society was paralleled by the centrality of martial values in the Hellenic moral code. Aretê, or 'excellence', the "worth" of a citizen, was measured chiefly by one's performance in battle, and towards that end Greek socialization practices featured both athletic competition and the transmission of a cultural legacy marked by the celebration of martial valor. With warfare constituting "the great communal labor," the yeoman-hoplite served as the principal representative and "carrier" of the communal ethos,

while the compact formation of the phalanx symbolized the fundamental equality and solidarity of the citizen-body. By taking up shield and spear for his native land, the tombs of his ancestors, and the shrines of his gods, a man fulfilled the ultimate civic obligation and became worthy of the highest honors his community could bestow. That reverence customarily extended to heroization after death, in the form of public funeral commemorations, monuments of stone and painted colonnades that depicted his valor, and the verses of poets that preserved his glory for the generations to come. Performance in the warrior role was thus not only a major determinant in the citizen's definition of self, it also expressed the deeply rooted self-identification of the individual with the community, a bonding sustained by the shared material and ideal interests which the Polis promoted as an organized warriors' guild. All this was challenged, confounded, by an increasing reliance on mercenary troops, professional warriors whose services were secured not by the obligations of citizenship or the traditions of Polis devotion, but solely by the prospect for pecuniary gain.

On the institutional level, the large-scale utilization of mercenaries was to foster an ever-widening rift between political and military power. As direct citizen involvement in the waging of war declined, the strength of the Polis as a power unit waned inexorably, ennervated by lapsing martial skills and spirit. Recourse to mercenaries did not compensate for this loss, as hired troops-notwithstanding their tactical superioritylacked the reliability and dedication that is essential if military pursuits are to serve political ends. 18 Hitherto the army and the assembly had formed two congregations of essentially the same koinônia; such functional congruence was no longer possible in an age when mercenaries either supplanted or significantly supplemented citizen armies.

As the changing strategic and tactical nature of Hellenic warfare overtaxed the limited operational capacities of the citizen-soldier, a deliberate and growing aversion to military service on the part of citizens themselves followed apace. This pacific disposition—a dramatic break with normative tradition—becomes manifest as early as 395 BC, during the Spartan-led campaign to liberate the Asiatic Greeks from the recently restored Persian dominion. Lacking a substantial cavalry force of his own, the Spartan king Agesilaus resorted to a novel procurement policy that enabled the wealthiest Greeks in the area to avoid personal service on condition they supply a substitute warrior replete with arms and horse. As Xenophon notes, the plan proved remarkably successful in raising the requisite cavalry, as the rich "eagerly sought after others to die on their behalf."19 In 383 BC the Spartans were compelled to adopt the same principle of pecuniary commutation within their own Peloponnesian League,

as war-weary allies became increasingly reluctant to take up arms. Henceforth, any allied community that so wished could "send money instead of men" (at specified rates), the resulting fund to be used for the procurement of mercenaries. A decade later the Athenians, after voting in assembly to send a squadron of sixty warships for the relief of Korcyra, were themselves unwilling to serve in the crews, thereby forcing a postponement as the commander embarked on a recruiting drive among impoverished Aegean islanders. By the mid-fourth century this aversion to personal service had reached crisis proportions, and the assemblies regularly resounded with oratorical censure of declining civic devotion and praise for ancestral patriotism. Isocrates' pamphlet On the Peace (355 BC) provides a classic exposition of this hortatory contrast between past martial virtues and present dereliction of duty:²²

If a stranger from another land were to come to Athens, . . . would he not consider us insane and deranged of mind, seeing that we pride ourselves on the deeds of our ancestors and think it fit to eulogize our polis for the achievements of their times, yet act in no respect like them, but do entirely the opposite? ... Indeed, we fall so far short of those who lived in those days, both in our deeds and in our thoughts, that whereas they fought on behalf of the common salvation of the Greeks . . . and vanquished the barbarian on land and sea, we do not even see fit to run any risk even for our own advantage. For though we seek to rule over all, we are unwilling to take to the field ourselves; and though we undertake to wage war upon, one might almost say, the whole of mankind, we do not train ourselves for this effort, but instead employ those who are apolis, deserters, and other criminals who have thronged together, men who whenever anyone offers them higher pay, will follow their lead in a war against us . . . We have proceeded even to this absurdity, that while we ourselves are in need of the necessities of daily life, we have undertaken to support mercenary troops, and so that we might have the funds to pay these common enemies of mankind, we exact tribute from our allies and despoil their private resources. So far inferior are we to our ancestors . . . that whereas they, whenever they voted to go to war—and notwithstanding that the acropolis was stored full with gold and silverdeemed it their duty to face dangers in their own persons in support of their resolutions, while we, who are in such extreme poverty and in such great numbers, employ mercenary armies just like the Great King of Persia!

Although the growing incapacity of citizen-soldiers to serve effectively in the field provided the objective basis for this psychic demilitarization, a contributing cause of considerable weight must be sought in the decades of *stasis* that had undermined the principles of civic communalism. The triumph of faction over community bore grim testimony to the failure of Polis society to satisfy the needs of its members and the failure of consensus politics to redress widening disparities between rich

and poor. Effective collective action was all but impossible given the nature of these domestic divisions, particularly in the sphere of war, where the costs, risks, and potential benefits of campaigning were not uniformly borne. Formerly zealous to garner public praise and honor for their contributions to the glory of their communities, it now transpired that sections of the wealthier strata became increasingly reluctant to support or serve the call to arms. The special war taxes, liturgical assignments, and other expenses involved in a vigorous war effort were deemed burdens too heavy to bear for the strategically inconclusive campaigns of the fourth century.²³ For the impoverished masses, in contrast, warfare continued to offer the one hope for relief in the form of plunder, pay, and the acquisition of land. The aged Aristophanes' observation that those most eager to launch the warships are the poor, while the farmers and plousioi are opposed, finds confirmation in the many political and lawcourt speeches that lambast the rich for shirking civic responsibilities. Concealing portions of their wealth in order to minimize taxes, failing to spend the sums necessary for the proper maintenance of assigned warships, squandering their fortunes on private luxury rather than on liturgies for the public good: these are the charges and the signs of civic fragmentation and class betrayal.24

Contemporaries were fairly uniform in viewing these developments in terms of mounting greed and waning patriotism, but disproportionate economic burdens alone cannot account for upper-strata demilitarization. Such costs had been readily borne by preceding generations, most of whom found the public honors and emotional gratification that such service entailed more than adequate compensation for championing the interests of their communities. In the fourth century, however, both the inclination to sacrifice for one's fellow citizens and the capacity to do so were seriously undermined, first by the internecine factionalism that destroyed communal ties, and then by the changing nature of warfare that eroded the citizen-hoplite tradition. As new tactics and operations strained the citizen's competence and resources, and as new personnel mercenary "criminals" and lightly armed "kakoi" drawn from the lowest social ranks—rose in prominence on the battlefield, warfare lost something of its traditional ennobling aura as an arena for the manifestation of aretê and Polis loyalty and became increasingly tainted as a desperate, pecuniary affair, with citizen and mercenary forces alike dependent upon plunder for their basic provisioning.

The "mercenary" character of fourth-century warfare is nowhere more strikingly on display than in the spectacle of several major poleis replenishing their treasuries through what might be termed "militia rentals," a practice that entailed the sending of thousands of their own citizens abroad to serve as "state mercenaries" for foreign potentates.25 In 361 BC one of the kings of Sparta secured employment as a mercenary general in Egypt, accompanied by a contingent of officers, Helots, and one thousand mercenaries. Though the affair was personally humiliating to the king, his assistance placed a rebel prince on the Egyptian throne, thereby netting for Sparta the enormous sum of 230 talents, a desperately needed windfall that enabled it to hire mercenaries for its own paltry struggles within Greece.26 Following the collapse of its short-lived hegemony, a hard-pressed Thebes rented out five thousand of its own troops to a rebellious Persian satrap in exchange for three hundred talents and later provided one thousand men for the Persian King. Argos similarly bartered its citizen's martial skills for Persian gold (three thousand troops on one occasion), while Athenian commanders frequently took pay from Persian kings and satraps in exchange for various forms of military assistance.27 That warfare should be devalued in such circumstances is readily understandable, for as glory and patriotism were routinely subordinated to pecuniary considerations in the new warfare, the traditional normative supports that had induced men to engage in the blood-spilling "work of iron" necessarily proved less compelling.28

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

Throughout its ascendant and classical phases, stability within Polis society had been founded upon the close functional integration between the economic, military, and political spheres, a basic structural equilibrium wherein wealth, martial capacities, and political power all tended to coalesce throughout the social hierarchy. Temporary imbalances did occur at certain historical junctures, as when prosperous members of the dêmos began entering the ranks of the hoplite phalanx while still lacking full political rights in an age of aristocratic supremacy; but progressive adjustments in the allocation of citizenship rights and privileges—though usually forthcoming only in the wake of civic unrest-invariably restored the equation of stability. The explosive rise of mercenary service in the fourth century could not be so accommodated. Where the progressive democratization of citizenship rights had entailed a fulfillment of the communalism inherent in the Polis ideal, i.e., a development consistent with the institutional logic of Polis society, mercenaries were "outsiders," noncitizens who could not be incorporated into the Polis koinônia without destroying its essential nature. Composed out of the discarded "refuse" of Polis society—exiles, criminals, the destitute—mercenaries were quite literally "foreign bodies" whose rising military prominence constituted a development inconsistent with the traditional institutional matrix. For not only did the mercenary reduce the citizen's capacity and participation in war, but as a separate, external instrument of powerloyal not to the Polis but to the paymaster—the mercenary posed a revolutionary challenge to the citizen's political autonomy, a point not lost on a number of ambitious men whose seizures of autocratic power typically entailed a skillful and decisive deployment of mercenary arms,²⁹

Collectively characterized as "the new tyranny" by modern scholars, the sudden resurgence of autocratic rule in the fourth century differed fundamentally from the tyrannies that had served to hasten and bridge the transition from aristocratic supremacy to broader-based self-government in the Archaic period. A few brief case histories of these new-style tyrants and their mercenary foundations should suffice to explicate the basic pattern.

Exposed on one of the frontiers of Hellenism, Greek Sicily had long followed a somewhat distinctive developmental path, owing not only to the proximity and great numbers of inhabiting barbaroi (including the powerful Carthaginians, who controlled the western portion of the fertile island), but also the composite "racial" mix of many of the colonial communities (Dorians and Ionians) and the cultural and economic strains occasioned by fresh immigration (the entrenched privileges of the original settlers fomenting disaffection among later arrivals).30 Political institutions were unstable, as the threat posed by the Carthaginians and native Sicels tended to favor the rise of strong military leadership, while the composite nature of the citizen population precluded the emergence of deeply rooted communal bonds.31 Tyranny accordingly experienced a longer reign in Greek Sicily than on the mainland, and the large-scale utilization of mercenaries made an earlier appearance. In the decades following the crushing defeat of the massive Carthaginian invasion of 480 BC, constitutional rule did revive in a number of Sicilian poleis, and in Syracuse, the largest and most prosperous community, it was a determined democracy that beat back the Athenian challenge in 413 BC. Yet another invasion followed, as the Carthaginians renewed their bid to subjugate the entire island. After the brutal sacking of several Greek cities, the resulting panic in Syracuse enabled a young aristocratic cavalry officer to malign the leadership and gain election in 405 BC as stratêgos autokratôr for the duration of the crisis. Dionysios quickly consolidated his position by gathering a large mercenary bodyguard and by boosting the pay for citizen troops, both measures being financed out of the confiscations of property that befell his opponents. He promptly failed in an effort to relieve the two Greek cities in the path of the Carthaginian advance, a setback that emboldened the cavalry to attempt deposition of the aspiring tyrant. Their hold on the city proved tenuous, however, as Dionysios' mercenaries had little trouble restoring their master once they had forced entry-the Syracusan dêmos having conspicuously failed to

rally to the aristocrats. The foreign menace likewise dissipated, though the agent here was not the tyrant's mercenaries but a horrific epidemic that ravaged the Carthaginian camp, forcing an armistice on the basis of the status quo.

Temporarily free from the Carthaginian threat, Dionysios directed his energies towards securing the tyranny. Real and potential enemies were summarily executed or exiled, their lands parcelled out amongst his supporters. An inner fortress sanctuary was constructed to protect the tyrant from any uprising by the citizenry, and thousands of mercenaries-Greeks, Italians, Celts, Iberians-were brought in to serve as an instrument of imperial conquest and of domination within the walls of Syracuse. In 403 BC the citizen army revolted while on campaign against the Sicels, but though Dionysios was momentarily besieged within his fortress, his mercenary army once again effected his restoration. To maintain the standing force that assured his supremacy, Dionysios resorted to the time-honored practices of conquest, taxation, and robbery. Numerous Sicel communities were subjugated and compelled to pay tribute, while the Greek cities in Sicily were eventually brought under the tyrant's control, some through intimidation, others through armed assaults and the sale into bondage of all surviving inhabitants, their lands providing "bonus wages" for thousands of mercenary settlers. Dionysios sought legitimation for his rule by periodically launching nationalistic wars against the Carthaginian presence, but amid great carnage and wild oscillations of fortune, the geopolitical map of Sicily was not significantly altered. The tyrant was more successful in southern Italy, where he sacked several Greek communities and forcibly transferred their populations to his expanding imperial city. Though plunder and territorial expansion provided the bulk of the revenues for his ravenous mercenary army, the citizens of Syracuse were also forced to bear heavy tax burdens.³² Even these measures proved insufficient, and Dionysios was at times driven to the expedient of robbing the funds that had been deposited in temples (the "banks" of the ancient world), Greek and barbarian alike. For four decades he carried on in this fashion, amassing vast riches and a considerable territorial empire, his military success reconciling many Syracusans to the material benefits of autocratic rule. The façade of constitutional government was in fact partially maintained, as Dionysios expressed his will through magistrates, the council and assembly. The visible presence of ten to twenty thousand mercenaries at the tyrant's beck and call, however, left no doubt as to the nature of his rule. By the time of his death in 367 BC, the tyranny had become so entrenched that a son succeeded to the position without challenge by a citizenry effectively reduced to subject status.

The next notable figure to transcend the bounds of conventional politics was Jason of Pherae, a brilliant militarist whose meteoric rise from petty dynast to absolute ruler of all of Thessaly was predicated upon shrewd exploitation of the mercenary power base.33 A land of rich and broad plains, Thessaly had long been dominated by a horse-rearing aristocracy whose Dark Age ancestors had invaded the region and reduced the original inhabitants to enserfment, the so-called penestai, or 'toilers', who owed both labor and military services to their overlords. Throughout the Archaic and Classical periods, a decentralized political structure prevailed, as the leading clans wielded power on a local basis, often warred against each other, and in times of emergency came together as a national military force under the command of an elected warlord, the Tagos. Urbanization was both late and minimal, though the major agrarian cantons did develop a few important urban centers by the end of the fifth century. One of these was Pherae, where Jason inherited an autocratic position sometime in the 380s. Embarking on a program of military reform, which featured the creation of a large and highly trained mercenary army, Jason was fast duplicating the career path of Dionysios. By 375 BC he was ready to bid for the position of Tagos of Thessaly, having subdued by force and intimidation many Thessalian and Epirot communities. One revealing episode in his ascendancy is presented in Xenophon's Hellenika, which preserves an account of his negotiations with Pharsalus, a strong polis in southern Thessaly that Jason hoped to secure without use of force. A Pharsalian report to the Spartan assembly requesting armed assistance included the following verbatim statement by Jason, whose words find confirmation in the ambassador's own revealing commen-

"Whether your polis liked it or not, I could still bring it over to my side . . . I imagine you know that I have up to 6,000 foreign mercenaries, against whom, I believe, there is no polis capable of easily contending. No doubt there are others that could send out forces equally strong in numbers; but in armies composed of citizens, some soldiers are already past their prime, while mine are in their greatest vigor. Indeed, in each polis there are very few men who diligently exercise and train their bodies, whereas no one serves in my mercenary army unless he can stand as much physical hardship as I can myself." And he himself-for I must tell you the truth-not only has a magnificent physique, but enjoys putting it to the test. In fact, he tries out his own men every day, marching at their head in full armor, whether on the exercise ground or on a campaign. Those of his mercenaries who are perceived soft, he discharges; but those who are seen to be fond of hardship and the dangers of war, these he honors and rewards by doubling, trebling, even quadrupling their pay, giving them additional gifts, and by according them medicinal care when they are sick and burial rites of distinction when

they are dead. The result is that all of the mercenaries in his service know that martial aretê on their part will earn them a most honored and bounteous livelihood.

This passage, the sociological significance of which can hardly be overstated, unambiguously attests to the emergence of a new realpolitik, as the limitations of the citizen-soldier vis-à-vis the professional warrior begin to upset traditional balances of power, and where a new form of solidarity that between military autocrat and his mercenaries—begins to threaten the viability of the old koinônia of the citizenry. As it turned out, the consequences of this momentous "realignment" were only foreshadowed rather than fulfilled in the career of Jason. For though the Pharsalians enrolled themselves under the tyrant's banner (the Spartans were unwilling to test him in the field), and Jason acceded to the position of Tagos, thereby acquiring command over the most powerful army of the dayconsisting of some eight thousand cavalry, twenty thousand hoplites, and innumerable peltasts—his grand designs for conquest and hegemony were abruptly cut short by an assassin's lance (370 BC). The fact that the surviving perpetrators of this deed were honored as heroic tyrannicides throughout Hellas shows clearly that many Greeks had come to understand that the combination of soldiers-for-hire and the "will to power" constituted a grave threat to their cherished civic freedoms.35

The endemic problem of *stasis* furnished yet another avenue for the entry of mercenaries and military autocrats into the political arena. Though available for hire by any party with money or objectives suited to their interests, Aristotle observed that oligarchies were particularly prone to employing military professionals, both for purposes of war and for internal security, as their own oppressed commoners were unreliable in combat and dangerous in peace.³⁶ But excessive reliance on mercenaries was fraught with its own peril: the military coup. The strategist Aeneas Tacticus pointedly advised that the number of citizens under arms should always exceed that of the recruited mercenaries, "for otherwise both the citizens and the polis will be under their sway."³⁷ A case in point is the tyranny established in 364 BC in the resource-rich polis of Heraklea-Pontica, situated on the Black Sea's southern coast.

Our sources relate that Heraklea was beset by a major agrarian crisis during the early decades of the fourth century, and as distress mounted, the masses began sounding familiar demands for debt relief and redivisions of the land. Lacking the means to forcibly restrain a rebellious dêmos, Heraklea's oligarchical regime sought the policing services of a mercenary army. The commander of the force hired was one Klearchos, a man previously exiled from Heraklea, but presently available as a con-

dottiere well seasoned after years of service with one of the petty barbarian dynasts of the region. A more intriguing aspect of the man's biography is that in younger days he had served the philosophical Muse, reportedly studying under both Isocrates and Plato, as a personal pupil to the famed rhetorician for four years and as a frequent attendant upon the celebrated philosopher's discourses in the Academy. To judge from his subsequent career, one must conclude that Klearchos' paideia was decidedly unbalanced, as the ethical content of his mentors' lessons was neglected while their respective forms—oratorical brilliance and dialectical dexterity were perfected with harrowing social consequences. After answering the call of the Heraklean oligarchs, Klearchos immediately turned on his employers. Making use of his rhetorical training, he announced to a startled assembly his fundamental opposition to the harsh rule of the oligarchs and offered—should the people require a champion—to destroy their oppressors. Roused by the oratory, the dêmos conferred full emergency powers, which Klearchos promptly exploited to banish, murder, and confiscate. His position as stratêgos autokratôr was soon transformed into an open tyranny with royal pretensions, as he paraded about crowned in gold and attired in the purple robes of kings. Twelve years of despotic rule followed, whereupon "philosophy took vengeance" in the form of tyrannicide, the assassination being carried out by a small coterie of Platonists recently invited to the tyrant's court (352 BC). Although this deed was widely and loudly celebrated in the Academy (eventually becoming the subject of a heroic novel written in the first century AD), the political autonomy of the Herakleans was not restored, as the tyrant's son managed to reclaim his father's position after a brief period of anarchy. Secure on its mercenary moorings, the dynasty thereafter enjoyed a long reign extending into the second decade of the third century.38

As noted earlier, the Theban victory over the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 BC provided the spark for a major conflagration throughout the Peloponnese, as prodemocratic forces rose up and threw off the yoke of oligarchy that Spartan power had so long secured. In Sikyon, the lead in this effort was taken by a citizen named Euphron, who astutely chose to renounce his former close ties with Sparta and pledge in the assembly that he would promote a democratic politeia founded upon the principle of "equal and mutual rights" for all citizens. This declaration secured his election as general in 368 BC, a platform from which he began purging sikyon of its oligarchical elements, i.e., "the richest and the best," and whose confiscated properties provided funds for the recruitment of mercenaries. Before Euphron's power could be entrenched, the Arkadians intervened and restored the exiled oligarchs. Shortly thereafter stasis again broke out between the beltistoi and the dêmos, a crisis that enabled

Euphron to stage a successful comeback at the head of several thousand mercenaries. His ultimate political intentions remain difficult to discern, obscured by the conservative bias of our contemporary sources (who uniformly depict him as a ruthless tyrant), and by the brevity of the man's uniformly depict him as a ruthless tyrant), and by the brevity of the man's career (he was assassinated by oligarchs before two years had elapsed). What is certain is that the *dêmos* of Sikyon viewed him as a legitimate defender of their interests, as indicated by the fact that he was interred in the public agora and accorded cult status as the true "founder of the polis." A disgusted Xenophon unintentionally confirms their judgment, closing his hostile account of the Euphron affair with the following acidic interests the multitude, so it appears, define those men as agathos who act as benefactors on their behalf."

Though the majority of new tyrants found the adoption of a prodemocratic pose the most convenient cover for autocracy, a different alignment was also possible, and should a strongman arise and defend the interests of the propertied elite, he might even be ranked among the true interests of the propertied elite, he might even be ranked among the true interests of the propertied elite, he might even be ranked among the true interests of the propertied elite, he might even be ranked among the true interests of the propertied elite, he might even be ranked among the true interests of the prosess of the provide and the good'. Such at any rate was the praise kaloikagathoi, 'the noble and the good'. Such at any rate was the praise whom he lauds as a great ruler who abjured the common tyrannical practices of executions, banishments, and the confiscation of estates, in favor of providing "great security" for the lives and property of his citizens. This willingness on the part of the affluent to consign their civic free-This willingness on the part of the affluent to consign their civic free-This willingness on the part of the affluent to consign their civic free-This willingness on the part of the affluent to consign their civic free-This willingness on the politics of the fourth century, leading ultimately to the triumph of class over community and the concomitant suppression of Polis autonomy.

Autocratic ambitions sustained by mercenary power thus formed a new equation in the historical evolution of Hellenic society, a negating challenge to the tradition of citizen politics. Seizing the opportunities afforded by mounting political disunity and martial weakness, a number of individuals were able to override constitutional limits on power and install viduals were as military autocrats. The roll call of these "new tyrants" ran distressingly long: in addition to the cases examined, it included Timo-distressingly long: in addition to the cases examined, it included Timo-phanes of Korinth, Alexander of Pherae, Iphiades of Abydos, Simus of Larissa, Python of Klazomenae, Themison of Eretria, Hermias of Atarneus, Neagenes of Histiaea, Charidemus of Oreus, Plutarchus of Eretria, Deinias of Krannon, Onomarchus of Phokis, and numerous others in Persian-controlled Ionia and in Greek Sicily, where the predatory policies of Dionysios had promoted petty tyrants throughout the war-torn island. With the exceptions of Korinth and Sikyon, however, where the autocracies proved shortlived, militaristic tyrannies in the first half of

the fourth century were basically restricted to the colonial fringes and the less urbanized communities of the mainland. The major powers— Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Sparta, as well as most other poleis in Boeotia and the Peloponnese—did not succumb to military-based despotisms, though all were put at risk by the imperial forces amassed by Dionysios and Jason, the two most powerful figures of the day. The opportunities for autocracy were clearly greatest in the smaller and militarily weaker communities, where a thousand or so mercenaries proved sufficient to effectively suspend traditional patterns of civic self-governance. Throughout the Hellenic world, however, the "desperate evils" and "anarchy" of which Isocrates and others spoke did not bode well for the future. Ruinous interpolis warfare, raging stasis, economic hardship, the mercenary explosion, a growing disinclination among the citizenry to combat service, and depoliticization within the ranks of the wealthy all combined to undermine the viability of the Polis as an independent, autonomous entity. Most destabilizing of all was the widening gap between battlefield and assembly, for as the citizen's role and effectiveness in the conduct of war diminished, so too did his prospects for the continued exercise of political sovereignty.

5.III PLATO AND THE DILEMMAS OF POLITICS AND REASON: THE POLIS AS PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT

The inherent antagonism between critical rationalism and the social demands for order and stability claimed its most celebrated victim in 399 BC with the execution of the elderly Sokrates. Owing to the nature of the charges laid against him, "corrupting the young" and "not believing in the gods the polis believes in," his death entailed more than a personal crisis for his devoted followers and associates. As the ones allegedly "corrupted," they themselves fell subject to the onus of public suspicion, a circumstance that induced a number of them to seek immediate refuge beyond the borders of Athens. In the years that followed, several of those who had been most deeply influenced by Sokrates attempted to preserve and extend his legacy through the publication of "Sokratic dialogues," a literary genre that featured the master in philosophical exchanges with various friends and other famous sages. Beyond their manifest educational intent, the authors of these writings sought a public rehabilitation of Sokrates—and indirectly for themselves—by presenting a fuller account of his methods, aims, and personal virtues. Unfortunately, of the dozen or so men who wrote such dialogues (more than a hundred separate titles are known), the works of only two, Xenophon and Plato, have been preserved in wholistic form, while a few fragments are all that survive from

the copious writings of others. Ancient secondary accounts make it clear, however, that the Sokratic legacy was a divided inheritance, as each follower pursued in distinct fashion separate lines laid down by their master. We will turn to the so-called minor Sokratics in section 5.IV, below, but our attention must first focus on Plato, that most celebrated and gifted of "disciples," whose life and thought can in many respects be best understood as protracted meditation upon—and engagement with—the rupture between philosophy and society that the death of Sokrates so vividly symbolized.²

Plato has long been a tempting target for superficial "sociologizing." His aristocratic genealogy, his undisguised contempt for the "banausic" callings of trade and craftwork, his bitter denunciations of democracy, and the marked authoritarian strains in his social philosophy have all contributed to the familiar—though by no means uncontested—picture of Plato the reactionary ideologue.3 If this line of interpretation has hitherto generated more heat than light on most issues (the rather crude forms of "class analysis" employed have too often resulted in sweeping and simplistic sociological imputations), few scholars today would deny that the ideological elements in Plato's reflections on politics, labor, and slavery are now much clearer to view. Identifying axiological appraisals that are determined more by existential commitments than by rational argument is of course only a preliminary stage in the sociological exegesis of any philosophical system; and it does not in and of itself legitimize reducing the other doctrinal components to the level of ideology. Plato's aristocratic heritage did place various fetters on his imagination and left him blind to certain aspects of the human experience. But for all that he was not the ideological spokesman for a declining nobility, seeking to salvage the privileges and powers of the traditional elite to which he belonged by birth and association. Far from being a class-conscious reactionary, Plato's reforming vision was so radical that it demanded a sweeping transformation of conventional practices and values, notwithstanding that the guiding impulses behind his social therapeutic were undeniably conservative. Plato's response to the deepest existential questions and the particular problems of his era were filtered through a variety of factors, including his psychological character and personal experiences, his status as a citizen and his ties to the aristocracy, and certainly not least, his revolutionary conception of the role of philosophy as a transfiguring power for both self and society.

Born around 428 BC into one of the most distinguished of Athenian families, Plato could trace his paternal ancestry back to Kodrus, the legendary last king of Athens, while on his mother's side he could claim

kinship with Solon, the great lawgiver. With such Eupatrid credentials, a prominent public role was virtually Plato's birthright, though the progressive democratization of political life in Athens over the course of the fifth century had significantly altered the criteria for such service. Winning popular civic support was now essential for the acquisition and retention of leadership positions, a requirement that intensified the long-standing Greek concern with oratorical and reasoning skills. It was largely in response to those increased educational needs that the professional sage or sophistês made his appearance, offering a training in politikê technê for the wealthy and leisured few who sought distinction in the forums of public life (4.IV).

New educational practices and expanded horizons of learning were not the only by-products of the Sophistic revolution. The discovery of cultural relativism and the nomos-physis controversy greatly undermined the sacral legitimacy of custom and law, while public discourse was rendered problematic by the value-neutral techniques of rhetoric and antilogic. As traditional certainties were shaken by the relentless probings of critical rationalism, a more extensive disorder was occasioned by the Peloponnesian War and the raging disease of stasis that attended the struggle for Hellenic hegemony. The confluence of cultural and political upheaval thus effected formed the turbulent context of the young Plato's own paideia, and renders explicable his subsequent tendency to conflate intellectual problems with questions of civic order. The unceasing war he was to wage against the Sophists must be understood in that light, and so too his readiness to countenance various forms of censorship as a means of preserving social harmony.

The initial strategies in the campaign against Sophism had been charted by Sokrates, who sought to stem the tide of relativism by grounding moral excellence in knowledge, and by associating the true *physis* of man with the rational *psychê*. Plato would retain those two principles at the core of his philosophy, and many of his own insights were reached by way of a search to support them with a more comprehensive ontological and epistemological framework. In addition to the formative influence of Sokrates, however, the spirit of Platonism was forged in the crucible of practical politics.

Towards the end of his long life, the philosopher produced for public circulation a remarkable document, the famous Seventh Letter, which bears all the trademarks of an apologia pro vita sua. For reasons that will presently become clear, Plato's reputation and that of certain members of his school had been tarnished as a consequence of their participation in the dynastic intrigues at Syracuse, occasioning the need for some form of public statement, if only to counter the slander. The result was the

Seventh Letter, a carefully crafted and at times moving testament (longer than many of the early dialogues) that attempts to explain not only the Sicilian fiasco, but also other aspects of Plato's own unconventional career. As his decision to become a philosopher rather than an active statesman was clearly the most important issue, both to himself and to his peers, Plato opens the epistle with a revealing account of the motivations and experiences that impelled him in that direction:⁴

As a young man, I felt the same as many others. I thought that once I came of age, I would immediately take part in the public affairs of my polis. And owing to certain fortunate political events, such an opportunity arose. For the existing [democratic] politeia was reviled by many and a revolution occurred . . . in which thirty men were set up as rulers with autocratic power over all things. Some of these men happened to be relatives and acquaintances of mine, and they at once called on me to join in these affairs as my proper duty. And I, not surprisingly for one of such youth, believed that they would lead the polis from a life of injustice to the way of justice, and govern it accordingly. I thus gave them very close attention, to see what they would do. As it turned out, I saw in a short time that the preceding politeia was a golden one compared to that installed by these men. Among their other crimes, they sent an elderly man, my friend Sokrates, whom I would not be ashamed to say was the most just man of his time, . . . to arrest by force one of the citizens and bring him for execution. Their purpose was to implicate Sokrates in their own activities whether he wished it or not. But he did not obey them, for he was willing to hazard any suffering sooner than become a partner in their unholy deeds. When I observed all this and other acts no less heinous, I became indignant and withdrew myself from the evils of that time.

Not long afterwards came the fall of the Thirty and their entire constitution. Once again, though more slowly this time, I was drawn back by my desire to take part in public life and politics. To be sure, there were many things occurring in those unsettled times which could cause discontent, and it is not surprising that during revolutions some men take excessive revenge on their enemies. Yet for all that the restored exiles [the democrats] acted with great fairness. By some chance, however, certain men in power brought my hetairos Sokrates to court on a most sacrilegious charge, one which he of all men was least deserving to bear. For they put him on trial for impiety, and he was condemned and put to death—the very man who had earlier refused to take part in the unholy arrest of one of their friends at a time when they themselves were in unfortunate exile!

Now as I reflected on these matters as well as on the men who were conducting political affairs, and on the laws and customs, the more I examined them and matured in age, the more difficult did it appear to me to administer political affairs correctly. For such a thing could not be done without friends and loyal companions, and these, even when they existed, were not

easy to find, since our polis was no longer administered according to the customs and practices of our fathers. And it was impossible to acquire new friends with any facility. Moreover, the written laws and customs were being corrupted at such an astounding rate, that I, who had at first been full of great eagerness for participating in public affairs, now beholding all this and seeing everything swept about in all directions, became completely dizzy; and while I did not cease to consider how this situation and, indeed, the entire politeia might be improved, in regards to action I continued to wait for the right opportunity. But in the end I discerned that all presently existing poleis are without exception badly governed, for the condition of their laws is all but incurable without some wondrous provision or plan aided by good fortune. And so I was compelled to say, praising the true philosophy, that from it alone can we perceive in all cases what is just and right, both in public and in private affairs. And that consequently, there can be no cessation of evil for the races of mankind until either those who properly and truly follow philosophy attain political authority, or those who wield power in the poleis become by some divine fate true lovers of wisdom.

The importance of this extended declaration can scarcely be overrated, seeing that the tension between politics and philosophy that reverberates throughout so many of Plato's dialogues is here laid bare in
explicit autobiographical terms. The intensely felt reforming zeal of a
young man of noble lineage, eager to play his part in the public life of his
community, is unambiguously disclosed; and so too his subsequent revulsion from the sordid realm of realpolitik, and the corresponding frustration and bitterness that torments those who believe they possess solutions to humanity's ills, but not the opportunities to put them into
practice. In this early existential experience, the oscillating polarity that
will preoccupy the life and thought of philosophy's most celebrated practitioner has already taken form: how to wed knowledge with power, and
thereby effect the deliverance of both self and society; or, failing that,
how to cope with their separation, and yet still remain true to the philosophical calling?

In the immediate aftermath of his disheartening brush with practical politics, Plato attempted to collect his bearings through intermittent travel, beginning with visits to Egypt and Cyrene in North Africa. His initial experiments in philosophical prose date from this period (the 390s) and take the form of short dialogues wherein Sokrates stresses the primacy of the psychê and explores the dependence of aretê on knowledge. The year 388 BC proved to be singularly fateful, for it was then that he first journeyed to Italy and established lasting relations with surviving remnants of the Pythagorean societies, including the remarkable statesman-sage Archytas, the constitutional ruler of Tarentum and renowned mathematician. From there he proceeded to Greek Sicily, where several disagreeable

moments at the court of Dionysios were more than compensated for by his encounter with Dion, the tyrant's youthful brother-in-law and a man with whom Plato was to share a most intriguing, but ultimately tragic destiny.

Ancient and modern scholars alike have suggested that Plato's personal contact with the Pythagoreans marks a critical phase in his intellectual development, for his subsequent dialogues chart several new directions that are largely Pythagorean in inspiration. Even the dialogue form is modified, expanding significantly in size and featuring a "Sokrates" more didactic than before. More important is the changed content, the influx of new ideas that testifies to the emergence of a "Platonic" philosophy that, while building upon Sokratic principles, also goes beyond them. That much is clear from Plato's most celebrated pupil, Aristotle, who expressly relates that whereas Sokrates had inaugurated the search for universal definitions (what is "justice," "temperance," etc.), it was Plato who gave them a separate ontological existence as transcendental "Forms" or "Ideas."

By grounding the objects of knowledge in an absolute reality that is eternal, immaterial, and apprehensible by reason alone, Plato had hoped to complete the Sokratic search for objective truth, and thereby counter the epistemological and ethical relativism of the Sophists. Rational support for belief in a supersensible realm was furnished by the formal logic of mathematics, a science, or epistêmê, that deals with abstractions and pure relationships that are found in the phenomenal world only in rough approximation. It was here that contact with the Pythagoreans proved particularly stimulating, for they had long been exploring the metaphysical implications of mathematics, following Pythagoras' two celebrated discoveries in harmonics and geometry (c. 540 BC). The first, that concordant notes in the musical scale correspond to fixed mathematical ratios between the first four integers, indicated that sound is in some way controlled by number; the second, that the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is always equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, implied a similar connection for shape. From these two remarkable findings, it was not too strenuous an imaginative leap to assume that all relationships and entities were somehow ultimately governed by or composed of numbers and that mathematics could provide cognitive access to the transcendental.

Plato concurred that mathematical knowledge intimated the existence of a higher ontological plane, but his own metaphysics would feature a different hierarchy. The ultimate category of Being he reserved for the ideational Forms, while the objects of mathematics were placed in an intermediate level, above the phenomenal realm that, in accordance with

Heraclitus' doctrine of perpetual flux, never is, but is ever becoming through ceaseless genesis and destruction. The relationship between the immaterial Forms and the phenomenal world is said to consist in 'participation' (methexis) or 'imitation' (mimêsis), with particular phenomena, i.e., the objects of sensory experience (ta aisthêta), deficiently copying or approximating the paradigmatic Forms that are their ultimate causes. Plato, notoriously, never provides a comprehensive, systematic account of the Forms—one finds frequent shifts and revisions in the dialogues, even open self-criticisms—and though various rational arguments are offered in support of their existence, Plato also relies heavily on myth and metaphor in presenting his basic ontological postulate.

Intimately linked to the "Theory of Forms" is Plato's metaphysics of the 'soul', or psychê, which likewise manifests a strong Pythagorean influence. As noted in our discussion on the rise of mystery cults in the Archaic Age, the Pythagoreans had produced a philosophical-religious soteriology based upon the doctrines of metempsychosis and the immortality and divinity of the soul (3.II.v). The psychê was held to be a fallen spirit, or daimôn, "entombed" within the body for a series of reincarnations in various life-forms, hierarchically arranged. Release from the cycle of rebirths could be achieved only through a life of purification, entailing ritual and dietary purity, ascetic practice, ethical conduct, and mathematical study, whereupon the psychê would regain its original state of union with the Divine. His own mystical inclinations clearly drawn to these principles, Plato harnessed them to the this-worldly, practical rationalism that had characterized the Sokratic "care of the psychê," i.e., the life of moral excellence that was "good-in-itself" and required no postmortem sanctions or rewards. The elaborate eschatological myths of the middle dialogues (Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic) that refer to "judgment day" and the torments of Hades and the bliss of "heaven" were never intended to supplant the Sokratic view that virtue is its own reward, vice its own punishment, but to strengthen the call to arete and to harmonize Sokratic ethics with Plato's subsequent explorations in metaphysics.3

The contention that the psychê possesses what we would term a priori knowledge forms the central theme of the Meno. In an effort to demonstrate that point, Sokrates proceeds to lead a slave boy, one lacking conscious knowledge of mathematics, to the solution of a complicated geometrical problem involving Pythagoras' theorem, all by a process of simple questioning. The principles of mathematical knowledge, so it is inferred, must be innate and latent within the psychê. This epistemological line is extended in the Phaedo, where it is shown that certain concepts, such as perfect or exact equality, cannot be derived from sensory experience, on the ground that absolutes of that sort do not exist in the phe-

nomenal world. No two stones or sticks, however similar, can ever yield the notion of exact or absolute equality since, as approximations, they do not manifest the requisite perfection.9 By analogy the same is said to be true of all other logical categories or universals, such as beauty itself, justice, and so on. Having thus disposed of empiricist claims, Plato concludes that the psychê must have acquired this knowledge prior to its association with the body—a proposition that ties in with the doctrines of transmigration and immortality. Resorting once again to the expressive discourse of myth, Plato relates that during its disembodied interphases between corporeal reincarnations, the immortal psychê soars beyond the physical world and enters the realm "where true Being exists, colorless, shapeless, and intangible," i.e., the supersensible world of the Forms, the reality "visible to reason alone, the pilot of the psychê." 10 As the psychê falls back once more into the "prison-house" of the body and the world of Becoming, this "vision" fades from memory, the more so as bodily vices and passions overshadow the light of the true reality and contaminate the soul.11 But those who keep themselves pure, and who are true lovers of wisdom, knowledge of the Forms can be "recollected" through dialectical inquiry and the pursuit of virtue. Hence the famous Platonic doctrine that learning is recollection or remembrance, anamnêsis, with learning restricted here to the cognition of "true Being," i.e., knowledge of mathematics and the Forms, truths which, unlike the particular empirical facts of the phenomenal world, are universal and logically necessary. Though largely Pythagorean in content, the Anamnesis doctrine is functionally congruent with the Sokratic role of the philosophical "midwife," the one who through dialectical discourse is able to assist others in "giving birth" to the wisdom latent within themselves.

Having outlined the rudiments of Plato's metaphysics—a necessary preamble to any deeper probing of his social philosophy since, as we shall see, his ontological and epistemological views carry considerable axiological significance—let us turn directly to our major concern, Plato's ambivalent relation to the Polis-citizen heritage.

Returning to Athens in 387 BC from his travels in Italy and Sicily, Plato set about establishing a philosophical school in the Academy, a public gymnasium and religious sanctuary located a short distance outside the western walls of the city. He purchased a modest estate nearby, and for the remaining forty years of his life spent most of his time in the company of friends and students, discussing philosophy and writing the dialogues that were to secure his eternal fame. The actual organization of "Plato's Academy" remains something of a mystery: the number of students is unknown, the curriculum is nowhere clearly specified, and even

the philosopher's own role as a teacher is obscure. Undaunted by the absence of firm evidence, modern scholars have boldly proferred diverging reconstructions, some likening the Academy to "a kind of German university with a regular program of lectures by the professor and seminars," while others prefer to view it as a "political organization," whose "primary function and purpose was the defense of international conservatism." The reality, both educationally and politically, appears to have been rather more modest.

Given the marked doctrinal influence of the Pythagoreans on Plato's philosophy, a number of scholars have assumed a similar organizational connection. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the Academy was modelled after the Pythagorean brotherhoods, with their hierarchical status levels and strict dietary rules, their initiation rites and sacred dogmas, or their communism in property and cult of secrecy. Although a few of these practices do resurface in Plato's writings as remedies for various social ills, the Academy itself was decidedly nonsectarian-divergent views were held even by Plato's closest associates-and there seems to have been no hierarchical structure, apart from the basic dichotomy of older associates and younger students. The school was, after all, situated in a public forum, with the consequence that many of its activities were conducted in the open—as evidenced by the numerous witty barbs hurled at the Academy by the comic poets, including one memorable scene in which Plato and his young pupils are heckled by an onlooker for their pedantry in defining the genus of the pumpkin.13

The safest conclusion to be drawn from the fragmentary evidence is that the basic organizing principle of the Academy was the traditional sunousia, or 'living together'. Historically, associational education had arisen in the form of "pederastic paideia," wherein adolescent aristoi were introduced to the adult world of war, politics, and culture through bonding relationships with older men (3.II.iv). As democratization altered the ground rules for public success—shifting the locus from aristocratic networks to mass politics—the Sophists radically transformed the nature of education by offering advanced instruction in politike techne for anyone willing and able to pay for the service. Educational practices in the Academy appear to owe something to both of these models, as the Sokratic-Platonic appreciation of Eros legitimized and encouraged personal attachments among the members, while the formal teaching methods of the Sophists were adapted to suit the school's pedagogic aims.14 This associational routine featured group discussions and lectures by Plato and the other distinguished sages who joined his company, and it is known that many an evening was spent in the entertaining ambiance of the symposion.15 The duration of study appears to have been solely a

matter of personal choice, with some members remaining for many years (two decades in the case of Aristotle), while others opted for shorter stays, ranging from a few months or weeks to three or four years. The curriculum is likely to have coincided with the subjects Plato explored in his written works, with mathematical study serving as the principal preparatory discipline. It should be kept in mind that for both Sokrates and Plato, philosophy was not simply a matter of education, but a way of life, to be shared by friends in the common pursuit of wisdom. Such being the case, it is most unlikely that the inner circle of members ever grew to sizes that precluded close interpersonal relations, or that formal scholastic rules and requirements rigidly governed their collective activities.

The role of the Academy as a "political organization" is a more controversial subject. While there are few today who would deny that political concerns loomed large in both the founding and functioning of the Academy—to do so would entail rejecting not only the larger part of Plato's political philosophy, but also a historical record that is crowded with a number of Academics who played major roles in the political affairs of Greece-there is strong disagreement as to how that involvement is to be interpreted. 16 As was the case with Sokrates, the registry of Plato's "pupils" includes several figures whose notoriety does not reflect favorably on the man who supposedly trained them. More disturbing still is the fact that unlike Sokrates, Plato himself chose to enter the political arena on several occasions, becoming deeply involved in the sanguinary struggles that revolved around the Syracusan tyranny. These matters are all rather difficult to assess, as most of our information about Plato's political activities and other "Academic intrigues" is derived from partisan sources, both for and against. It is essential, therefore, that we begin by identifying the probable objectives and motives behind these engagements, a requirement that can best be achieved through an examination of Plato's political philosophy as expressed in his written works.

Although the early dialogues do not focus directly on political issues, Plato's initial probings into the nature of aretê and its manifold capacities were politically relevant. Within the insular world of the Polis, to raise questions pertaining to the moral life of the citizen was ipso facto a political act, inasmuch as public and private were bonded through the status of citizenship and its core social roles. We have already seen how the Sophists incurred public hostility for subjecting traditional normative ideals and practices to critical analysis, and how Sokrates himself was tried and condemned for impiety and "corrupting the young." The hazards of his calling were thus not unknown to Plato, which may explain why his writings repeatedly seek to differentiate the true philosopher

from the sophist, the true statesman from the rhetorician-demagogue. "Praising the true philosophy," as he would express it in the Seventh Letter, thus constituted an essential task for the young Plato, an enterprise all the more necessary given the personal tragedy that was Sokrates' death and Plato's growing conviction that philosophy alone could provide the basis for a moral regeneration of both self and society.

The Sokratic thesis that virtue depends upon knowledge is employed by Plato in his early writings for two basic purposes: to counter the subjectivism and moral relativism that had been introduced by the Sophistic opposition of "culture" to "nature," and to lay bare the deficiencies of many traditional conceptions of aretê. Not only are the arguments of sundry Sophists rendered hollow by Sokrates' dialectical probings, but the same "numbing" is inflicted on various representatives of the elite, members of the aristocracy as well as prominent democrats, whose firm convictions and conventional judgments typically fail to pass the test of philosophical reason. The work of criticism that predominates at this stage of Plato's work is generally thought to reflect the legacy of the historical Sokrates, whose own search for wisdom was more successful in exposing error and ignorance than in formulating solutions to the questions he raised. This latter task Plato eventually assumed as his own, as is clear from the fact that after the trip to Italy and Sicily in 388 BC, the positive, didactic content of the dialogues expands significantly.

The dialogue that contains the first detailed exposition of Plato's social philosophy is the Republic, a massive work that he completed sometime around 375 BC after many years of careful composition. The most celebrated volume in the history of philosophy, the Republic challenges all interpreters through its synoptic scope (epistemology, theology, metaphysics, politics, ethics, education, aesthetics, and psychology are all densely interwoven into a coherent whole), as well as through its dramatic artistry, which not only conveys important information nondiscursively (and hence abstrusely), but also "shields" the author behind the many voices of his characters. Interpretations have accordingly varied widely, not to say wildly, with much of modern exegesis revolving around the anachronistic question of whether Plato's work is "humanitarian" or "totalitarian" in its intentions and implications.17 Our concern here will be more strictly sociological: namely, to examine Plato's response to the institutional disorganization and normative anarchy of his era, and to identify the social concerns that shaped his perceptions and reasoning.

It should be noted at the outset that the English title Republic (via the Latin res publica) is a rather pale rendering of the Greek Politeia, a resonant term which simultaneously expresses the notions of 'citizenship' and 'constitution', and hence the organic unity of civil society and the

state. Within such a social framework, ethics and politics comprise a corresponding unity, as the moral life of the citizen encompasses his public participation in the affairs of self-government. Plato's assumption that the virtues could not be fully realized without a radical reordering of the existing socio-political structure was therefore perfectly congruent with Greek tradition and the legacy of the great lawgivers, Lycurgus and Solon above all. The articulation of a moral code fundamentally sundered from the Polis-citizen nexus will become possible, as we shall see, only after the tradition of civic communalism had been irrevocably shattered by various structural changes which undermined the viability of Polis autonomy and the sovereignty of the citizen.

The problem that opens the Republic concerns the nature of justice, dikaiosunê, and the attempt to define this term and demonstrate its value for human existence constitutes the core of the dialogue. The Sokrates character initially questions several interlocutors on their understanding of justice, but the answers they advance are all found wanting, including the traditional "benefitting one's friends and harming one's enemies." This claim is dismissed by Sokrates on grounds that to harm others is to make them worse, and therefore more unjust; the aim or function of justice cannot possibly be the genesis of its opposite, so intentional harm can never qualify as justice.18 At this point the sophist Thrasymachus bursts into the discussion and abuses Sokrates for his "driveling nonsense." A champion of the egoistic claims of physis, Thrasymachus declares that "justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger," a point proven by the fact that all ruling powers—whether tyrants, oligarchs, or democrats—invariably enact laws that are partisan and self-serving.19 Sokrates counters that it is possible for rulers to err through ignorance, and therefore unwittingly enjoin what is harmful for themselves. Every technê exists for the purpose of discovering and providing for some specific advantage (e.g., medicine:health, navigation:safe travel), but this is dependent upon acquiring the knowledge particular to that art or craft. The 'art of politics', politikê technê, he then defines in traditional terms, as providing for the good of the Polis and its citizenry. Possessed of the requisite knowledge, rulers "in the true sense" would not seek the selfish gains that Thrasymachus and others advocate, but the harmony and health of the community as a whole. For the sophist, however, this is all mere wordplay, far removed from the "real world" where the strong dominate the weak and where the just man is repeatedly exploited by those whose "will to power" overrules the spurious claims of nomos.

Unsatisfied by the course of the discussion, the two brothers of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus, intervene and implore Sokrates to provide "an encomium on justice in and of itself," i.e., without reference to any possible external rewards, such as high repute, honor, or divine favor, but solely on the basis of its consequences for the *psychê*, the true self. Acceding to their request, Sokrates begins by shifting the focus from the individual to the Polis, arguing that it will be easier to discern the truth in the larger context first. To facilitate the quest still further, the Polis to be examined will be a hypothetical "ideal" or "model" community manifesting all of the virtues.

The search for justice begins with the observation that communal living is a necessity, given that humans are not self-sufficient, but require the cooperative interchange of services for survival. A rudimentary division of labor—farmers, artisans, traders—arises in response to these mutual needs, since productivity and performance are both enhanced through occupational specialization. Sokrates also notes that "by nature" each of us is best suited for a specific function or task, a thesis mentioned in passing but pregnant with far-reaching implications that are realized later in the dialogue. The same holds for the casual remark that there are some people whose "intellect" is not "entirely worthy of our *koinônia*," but whose "bodily strength" is sufficient for "hard work"—an assumption no doubt consistent with the prejudices of leisured aristocrats and slaveowners, but a rather unusual premise for a philosophy of social justice.²⁰

Sokrates proceeds to discuss the simple life of the community he has sketched, but is interrupted by Glaucon's comment that he is founding a "polis of pigs," a community lacking the cultural refinements and luxuries of civilization. Although Spartan austerity is closer to Sokrates' ideal of a "healthy polis" than Glaucon's "feverish polis," he agrees to expand the size of the community to accommodate those engaged in nonessential tasks, such as poets, dancers, cooks, and barbers. An expanded population creates the need for additional territory, and hence the necessity of waging war. Since the traditional citizen army composed of landowners and artisans does not conform to the one man/one function principle, Sokrates argues that a class of full-time warriors or "Guardians" will be needed. As this concentration of martial power poses the danger of an armed tyranny over the other citizens, selection of prospective Guardians is to be rigorously controlled. Two character traits will distinguish those who are best suited by nature: a "high-spiritedness" conducive of fierceness and courage in war, and an inherent "love of wisdom" conducive of friendship and gentleness towards one's fellow citizens. These two natural traits will be directed towards the proper ends only if the educational system is sound, and as that is not presently the case, Sokrates proposes a radical reformation of Greek socialization practices.

He begins by noting that most of the stories that are told to children are utterly unsuitable for the inculcation of virtue: myths about gods

who castrate their fathers and commit adulteries, who fight amongst themselves and who deceive and mistreat mortals, along with the stories of heroes who rape, steal, and speak falsehoods-all this only serves to sanction and excuse immorality. The normative content of poetry, and that of Homer and Hesiod in particular, must be strictly censured so that the young will not be corrupted by inappropriate standards. The dramatic arts of tragedy and comedy are to be banned altogether, primarily on the ground that they undermine the principle of one man/one function by presenting to audiences a multiplicity of personalities, actions, and beliefs. Not only does this foster the emergence of pollaplous, or 'manifold' men, who seek to imitate the varied experiences presented to their imaginations, but both arts stir and elevate the irrational elements of the psychê through their vivid portrayal of excessive emotions and states (grief, fear, sexual desire, buffoonery, etc.). For analogous reasons, the harmonies and rhythms of certain musical modes are to be banned, as are harps, flutes, and other polychordic-polyharmonic instruments, whose complexity and versatility are deemed a threat to decorum and moderation. Sokrates completes his sketch of the ideal educational system by outlining a simple dietary and gymnastic regimen, the basic aim of which is to enhance military performance. In sum, the entire cultural realm is to be carefully supervised and censored, "in order that our Guardians may not be reared among images of vice as if in a pasturage of evil."21

Sokrates now turns to the problem of selecting the actual rulers, an elite group to be drawn from the ranks of the Guardians. The *aristoi*, or 'best' rulers, must be wise and protective of the interests of the polis, and convinced that it is ever necessary to do what is best for the community. From youth onwards, therefore, the Guardians are to be tested by various pleasures, toils, fears, and pains to see if this conviction remains firm; those who endure these trials will become rulers, the true Guardians, while those who fail are to be restricted to the warrior role, henceforth identified as *epikouroi*, or 'auxiliaries'.

Having divided the citizenry into three functional classes—the ruling Guardians, the warrior-Auxiliaries, and the laboring artisans and farmers—Sokrates proposes a charter myth for the founding of the community. A "noble fiction" or "falsehood" must be told to the citizenry conveying two "essential truths": first, that they were all originally fashioned within the womb of the earth, their mother, and are therefore obligated to defend their native soil and to regard their fellow citizens as earthborn siblings; second, that while they are indeed all kindred, the god so created them that gold is mixed into the natures of those who are fitted to rule, silver in the warriors, and iron and bronze in those who are obligated to

labor.22 The underlying purpose of this "noble fiction" (which is adapted from traditional mythic materials) is unfortunately left very much in doubt and constitutes one of the most bitterly contested issues in Platonic scholarship. That a philosopher would legitimize deceptions or falsehoods-which Plato does here and elsewhere on the grounds that some untruths are socially beneficial—has incensed many who regard it as a cardinal violation of the philosopher's calling. Political judgments have been equally severe, with Marxists and liberals alike condemning the ploy as "propaganda," "racialism," or "totalitarian thought-control." Since Sokrates himself is made to say that the myth lacks plausibility, however, it would seem that Plato's primary considerations were artistic and didactic rather than practical: the earthborn motif furnishes a convenient means for Plato to express his belief that a feeling of communal kinship was an essential component of the healthy Polis (a traditional Greek notion); whereas the allegory of the metals strikingly illustrates Plato's fundamental belief in the natural inequality of human beings (a traditional aristocratic credo). Indeed, the Republic as a whole, given its notable lacunae and explicit declarations that consideration of details can be postponed, should not be read as a specific blueprint for practical reform (that was to come later, with the massive Laws), but rather as a statement of essential principles, a reforming vision or paradigm founded upon philosophic wisdom.

To reconcile the claims of communalism with those of hierarchy is one of the challenges Plato addresses in the remaining sections of the dialogue, and the radical solutions he proposes make it extremely difficult to justify charges that his philosophy somehow defended the interest of the hereditary aristocracy. He begins by having Sokrates observe that the most shameful thing for a shepherd is to breed dogs that, through indiscipline, hunger, or some other evil, become like wolves and so harm the sheep they are assigned to guard and protect.23 Correspondingly, the Guardians and warrior-Auxiliaries must be prevented from becoming "savage masters" of the citizenry instead of their "benign allies." The censored education they are to receive provides one safeguard, but others are manifestly needed. To that end the entire Guardian class must be prohibited from owning private property, beyond the limited personal necessities they will receive from the farmers and artisans. All Guardians are to dine in common messes and live together in fellowship "like soldiers on campaign"; and as they already possess "divine" gold and silver in their souls as a gift from the gods, they are to refrain from any contact with "mortal" gold and silver, whether in the form of coinage or as items of luxury.24 So living, it is declared, they will "save" and "preserve" both themselves and their polis:25

But whenever they shall acquire for themselves private land and houses and wealth, they will become household managers and farmers instead of Guardians, hostile masters instead of allies of the other citizens; and so hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole lives, fearing far more the enemies within than those without, and thereby rushing themselves and their polis ever nearer destruction.

Quite understandably, these institutional proposals strike the noble Adeimantus as highly questionable, and his objection that Sokrates is not making his Guardians "entirely eudaimonas," i.e., materially prosperous and psychologically contented, undoubtedly expresses the natural reaction of conventional aristocrats to such a call for "monastic austerity":²⁶

For in truth the polis is theirs, but they derive no good from it, as do men who possess lands and build grand and beautiful houses decorated with suitable furnishings, and who offer private sacrifices to the gods and entertain guests, . . . possessing gold and silver and all the things that are thought to belong to those who are fortunate. But your Guardians, one might say, seem like hired mercenaries, sitting idly in the polis with nothing to do but keep guard.

Sokrates responds that while he suspects that the Guardians will indeed prove to be the most fortunate or happy (eudaimonestatoi), the aim in founding the ideal community was not to establish surpassing happiness for any one group, but for "the polis as a whole." Moreover, since true well-being is contingent upon functional excellence or aretê, anything that corrupts or interferes with functional performance will necessarily hinder the realization of happiness. Among the principal causes of such corruption are the extremes of wealth and poverty, the one engendering idleness, negligence, and innovation, the other incapacity and meanness. No less detrimental is the discord bred by great disparities in wealth, a problem that is said to plague all existing poleis. Far from denying eudaimonia to the Guardians, the ban against private ownership and the proposed communal life-style (subsequently broadened to include Plato's notorious "communism of women and children"), are measures that will actually promote the well-being of all the community's members.

The basic institutional arrangements of the ideal polis having been outlined, the search for justice is now resumed. Since the "completely good" community will by definition manifest each of the cardinal virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice—Sokrates argues that if the first three qualities can be identified, justice, as the remainder, will be easier to discover. Wisdom is then shown to belong essentially to the

ruling Guardians, who possess the requisite 'science' or 'knowledge', epistêmê, of proper rule. Courage is the essential trait of the warrior-Auxiliaries, whose supervised paideia has been "dyed" in so deeply that the corrosive "lves" of pleasure, pain, and fear cannot wash out their proper and lawful beliefs.²⁷ Temperance or sôphrosunê is slightly more elusive, and Sokrates begins by defining it as a kind of 'self-control', enkrateia, regarding certain pleasures and desires, characterized in popular idiom as a "mastery of one's self." Such mastery is said to exist whenever the "naturally better part" of the human psychê, the rational element, controls "the worse" or appetitive part. Correspondingly, a community will be "master of itself" whenever the superior few ("those who are best by nature and best educated") control "the manifold desires, pleasures, and pains" of the inferior multitude.²⁸ Temperance in the social sense is thus a shared agreement or 'oneness of mind', homonoia, among the citizenry as to who should rule and who should obey. As for justice, Sokrates promptly locates it in the foundational principle of the ideal Polis: the injunction that "each individual perform the one service in the Polis for which his nature is best-suited."29 It is this principle that allows the other three virtues to develop within the community, whereas its violation will cause "the greatest ruin." In short, so long as each of the 'three natural races or types' (tritta genê physeôn), the Guardians, Warriors, and Producers, pursue their own 'proper functions' (oikeiopragia) and refrain from 'meddling in many affairs' (polypragmosunein), the community will be united and just. Alternatively, "whenever one who is by nature an artisan or some other kind of Producer is incited by wealth, the multitude, his strength, or by some other such thing, and attempts to enter the class of the Warriors, or one of the Warriors tries to enter the ranks of the counselling Guardians, though unworthy of it, ... or whenever the same man attempts to perform all these functions together, ... this polypragmosunê entails ruin for the Polis."30

Now that the virtues have been illustrated on the social plane, the stage is set for discovering the nature and value of justice for the individual. Central to Plato's entire line of analysis is his assumption that a fundamental correspondence exists between polis and psychê, an essential parallelism that he grounds in two ontological postulates, one metaphysical, the other sociological. Because the phenomenal realm is said to consist of particulars that derive their qualities through imperfect "participation" or "imitation" of the unchanging, immaterial universals, it follows that all phenomenal particulars that can be subsumed under a common Form will manifest that Form's essential attributes or nature: a beautiful horse, a beautiful statue, and a beautiful person are all "beautiful" owing to their "participation" in the universal Form of the Beautiful,

"beauty itself." In the present case, therefore, "the just man will in no way differ from the just Polis in regards to the Form of justice itself, but will be alike or similar (homoios)." Even apart from the metaphysics, Plato is able to sustain the polis-psychê analogy by observing that the social qualities of wisdom, courage, temperance, etc., are all ultimately derived from the actions and characters of individual citizens.³¹

Having established the interdependence of collective and individual psychologies, Plato proceeds to the nature of the human psychê itself. Given the conflicting impulses and desires that arise within every individual, Plato argues that the psychê must be composed of diverse elements or parts: the logistikon, or 'rational' element, that reasons; the thumoeides, or 'spirited' element; and the epithumêtikon, or 'appetitive' part. In accordance with the polis-psychê analogue, each of these three parts is said to stand in a functional correspondence with the three classes of the ideal community, the Guardians, Auxiliaries, and Producers respectively. It consequently follows that in the ideal "constitution" of the human psychê, the rational logistikon will rule, "being wise and exercising forethought on behalf of the entire soul"; the spirited thumoeides will function as the "ally" of the ruling principle, implementing and enforcing its decisions; while the appetitive epithumêtikon, revealingly characterized as "the mass of the soul in each of us, and by nature the most insatiate of possessions," must be disciplined and controlled by the two superior elements.³² It further follows that the social virtues discovered earlier will be paralleled in form by those of the individual: wisdom is thus manifested when the rational element governs in accordance with "the knowledge of what is beneficial for each of the parts and for the common whole"; courage is on display whenever the spirited element "preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures the commandments of reason"; while temperance occurs whenever there is "friendship and concord" among the elements and "a shared belief that the logistikon should rule without the other two parties rising up in faction against it." As for justice, this turns out to be nothing other than the proper internal ordering of the psychê, wherein "each of the elements performs its own functions." Injustice, in contrast, is "a kind of stasis among the three elements, their meddling and interference with each other's tasks, a rebellion against the whole of the psychê by a part seeking to rule that is unfit, since by nature it is of a kind suited to serve as a slave (douleuein) . . . to the ruling element."33

Inasmuch as health is by definition a proper ordering of one's internal elements, "a relation of domination and being dominated among the parts according to nature (kata physin)," and disease is disorder, "parts ruling and being ruled contrary to nature (para physin)," it follows that

virtue, or *aretê*, will be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the *psychê*, whereas vice, or *kakia*, will be a kind of disease, ugliness, and weakness. Justice, as one of the cardinal virtues (indeed, the basis for all the others), will therefore be beneficial in itself, irrespective of any external rewards or punishments, whereas injustice, a diseased condition in which the appetitive element is no longer under the control of reason but dominates the entire *psychê*, the true self, will be intrinsically harmful.³⁴

The question that opened the *Republic* has been answered, and in that regard the dialogue is complete. In the process of discovering the true nature of justice, however, a number of subsidiary issues and problems were raised that Sokrates is now called upon to address.

The first request is for a fuller account of how the "communism of women and children" for the Guardians and Auxiliaries will be managed. The details of Plato's most controversial proposal are so well known that only the essential features need be mentioned: contrary to conventional practice, women will receive the same training as men and, if fit, share equally in the tasks of guardianship; eugenic couplings will be arranged periodically through a rigged sortition process controlled by the supreme authorities; all healthy offspring will be given over to special nurses for rearing; and the biological ties between parent and child will remain concealed behind a substitute kinship language that establishes parental and sibling relations in accordance with the controlled breeding schedule. The intended purpose of all these machinations is identical with the proposed ban on private property: to create the greatest possible unity and solidarity among the Guardians and Auxiliaries, something Plato believes can best be achieved through the curtailment or 'elimination of all private interests' (idiôsis dialuei), and most particularly those powerful concerns that are engendered by familial affections and matters of property.35

After several critical remarks on the savagery of interpolis warfare, the impropriety of reducing fellow Greeks to slavery, and a recommendation that Greeks henceforth treat barbarians "as Greeks now treat each other" (i.e., to destroy and enslave them, devastate their lands, burn habitations, etc.), "lest they suffer enslavement to barbarians," Sokrates is asked to discuss whether the ideal polis is at all possible, and if so, how it could be realized. He notes that since "it is not in the nature of things for actions to lay hold of truth to the same extent as speech," it should suffice if they can discover the possibility of realizing a polis that most closely approximates the ideal *paradeigma* they have constructed. As to its actual feasibility, that can best be demonstrated by identifying "the smallest change" from existing practices that would promote the desired trans-

formation. Introduced as his "greatest wave of paradox" and a thesis he expects will be "inundated by ridicule and contempt," Plato identifies that "smallest change" in the following passage, the most celebrated of his philosophy:³⁶

Unless either philosophers rule as kings in our poleis or those whom we now call kings and rulers become lovers of wisdom truly and adequately, and these two faculties, political power and philosophy, coincide in the same persons, . . . there can be no cessation of evils for our poleis, dear Glaucon, nor, I suspect, for the human race. Nor, until this happens, will the *politeia* which we have been discussing ever grow to the limits of its possibility and see the light of the sun.

In order to justify his call for "philosopher-kings," Plato proceeds to define the nature of the true philosopher, a figure fundamentally different from the "sophistic" character who has sullied the calling of philosophy and brought confusion to the masses as to its real value. The distinctive mark of the philosopher, "a lover of all wisdom and truth," is that he is capable of apprehending "true being," of perceiving the universal, eternal Forms amidst the confusing flux of phenomenal particulars. And it is precisely possession of that knowledge that legitimizes his right to rule and serve as lawgiver:³⁷

Do you think there is any difference between the blind and those who are deprived of knowledge of the reality of each thing, who have no clear paradeigma in their souls and thus cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their gaze upon absolute truth, and always with reference to this and in the exactest possible contemplation of it, so establish in this world the proper customs regarding the noble, the just, and the good, when that is needed, or guard and preserve them once established?

Such natures are unfortunately all too rare, since many are corrupted by improper education or are diverted by the so-called worldly goods of wealth, physical prowess, beauty, noble birth, and all the things akin to these. Moreover, in order to achieve public recognition in the present state of affairs, all gifted individuals are compelled to gratify the cravings of the "ignorant multitude" and so are constrained to learn not the true nature of virtue and vice, but the impulses and desires of the dêmos, "a mighty and powerful beast." In such circumstances the true philosopher will indeed be scorned as a useless fellow, a crank and babbler, and will perforce abstain from the corruption presently holding sway in all existing poleis. But this forced exclusion from public affairs is not experienced without considerable pain and torment, as Plato reveals in a bitter, clearly autobiographical portrayal of a philosopher who is trapped in a world unworthy of his nature and ignorant of the blessings he can bestow:³⁸

Having sufficiently perceived the mania of the multitude, and that there is nothing healthy or sound, so to speak, regarding public affairs, nor an ally with whom one could go to the aid of justice and survive, he will be like a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to share in their misdeeds but, as one man alone, lacking the strength to oppose the savagery of all, and so would perish before he could benefit the polis or his friends, useless to himself and to others. Taking all these things into account, the philosopher remains quiet and pursues his own affairs, like a man who in a storm of dust or hail takes refuge behind a wall, seeing the others filled with lawlessness, he is content if he can somehow live his life in this world unsoiled by injustice and unholy deeds, and depart from it with fair hope, serenity, and graciousness.

Although a life free from iniquity is praised as "not the least" of achievements, Plato stresses that it would not encompass ta megista, 'the greatest things', for only when a philosopher lives in a community suited to his nature can he attain his full stature. The maximal augmentation of the true lover of wisdom, in other words, presupposes his governing role in public affairs. The centrality of this position in Plato's thought is unmistakable:³⁹

Being compelled by the truth, we declared that neither Polis nor politeia nor even Man will ever attain perfection, until either those few philosophers who are not corrupt—those now bearing the label of useless—are compelled by some chance turn to take charge of the Polis, whether they wish to or not, and those in the Polis obey them; or until by some divine dispensation, the sons of those who are now rulers and kings, or they themselves, become possessed of a true passion for true philosophy. To affirm that it is impossible for either or both of these things to come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable.

Sokrates concludes by enjoining those in attendance "to persuade the multitude" as to the real nature of the true philosopher, a task that is likewise declared feasible, seeing that the majority of men are not "harsh by nature," but have simply been diverted by corrupt pursuits. Enlightened by the truth, they will—given the natural human desire for the good—accede to the ordering vision of philosophy, which seeks to realize in society the images of "the divine order," i.e., the Forms of justice, temperance, and the other virtues.

It is unnecessary at this point to examine the remaining subjects of the Republic: the advanced education of the Guardians; the ontological and axiological status of the supreme Form, the Form of the Good; the famous allegory of the cave and the philosopher's ascent from the darkness of opinion to the light of knowledge; the nature of the dialectic; the renewed criticisms of Homer and the mimetic arts; the arguments in favor of the

soul's immortality; and the great transmigration myth that brings the dialogue to a fitting close—all these basically serve to clarify and reinforce the essential arguments already presented. It is essential, however, that we briefly note the lessons of Books VIII and IX, wherein Plato offers a detailed "pathology" of the major existing political structures and the diseased or unbalanced characters that they foster among the citizenry.

As one might expect given the paradigm of the ideal Polis and Plato's definition of justice, the social ills peculiar to each constitution-militaristic aristocracies or timocracies, oligarchic or plutocratic regimes, democracies, and tyrannies—are ultimately traced to property differentials and the pursuit of narrow factional interests, while personal vices are correspondingly attributed to disorders within the psychê and the enslavement or subordination of the rational element to the spirited or appetitive parts. As constitutions of civic and psychological discord, all stand condemned for their failure to secure communal solidarity and the moral betterment of their citizens—the twin ideals of the Polis-citizen cultural tradition. Fully cognizant of the institutional and normative crisis besetting contemporary Polis society, Plato nonetheless refuses to abandon these ancestral civic principles; indeed, to judge from the contents of the Republic and other dialogues, it would appear that the turmoil of his era only served to exalt these ideals still higher, thereby giving sanction to the radical, extremist measures that he proposed for their realization.

So much, then, for an overview of theory; it is to praxis that we must now return. As noted earlier, Plato's first sojourn in Syracuse at the court of Dionysios furnished the occasion for his encounter with Dion, the tyrant's youthful brother-in-law. From all the available evidence, which includes Plato's own testimony in the Seventh Letter, the mature philosopher (then aged about forty) and the young aristocrat (approaching twenty) formed an intense personal relationship that apparently mirrored the Platonic conception of true Eros, i.e., homoerotic bonding through the mutual pursuit of philosophy, an ideal championed most extensively in the Symposium and the Phaedrus. Indeed, several scholars have maintained that a famous passage in the latter dialogue is in all likelihood an allusive reference to Plato's own relationship with Dion, given the suggestiveness of the syntax and grammatical construction of the Greek:⁴⁰

Thus the followers of Zeus (Dios) seek a beloved who is Zeus-like (dion) in the soul; wherefore they look for one who is by nature disposed to be a lover of wisdom (philosophos) and a leader of men (hêgemonikos), and whenever they find him, they will love him and do everything they can so that he will become such a man.

More directly, Plato himself relates in the Seventh Letter that during his initial association with Dion, he imparted to the noble youth his views regarding 'the best things for mankind' (ta beltista anthrôpois) and pointedly encouraged him to implement those ideals in the arena of practical affairs. Gifted with a remarkable capacity for learning, Dion responded to those teachings "more keenly and zealously than any other young man I ever met, and he resolved to live the remainder of his life differently from most of the Greeks in Italy and Sicily, holding aretê dearer than pleasure or luxury."⁴¹

Over the course of the next two decades, while Plato was preoccupied with philosophical work and the affairs of the Academy, Dion rose to a position of power at the Syracusan court. He amassed a tremendous fortune in the process—valued at more than one hundred talents—and strengthened his hand by marrying his niece, one of the daughters of the bigamous Dionysios, who had simultaneously married into a prominent local family (wedding Dion's sister) and another from Lokris in Italy. At the tyrant's death in 367 BC, the throne passed to the eldest son, Dionysios II, then in his early twenties and a product of the Lokrian marriage. Rival factions formed around the two families, and each side tried to exercise influence over the young tyrant, a vacillating character heavily dependent on court flatters and advisors.

Dionysios II was utterly unsuited for the position he had inherited, for his paranoiac father—fearing a possible rival—had kept the youth in seclusion and uninitiated in the affairs of state. Dion now sought to bring the young tyrant under the sway of philosophy, a conversion he hoped would lead to a "prosperous and true way of life throughout the country." He promptly called on Plato to assist him in the enterprise, pointedly reminding the philosopher of the extensive dominion of the Syracusan tyranny, his own great power within the government, the youth of Dionysios II and his eagerness for learning, and the likelihood that other family members would also become attracted to the life of philosophy, "What greater circumstances could we expect," he wrote pressingly, "than those which have now arrived by some divine fortune? . . . Surely now if ever will the hope be realized that the same persons will become both lovers of wisdom and the rulers of great poleis." Though allowing that Dion had "reasoned correctly" in these matters, Plato remained ambivalent, fearing that the sudden and contradictory impulses that commonly beset the young might divert the tyrant from Dion's design, an outcome all the more likely in the corrupt atmosphere of a tyrant's court. Notwithstanding his doubts, the philosopher resolved to go, reasoning that "if ever anyone was to attempt to establish that which had been reflected upon regarding proper laws and constitutions, now was the time to try; for if I

could persuade but one man sufficiently, that would bring to pass everything good." He goes on to add that he was not guided by the motives some have suggested (presumably a desire for power and wealth), "but most of all by my own sense of shame, that I would not appear to myself as a man utterly and entirely concerned with words alone, and who would never willingly lay hold of any practical task." Concerned lest he betray the cause of philosophy and disgrace himself as an idle dreamer, the sixty-year-old Plato set sail for Syracuse.

We learn from Plutarch's biography of Dion that the initial reaction to Plato's efforts was highly propitious, as discourse and philosophy became all the rage at court—the palace itself being filled with dust for purposes of tracing geometrical figures. The fashion proved short lived, however, for within the space of a few months Dion was expelled on a charge of plotting with the Carthaginians. Plato himself was not implicated, and as Dionysios had grown quite fond of him (even jealous of Plato's friendship with Dion), the philosopher was compelled to remain at court, his docility assured by repeated promises that Dion would be recalled in due course. No communion with philosophy was ever achieved, as the slander and intrigues of various factions prevented the impressionable tyrant from subjecting himself fully to Plato's instruction. A major military campaign in 365 BC furnished Dionysios the opportunity to release his would-be mentor without public embarrassment, and Plato was allowed to return to the safety of the Academy, presently providing haven for the exiled Dion.

A few years later, in 361 BC, the tyrant once again desired Plato's company and enlisted the support of the Pythagoreans in Italy to convince Plato of his renewed interest in philosophy. He also indicated that Dion's fate rested with Plato's response, a threat that basically forced the disillusioned philosopher to sail once more into the dangerous waters of Syracusan politics. The fiasco he expected readily ensued: the tyrant not only failed to respond to the call of philosophy, he also opted for a complete rupture with the exiled Dion, confiscating his property and compelling his wife to wed a court henchman. Plato himself was placed under a form of house arrest, being "lodged" among the tyrant's mercenaries, a number of whom made threats against his life, convinced as they were that Plato was attempting to eliminate the tyranny, and with it their lucrative employment. The captive sage managed to send word to his friend Archytas, the Pythagorean statesman of Tarentum, who promptly sent an embassy that secured Plato's release (360 BC). His travails were not yet over: with the breach between Dionysios and Dion now complete and irreparable, the latter began preparations for war. His vast private fortune enabled him to recruit an army of elite mercenaries, and many of his aristocratic

friends from the Academy rallied to his cause, including Speusippus, Plato's nephew and eventual successor. Plato himself refused to join the expedition, however, pointing to his advanced age (nearing seventy) and the fact that he had "broken bread" with Dionysios and thereby established sacred ties of guest fellowship. The feasibility of the invasion must have seemed a grave matter of doubt as well, for after three years preparation, it was a line of only five vessels—conveying eight hundred men and a surplus arsenal of weapons—that set sail against one of the most formidable military powers in the Hellenic world.

Incapable of challenging the tyrant's forces in direct combat, Dion's strategy was premised on sparking an internal uprising. 43 Plutarch relates that several Academics had circulated among the Syracusans during Plato's second stay at the court and had discovered that popular support would be forthcoming if Dion chose to act. The intelligence proved accurate, for as Dion's private army marched towards the city, it was joined along the way by armed contingents from several subject poleis and by large numbers of Syracusan peasants, their objective succinctly conveyed by a stirring chorus of eleutheria, 'freedom', that heralded their advance. Dionysios was absent from the capital during this critical moment, having recently embarked on a military venture in Italy with a portion of his fleet. Employing a ruse that drew most of the remaining mercenaries away from the city, Dion entered Syracuse without opposition amid wild rejoicing by the citizenry. He and his brother were elected stratêgous autokratoras, and twenty others were chosen to form a provisional council. Upon learning of these matters days later, the tyrant returned to his island citadel in the harbor, determined to restore the autocracy.

During the protracted struggle that ensued, Dion's liberation forces were joined by an armament of ships and soldiers under the command of Heraclides, a man of democratic leanings previously exiled by the tyrant. Opposition to the tyranny now began rupturing along the class divide, as the masses turned increasingly to Heraclides, while the rich and noble rallied to the conservative Dion. In the aftermath of five decades of tyrannical rule, marked by population transfers, banishments, and confiscations, relief and redress for economic hardship naturally formed the core of the democratic program. Particularly urgent was the need for land redistribution, a demand vigorously defended in the assembly on the principle that "equality is the basis of freedom (eleutheria), while poverty brings slavery (douleia) to the dispossessed." Dion unwisely attempted to block this measure, and for his efforts was deposed as supreme general. Shortly thereafter he and his supporters were driven from the city by the democrats—a departure that provided Dionysios his

opportunity. Having secured reinforcements from Italy, the tyrant's mercenaries launched a surprise counterraid that succeeded in recapturing much of the city. The hard-pressed citizens had but one remaining hope; the recall of Dion and his men. Plato's *erômenos* responded magnanimously and heroically, drove the foe back into the island fortress, and was hailed as the savior of his polis. At long last the tyrant's son—who had assumed command following Dionysios' earlier escape—surrendered the island to Dion in 355 BC. The stage was now seemingly set for a Platonic reformation of the Syracusan *politeia*.

Dion's first measure upon his return to power had been to annul earlier decrees entailing redistributions of the land, and he steadfastly opposed all additional requests of that kind. With intransigence ruling out compromise, the Syracusan citizenry began splitting once again into rival factions, 'the notables' and 'the best' (gnôrimoi and aristoi) supporting Dion, while 'the nautical mob' and 'vulgar craftsmen' (nautikos ochlos and banausoi) pressed for a return to democracy. Dion's own constitutional objective was to establish some form of oligarchical governing apparatus that, according to Plato's surmise, would administer the affairs of state in accordance with the principles of isonomia, 'equality under the law'. Plutarch provides a less guarded characterization of Dion's political vision: 45

It was his intention to prevent an unrestrained democracy (which he did not even regard as a constitution at all, but—in Plato's words—a kind of "bazaar of polities"), and to introduce and set in order a blend of democracy and kingship on the Spartan and Kretan model, wherein an aristocracy presides over and controls the most important affairs.

Within short order, however, suspicion began to mount that Dion was himself intending to reign as tyrant (he had conspicuously refrained from destroying the island fortress); and following the assassination of the democrat Heraclides by Dion's associates—a murder Dion had sanctioned—the prospects for tyranny seemed very real indeed. Whether Dion intended to rule as a kind of philosopher-king is uncertain, for before his plans were fully implemented or made clear, he was cut down in 354 BC by assassins in the employ of his Athenian comrade Callippus, a fellow Academic. There followed a succession of transitory tyrannies—Callippus, Dion's nephews, even Dionysios again, who returned in 346 BC—and amid the factional violence and political anarchy that attended these sanguinary struggles the once great empire of Syracuse disintegrated, and virtually all of Greek Sicily fell under the sway of petty tyrants and their mercenary armies. As M. I. Finley characterized the situation, "outright gangsterism had taken over." 46

The pressing need for the public apologia of the Seventh Letter should now be clear: far from effecting any positive changes in Syracusan life, the attempt to wed politics and philosophy had ended in unmitigated disaster, with the Academy itself stained by the bloody crimes of assassins. Plato's own involvement as the "educator of a tyrant" was a complete failurethough throughout he appears to have been a rather helpless and reluctant participant, motivated less by any real expectation of success than by the sense of shame that torments the contemplative personality whenever confronted by a challenge to translate theory into practice. He did choose participation, however, and it is clear that he saw in his beloved Dion a champion worthy of his philosophical ideals, "a man dikaios, andreios, sôphrôn, and philosophos."47 The inability to convert Dionysios to philosophy could be rationalized as an unsuitable test case, and that is apparently how Plato himself judged the matter, for he never abandoned the notion that the conversion of autocrats offered the quickest and easiest route to social melioration.48 The calamitous miscarriage of Dion's enterprise posed a more difficult problem, for not only was Dion Plato's close personal friend, his erômenos, he also represented the living embodiment of the ideal Platonic ruler. That latter aspect becomes particularly manifest when one examines Plato's Politikos, or 'Statesman', a dialogue generally dated between 367 and 357 BC, the decade of his most intense personal involvement in the affairs of Syracuse.

Employing his new method of logical division to reach a definition of the true statesman as one who is responsible for the "tendance" or care of a human community, Plato goes on to stress that it is the distinguishing mark of the true politikos that he alone possesses requisite knowledge in matters of ruling. Since such knowledge takes precedence over all other political concerns—including constitutional structures, codes of law, and even the consent of the governed—those special few who possess it are to be accorded considerable license in their "tendance" of the community: "

In purging the Polis for the good, they may put some of the citizens to death and banish others, or reduce the population by sending off colonies like bees from a hive, or augment it by admitting to citizenship those from the outside. So long as they follow knowledge and justice, thus preserving and improving the community so far as is possible, this alone according to our standards must be called the true *politeia*.

In defending this authoritarian doctrine, Plato deploys one of his favored analogies, that between politics and medicine. He maintains that the true statesman governs in much the same manner as the true physician heals: not on the basis of wealth or poverty, or on any rigid, written instructions, but solely on the expertise or knowledge appropriate to

these respective tasks. Indeed, the claims of epistêmê are so overriding that they are to take precedence even over the willingness of subjects and patients to undergo tendance and therapy! And when pointedly asked if it is not the case that "persuasion" is a necessary part of the statesman's art, Plato again invokes the medical analogy, declaring that if a physician effects a cure by imposing treatment on an unwilling patient, it would be absurd to hold that the physician had transgressed or violated the art of medicine. So, analogously, with the actions of the true statesman, who overturns written laws and ancestral customs and so forces the citizens into juster, greater, nobler actions:⁵⁰

No wrong can possibly be done by rulers so minded, so long as they preserve the one great principle, that they must always administer justice to those in the Polis, using intelligence and skill (meta nou kai technês), and so save and improve the citizens so far as is possible.

Plato immediately concedes that where the philosopher-statesmandoes not appear, the primacy of law must be maintained. For though Nomos is an imperfect master, too general and rigid to provide justice in all particular cases, it is "second best" after true knowledge, and therefore much to be preferred over the private and factional interests of those lacking true wisdom. ⁵¹ Such a backhanded compliment does little to resolve the tension, however, for in theoretically allowing for the possibility of a philosopher-king, Plato legitimizes the kind of "savior with a sword" figure that Dion personified and a handful of other Academics attempted to imitate. The least that can be said here is that a philosophy that sanctions the purging and cauterizing of unwilling subjects is dispensing a very dangerous and heady medicine; and in light of the doctrine, it is not at all surprising that the legacy of the Academy is burdened by the record of members turned tyrant and assassin.

The depth of Plato's involvement in the affairs at Syracuse and the magnitude of the ensuing disaster were experiences that could not pass without occasioning a reexamination of his political philosophy. And it appears that Plato did indeed come to grudgingly appreciate that the "real world of politics" was less malleable to the ordering vision of philosophy than he had originally supposed. The first signs of that rethinking can be found in the "postmortem" that is the Seventh Letter, addressed to the followers of Dion who were then seeking his advice. There he conspicuously avoids mention of the "true statesman" whose knowledge raises him above the law, and rather pointedly declares "do not subject Sicily or any other polis to human masters, but to the laws—this is my doctrine!" Moreover, the ominous medical analogies of the Politikos are now recast so that the patient's willingness to undergo treatment becomes

the primary consideration, with the consequence that Plato here condemns the purgative methods of exile and death he had earlier sanctioned. That this revision was not simply a defensive move to blunt criticism of the Syracusan tragedy is clear from Plato's last words on the subject, the *Laws*, written during the final years of his life.

A massive tome offering a host of detailed legislative proposals for the proper ordering of Polis life ("not Ten Commandments," Finley humorously notes, "but ten thousand"), the Laws has been generally regarded as a practical manual for lawgivers, Plato's paradigmatic bequest to his associates in the Academy and to any existing or future rulers who might be interested in ordaining "the good" for themselves and their citizens. Despite the limitations of Nomos that he had earlier exposed in championing the "true statesman" of the Politikos, Plato now holds that the salvation of a community depends on the subordination of human authorities to the rule of law—a self-correction he justifies by the parenthetical comment that "a man is always most shortsighted in such matters in his youth, and most farsighted in old age." The ideal of the philosopherking is likewise abandoned as a practical impossibility, though Plato still clings to his vision as philosophically true:⁵³

There is no man whose nature is naturally competent both to perceive what is beneficial for mankind in civic life and, perceiving it, to be always able and willing to do what is best. For in the first place, it is hard to perceive that a true political art cares for the community and not the individual-for the common interest binds poleis together, the private tears them asunder-and that it benefits both the community and the individual if public interests take precedence over private. Secondly, even if someone perceived the nature of these things and sufficiently mastered this technê, and afterwards became an absolute and unchecked ruler of a Polis, he would never be able to abide by this view and spend his life fostering the civic koinônia, with private interests subordinate to the public. Rather, his mortal nature (thnêtê physis) will always urge him towards aggrandizement and self-interested action (pleonexia kai idiopragia), avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without reason, and placing both of these in preference to what is better and more just. So creating darkness within itself, this mortal nature will in the end fill both the man and the entire Polis with all manner of evil. Yet if ever there should arise a man begotten by a divine fate, competent by nature and with the capacity to attain this stature, he would need no laws as rulers over him. For there is no law or ordinance that is greater than knowledge, nor is it right for intelligence to be subject or slave to anything, but to be the ruler of all things, if it is in fact true and free in its nature. But at present there is no such nature anywhere, except in a small degree; wherefore we must choose what is second best, ordinance and law, which look to and take heed of the general, but are incapable of regarding every case.

As he expresses it elsewhere, "we are talking to men, not gods," and as absolute power necessarily gluts those of human nature "with hubris and injustice," it is imperative that civic life be founded on the rule of law, which constitutes the instantiation or "dispensation of nous." Thus in the second-best (but best possible) polity of the Laws, it will not be philosophers who are empowered to rule in accordance with their knowledge of the Good, but civic magistrates who administer the dictates of sovereign Nomos. The institutional arrangements of the Republic that had fostered the emergence of philosophical natures and had insulated the Guardians from particular interests are accordingly dispensed with in the Laws, which substitutes a social order rather closely modelled after the Spartan politeia.

As with his cherished philosopher-king ideal, Plato does not repudiate the polity of the Republic as flawed in principle, but only unrealistic in practice, fit perhaps "for gods or sons of gods" but "beyond the present birth, rearing and education" of men. Thus, notwithstanding that a "communism of women, children, and all possessions" would constitute the best way of life, "reflection and experience" indicate that this ideal is unattainable; and so traditional family units as well as the private ownership of property are to be allowed, though not without restrictions, The territory upon which the new polis will be founded is to be parcelled into five thousand equal allotments, each klêros henceforth hereditary and inalienable. As in Lycurgus' Sparta, no citizen will be allowed to engage in the vulgar callings of merchant trade or craftwork, on the ground that such activities necessarily corrupt the soul through the shameless pursuit of private gain. Nor will citizens be required to perform manual labor on their own behalf: estates are to be "let out to slaves who will render up from the land such produce as is sufficient for men living moderately." As a further check against the pernicious influence of pecuniary concerns, the private ownership of gold and silver is forbidden, and a strictly local currency will be employed for all internal transactions (similar to the Spartan use of iron spits). And as "it is impossible for a man of extreme wealth to be also extremely good," no citizen will be allowed to accumulate possessions exceeding four times the value of his klêros, with all surpluses accruing to the polis. In short, disparities in wealth will be minimized so as to eliminate the basic cause of civic factionalism, i.e., the opposition between rich and poor; while all economic production and commercial activity will be turned over to metics and slaves (revealingly characterized as "men whose corruption would not entail a great disgrace for the polis"), thereby freeing the citizens—a landed gentry similar to the Spartan Homoioi-for the more noble pursuits of public service in politics, culture, and war.55

Inasmuch as despotism and excessive liberty are the two extremes that destroy civic communalism, the political apparatus of the Law-state must be established on the basis of a balanced mixture, a blending of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic features. In lieu of the unacceptable rule of mortal natures, the traditional ideal of Nomos Basileus, 'the Law is King', is to be enthroned in an extensive lawcode encompassing all facets of Polis life, including politics, religion, economics, familial relations, and education. Administrative and enforcement responsibilities are to be vested in various boards and offices whose members are elected on the basis of personal excellence in citizenship, thereby instituting an aristocracy of merit. To ensure balance from the popular side, a measure of democratic practice is to be allowed in the form of an assembly, the equitable rule of law, and in the principle of open eligibility for office.

The traditional aim of the lawgiver was the inculcation of civic virtue among the citizens, a charge that Plato accepts as the primary responsibility of his Law-state. Before all else, then, the educational system must be established on a sound basis, and as "the Polis teaches man," this necessarily entails a reformation of the entire cultural sphere. Although Plato defines paideia in traditional terms, "the training in aretê from childhood onwards which engenders an ardent and passionate desire to become a perfect citizen (teleos politês), one knowing how to rule and be ruled with justice," the normative content of that education differs significantly from conventional practice.57 As in the Republic, Plato maintains that a rigorous censorship of all cultural materials is necessary if the young are to learn that the good, the just, the pleasant, and the noble are all inseparable from each other. Unseemly myths, legends that present unsuitable role models, musical modes that excite the lower elements in human nature, and all other cultural productions that undermine the call to virtue are accordingly banned, including tragic drama. Somewhat grudgingly, Plato does allow for staged comedy, though of a controlled, "devitalized" sort, in which the objects of satire are to be restricted to noncitizens, and the performers slaves or foreigners. More fundamentally, the artist in the Law-state will be under an obligation to not only contour his art to the requirements of moral excellence—by consistently celebrating virtue and condemning vice-he will also be compelled to bridle his creative powers, on the ground that all innovation and changesave from evil-is "highly perilous." Hence Plato's peculiar fascination with Egypt, a society he lauds for the cultural rigidity it has displayed through the uniformity of its art over the preceding ten thousand years!58

Indoctrination and conditioning are thus central in the socialization of the young, but Plato appreciates that mature compliance with any moral

code presupposes a measure of reasoned acceptance by the citizens. Toward that end, he proposes that the legislative art be significantly broadened: all major injunctions and regulations of the lawcode are to be prefaced by written accounts that provide rational justifications for each statute. Beyond strengthening the devotion and commitment of the citizens to the laws, these educational "preambles" will also assist the lawgiver in his other major task, that of fostering *phronêsis* ('practical wisdom') and eradicating *anoia* ('ignorance') within the community.⁵⁹

Owing to the "universal weakness of human nature," these educational techniques can never fully reform and restrain those whose hard natures are "unsoftened" by paideia. A comprehensive criminal code is therefore necessary as a safeguard against the recalcitrant few, and it must be composed of three essential features: hortative preambles enjoining obedience to the laws; explicit penal sanctions for all offenses; and grim warnings of postmortem punishments in Hades and of the sufferings that will attend the rebirth of souls contaminated by evil. The primary aim of subjecting the offender to punishments—branding, flogging, incarceration, the pillory—is to improve his character through chastisement; where such correction fails, or where the offense is beyond redemption (e.g., treason with the enemy, factionalism), the community has no recourse but to impose death or exile.

The reference to judgment in the afterlife is not an incidental remark in Plato's last great vision of social reconstruction; the religious foundations of the Law-state are in fact stressed throughout, and the keynote of the entire composition is undoubtedly the celebrated comment that God, not man, is "the measure of all things."61 An examination of Plato's complicated theological views is beyond our present concern, but it is worth noting that as he restricted the scope of philosophic wisdom in his secondbest polity, religious values—though always present in his dialogues assume a much more direct and extensive normative authority. Indeed, in the closing books of the Laws, Plato makes it clear that the preservation of the entire legal-political order depends ultimately upon the citizenry's adherence to proper beliefs about the divine. The three great theological falsehoods-that the gods do not exist, that they take no interest in human affairs, that they can be seduced from justice by lavish offerings these blasphemies must be eradicated and suppressed, preferably by persuasion, but by force if necessary. A variety of detailed arguments are presented that are intended to refute not only the materialistic cosmologies of the physikoi that promote atheism, but also the many unseemly myths that compromise traditional morality. Should these arguments—which are to be incorporated in the lawcode—fail to dissuade the citizen from impiety, the offender will be incarcerated for therapy in a kind of mental institution, the *sôphronistêrion*, and eventually executed if he fails to purge his *psychê* of heresy. Plato's demand for religious orthodoxy is so uncompromising that he reserves the same corrective procedures for all atheists, including those who shun injustice and evil.⁶²

The grand exercise in legislation is finally brought to a close with a discussion of the infamous 'Nocturnal Council' (nukterinos sullegos), an institution charged with "preserving the laws and the constitution." Both the sinister title and its stated function mislead: the name simply refers to the time of day in which the members assemble to conduct their business (in the predawn hours); while the responsibility for "preserving" the legal-political order actually brings with it powers that raise the Nocturnal Council to a position of dominance. Composed of the senior magistrates, various religious officials, other noteworthy citizens, and a number of younger associates distinguished for their virtue, this small council of perhaps sixty or so men is to oversee "all that occurs concerning the polis," though its precise statutory authority is to be left unspecified until the council actually convenes and determines this for itself.63 More revealing perhaps is the laudatory manner in which the members are characterized: "possessed of all virtue," these are individuals who are capable of discerning the Forms among the many particulars, and as such they will serve as "the interpreters, teachers, legislators, and guardians of all the rest." That all-encompassing supervision calls to mind the philosopherrulers of the Republic, which is presumably Plato's intention since he frequently refers to the members of the Nocturnal Council as simply "the Guardians."64 Indeed, it is explicitly noted that men of such extraordinary abilities will require an advanced education, a premise that legitimizes both the theory of the Republic and the practice of the Academy on the subject of training a political elite. Once such figures are "carefully selected and properly educated," it becomes essential that "the polis be delivered over to this divine council" for tendance, thereby bringing an end to the corruption and conflict that presently disfigure the course of civic life.65

The finishing flourish of the Laws thus makes it clear that while Plato saw the need to temper or modify his earlier sociopolitical views, he by no means felt constrained to abandon them. If philosophy could not rule openly in this mundane world, then wisdom must be instantiated in the rigid but more stable guise of Nomos, itself the creation of men whose communion with philosophy affords them access to the divine realm of timeless truths. Though chastened by the Syracusan tragedy, Plato never wavered in his conviction that true knowledge must be wedded to political power if the moral regeneration of society is to become a waking reality rather than a fanciful dream.

Having outlined the major themes in Plato's social philosophy, along with the pertinent biographical facts, we are now in a position to situate his thought in the wider cultural and social context from which it emerged and to which it responded. In an effort to facilitate that task, the basic volitional-cognitive structures that comprise Plato's "world view" will be analytically separated and examined for the various assumptions, linguistic modes, inconsistencies, and internal limits that most plausibly suggest some form of sociological "determination" or anchorage.66 From the preceding review of Plato's social diagnoses and recommended therapies, three such noetic complexes or patterns are identifiable: his commitment to the prevailing Polis-citizen normative tradition; his identification with the cultural ethos of the aristocracy; and his revolutionary conception of philosophy as a transfiguring power. Although the philosophical component is unquestionably the dominant cognitive modality in Plato's consciousness, and indeed critically expands, refines, and at certain points even transcends both the Polis-citizen and the aristocratic traditions, it is also true that these latter two cultural legacies significantly constrain, channel, and inform a number of postulates and axioms central to Plato's philosophy.

Let us begin with the obvious: no sage or artist ever creates ex nihilo, but must necessarily work with—and possibly through—a socially inherited aggregate of mental categories, values, perceptions, and modes of discourse. The major cultural traditions and socialization practices of Polis society have been delineated in earlier chapters, and both as a citizen and as an aristocrat, Plato was heir to that endowment. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the formative influence of Plato's milieu upon his reflective processes is the marked prominence he accords to the ideals of civic virtue and devoted service to the Polis, principles upon which he was nurtured from youth onwards through various media of cultural expression. Far from rejecting the regnant Polis-citizen value system, Plato's philosophical reason is in large measure directed towards the normative exaltation and practical realization of its principles—as evidenced by his seemingly obsessive quest for unity within the civic community and the variety of radical methods he proposed to further that end. It is instructive to recall that the subordination of private to communal interests was not simply a long-standing Greek ideal, it was to a large extent contemporary practice, mandated by a legal-political apparatus that penetrated deeply into the spheres of the personal, regulating such familial concerns as marriage, inheritance, and legitimacy, and demanding of its citizenry various compulsory services ranging from liturgical benefactions to the duties of the hoplite-warrior. Plato's social philosophy was in fundamental accord with that communal ethos, and one of the reasons why he praised the

politeia of "man-taming" Sparta (despite its excessive militarism) and condemned that of democratic Athens, was precisely because the latter had, in his view, allowed the individual "license to do whatever he likes," an anarchic principle destructive of the communal bond.67 It is therefore quite misleading to charge Plato with "totalitarianism" in this regard, for his theorizing did not presuppose the kind of bifurcation of "state" and "society" characteristic of modernity-something quite alien to Greek thought and practice, given that the self-governing citizenry constituted the "state." Like his predecessors, Plato's perception was grounded in a tradition that held that the Polis was the collective magnification of the citizen's life and powers, a quasi-divine normative authority that made the good life—the life of eudaimonia and aretê—possible for its civic progeny.

The analogue to this communal ideal was the focus on virtues germane to the status of citizenship, and here too Plato's traditionalism is quite pronounced, seeing that the object of moral edification throughout his writings is not humanity at large, not "man" distinct from the social positions he occupies, but rather the citizen of Polis society. To be sure, in following up the Sokratic identification of virtue with knowledge, Plato transvalued conventional standards by investing them with cognitive qualities that minimized their dependence on particular social roles; but it is still worth stressing that the potential carrier of "human value" still remained the citizen, while all "outsiders" were in some sense beyond the pale. Hence the judgment that metics and slaves—unlike citizens were men whose "corruption" from degrading trade and labor brought no great disgrace to the Polis and that barbaroi were fit to be warred upon and enslaved. Not only is there no notion in the Platonic corpus that slavery is an evil or unnatural institution, but inasmuch as the manifestation of excellence as a citizen presupposes freedom from direct productive labor and leisure for public service, the enslavement of outsiders constitutes a sociological imperative, in Plato's model communities no less than in conventional Polis society.68 Nor can Plato be regarded as particularly progressive on the subject of interpolis relations, for though pan-Hellenic sentiments are occasionally expressed (most notably in his request that Greeks refrain from enslaving each other and limit their mutual wars to chastisements rather than savage reprisals), the insular world of Polis society remains the canvas upon which Plato illustrates the life of perfect virtue. Indeed, even in his revolutionary demand that politics be transfigured in the light of true philosophy, Plato adheres to the Polis-citizen standard by justifying the rule of philosophy on the ground that conventional political practice—whether oligarchical, democratic, or tyrannical-had manifestly failed in its traditional responsibility of "making the citizens better" by educating them in the ways of aretê.69

As we have seen, however, Plato's appeal to communalism and notion of citizenship is scarcely a neutral one, being informed by a marked aristocratic bias at several critical points. Full political participation by the "multitude," the dêmos, is attacked with an almost reflexive scorn throughout, and so too the democratic principle of equality, which is assailed for "distributing a kind of equality to equals and unequals alike."70 We are repeatedly informed that the masses are congenitally incapable of either the love of wisdom or the true art of politics, from which it follows that for their own benefit and that of the community, the multitudes should be guided and governed by those few who are "fit by nature both to engage in philosophy and to rule in the Polis."71 More revealing still of an aristocratic animus is the invidious language that Plato frequently employs in referring to the dêmos. To characterize one's fellow citizens as "wild beasts," "the wretched multitude," "the great beast," "a manifold and many-headed beast," to speak derisively of "the mania of the multitude" and to compare life of the many, hoi polloi, with that of "cattle which are ever grazing, fattening, and copulating," surely all this bears the impress of a reactionary class ideology rather than any philosophical insight.72 Plato's advocacy of communalism and civic harmony is thus gravely compromised by a manner of expression that remains shackled to the deadweight of traditional aristocratic prejudice. Even in so original and vital a subject as the nature of the human psychê, Plato's thought seems bound by the constraining vocabulary and imagery of partisan politics. The tripartite structure of the soul is described in explicit "constitutional" terms, with the rational element fit for rule, the spirited for war and control, and the appetitive for slavery. Disorder in the soul is correspondingly characterized as a form of stasis, sparked whenever the massive appetitive part raises faction and "attempts to enslave those elements which it is not fit by genos ('race' or 'descent') to rule."73 In wedding such provocative language with the avowed purpose of elucidating the parallels between psychê and polis, self and society, there seems little doubt that Plato's understanding of "psychology" was in part a projection of his sociopolitical attitudes, and that the stated correspondence between the nonrational, appetitive element of the individual soul and the ignorant, passion-driven social multitudes was intended to legitimize the rule of a philosophically informed political elite.74

Plato's conception of conventional politics likewise betrays its grounding in the aristocratic world view, as it is characteristic of ruling elites—and particularly those whose grip on power has been loosened—to regard the political realm not as an arena for the adjudication of legitimate conflicts, but as a state or condition of health-disease, order-anar-

chy. For those accustomed to rule, the art of politics is the art of control, of imposition rather than compromise, with the consequence that social disturbances are regarded as symptoms of disease or anarchy that require suppression rather than mediation. Plato's affinity with this perspective is revealed in his marked preference for analogies and metaphors that suggest that political solutions are possible only through active agency from above coupled with passive acceptance from below: e.g., the ruler as "physician" who cures the diseases of the body politic (sometimes through "cauterization"); as the "navigator" whose knowledge of the heavenly reality allows him alone to pilot the ship of state; as the "royal weaver" who skillfully intertwines the threads of unity within the fabric of society. There is a similar social basis for the aesthetic-normative watchwords that pervade Plato's discourse: limit, proportion, symmetry, harmony, order, etc., are all concepts with an intuitive appeal to ruling or privileged strata, whose position of preeminence fosters an idealization of existing or traditional social arrangements and a corresponding aversion to change, complexity, and diversity. Plato's aristocratic aesthetic features as its standard the social value of art, its formative influence upon human character and the political order, and it is that orientation that explains his seemingly perverse desire to prevent all novelty and reduce variety in the cultural sphere. "To bar men from their own imaginations," Jacob Burckhardt's incisive characterization of Plato's intentions, is a most effective—but dehumanizing—method of social control.75

Perhaps the most important limitation that Plato's aristocratic heritage imposed on his philosophy concerns the inconsistency between his frequently expressed scorn for the ignorant masses of humanity on the one hand and his panhuman elevation of the psychê on the other. It is the former attitude that fosters Plato's authoritarian paternalism, his emphasis on control and conditioning, while the latter celebrates the liberating capacity of knowledge and the critical impulse enshrined in his memorable maxim, "the unexamined life is not worth living." The chasm separating these two orientations is unbridged in Plato's writings, for the anthropological dualism between the wise few and the ignorant many (integral to Plato's politics) is nowhere explicitly related to the doctrines pertaining to the soul's immortality, its kinship with the divine, and its linkage with the theory of the supersensible Forms (all integral to Plato's ethical and metaphysical concerns). Indeed, there are several striking passages that present an "enlightenment" view of reason and the psychê that stand in sharp contrast to the negative assessment of the common man's capacity for intellectual autonomy and virtue that Plato draws in his political commentary. In the famous allegory of the cave, Plato stresses that education is not a matter of putting vision into a blind eye, but in redirecting sight to

the true reality, a practical possibility since "the dynamis ('capacity' or 'power') to learn and the organ by which we do so are within the psychê of each of us." Moreover, Plato declares that the aretê of thinking or understanding (to phronein), which is "more divine" than all other excellences, "never loses its dynamis, but depending on its direction is either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful." Temporarily entombed within the body, the psychê is unavoidably contaminated by the earthly dross of sensuous appetites and desires, but Plato maintains that these "leaden weights" that pull the soul downward can be "hammered off" by education and the true love of wisdom—or as he expresses it elsewhere, they can be "canalized" into higher pursuits. The logical implications of Plato's theory of Anamnesis also point to a potential panhuman emancipation: To the property of the pr

The psychê, since it is immortal and has come to birth many times, has seen what is here and in Hades and all things, so there is nothing which it has not learned. No wonder, then, that it can recollect what it knew previously regarding virtue and other things. For as all nature is akin and as the psychê has learned everything, there is nothing to prevent a man after recollecting one thing—which is what men call learning—from finding out all the rest himself, if he is courageous and does not weary of the search. For all seeking and learning is nothing but recollection (anamnêsis).

Finally, we should note that Plato never abandoned the Socratic paradox that "no one willingly does wrong," a thesis that attributes all error and vice to the pursuit of "false" goods, a miscalculation occasioned by unintentional ignorance of what is truly valuable and beneficial.⁷⁸ This intellectualist orientation, combined with the notion that human beings naturally desire the good, similarly reinforces the emancipatory conception of the *psychê*, inasmuch as a proper education holds the promise of eliminating the causes of wrongdoing.⁷⁹

Why, then, does Plato seek to restrict political power and authority to a select few, and confine the citizen masses to a form of "passive citizenship" in which they are denied any self-directive capacity? Why, indeed, does Plato insist on a rigid and narrow functional specialization in the Republic, a format in which the vast majority of citizens are excluded from the communism scheme and the advanced system of education and are thereby consigned to practices that will further corrupt their souls? Since Plato's philosophy demands a reformation of human character and society, it will not do to suggest that he simply concluded from the present state of corruption that most individuals are inherently benighted and therefore beyond significant redemption. Nor does the transmigration theory with its inferior reincarnations for the wicked entirely satisfy, for on that principle all effort at social reconstruction would appear mean-

ingless. Hence we seem driven to the conclusion that ideology has here intruded in a decisive manner, as Plato's aristocratic animus against the masses overrides the logical social implications of his panhuman doctrine of the immortal, quasi-divine *psychê*, and substitutes instead a truncated version in which the wise few must govern the appetitive many for the best interest of all concerned.

For all his identification with certain features of the Polis-citizen and aristocratic traditions, however, the philosopher is also quite clearly a man apart, a circumstance Plato both lauds and laments throughout his dialogues. Since it is not the Polis but the Form of the Good that is the highest normative standard for the philosopher, and since, correspondingly, it is not the citizen—nor even the aristocrat—but the lover of wisdom who is judged the true carrier of human value, the philosopher's relationship to conventional society will always be tenuous. To remold both Polis and citizen in the light of philosophical reason was Plato's most fervent aim, but his confidence in practical realization was never so strong that he failed to stress the independent, transcendental value of the philosophic life.81 Hence the oscillations within the Platonic corpus between attitudes of critical engagement on the one hand and of detached alienation on the other, radical extremes that Plato managed to encompass within his expansive conception of philosophy as a healing art for both self and society.

5.IV THE MINOR SOKRATICS AND THE ONSET OF NORMATIVE INDIVIDUALISM

As discussed in Chapter 4.IV, the revolution in adolescent education initiated by the Sophists during the second half of the fifth century established the institutional basis for the emergence of a new stratum of professional intellectuals. These sophoi, or 'wise men', gained fame and fortune by tutoring the sons of the wealthy and by offering public lectures on subjects ranging from mathematics and astronomy to literary criticism and logic. The flowering of intellectualism that ensued did much to broaden the horizons of Hellenic culture, but the emancipation of critical reason from the confines of traditionalism was not without costs. Almost immediately, the hallowed sanctity of conventional standards was called into question by the discovery of cultural relativism, while patriotic appeals to civic virtue were rendered suspect by the antisocial doctrines of physis-egoism. Into this breach stepped yet another proponent of rationalism, the Athenian Sokrates, who sought to counter the antinomian views of Sophism and thereby reestablish an objective basis for ethical conduct. His enterprise and extraordinary personality soon attracted others to his fellowship, younger members of the *kaloikagathoi* as well as other aspiring sages and renowned Sophists from all over the Greek world, many of whom were initially attracted by the wealth, power, and cultural dynamism of imperial Athens.¹

The reception given to the new wisdom by the public was decidedly mixed: renown and riches being awarded in some circles, scorn and persecution in others. Active opposition tended to galvanize around three basic charges: that the Sophists were purveying atheism through their materialistic cosmologies; that as "excessive intellectualism" supplanted the archaia paideia, with its gymnastic regimen for war and sport and its aesthetic refinement, the martial and moral fibre of the citizenry was being gravely weakened; and thirdly, that in espousing the relativity of Nomos, and in some instances even preaching its subordination to purported "laws of nature," the new education was serving as a nursery for tyrants. As public anxiety mounted during the final war- and faction-ridden decades of the fifth century, these complaints grew louder, with the consequence that Sokrates himself—though not a true Sophist, a "professional" educator—was executed in 399 BC as a threat to the community.

Plato's response to the death of his mentor and the moral and social turmoil of his era was examined in the preceding section: a grand, visionary synthesis that sought to reconstitute the Polis-citizen bond and the aristocratic ethos on a higher plane, informed by a philosophical spirit fusing the practical turn of the Sokratic "care for the psychê" with the metaphysical mysticism of Pythgoreanism. Although his work undoubtedly constitutes the richest development of Sokrates' legacy, it was not the only one, nor, initially, even the most celebrated. Among the associates of Sokrates, there were several distinguished sages whose seniority in age and experience marked them rather than the youthful Plato as the leading "disciples." Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the philosophies of these so-called minor Sokratics, for their voluminous writings are not only lost, save for a few isolated fragments, but the doxographical summaries preserved in later sources tend to conceal their original form, having been recaste in the language of subsequent philosophical schools, notably the Epicurean and Stoic. Despite these difficulties, it is essential that brief mention be made of their contributions to the intellectual milieu of the early fourth century, both for the exegetical significance that their positions hold for the more prominent themes of others, and for purposes of understanding later philosophical developments.

Of the dozen or so *sophoi* who shared Sokrates' fellowship, three (apart from Plato) were to play a significant role in charting the course of fourth-century philosophy: Euclides of Megara, Aristippus of Cyrene,

and Antisthenes of Athens. Each of these men pursued in a one-sided fashion certain aspects of Sokrates' thought, along with other themes traceable to various Sophists and physikoi. Of Euclides and the "Megarian school" he founded, little need be said here, for his primary concerns were in the fields of metaphysical ontology and logic. Although specific doctrines of the Megarians are obscure, they did foster a general skepticism regarding sensory experience and questioned the capacity of language to convey information about reality—two problems that were to preoccupy much of subsequent philosophy.

Aristippus (c. 435-350 BC) was a native of Cyrene, a prosperous Greek polis on the Libyan coast, who is said to have first journeyed to Athens because of the fame of Sokrates.3 He presented himself as a professional educator and after Sokrates' death migrated to the tyrannical court at Syracuse in search of patronage (where he had several bantering encounters with Plato). Towards the end of his life he returned to Cyrene and there founded the "Cyrenaic school" later headed by his daughter Arete and grandson Aristippus. He is generally regarded as the first philosopher of hedonism, an orientation he seems to have based on an epistemology partly derived from Protagoras' "man-measure" doctrine. Given the relativism of sensory experience, all that can be known with certainty are our own particular sensations or emotional states (pathê), not the things that cause them (ta pepoiêkota ta pathê). From this Aristippus concludes that our own personal emotions and experiences can be our only legitimate concern (natural science and mathematics were dismissed as useless) and that rational conduct must seek to promote pleasurable subjective sensations. In his own case, that injunction entailed maintenance of an extravagant life-style replete with luxurious dining and sexual indulgence, the latter pursuit including expensive liaisons with many of the most celebrated courtesans of the day. There are several anecdotes and fragments that suggest that Aristippus' hedonism was not unqualified, however, for he does speak of the importance of training and disciplining the psychê and insists that 'practical wisdom', or phronesis, is required as a calculus for conduct. He also holds that the aim, or telos, of hedonism is not a total abandonment to sensual delights, but rather a rational control over them: "It is not the one who abstains who masters hêdonê, but the one who experiences it without being wrongly carried away"; or "To master pleasures without being overcome is aristos, not their avoidance." As a corollary to this ethos of self-gratification, Aristippus advocated indifference to the normative claims of the Polis koinônia, and open rejection of the duties of citizenship whenever they conflict with the life of pleasure.

In his Memorabilia, Xenophon preserves a revealing exchange between Aristippus and Sokrates on the subject of how an individual ought to live, whether in the cultivation of private desires or in the pursuit of virtue through public service. To Sokrates' argument that a readiness to endure ponos ('hard work', 'toil') and the possession of enkrateia ('self-control') are essential attributes for those aspiring to rule in the Polis, Aristippus responds by dismissing such service as an ideal:

For considering how great a task it is to provide for one's own needs, it seems to me entirely senseless (aphrôn) for a man not to be content with that, but to take on the added task of providing for the needs of other citizens as well.

Far from regarding political office a great honor—the traditional assessment—Aristippis actually likens it to slavery:

For poleis deem it proper to use their leaders just as I use my house-slaves. For I require that my servants provide me with the necessities of life in abundance, but not to grasp any of these things for themselves. And so too poleis believe that their archons are to furnish them with all manner of good things, yet must refrain from these things themselves.

Under such circumstances, one ought surely aim for "the life of greatest ease and pleasure." Sokrates counters by arguing that rulers generally live more pleasantly than the ruled and that the politically powerless are apt to be treated like slaves by their rulers. Aristippus' aspiration to follow a "middle path" that bypasses both rule and slavery is an illusion, since he must perforce "live among men" and therefore either become the servant of others or rule himself. Aristippus suggests that as one who will not "lock himself up" in any one politeia—i.e., by living as a metic in various poleis-he will avoid the factional struggles of political life, and thus remain free to pursue his own eudaimonia. Moreover, even if his own position entails risks, Sokrates' alternative is still more unappealing, since in his conception the rulers must undergo toil and sacrifice for the collective good, which Aristippus labels "the folly of voluntary suffering." The debate is brought to a close at this point, with an unpersuaded Sokrates offering several encomia on the personal joys that attend service to family, friends, and country, and on the superiority of a life of virtue over that devoted to sensual vice and idleness.5

The meager evidence available makes it difficult to judge Aristippus' stature as a thinker, but it does not appear that his was a particularly original mind, seeing that hedonism and epistemological relativism were both of earlier vintage. Indeed, the "cultivation of self" philosophy that he advocates seems little more than an intellectual refinement of certain attitudes and behavioral patterns prevalent among depoliticized sections of

the aristocracy and wealthy, the so-called apragmones, or 'uninvolved', who reacted to the rising influence of the dêmos, "the ignorant mob," by minimizing their involvement in public affairs in favor of the private pleasures of eros, culture, and luxury. This retreat into "passive citizenship" had been initially occasioned by the curtailment of aristocratic power in the spheres of war and politics (3.II.iv), but now that decades of factionalism and ruinous interpolis warfare had debased the very ideals of citizenship, the attractions of "soft escapism" were naturally more alluring. The inner connections between a philosophy of leisured hedonism and the social position of an apolitical rentier class of slaveowners—of which Aristippus was himself a member—are too obvious for comment.

In sharp contrast to Aristippus' advocacy of pleasure, Antisthenes of Athens (c. 446–366 BC) championed a philosophy of personal renunciation and endurance. A pupil of the celebrated sophist Gorgias and later a devoted companion of Sokrates, Antisthenes was a philosopher of broad scholarly concerns. The listed titles of his extensive writings (all lost) and the surviving fragments attest to interests in numerous fields, including rhetoric, literary criticism, biology, logic, theology, and ethics. He was an early critic of Plato's Theory of Forms ("A horse I see, but horseness I do not see"), and he also raised important logical problems concerning predication and contradiction. It was in the domain of ethics, however, that Antisthenes established his reputation as a sage, largely by raising Sokrates' way of life and personality into a normative ideal.

The priority that Sokrates accorded the psychê, the true self, entailed a devaluation or subordination of "external" or worldly standards of value: wealth, status, power, and the like. The philosopher himself neglected the productive management of his own oikos in favor of discourse with friends and went about in simple clothes and unclad feet—traits that Aristophanes and others caricatured as evidence of pro-Spartan sympathies. In opposition to those who held that luxury and extravagance brought eudaimonia, Sokrates maintained that "to have no wants is divine, and to have as few as possible is nearest to the divine." His indifference to conventional goods was complemented by his celebrated equanimity in all circumstances, whether facing dangers as a hoplite, being ridiculed by interlocutors, defending himself before a hostile jury, or in conversation with grieving friends in the hours before his execution.

Antisthenes, possibly Sokrates' closest friend, was deeply influenced by his mentor's example, and accordingly based his own ethical teachings upon the twin Sokratic principles of *autarkeia* and *enkrateia*, 'self-sufficiency' and 'self-mastery'. True wealth and poverty, he maintained, do not pertain to externals, but to the condition of one's *psychê*, and all that the

body requires is a basic satisfaction of essential needs: simple food, clothing, shelter, and periodic sex. ¹⁰ Those who strive after luxury and refinement rob themselves of the leisure necessary for moral betterment and enslave their souls to the dictates of the body. The Aristippean ideal of hedonism is vigorously rejected on the ground that the pursuit of pleasure binds the *psychê* to the external world, thereby diminishing its *autarkeia*. For Antisthenes, *aretê*, or 'moral virtue', is sufficient for *eudaimonia*, which he basically equates with a disposition of independence or freedom from worldly needs and passions. ¹¹

To what extent the sage should become independent of the Polis koinônia is unfortunately nowhere clearly specified in the surviving materials. Though several fragments are manifestly antidemocratic in orientation, featuring complaints about equality with unequals and the participation of the phauloi and ponêroi (the 'wretched' and 'knavish') in public life, Antisthenes does not counsel complete withdrawal. His advice is that one should approach politics "just like fire, advancing neither too close, lest one become burned, nor remaining too far away, lest one grow cold." His didactic use of the mythic Herakles and the Persian king Cyrus as role models for public service also points to some form of civic concern, though direct involvement will presumably be limited to those instances where the situation allows for remedial action.

It is hazardous to attempt sociological exegesis where the evidence is so slender, but Nietzsche's insight that ascetic ideals invariably provide some form of "bridge to independence" offers a tempting analytical key for the interpretation of Antisthenes' philosophy of renunciation.¹³ By sundering the self from the standards of conventional existence, the sage gains a measure of immunity from the hurly-burly of the outside world, a "defensive" strategy all the more necessary in periods of social disorganization and crisis. The metaphors that Antisthenes employs in expressing his central thesis leave little doubt as to their animating motivations:¹⁴

The most unassailable wall of fortification is *phronêsis* ('practical wisdom'), for it is never stormed nor betrayed.

Fortifications must be constructed in our own impregnable reasonings.

Aretê is a shield (hoplon) which cannot be taken away.

The proverbial "siege mentality" is here in evidence, and from the assaulting forces of the outside world the individual is enjoined to retreat into the stronghold of his own inner self.¹⁵ Where the Polis, the citizens' commune, had once provided a secure bulwark for the lives of its members—its normative standards offering a coherent ethos for conduct, its institutions and roles a fulfilling mode of existence—the sage now sets up

independent standards of value. And if this interiorization of virtue does not yet feature an explicit repudiation of the Polis-citizen framework, there is no mistaking which principles now take precedence: "For the sage will be guided in his public affairs not by the established nomoi, but by the law of aretê." 16

The first steps in the emigration of the sage from civic society become visible in the philosophies of Aristippus and Antisthenes. Where Sokrates and Plato had exalted psychê and polis simultaneously, and had sought their mutual regeneration through philosophic wisdom, the two "minor Sokratics" concentrate almost exclusively on the individual, the one seeking eudaimonia through a masterful enjoyment of pleasures, the other autarkeia through a renunciation of conventional standards of value. Though hedonism and asceticism constitute rather one-sided and simplistic responses to the waning intensity of the Polis-citizen bond, each achieves the desired result of distancing the psychê from the decaying Polis organization, of freeing the individual from traditional values and practices that are being rendered problematic by the dislocating effects of social change. As it turns out, it will not be Plato's utopian appeal to transfigure self and society through the linkage of philosophy with political power that wins the support of the majority of later intellectuals, but the apolitical, individualistic stance of his two elder contemporaries.

5.V THE MACEDONIAN CONQUEST AND THE SUPPRESSION OF POLIS AUTONOMY

In the aftermath of the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC, the mutually destructive cycle of inconclusive local wars and failed drives at regional hegemony continued to drain away the diminishing resources of the leading Hellenic powers. Sparta's decline was the most precipitous. Decades of warfare had ravaged the ranks of its citizen-army, while the loss of Messenian territory—and the Helot population that had for centuries cultivated its rich abundance—dealt a crippling blow to the agrarian base of the society. Irredentist policies of reconquest were accordingly foremost on Sparta's agenda, but the expulsion of many of its oligarchical allies within the Peloponnese, coupled with its own diminished manpower, promised only perpetual, debilitating stalemate. The situation was scarcely less bleak in Argos. Sparta's longtime rival had never fully recovered from setbacks in the Peloponnesian War, and thereafter the plains of the Argolid were repeatedly trampled by invading armies. Hard-pressed by war from without, the Argives were also afflicted by faction from within, their civic koinônia irreparably shattered by the murderous assault on

the megaloploutoi during the skytalismos affair. A community militarily drained and politically unstable, Argos mirrored the plight of many fourth-century poleis. Even the sudden ascendancy of Thebes had brought no lasting advantages, for by midcentury its citizens were embroiled in several ruinous wars against rebellious dependencies in northern and central Greece. Adverse conditions prevailed in Athens as well, for though a modest revival attended the refounding of its naval league in 378 BC, this had in no sense restored the prosperity and power of the former imperial era. Indeed, for large sections of the civic population, material prospects grew ever more desperate—an intolerable condition in a democracy, and one that eventually forced the Athenians to revert to the old practice of planting kleruch-settlers in allied territories, in contravention of the terms of the new alliance. Before these imperialist measures could proceed too far, Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Kos overturned their democracies and revolted from the league, sparking a major war in the Aegean (357-355 BC). After several humiliating naval defeats, and their finances strained by the effort, the Athenians assented to independence for the breakaway poleis amid general feelings of war weariness and despair.

While the major city-states were thus exhausting themselves in mutually ruinous bids for regional hegemony—thereby compounding the misery of many smaller communities, plagued by their own local wars and civic disputes—a neighbor to the north was harnessing its bounteous resources and preparing the ground for a forceful intrusion upon the world of the Polis. That neighbor was Macedonia, a backwater kingdom long riven by dynastic intrigues and warring clans, and oft subject to territorial depredations by bordering Balkan tribesmen and by Greeks from the south.²

The Macedonians were of Greek stock, though for centuries they had remained outside the mainstream of Hellenic civilization. They were generally regarded as barbaroi by their distant kin, who found the Macedonian language—a patois Greek dialect—largely incomprehensible, their archaic social customs uncouth. Macedonia had preserved many features of the "heroic era" depicted by Homer, with a patrimonial monarch exercising his rule through a self-assertive retinue of warrior-nobles, each of whom wielded considerable power in the regions that contained their vast estates. Feasting, hunting, athletics, and war were the principal aristocratic activities; while necessary productive tasks were relegated to slaves and serfs, and a freeholding peasantry that owed labor services and taxes in kind to the clan nobles. Urbanization was both late (fifth century) and minimal, and largely confined to the southeastern region adjacent to the Greek poleis of the Thermaic Gulf and Chalcidic peninsula. The country was exceedingly rich by Greek standards, with substantial

mineral deposits, great timber forests and rivers, and several expansive plains that supported a proportionately large human population as well as great herds of livestock. That this prodigal endowment had not been translated into effective national power prior to the fourth century can be attributed to two fundamental institutional problems: chronic political instability and an unbalanced military format. The former difficulty was literally multifaceted, for not only was the kingship frequently contested by pretenders to the throne (polygamous practices bred many aspirants), but the kings were engaged in an ongoing struggle with various clan barons who opposed royal efforts at centralization. In the military sphere, Macedonian prowess was limited to its superb cavalry, a hard-charging force that was carried into battle by a superior, heavier breed of horse, nurtured on the rich grazing lands and manned exclusively by warriornobles and their retainers. The peasants who filled the ranks of the infantry were, in contrast, both ill equipped and ill trained, and thus no match for disciplined Greek hoplites or the fierce tribal peoples who intermittently overran and appropriated the kingdom's border territories. Charisma, in its familiar historical guise as solvent of the old and catalyst for the new, would occasion the transcendence of both of these traditional limitations.

When Philip II donned the Macedonian crown in 359 BC at the age of twenty-three, he inherited a kingdom verging on imminent collapse. Three invading armies-Illyrians from the west, Paeonians from the north, and Thracians from the east—were advancing deep into the realm, while dead in the field lay the previous king, Philip's brother, along with several thousand warriors. Philip reacted to the crisis with the decisiveness and foresight that were to become legendary, first buying off the Thracians and Paeonians with offers of gold and silver—a respite that enabled him to remodel and train his army over the winter months—and then launching spring offensives against the Illyrians and Paeonians, both of whom suffered heavy defeats at the hands of Philip's improved forces. Over the next few campaigning seasons, the victorious monarch proceeded to expand the borders of his kingdom, appropriating various holdings in Thrace (including the rich mining district around Mount Pangaeus, soon yielding the fabulous sum of one thousand talents annually to Philip's coffers) and capturing several Greek poleis along the coast, actions that opened a desultory war with the Athenians, whose allies and colonies were among Philip's conquests.

This remarkable reversal of national fortune was due to Philip's inspired leadership, but extraordinary individuals reshape history only to the extent that they transpose their individual talents and vision into

lasting institutional arrangements. Philip's immediate challenge had been to rebuild an ineffective army, and here he was well-served by an earlier childhood experience. During the period of Theban hegemony, a dependent Macedonia had been obliged to deliver "honored hostages" from the nobility as pledges of fidelity. Among those sequestered was the young Philip, whose stay in Thebes (367–364 BC) afforded opportunity to associate with the preeminent military men of the age, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, from whom he undoubtedly learned the value of phalanx discipline, oblique maneuvers, and weighted tactical wings. These lessons—to be blended with innovations of his own design—the newly crowned Philip now applied to the Macedonian militia, and in swift order he succeeded in forging a most formidable instrument of royal power.³

The combat effectiveness of the infantry was dramatically enhanced through several major reforms, beginning with intensified training in formation tactics. Philip also raised the quality of the Macedonian panoply, the most important change being introduction of the sarissa as the principal striking weapon of the infantry, a heavy pike measuring fifteen to eighteen feet in length and capped by a foot-long blade of iron. Held in both hands, with a small button-shaped shield strapped around the shoulders and left arm for protection, the sarissa was a devastating weapon when encased within an advancing, tightly compacted phalanx of warriors bellowing the ancient Macedonian war cry-to its enemies it appeared as if they were being assailed by an armored porcupine bristling with deadly iron-tipped quills. The sarissa-pike was cumbrous, however, and to offset its limitations Philip formed an elite squadron of hoplites, the royal Shield-Bearers who utilized spears and swords more suitable for the close infighting of direct line engagements (the sarissa-phalanx being most effective in cutting through formations already disrupted). In keeping with the new directions in fourth century warfare, Philip also employed other diversified tactical units, such as peltasts, slingers, and archers, and he developed a vastly improved siege apparatus that included torsion catapults, rams, and scaling towers. The end product was a disciplined, flexible, articulated army capable of fighting all manner of foe under any circumstance. As before, however, the Macedonian heavy cavalry-spear-wielding and mail-coated-remained the decisive striking force, shattering opposing infantry by charging in at the flanks in wedgeshaped formations at full gallop, a feat that only the most skilled of horsemen—those literally "born to ride"—could hope to achieve.

In addition to enhancing the fighting capabilities of his troops, Philip introduced several reforms that greatly raised morale and patriotic spirit. Prior to his reign, the honorific title of the king's *Hetairoi*, or 'Companions', was a privilege borne by aristocratic horseman alone, and it was

they who invariably received the lion's share of any booty or land that the king allocated from successes in war. Philip now took the decisive step of symbolically including commoners within the extended royal retinue, elevating the status of the infantry by designating them his pez-hetairoi, or 'Foot-Companions', and raising their material benefits through land grants and an attractive pay scale that offered differential rates for martial excellence. National identity was further strengthened by a process of selective conscription that broke down regional loyalties, and by the camp routines and repeated drill exercises that eventually gave rise to new bonds of solidarity. Having inherited a quasi-feudal military force, limited by the inadequate and poorly trained levies raised by the clan barons, Philip had proceeded to fashion a professional, patrimonial army, zealously loyal to a crown appreciative of the need to enrich and exalt its expanding soldiery.

Concurrent with the process of military reform, Philip was engaged in the demanding tasks of securing his kingdom from internal and external threats and of extending the boundaries of Macedonia beyond traditional confines. The centrifugal tendencies of the aristocracy, long a problem for Macedonia's kings, were effectively checked by the institution of the Royal Pages, which mandated court attendance for adolescent sons of the leading families. There they served the king's person and received training for senior military and administrative posts-an arrangement that not only bound the younger generation to the royal banner through court ideology and ceremonial (and the promise of career advancement), but also furnished strong inducement for loyalty on the part of their powerful fathers. Other measures to overcome divisive regionalism included the translocation of population groups and the creation of an extensive network of roads, fortresses, and internal colonies throughout the kingdom. Even more effective was Philip's wholesale creation of a new stratum of Hetairoi, primarily through royal discretionary grants of military benefices to outsiders (many of them Greek exiles)—a standard patrimonial practice that offset the power and status of the hereditary aristocracy. The Companion cavalry thus swelled from some six hundred men at the outset of Philip's reign to four thousand strong two decades later, most of the increase being due to the "new men" whose status and estates were the marks of royal benefaction.4

In bringing internal order and greater unity to Macedonia, Philip was simultaneously strengthening the geopolitical position of his kingdom, just as each successive victory on the field of battle provided support for the king's domestic reforms. Having embarked on a course of societal militarization, the king was caught up in an unrelenting outward current, for it was only through continued conquests, plunder, and foreign

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tribute that the lands and monetary riches could be acquired that sustained the nation's mobilization. Thus even after immediate dangers to the survival of his kingdom had been removed and his own position as monarch secured, Philip was driven—by ambition made urgent by necessity—to an imperialist agenda, and hence into a fateful conflict with his neighbors to the south.

The Greeks were quite unprepared for the sudden emergence of Philip's Macedonia as a military power, and throughout the critical period of the kingdom's reorganization, they both underestimated and misread the potential threat of their new rival. Contemporary sources are accordingly sketchy on Philip's early career and exhibit uncertainty over his foreign policy aims. That he should seek to appropriate the Greek-inhabited coastal regions bordering his realm was perfectly understandable (his bitter opponent Demosthenes would even call it "natural"), and likewise his deep penetrations into resource-rich Thrace. But whether Philip had formulated imperial designs on Greece proper is a question more difficult to answer, in large part because our information reflects the reality that Hellas itself was no unity, but a confusing patchwork of mutually warring cities and classes. Under those fractious circumstances, the Macedonian king could-and did-appear simultaneously as both conquerer and liberator, skillfully exploiting the divisions of Greece to his own advantage.

In the comparatively short span of two decades, from his accession in 359 BC to his decisive military victory at Chaeronea in 338 BC, Philip would succeed in establishing hegemonic domination over the city-states of Greece. The complicated process of that ascendancy—the many campaigns and acts of subversion, the diplomatic moves and shifting alliances—need not be related here in full, but it is essential that we situate Philip's progress within the context of Greece's interpolis rivalries and the internal decomposition of Polis communalism, the two forms of fragmentation that gravely undermined the viability of Hellenic independence and continued civic sovereignty. Even that task presents difficulties, as the divisions between the cities and the factions within them followed no fixed pattern, but frequently shifted according to changing strategic and political fortunes. Our analysis must accordingly be confined to the predominant geopolitical tendencies, both in the tactics of the Macedonian monarch and in the Greek response.

Philip's interventionist strategy was perfected early on, as illustrated by his initial thrusts into the Greek coastal regions bordering his realm. Operations began with the conquest and capture of several Athenian colonies and allies—much to the satisfaction of the neighboring Chalcidians, who were hostile to the Athenian presence and to whom Philip astutely allocated a share of the spoils. In due course, however, the Macedonians turned against the federated Chalcidians, brutally sacking and razing to the ground more than thirty member communities, their surviving populations sold into slavery and their appropriated territories furnishing vast estates for the king's expanding retinue of royal Companions.⁵

Similar divide-and-conquer tactics eventually won for Philip control of Thessaly, a land long torn by stasis and by rivalry between the tyrants of Pherae (successors of Jason) and the clans of warrior-horsemen who ruled the loosely federated Thessalian League. Philip's opening came when the ongoing "Sacred War" between the major powers of central Greece (356-46 BC) spilled over into Thessaly, as the Phokians, who had sacrilegiously seized the sanctuary at Delphi and appropriated its treasuries for the buildup of a massive mercenary army, joined forces with the tyrants of Pherae. The hard-pressed Thessalian barons turned to their northern neighbor for aid, and Philip lost no time marching south to accept command of their forces (353 BC). Initial successes were cut short when the Phokians and their mercenaries inflicted two heavy defeats on the Macedonians, but an undaunted Philip ("I draw back like the ram, to butt harder!") returned the following spring and reversed these decisions with an overwhelming victory at the Crocus plain in which more than a third of the Phokian forces were slain or captured for slavery. Though the Macedonians were checked from proceeding south by the timely action of the Athenians, who occupied the pass at Thermopylae so as to block Philip's entry into the Greek heartland, the king could afford patience, and turned his attention to securing the overlordship of Thessaly. The tyrants of Pherae were expelled and the strategic port city of Pagasae was occupied by Macedonian troops. Several towns and mountain passes of the northern cantons were likewise garrisoned, and Philip annexed extensive tracts of land for Macedonian settlers. Two disaffected Thessalian towns then at war with his ally Pelinna were summarily destroyed, and for added security a neighboring village was given over to colonization by Macedonian settlers. Philip's Greek partisans among the nobility assumed control throughout Thessaly, though a number of them—particularly the Aleuadai of Larisa-were alarmed that collaboration with Macedon seemed to entail their own subordination.7 After the Phokian menace was eliminated by Philip's forceful intervention in 346 BC (cities were broken up into villages, their citizens disarmed and sentenced to repay the plundered Delphian treasuries), anti-Macedonian agitation in Thessaly grew stronger, eventually erupting into an independence movement headed by the Aleuadai. Little is known of Philip's Thessalian campaign

of 344 BC, save that he "cast the tyrants out" and established oligarchical, pro-Macedonian councils in rebellious and unreliable communities. The political infrastructure of the Thessalian League was reorganized to favor the interests of the nobles loyal to Macedon, and in 342 BC Philip took the formal step of having himself elected Tagos of Thessaly for life, a position that enabled him to control the financial and military affairs of the League's member states. Constitutional appearances notwithstanding, a garrisoned Thessaly was now a Macedonian province in all but name.

Philip played to similar interpolis rivalries elsewhere in Greece, most notably in Euboea and the Peloponnese, but his capacity for direct intervention was limited owing to reasons of geography. Where his army could not readily march, Philip turned to subversion and propaganda, working his will through various supporters and agents within the city-states, the notorious "traitors" and "Philippizers" who were accused by anti-Macedonian factions of betraying the cause of Hellenic freedom for personal aggrandizement. Though the ranks of these "Philippizers" were undoubtedly rife with opportunists, a careful examination of the social bases of Philip's Hellenic support discloses a following conspicuously drawn from the ranks of the wealthy and the oligarchically inclined.

This connection between the class interests of the propertied and the establishment of Macedonia's hegemony has not gone unnoticed in earlier scholarship, but it is only with Ste. Croix's Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (1981) that a systematic analysis has been attempted.11 After providing a brief review of the deteriorating economic and political conditions of the first half of the fourth century, Ste. Croix notes that as interpolis warfare and civic factionalism undermined the position of the proprietary classes, they were drawn to the expedient of turning to an outside power, one that could impose a "favorable solution" from above by force of arms. Ste. Croix goes so far as to conclude that Greek democracy was destroyed "by the joint efforts of the Greek propertied classes, the Macedonians and the Romans."12 Most of the evidence in support of that thesis—which would of course require a more precise periodization-dates from Hellenistic and Roman times, and Ste. Croix accordingly concentrates on the period after Philip's ascendancy, tracing in fascinating detail the gradual extirpation of Greek democracy through practices that undermined the sovereignty of citizen assemblies, conjoined magisterial offices with expensive liturgical duties, and eroded the power of the popular law courts (see below, 6.II). The actual interplay between Philip's imperial ambitions and the class divisions within Greece thus remains open for further examination, though Ste. Croix's observations have provided the analytical principles from which to proceed.

It is essential that we begin by identifying the complex of interests that exerted the strongest influence on the actions of the participating parties. Eruptions of civic violence in the fourth century were for the most part political struggles grounded in material conditions, as plainly evidenced by the repeated demands for land redistribution and the cancellation of debts. With the intensification of interpolis warfare and its attending devastation of the countryside, the lower strata in particular were subjected to mounting hardship and dislocation. Scores of impoverished citizens were driven into debt bondage, precarious forms of tenancy, or outright displacement from the soil. Wealthier citizens were not immune from catastrophe, however, as their estates were likewise ravaged by invading armies or confiscated by momentarily ascendant factions. In addition, the more affluent groaned under the burdens of sustaining endless military campaigns through emergency war taxes and the liturgical provisioning of warships.13 Given the inelastic nature of the agrarianbased Polis economy—arable farming land was limited, crop yields modest, and technologies primitive—the only practical response to chronic scarcity was predatory, i.e., the forcible appropriation of the goods and resources of others, whether fellow citizens or neighboring communities. But such practices offered at best only temporary relief, for neither defeated factions nor defeated poleis accepted their losses as permanentnot at a time when vengeance and irredentism served as the most compelling motives for collective action. Where Sparta and Athens had each managed to secure durable hegemonies for much of the classical period, and hence a measure of regional stability and prosperity, their failure to do so in the fourth century opened the floodgates to innumerable mutually debilitating localized conflicts.

That segments of the propertied strata should express war weariness in such circumstances is readily understandable, for continued warfare now offered few prospects for material gain, but the real likelihood of substantial losses, through fiscal burdens and possible defeats in war. The requisite "spiritual" conditions had changed as well: in the aftermath of decades of murderous civic factionalism, patriotic appeals to communalism must have sounded hollow, even farcical; while the rapid influx of mercenaries and peltasts—"outsiders" who usurped the citizenhoplite's preeminence on the field of battle—could not but have undermined the latter's psychic commitment to martial service as an ennobling enterprise. For those inclining towards demilitarization and alienation from public life, the so-called apragmones, or 'uninvolved', Philip's advancing hegemony offered the appealing prospect of security and peace, an "arrangement" that would at once constrain the rebellious rabble at home and curtail the scourge of interpolis warfare. As for those still

obsessed with the wielding of power, local or regional, an alliance with the Macedonian monarch could serve that end as well, either as a lever to restore lost privileges or as a brake against further slippage. Individuals from both groups—quietists and partisans—accordingly had strong incentives for entering into a reactionary coalition with Philip, notwithstanding that other interests, such as civic freedom and pan-Hellenism, could and did override that inclination in particular cases.

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

For the very reasons that the wealthier strata would be disposed to a "Macedonian solution," the dêmos—and the propertied political leaders who championed its interests—would incline the other way, fearing not only a loss in sovereignty, but also a cessation of those expansionary ventures that the poor regarded as their best opportunity for material advancement. Uniform hostility by the masses did not obtain, however, for wherever Philip exploited interpolis rivalries to the advantage of one community over another, he naturally garnered popular support from those who benefitted by his intervention. That the Macedonian king could on occasion pose as a benefactor to all civic strata was an appeal central to his strategic diplomacy, one he stage-managed brilliantly throughout his career. Indeed, as the patrimonial ruler of a people with no tradition of civic self-governance, it is not to be expected that Philip was himself "ideologically committed" in the oligarch-democrat struggle, though for reasons of administrative efficiency and perhaps social psychological or life-style affinities, the king no doubt preferred to exercise dominion through narrow circles of horse-loving aristocrats rather than through a clamorous commons.

The historical record—though frustratingly incomplete on many of the details—leaves no doubt that Philip's ascendancy was greatly facilitated by Greek collaboration and collusion, in the form of oligarchical factions that turned to Macedon for assistance in seizing or retaining local power, and by the disinclination of propertied apragmones to serve the cause of Hellenic freedom, either militarily or financially. We have already seen how the landed barons of Thessaly formed an alliance with Philip in an effort to quell internal disturbances and secure regional advantages, and how the king exploited that dependency to establish himself as overlord of their country. Philip's earlier victory over the Chalcidians had likewise featured assistance from the propertied, with five hundred wealthy Olynthian horsemen defecting to Philip at a critical point in the campaign, and several other communities falling to internal treachery as well.¹⁴ During the years 343 and 342 BC, Philip intervened forcefully in the factional struggles taking place in Euboea, dispatching several thousand mercenaries to assist his partisans in their efforts to subvert the democracies of Eretria and Oreus. In both communities

Philip's aid proved decisive, and narrow juntas headed by "tyrants" loyal to Macedonia were established. In distant Elis, Philip resorted to the strength of his purse, funding lavishly the intrigues of his oligarchical supporters, who rose up in 343 BC and embarked on a murderous slaughter of the dêmos. 15 Only months later a similar seizure of power was planned for Megara, where a cabal headed by a man described as "the foremost citizen in wealth, descent, and reputation" conspired with Philip to overthrow the existing democracy.16 As the king's mercenaries headed south, information pertaining to the coup was uncovered, allowing the Megarians time to secure armed protection from their Athenian allies, whose arrival forestalled the uprising.

From the cases reviewed, it is clear that anti-Macedonian politicians were quite justified in equating support for Philip with oligarchical ambitions. Though the violent upheavals that transpired in Thessaly, Chalcidice, Eretria, Oreus, and Elis do not appear to have occurred elsewhere, "Philippizers" are known to have operated throughout much of Greece, their influence on domestic and foreign policies tending to serve the interests of the affluent and, directly or indirectly, the Macedonian cause. With the exception of those instances where Philip's interventions in regional rivalries earned him popular support, the following characterization of the division within Greece highlights the basic reality:¹⁷

Assuredly, in all the poleis the Greeks are divided into these two factions: the one desiring neither to rule others by force nor to be enslaved to another, but to govern themselves on the basis of freedom and laws founded upon equality; the other longing to rule over their fellow citizens, and to take orders from another man through whom they believe they will be able to accomplish their ends-those who follow Philip's policy, the men eager for tyrannies and oligarchical juntas who have gained supremacy everywhere, with the consequence that I doubt whether a secure, democratically governed polis survives anywhere save here in Athens!

The concluding rhetorical flourish goes beyond the facts, but there is no question that the reactionary coalition between Greek oligarchs and the Macedonian monarch posed grave threats to existing democratic practice. In his great oration On the Embassy (343 BC), in which he accused several Athenian politicians of collusion with Philip, Demosthenes spoke at length of the "terrible disease" then plaguing Greece, an epidemic of treachery whereby "the most notable men" betray their own liberty for a slavery they seek to conceal under such specious phrases as "Philip's friendship and fraternity." The real aim of Philip's Hellenic partisans is not, Demosthenes goes on, the peace and prosperity they promise, but to gain personal mastery over the polloi, for these are the very men "who wish to remove the democracy and who regard the established

political order as 'billowing waves' and 'madness.'"¹⁸ These abusive epithets echo rather strikingly the antidemocratic rhetoric of Plato and other intellectuals, and it is a historical fact of importance that there was considerable ideological support for Philip emanating from the highest intellectual circles.¹⁹

The publicist-educator Isocrates in particular worked assiduously to inform his fellow Greeks of the benefits they would enjoy under Philip's leadership, especially should the king pursue Isocrates' long-cherished dream of a pan-Hellenic crusade against Persia. Conquests in the east, so Isocrates pledged, would "drain off" the dangerous surplus population of propertyless, vagabond Greeks (ominously styled as "those who crave the possessions of others") and strategically resettle them "as a buffer" in territories to be carved out of Asia Minor.20 That Isocrates' pan-Hellenism and support for Philip was strongly informed by partisan class interests is clear from his other writings as well. In addition to several tirades against the "corrupted" or "extreme democracy" of his own native Athens, featuring complaints about excessive liturgical burdens and an "equality" that "distributes the same to all alike,"21 the Isocratean corpus includes several encomia on monarchical forms of government, two of which were commissioned by military autocrats in Cyprus and Herakleia-Pontica, whose reigns merited special praise for their "protection of the propertied."22 Though Isocrates himself abstained from public office, his school, less "academic" than the Academy, provided rhetorical training for numerous politicians, prominent in Athens and elsewhere, some of whom are known to have pursued pacifist or "Philippizing" policies.

Not to be outdone, Speusippus, Plato's nephew and successor as head of the Academy, wrote a public Letter to Philip in 343 BC, openly currying for royal patronage. Speusippus informs the king of a fellow Academic whose historical researches have "documented" the legitimacy of Philip's recent conquests of Greek territories—valuable "scholarship" indeed, given that myth and legend were commonly invoked in the arbitration of territorial and political claims. Building upon the official Macedonian line that the royal family was descended from Herakles, Speusippus and his historian colleague scoured the tangled web of myths pertaining to the hero's exploits and "discovered" that all of Philip's earlier conquests (as well as a few that he was then contemplating!) had been originally won by his great ancestor.²³ What most Greeks mistakenly regard as Macedonian aggression is thus in reality nothing more than Philip's rightful claim to his ancestral patrimony, "the property of the Heraklids." The king was apparently impressed, for he subsequently utilized portions of this Academic research in his negotiations with Athens.

The Academy, to be sure, was not a monolith, either in respect of philosophical doctrine or of practical politics, but Speusippus' antidemocratic colors had been shown before (during Dion's coup in Syracuse), and it is not surprising that Plato's school came to be regarded as pro-Macedonian in its sympathies, not least because of the very close ties between the royal family and another celebrated Academic—a Stagirite named Aristotle—a figure whose story will be recounted in due course.

Having outlined the constellation of interests that were operative during this pivotal contest between royal and civic power, let us turn to the social factors that ultimately resolved the struggle in Philip's favor. Fortunately, we are not limited in this case to a lifeless registry of respective troop strengths and fiscal resources, the strategic ebb and flow of diplomatic and military activities, or even the later judgments of those safely removed from the immediacy of the events of which they write. For in addition to the above materials, our sources include a series of extraordinary public documents-orations by one man in particular-that in a very real sense gain us entry into the impassioned arena of the Athenian assembly, where the conflict with Macedonia found expression in the hopes and fears of the citizenry as recorded in the heated rhetoric of political debate. The most implacable foe of the Macedonian monarch is not a neutral guide; but far from being a disadvantage, such commitment places the conflict in its true existential context—particularly as it was Demosthenes above all others who adhered to the traditional Poliscitizen ethos and who championed the Periclean ideal of an active, expansionary democracy. As witness to the processes of social decomposition we have been examining, it is Demosthenes who will furnish the most invaluable direct testimony.24

Born in 384 BC into the household of a prosperous urban rentier whose properties included a small-scale manufacturing concern based on slave labor, Demosthenes' privileged birth was offset by his father's early death and the subsequent peculation of the inheritance by his guardians. Turning eighteen, Demosthenes brought suit against these men, but though successful in court, he was unable to secure full compensation. His education and recent legal experience made the profession of logographos, or forensic 'speechwriter', the most suitable career choice, and he quickly established a reputation as one of the most skilled advocates in Athens. From successes in the jury courts, he soon progressed to the politics of the assembly. His first public speech, at age thirty, addressed the need to reorganize the liturgical system of naval procurement. In it the young orator shows an early appreciation of the class tensions that hamper effective politics, noting that false war scares drive the "possessing classes"

into concealing their wealth against unjust taxation.25 Though Philip had by this time achieved several notable successes against Athens, Demosthenes exhibits no great concern with the king in his earliest speeches, focussing instead on traditional foes and rivals like the Spartans, Thebans, Persians, and oligarchs everywhere. In his oration On the Liberty of the Rhodians, he waxes eloquent on the need to follow the old Athenian practice of supporting the dêmos in all the other poleis and of regarding "the men who overthrow constitutions and change them into oligarchies as the common enemies of all who desire freedom." In domestic matters as well the Athenians are urged to disregard the counsels of "those who have adopted oligarchical policies and so deserted the political post bequeathed to them by their ancestors."26

Following Philip's crushing victory over the Phokians in 352 BC, it became clear to Demosthenes that Athenian policy would have to deal seriously with this upstart "barbarian" from the north. In 351 BC the orator fired his opening anti-Macedonian salvo in the First Philippic, a vigorous declamation that repeatedly upbraids the citizenry for their negligence and urges prompt military action. Philip's recent rise, he reports, should not be attributed to his own strength, but to "our own carelessness" in allowing him freedom to strike while we sit idle or respond after the fact, "conducting our war against him the way a Persian boxes, always clutching where the blow was landed . . . rather than parrying." Demosthenes proposes a two-fold military armament, one force to strengthen Athenian defenses, another to conduct offensive operations. To prevent Philip's sudden raids into Greece, a fleet of fifty warships must be equipped for action, "and you yourselves of such a resolve that, if it is necessary, you will embark and sail in them yourselves." Transport vessels that can convey up to half of the Athenian cavalry are also to be provided. As confirmation to all that we are now freed from our "excessive apathy," a force must be equipped for direct assaults on Macedonian territory, and "what I propose is not a force consisting of ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, nor an imposing paper army that never materializes, but a real polis force!"27

The contrast between this elevated patriotic language and the concrete proposals that follow is both striking and depressing, for it turns out that Demosthenes' "real polis force" is preponderately mercenary in composition. Of the two thousand infantry requested, a mere five hundred are to be Athenian citizens, "serving in successive turns for a specified period—not a long one—but just so long as seems advisable for success"; and of the two hundred cavalry, again only a quarter will be Athenian citizens, their service likewise limited to short duration! Demosthenes rationalizes the leanness of this force by noting that Athens

presently lacks the finances to provide for the pay and maintenance of a substantial army; with no hope of challenging Philip's forces in a set hoplite encounter, raiding tactics remain the only option for the immediate future. As for the combat participation of Athenians (the mere fact that this had to be justified in time of war is powerful testimony to the erosion of the citizen-hoplite tradition), Demosthenes observes that the current policy of relying exclusively on noncitizen troops has resulted in Athenian setbacks, since poorly paid mercenaries invariably pursue the best available prospects for plunder, often at the expense of friends and allies, to say nothing of strategic planning.

The orator now turns to the daunting subject of finances, and the desperate fiscal straits of his community are glaringly exposed in his recommendations. By cutting costs to the bone, Demosthenes calculates total expenditures on maintaining twenty-five hundred men and their ten warships at ninety-two talents per annum, a comparatively substantial outlay given that public revenues at the time were garnering only about four hundred talents annually (Philip's goldmines around Philippi alone were yielding more than double that sum). War taxes on the propertied would have to be imposed, but even so Demosthenes could offer the hoplites no more than a bare subsistence allowance of two obols per day for rations (down from the rate of twelve they had received during the Peloponnesian War), optimistically suggesting that shortages could be made up by successful plundering. The bitter facts presented, Demosthenes closes the oration by noting that continued inactivity will entail yet greater costs, in territory and dignity both, and that "if we now refuse to fight against Philip in the north, we shall probably be compelled to fight him one day here at home."28

In a number of respects, the First Philippic can serve as a rough gauge of the fourth-century crisis, for through the great orator's language and proposals the institutional and normative decomposition of the classical order is raised to the level of practical politics, and there confronted in the open forum of the citizens' assembly. We see clearly how a determined advocate for war is constrained by the fiscal crisis besetting his polis and by a fatal disinclination among the citizenry to military service: the prosperous averse owing to disproportionate financial burdens, the poor incapable owing to inadequate provisioning. Confronted by the standing army of an expansionary foe, the once imperial polis of Athens is now almost wholly dependent on unreliable mercenaries in the defense of its exposed colonial outposts, a circumstance that admits of no resolution save continued losses. The proposal to include citizen contingents among the mercenary forces does little to correct these imbalances, seeing that it addresses one problem (that of military control), only by exacerbating

another (that of finance). Given these obdurate realities, Demosthenes' eloquent call to mobilization went unheeded—and understandably so, for stirring oratory in the assembly is no substitute for the manpower and funds that make possible and sustain operations in the field.

Two years later Philip's renewed assault on the Chalcidian League brought Demosthenes to the speaker's rostrum repeatedly, his counsels basically unchanged save for a mounting sense of urgency. The recent request for Athenian aid by Olynthus, the dominant Chalcidian polis, furnished Demosthenes the opportunity to press for action, this time under the more favorable prospects of an alliance with a militarily competent ally. In his First Olynthiac, delivered early in 349 BC, the orator begins by listing Philip's string of victories, but again insists that Athenian negligence rather than Macedonian prowess has been the cause. Now, however, owing to the "goodwill of the gods," we have an opportunity to reclaim our lost territories by joining with the Chalcidians in repulsing Philip's aggression. The two-armament strategy of the First Philippic is revived (though without specific details), one force to aid the Olynthians in defense, the other to ravage Philip's realm; funding is to be supplied by a universal war tax. Again the warning is made that a failure to check Philip in the north assures his eventual invasion of Attika itself, where the costs will far exceed those required for responsible action now. Demosthenes closes with an exhortation for concerted action and shared sacrifices, calling on the prosperous to contribute generously of their wealth, "so that they may pleasantly enjoy the fruits of the remainder"; for those in the prime of life "to gain the experience of war in Philip's land, so that they will become formidable guardians of their own inviolate homeland"; and for statesmen "to conduct public affairs in such a manner that the citizenry's supervision is unimpeded."29

The Macedonian threat was at this point unmistakable, for the demise of the Chalcidians would leave Philip master of the entire coastal northwest, and hence in striking range of the shipping lanes to the Hellespont, the Athenian lifeline to the grains and resources of the Ukraine. The assembly accordingly voted for a military response, but a rather paltry force of two thousand mercenary peltasts, thirty warships already patrolling in the north, and eight additional ships manned by patriotic volunteers was all that could be mustered. In the following spring (348 BC), the hard-pressed Olynthians renewed their appeal for aid, but an anti-Athenian uprising in Euboea—which Philip is alleged to have abetted with money and mercenaries—diverted Athenian attention nearer to home. The proposed in the latter venture (which ended in an Athenian defeat), and counselled maximum armed support for Olynthus.

A supplemental force of four thousand mercenaries, eighteen warships, and one hundred and fifty Athenian cavalry was subsequently sent, but Philip's tightening grip could not be broken.

Alarmed by the deteriorating situation and frustrated over his inability to redirect the course of Athenian policy, Demosthenes opts in the *Third Olynthiac* to launch a scathing attack on the existing political leadership, which he charges has betrayed the Athenian heritage through mismanagement of the public interest. The chief obstacle to the vigorous war effort now required is the problem of funding, which not only constrains strategic options but saps the martial spirit of the citizenry. Demosthenes caustically observes, however, that it is not the case that the Athenians lack the resources; it is rather that they prefer to expend their public monies on festivals and projects of civic adornment—a preference deliberately nurtured by the politicians in power.

A brief historical excursus is necessary in order to appreciate the gravamen of Demosthenes' charge. In the wake of the Peloponnesian War, and the decades of intermittent but ruinous warfare that followed, an exhausted Athens had been compelled to limit imperial ventures, if only as a means of restoring a measure of fiscal stability. The politicians who pursued this "peace abroad/prosperity at home" policy were not hardline oligarchsafter the white terror of the Thirty, such people remained very much underground—but their efforts to restrain Athenian militarism did find favor with the propertied strata, long weary of war taxes and other military liturgies. Fully aware that their ascendancy would prove short-lived if the antiimperialist program did not address the needs of the citizen poor, Eubulus, the leader of this so-called peace party, passed a law redirecting all annual public surpluses to the Theoric Fund, the revenues of which were periodically distributed to the citizens: indirectly through expenditures on public works, directly in the form of outright grants or as attendance allowances for theatrical performances and religious festivals.31 The ulterior purpose of this expansion of the Theoric Fund was to wean the dêmos from ill-considered imperialism; and under Eubulus' deft fiscal management it soon became possible to cool the passions for war-stirred by Demosthenes and others—simply by threatening to transfer the fund's revenues for military purposes. As one contemporary wit expressed it, "the Theôrika was the glue of the democracy," and though each citizen would receive perhaps only five to twenty drachmas per year directly (with the possibility of occasional windfall distributions), for the poor this constituted an indispensable supplement. On an elementary level, the choice came down to cash for an increasingly demilitarized citizenry, or pay for mercenaries.

The challenge facing Demosthenes was accordingly great, for to request the transfer of Theoric funds into the Stratiotic, or 'military',

account risked alienating the citizen masses, the very group he needed to win over if the appeasement policies of the "peace party" were to be overturned. The orator's only option was to expose the duplicitous function of the Theoric Fund, in the hope that an enraged dêmos would rally to his cause. Invoking the glorious example of their fifth-century ancestors, Demosthenes drove home the point that a Polis prospers only when politicians and citizens alike deem it their duty to serve the koinônia;³²

Why, then, did everything go so well formerly, but now so disastrously? Because then the citizens themselves had the courage to act and serve militarily, and were themselves masters of the politicians and sovereign over all assets. Then it was a matter of satisfaction for each man to receive from the dêmos a share of honor, authority, and reward. But now the contrary obtains, for the politicians have become sovereign over our assets and it is only through these men that all things are done, while you, the dêmos, are unnerved and stripped of wealth and of allies, and play the part of servants and lackeys, content if these men give you a share of the Theôrika or a festival... your manliness at its height when you give thanks for receiving what is your own! Yes, they have confined you to your own polis by enticing you with these baits so that you will become tame and subservient to their hand. But never, I believe, has a great and vigorous spirit been attained through mean and paltry actions; for whatever are the practices of men, such by necessity is their spirit...

If, therefore, even at this late moment, you shake off these habits and consent to serve militarily and act as becomes Athenians, and devote the surplus resources that you have at home to the attainment of successes abroad, then perhaps, men of Athens, just perhaps, you might achieve some great and complete advantage, and so gain deliverance from these petty doles, which are like the diets prescribed by physicians for the sickly. For just as these neither restore the strength of the patient nor allow him to die, so these doles that you now distribute neither afford any lasting benefit nor allow you to renounce them and pursue another course; they only foster the apathy in each of us.

Such being the shameful reality of the situation, only one course of honor presents itself: the citizens must compel the politicians who drafted these paralyzing laws to effect their immediate repeal, and all alike must accept the necessity of self-service in the field and financial sacrifice. The orator's closing remark is fittingly clothed in the hallowed language of Polis devotion:³³

Do not desert that post of honor, men of Athens, which your ancestors won and bequeathed to you through their own aretê and at the risk of many noble dangers.

Stirred by this patriotic call to duty—and yet another appeal from the beleaguered Olynthians, who implored the Athenians to send citizen troops rather than mercenaries if they valued the lives of their allies—the assembly voted a third relief force, comprised of seventeen warships, two thousand citizen-hoplites, and three hundred cavalry—all mobilized, however, without repeal of the Theoric laws. The expedition was in any event sent too late, as Olynthus succumbed to treachery from within and fell to Philip's superior forces before the Athenians arrived. The city was completely obliterated, its thousands of inhabitants either slaughtered or enslaved, with scores bestowed as "gifts" by the king to his Companions and "friends" among the Greeks—witnesses recounting the tragic plight of small groups of Olynthian women and children being shamelessly marched into Greece by the beneficiaries of Philip's patrimonial largess.³⁴

The brutal annihilation of Olynthus and violent dismemberment of the Chalcidian League delivered an ominous warning to Philip's opponents within Greece, but the king coupled intimidation with offerings of peace. The initial reaction in Athens was one of alarm, so much so that even Eubulus and the peace party felt the need for action, initiating a diplomatic offensive to form a pan-Hellenic alliance against the "murderous barbarian." These embassies came to naught, as military weakness, fiscal strains, and interpolis rivalries—exacerbated by the intrigues of "Philippizing" politicians—thwarted all efforts at unity. Within a year, ambassadors from most of the Greek poleis, including Athens, were at the Macedonian court in Pella for formal peace negotiations. As before, Philip's diplomacy followed a pattern of exploiting regional animosities to his own advantage, and on this occasion he was intent on gaining control of the Gates of Greece (the Thermopylae pass) by crushing the Phokians, an ambition shared by his Theban and Thessalian allies. When Philip's terms were aired in the Athenian assembly, the dêmos showed signs of balking—the loss of Phokis would strengthen Thebes and pave the way for a possible Theban-Macedonian assault on Athens—but a few of the returning envoys (some now in Philip's pay) assured the citizens that the king had pledged in private an outcome favorable to Athens. The turning point came when Eubulus himself mounted the rostrum and declared that his entire economic policy would be jeopardized if the dêmos opted for war: "taxes would have to be levied, the Theoric funds transferred to the Stratiotic, and the citizens themselves would have to embark in their warships."35 A devitalized citizenry required no further debate: the Peace of Philocrates (so named for the bribed Athenian envoy who proposed the formal decree) was accepted in April of 346 BC, bringing to an end the desultory war that had begun with Philip's capture of Amphipolis eleven years earlier. Even Demosthenes conceded that the Peace was a shameful necessity under present circumstances, though he and his supporters lost little time in mounting a campaign to prepare the dêmos for a "return bout" with Macedonia.

During the nominal peace that followed, Philip consolidated his recent gains and pressed on, with further military campaigns against bordering Balkan tribesmen, the internal reorganization of a dependent Thessaly, and sundry probing moves to assist his partisans in Euboea and the Peloponnese. All this tended to erode support for Eubulus and the peace party, and in 343 BC the politician for whom the odious peace was named, Philocrates, was indicted for treachery and condemned to death *in absentia* following his flight from justice. Demosthenes forthwith brought to trial one of Eubulus' closest associates, Aeschines, on a related charge of treachery, and though the latter won narrow acquittal, public opinion was clearly turning in favor of the "war party." In response to Philip's continuing intrigues, Demosthenes carried his message to a number of other Greek poleis, warning them of the Macedonian's imperial ambitions and his threat to constitutional liberties:³⁶

What do you seek? Freedom? Then do you not see that Philip's very titles are utterly irreconcilable with that? For every king, every tyrant is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of law. Do not be so guarded in seeking deliverance from war that you find yourselves subject to a despotês.

In 342 BC Philip mobilized for a major campaign of conquest against Thrace, and as his formidable thirty-thousand-man army moved steadily eastward, closer to the Athenian settlements in the Chersonese peninsula that guarded the access route to the indispensable Black Sea grain supply, the apprehensive Athenians dispatched a military force of kleruchs and mercenaries to protect these vital interests. Engagements along the frontier followed as the Athenian commander sacked several Thracian towns recently brought under Macedonian sovereignty, an action that Philip protested as a breach of the Peace in a threatening communiqué to the Athenian assembly. Demosthenes countered with his defiant On the Chersonese (341 BC), an oration charging that the recent peace was merely a screen for Philip's continuing aggression. The king had been waging war on Athens ever since his accession to the throne, Demosthenes declared, "knowing full well that even if he should become master of all the others, his position would not be secure so long as you remain a democracy . . . and are prepared to oppose those who seek to rule and deprive all mankind of freedom." Far from recalling the fighting force in the Chersonese, as Philip and his partisans here in Athens demand, we must "put aside our excessive, harmful apathy and contribute war funds, rally our allies, and provide for the permanent upkeep of our existing army in the field, so that just as Philip has a force ready to assault and enslave all the Greeks, so you will have one ready to protect and assist them all." The politicians who are in Philip's pay and who are working for the ruin of our polis will of course "straightaway stand up and declare that peace brings us benefit, and that it is difficult to raise a great force, and that certain persons are seeking to plunder the revenues, and similar such complaints, speeches by which they put you off action and afford Philip the quiet to do whatever he wishes." But to accept their counsels is to accept slavery, douleia, for the polypragmôn Philip will not rest content until he has achieved total mastery. Stirred by Demosthenes' fiery appeal, the long languorous dêmos, though still uncommitted to the policies of the war party, rallied to overrule the proposed recall of the Chersonese contingent.

Shortly thereafter (summer 341 BC), and on Demosthenes' initiative, the Athenians formed an alliance with Chalkis in Euboea and promptly mounted two successful expeditions against the "tyrants" who had been established in Oreus and Eretria the year before by the strength of Macedonian arms. Only weeks later Demosthenes and his Euboean League allies were in the Peloponnese laying the foundations for a general anti-Macedonian coalition, a move shortly followed by an alliance with Byzantium, formerly in the Macedonian camp, but now alarmed by Philip's menacing drive towards the Hellespont. By the spring of 340 BC, the Macedonian king had seen and heard enough—news that Demosthenes had just received an honorific crown of gold for his recent patriotic service was no doubt particularly galling. With a massive army and a modest fleet, Philip advanced eastward and laid siege to the coastal city of Perinthus, Byzantium's southern neighbor.

This episode in Hellenic warfare is chiefly notable for the unveiling of Philip's improved siege apparatus, the product of years of experimentation carried out by Greek engineers in the king's employ.38 The Syracusan tyrant Dionysios had introduced bolt and arrow-throwing catapults during his reign, but the technology was sparingly employed, even after its spread to the Greek mainland. The Macedonian breakthrough came with the invention of torsion catapults, which greatly enhanced both the range and force of the projectiles. In combining this superior artillery with mobile siege towers over one hundred feet high (from which one could shoot down at defenders manning parapets) and battering rams encased in leather, metal, and wood shielding, the Macedonians placed the traditional security of walled settlements in grave doubt, thereby inaugurating a revolutionary development in the history of ancient warfare. Hitherto it had been necessary to invest fortified settlements and starve them into submission; if unaided by treachery from within, this procedure proved both lengthy and financially draining. As a result of the new siege technology, breaching fortified defenses within weeks or months became a real possibility, with the consequence that cities—and not only fertile plains became strategic objectives in the conduct of war.

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Though the walls of Perinthus fell to Philip's siege train, all attempts at storming the city were repulsed by the defenders, who used the unique layout of their urban center—tiers of buildings erected against a sloping peninsular cliff-to tactical advantage. Various allies offered timely assistance, including not only the Byzantines but Persians as well, the one dispatching substantial numbers of citizen-troops, the other contributing massively with mercenaries and provisions. Bogged down in a murderous street fight, Philip abruptly quick-marched half of his forces north against Byzantium, hoping to storm the now undermanned city by surprise or possibly through the aid of treacherous "Philippizers" from within. Neither ploy materialized, and Philip was forced to invest the city with his siege apparatus.

The Athenian warships patrolling the area had to this point refrained from offensive operations, attending strictly to their assigned responsibility of safeguarding the huge flotilla of cargo vessels that conveyed Black Sea grains to Athens. Undaunted by the paucity and inexperience of his own naval forces, Philip opted to challenge the Athenian convoy, and though initially repulsed at sea, he subsequently launched a surprise amphibious operation that carried off some two hundred and thirty merchant vessels from anchorage. The raid garnered his treasury the enormous sum of seven hundred talents through the sale of prisoners and cargoes, while the hulls provided much-needed timber for his siege trains. Stunned by the disastrous news, the Athenians now took the decisive step—on a motion of Demosthenes—of declaring war, symbolized by the destruction of the stone pillar upon which the hated Peace was inscribed.

The Athenians promptly manned an additional squadron for the conflict in the Hellespont, and several of Byzantium's allies in the Aegean-notably Rhodes, Chios, and Kos-poured in armed assistance as well. Philip calculated that the opposition had now grown too formidable for prizes insignificant, and he resolved to cut his losses by lifting the sieges. The problem of extracting his fleet past Athenian patrols in the Bosporus strait and the Dardanelles was effected by some unrecorded ruse (another instance of Athenian naval incompetence), while his army marched, not home, but northwards (late spring 339 BC). Within a few months, all the Scythian tribes south of the Danube had been reduced to tributary status, and Philip began his return gorged with plunder, including twenty thousand breeding mares and a like number of enslaved women and children. Opting for a shorter route through the Balkan mountain range in present-day Bulgaria, the Macedonians encountered the Triballi, a fierce tribal people who demanded a share of Philip's plunder as the price for safe passage. Upon refusal, they proceeded to take it by force, putting a spear through Philip's thigh in the process. Only by

abandoning most of their baggage trains were the Macedonians able to save their wounded king and fight their way to safety, arriving in Macedonia sometime in midsummer. Though not without its successes—Thrace annexed and colonized, Scythia subdued—the record of the past three years of war was not particularly impressive: thwarted in the Hellespont, robbed by savages, and now facing an open war with Athens and her allies. Yet these reversals were more a matter of prestige and politics than military strength and did nothing to slow the ever-widening strategic imbalance between kingdom and city-state.

Emboldened by Philip's string of setbacks, the Athenians prepared for war under the guiding hand of Demosthenes, now the commanding voice in the assembly. One of the orator's first moves was to pass legislation revamping the liturgical naval boards responsible for the fleet. Under the old system, the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens had been required to finance the construction and maintenance costs of an assigned number of warships each year, a duty that they fulfilled in syndicates of varying size—groups of five, fifteen, twenty—on the principle of equal contributions. Those at the top of the property scale thus contributed equally with those lower down, and in some cases they were able to avoid payment altogether by advancing the requisite sum to the contractor and then fraudulently assessing other members of their board for the entire cost.39 The orator bitterly observed that while the superrich were thus practically exempt owing to these machinations, those of moderate wealth were "losing all they had" and frequently falling in arrears in their quotas. The resulting shoddy construction and upkeep has all but scuttled the fleet, with "ships being regularly abandoned at sea" and numerous others "left behind in port as unseaworthy."40 The undistinguished record of the Athenian navy in the fourth century can be traced to several causes, including poor leadership and, most pressingly, reduced training opportunities and service commitments owing to fiscal constraints (precision timing and discipline being indispensable in oared tactics). There can be little question, however, that inefficiencies and corruption in the method of provisioning and maintenance—itself an index of waning civic loyalties-contributed greatly to the Athenian decline.

Placing the interests of class over those of community, the plousioi immediately opposed Demosthenes' reforms, which called for a system of proportional payment whereby the three hundred or so richest citizens were assigned the greatest liturgical responsibility. Bribes were offered to the orator for his retraction of the proposal, but failing that, a constitutional challenge was initiated. The popular tide was now clearly against appeasement, for not only did Demosthenes win an overwhelming judicial triumph, he also secured passage for his next proposal, the repeal of

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Eubulus' Theoric legislation. The anti-Macedonian coalition of Greek poleis he had labored for earlier now began coming into shape, with the added bonus of more than five hundred talents donated by various allies for the procurement of mercenaries and supplies. Although the formidable hoplite army of Thebes lay still outside the fold, there, too, anti-Macedonian statesmen had recently gained popular favor. In the summer of 339 BC the Theban liberators acted, forcibly expelling the Macedonian garrison from the pass at Thermopylae.

By November, Philip was ready to reengage, and under the pretext of settling a dispute between several small communities in central Greece, he marched his battle-hardened array southwards. With Thermopylae sealed by the Thebans, Philip entered through the mountain bypasses leading into Phokis—a strategic blunder had left these unguarded—and swiftly captured Elateia, an old Phokian fortress that commanded the passage to Thebes. News of Philip's sudden arrival caused a near panic in Athens, but Demosthenes stood forward and counseled immediate full mobilization and an alliance with Thebes, Athens' longtime rival. Days later emissaries under Demosthenes' leadership entered the Theban assembly and there rebutted Theban "Philippizers" and Philip's envoys who were advocating a joint Theban-Macedonian invasion of Attika. Undoubtedly realizing that the destruction of Athens would bring their own subordination in a Greece dominated by Macedon, the Thebans voted for the Athenian alliance-perhaps with an eye towards removing the stain of "Medism" that had been theirs since the Persian Wars. The Athenian and Theban armies promptly took up a strong defensive position in northern Boeotia, supplemented by allied contingents from Korinth, Megara, the Achaean and Euboean Leagues, and other smaller powers. A force of ten thousand mercenaries under joint Theban-Athenian command was deployed further west to prevent any flanking operations. The winter campaign that followed is poorly documented, but we do hear of two early engagements in which the Greek army apparently more than held its own.

Reinforced by additional troops in the spring, Philip directed his attention to the mercenary force at Amphissa, allowing a dispatch to be intercepted announcing his withdrawal, and then striking hard in a devastating surprise raid. To avoid being turned, the main Greek army withdrew southwards and redeployed in the Chaeronea plain. Rather than press his advantage in the field, Philip chose to send out various peace offerings over the summer months—presumably serious gestures, though it is possible he counted on time draining away the opposition's finances and ardor for war. In early August, these preliminaries came to an end, and the two grand armies squared off to decide "the contest for Greek freedom." The opposing forces were roughly equal in troop strength

(each with some thirty thousand infantry and two thousand horse) but from the scraps of information that have survived, decidedly unequal in tactical skill. The two lines clashed in a traditional phalanx encounter, but Philip's right effected a controlled retreating maneuver that the Athenians mistook for victory, and amid shouts of "On to Macedonia," they pressed forward so vigorously that gaps were opened in the extended Greek formation. At that point the Macedonian infantry abruptly turned and counterattacked, while crown prince Alexander led a furious charge of the famed Macedonian cavalry into the broken Greek ranks. The battle ended in a complete rout, but not before the Chaeronea plain was strewn with thousands of Greek dead, including all three hundred members of Thebes' Sacred Band, who had fought heroically to the last man. Their valor could not offset the discipline and experience of Macedonia's national army, with the consequence that the era of the citizen-soldier-and the political freedoms he had sustained—were now irrevocably ended by the ascendancy of military professionalism.

With the victory at Chaeronea, Philip became the master of Greece, and the only question that remained concerned the form his domination would take. 41 His first action was to offer peace and alliance to Athens, presently in a state of terror and franticly preparing for the expected onslaught; to bolster the defenses, the orator Hyperides had even proposed that "the slaves should be freed, the metics granted citizenship, and the disfranchised restored to full rights."42 These measures proved unnecessary, for it was not the Macedonian siege train that Philip sent to Athens, but his son Alexander and viceroy Antipater, conveying the ashes of Athenian war dead and preceded by some two thousand prisoners graciously released without ransom. By terms of the ensuing treaty, Athens' second naval league was dissolved (no vestiges of an old hegemony could be allowed to interfere with the new), but its kleruchies on Samos, Lemnos, Skyros, and Imbros were not expelled, though it does appear that Athenian settlements in the Chersonese passed into Macedonian hands. As a natural consequence of the defeat, leaders of the peace party returned to political influence, but Philip demanded neither a purge of the anti-Macedonians nor a dismantling of the democracy. Such leniancy was clearly intended to reconcile the Athenians to the king's hegemony, a political imperative given Philip's wider ambitions.

Thebes fared less fortunately. Not only were the Thebans compelled to ransom their prisoners, Philip even forced them to pay for the privilege of collecting their dead for burial. Humiliation was followed by repression, as the king imposed a narrow oligarchy of pro-Macedonian exiles who inaugurated their reign with a series of executions, banishments,

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and confiscations. The rule of these "foremost citizens" was backed by a Macedonian garrison that now assumed policing vigil on the sacred acropolis; characterized as "the strongest fetter," the mere presence of the garrison was said to have "bound the citizens' hands and robbed them of their freedom of speech." As a final measure to break Theban power, the three rival communities it had previously destroyed—Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespiae—were now restored, and control of the Boeotian League passed into the hands of "Philippizers."

In western Greece, Philip's dispensations took a similar uncompromising form. Ambracia, long an object of the king's desire, was garrisoned by Macedonians and rendered loyal by the establishment of an oligarchy. Philip's partisans assumed power in Akarnania as well, stabilizing the situation there by a sweeping purge of all suspect and unreliable elements. Pro-Macedonian factions appear to have gained ascendancy

elsewhere in the region, including the offshore islands.

Euboea was the scene of similar reversals of governments, as Philip's old supporters returned to power in the wake of the crushing defeat of the island's democratic forces at Chaeronea. To maintain order and the ascendancy of his partisans, Philip fastened yet another strategic "fetter" by

garrisoning Chalkis.

Central Greece secured, Philip marched into the Peloponnese in November, his advance precipitating seizures of power by supporters and oligarchs, sometimes spontaneously, as in Megara and Korinth, and on at least one occasion, in Troezen, by receiving armed assistance from a pro-Macedonian ally (Argos). Korinth, as the gateway between central and southern Greece, was too important to be left independent, and it accordingly received a Macedonian garrison for its famed acropolis. Sikyon was likewise garrisoned, and two of Philip's supporters were entrenched with autocratic powers. The members of the democratic Achaean League surrendered, but Philip's only punitive action was to transfer their extraterritorial possession of Naupactus to his Aetolian allies. The next item on the king's agenda was to fulfill long-standing promises to those who had turned to him for support years earlier in their struggles with Sparta. Messenians, Argives, Eleans, Arkadians-all smarting from humiliations suffered in the distant days of Sparta's martial supremacy-now clamored for revenge and redress. At Philip's behest, Aristotle had drawn up a series of Dikaiômata, or 'Rectifications', dealing with territorial disputes in Greece, and this research into the historical and mythological record was now used to legitimize a redrawing of frontiers favorable to Philip's allies-the enterprise itself being sanctioned by the Macedonian claim that Philip was a descendant of Herakles, and hence rightful arbiter of Heraklid domains.44 The Spartans apparently found

Aristotle's scholarship and the king's genealogy equally suspect, for Philip was compelled to invade Lakonia and strip the disputed territories from them by force of arms.

With obligations discharged and authority now entrenched, Philip turned to the grander designs he had been contemplating for at least a decade. In the spring of 337 BC, he convoked at Korinth a gathering of delegates from all the Greek communities (excepting those still under Persian control and the excluded Spartans) for the establishment of a common peace under the aegis of the Macedonian monarchy. 45 A federal council, or sunhedrion, was established, composed of representatives drawn from member states on the proportional basis of military levies, which served as a rough gauge of their respective citizen populations. Thessaly was thus accorded ten seats, Phokis and Lokris three each, and so on. Meetings of the sunhedrion were scheduled to coincide with the annual occasion of one of the Great Games, and not only were its decisions binding on all member states, but delegates themselves were immune from audit by the citizens of their own communities. That this body was intended to serve as the constitutional instrument of the king's domination is clear from the founding charter. In addition to a mandatory oath of loyalty to "Philip and his descendants" (permanence thus being clearly envisaged), the existing sociopolitical arrangements within each member community were legally "frozen" by clauses that proscribed, among other things, the overthrowing of constitutions, the confiscation of property, redivisions of land, the cancellation of debts, and the emancipation of slaves for purposes of revolution. 46 Interpolis warfare was also prohibited, excepting instances of treaty violation, whereupon the offending community was to be punished by a collective military response. Bearing the official title of hêgemôn, the Macedonian king functioned as supreme executive of the sunhedrion, a power that included the appointment of "defense officers" responsible for ensuring compliance with the charter and all council decisions.

In his capacity as strategos autokratôr of the alliance, the king was empowered to call out military levies from all member states, a prerogative that points to the real purpose of this "League of Korinth" (the modern appellation). For Philip, a common peace within Hellas—secured by his partisans and Macedonian garrisons—was a necessary prelude to a war of conquest against Persia, the only opponent with riches worth plundering. In such a campaign Greek military assistance—especially in the form of the Athenian navy—was deemed essential, if for no other reason than to prevent the old Persian ploy of stirring up war in Greece with alliances of gold (a tactic that had cut short Sparta's invasion in the 390s). Accordingly, the establishment of the league coincided with pro-

paganda and preparations for a grand crusade of revenge and conquest against the Persians, a campaign that was duly sanctioned at the first session of the *sunhedrion*.

Such, then, was the "new order" imposed by the victorious Macedonian king. As with his earlier diplomatic endeavors, the League of Korinth served first and foremost as an instrumentality of Philip's interests, but since hegemony is facilitated by a measure of willing compliance, he was constrained to offer a settlement that met the approval of his Hellenic supporters. The affluent and the oligarchically inclined were, as we have seen, his two main, overlapping bases of support, and for the most part they were well served by the king's dispensations. Those of his partisans who had assumed power in the wake of Chaeronea were no doubt pleased to find their authority legally entrenched by terms of the treaty, and the proprietary classes were certainly enamored of those clauses that proscribed debt cancellations, redivisions of the land, and the confiscation of estates. On the national level, many of the smaller poleis took comfort in the common peace that shielded them from depredations by their stronger neighbors, and the promise of countrysides unravaged by war was of universal appeal. There was, moreover, the prospect of a lucrative expedition against Persia, and though few Greeks will have harbored any illusions regarding the territories to be annexed and the treasuries to be plundered-all of which would enrich Philip and his Companions—many could at least look forward to steady military pay and other spoils.

It is equally true, however, that few Greeks will have misconstrued their de facto subject status to a monarch who had crushed them decisively in war. The league organization itself-with its proportional representation, authoritative decrees, unaccountable delegates, and "defense officers"—clearly contravened the hallowed traditions of Polis autonomy, while the founding charter placed severe restrictions on the selfmanagement of domestic as well as foreign policy concerns. And whatever the delicacy of the constitutional language, there was still the harsh reality of Macedonian garrisons and "Philippizing" oligarchs, the former making a mockery of any notion of independence, the latter "trampling upon the dêmos" and holding them down "in fear."47 This was peace, admittedly, but in light of the Polis cultural heritage, it was a peace more appropriate for slaves than free citizens. That judgment, understandably, was rendered most openly in the many encomia bestowed upon the Greek war dead, as the fallen were lauded as heroes who sacrificed themselves "on behalf of freedom," true patriots who "strove to save the sacred land of Hellas."48 In contrast to the living, those who died at Chaeronea were said to have "escaped slavery by choosing a glorious death," and Demosthenes, chosen to deliver the funeral oration in Athens, declared that "the *aretê* of these men was in truth the soul of Hellas, for at the very moment their spirits were separated from their bodies, so too was the dignity and esteem of Hellas stripped away."⁴⁹

Philip was not unaware of these hostile sentiments, but he could tolerate them for the present, his overwhelming military superiority, his strategically situated garrisons, and the ascendancy of his partisans were sufficient guarantee that the Greeks would remain quiet—barring some unexpected crisis. In July of the following year, just such a calamity occurred: on the day of his daughter's wedding, King Philip, still in his midforties, was struck down by an assassin's dagger. The fate of Greece now passed into the hands of his youthful son.

5.VI ARISTOTLE'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF POWER

At the time of Plato's passing in 347 BC, the Academy had been in operation for nearly four decades, and over that period its reputation spread throughout the Hellenic world, attracting the sons of the leisured few who were eager for training in philosophia and politikê technê. Driven by his dream of transforming Polis society in the light of "true philosophy," Plato had long been preoccupied with the question of how philosophic wisdom could be harnessed to political power. The early interest in the program of his kinsman Kritias and the Thirty Tyrants, the founding of the Academy, the philosopher-king ideal of the Republic, the attempted education of the tyrant Dionysios II, the rise and fall of Dion, the political pursuits of numerous Academics, which ranged from lawgiving and diplomacy to assassination and dictatorship: all this confirms the basic inseparability of theory and praxis in the Platonic conception of philosophy. Even in the wake of the Syracusan disaster, Plato refused to abandon his belief that the education of young autocrats offered "the quickest and best method" for bringing order and eudaimonia to public life—a fixation that presumably accounts for his decision to send Academic advisors to the likes of King Perdikkas of Macedonia (the elder brother of Philip) and to Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus in northwest Asia Minor. The career of this latter figure is particularly noteworthy, for in addition to his affiliation with the Academy, Hermias was to become a key player in Philip's plans for a grand campaign of conquest against the Persians. At the center of those criss-crossing ties, intriguingly, stands Plato's most celebrated pupil.

Of the thirteen epistles preserved in the corpus of Plato's writings, several are generally accepted as genuine, others are proven forgeries. The

correspondence concerning Hermias, the Sixth Letter, has strong claims to authenticity, in part because its essential contents are confirmed by other sources, including fragments of a treaty inscription.2 The picture that emerges is that around 350 BC, a compact was formed between Hermias and two students of the Academy, Erastus and Coriscus, both of whom hailed from a Greek polis in Hermias' territory in the Troad. Plato's missive is addressed to all three individuals, and enjoins their forming an unbreakable bond of philotês and koinônia, 'friendship' and 'association', in which "the noble wisdom of the Forms" will be combined with "the wisdom of protection against the base and the wicked" for the mutual benefit of all parties.3 They are advised to read the letter repeatedly and regard its content as "a contract and authoritative law," a somewhat religious appeal underscored by Plato's closing invocation of "the god who is the ruler of all things." Other sources attest that Hermias moderated his tyrannical rule in accordance with Academic principles, and the inscription reveals that he proclaimed the new partnership openly, his treaty with the neighboring polis of Erythrae designating "Hermias and his hetairoi" as the legal signatory. Evidently undaunted by the Syracusan debacle, yet another Academic experiment is underway to bring philosophy to power, and though of interest in its own right, the affair takes on far greater significance when set within the turbulent geo-political currents of the day.

The Persian factor had loomed large in Hellenic affairs ever since the days of Cyrus the Great, but by mid-fourth century the once mighty empire was in manifest disarray and decline. Administrative disorders and regional uprisings by various subject peoples undermined all efforts at renewal, while palace intrigues and revolts by powerful satraps gave scope for mercenary strongmen to establish semiautonomous dictatorships throughout Asia Minor. Of these adventurers, Hermias proved to be singularly adept: after murdering his patron and tyrant predecessor, he rapidly extended his sway over much of the Troad by force of mercenary arms. Official recognition from the Persian king was forthcoming in exchange for the customary tribute, but Hermias fully grasped the instability of his situation. Contact was secretly made with the rising power of the west, but the record is understandably discrete and partisan on the matter of his negotiations with Philip. No less shrouded and mysterious is the involvement of a philosopher whose ties to the Macedonian crown and subsequent attachment to Hermias provide much ground for speculation—then and now.

Born in the Chalcidian polis of Stagira in 384 BC to a father who served as court physician and friend to King Amyntas II (father of Philip), Aristotle was from birth in close association with the Macedonian royal

family.4 Given his father's appointment and the nobility of his own ancestry, it is all but certain that Aristotle's childhood contacts included the young Philip, two years his junior, as well as other noble Macedonians destined for fame and power (most notably Antipater, the future viceroy and designated executor of Aristotle's will). At age seventeen and already well trained in the biological studies germane to his father's profession, Aristotle enrolled in the Academy, and for the next twenty years immersed himself in its communal life, rising to prominence both as a teacher and as an author of published dialogues. A metic in Athens with suspect political connections, his status became increasingly problematic as a revamped and greatly expanded Macedonian army began its violent intrusion into Hellenic affairs. Philip's brutal annihilation of Olynthus and dismemberment of the Chalcidian League in 348 BC marked a turning point: as leadership passed to Demosthenes and the war party, the appeasement policies of "traitors" and "Philippizers" were at last repudiated. Clearly at risk in the changed circumstances, Aristotle was rescued by the intervention of Hermias, who extended an invitation that he and Xenocrates, another leading Academic, join the philosophical court circle in the Troad.

Whatever his interests in philosophy, Hermias was manifestly an astute student of power, and toward that end an alliance with Macedonia held the greatest promise for his own security. Philip's interests are equally transparent: a strong vassal in Asia Minor would prove strategically useful in the upcoming campaign against the Persians, as well as expedient in his ongoing propaganda effort to pose as champion of the Hellenic cause. Negotiations were soon opened, but precisely when and at whose initiative are questions unanswered by our sources. Nor is Aristotle's own involvement any clearer to view, though modern scholarship is fairly uniform in assuming that his was a mediating role. After all, Aristotle not only provided a long-standing and reliable Macedonian connection, but the union of politics and philosophy was already in operation at Hermias' court—an association strengthened in Aristotle's case by the fact that he had early on established kinship ties with the tyrant, through marriage to his niece and adopted daughter. In the preserved catalogue of Aristotle's writings, moreover, one finds an entry titled Letters to Mentor, and it is all but certain that the addressee is the infamous Greek mercenary from Rhodes who had risen to high office in the Persian command.5 Responsible for maintaining imperial authority in coastal Asia Minor, Mentor at one point subjected Hermias to siege, but the recently refurbished fortifications of Atarneus withstood the challenge. The contents of Aristotle's correspondence are a mystery, but given the philosopher's antibarbarian predilections (discussed below) and the strategic interests of his patrons Hermias and Philip, it is not unlikely that Aristotle sought to

win Mentor's defection from the Great King's service. Such an interpretation gains in plausibility when the unlikely manner of Hermias' fall is considered.

Through some unspecified ploy, Mentor managed to convince the tyrant that he was receptive to offers. Upon arriving for negotiations, Hermias was arrested and tortured for information of Philip's invasion plans; defiant to the end, he suffered crucifixion in 341 BC. Aristotle, who had been recalled to Macedonia two years earlier to take up the post of tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander, was stricken with grief and bitterness. As friend, kinsman, and ally, the philosopher commissioned a memorial statue for Hermias to be set up in the most hallowed site in Hellas, sacred Delphi, and upon which was inscribed the following testament:⁶

This man was slain in unholy transgression of the sacred law of the blessed gods by the king of the bow-bearing Persians, who overcame him, not openly with a spear in murderous combat, but by making use of the treachery of a man who was trusted.

That Hermias could have been lured into such a trap suggests Mentor had assumed a convincing collaborationist posture—quite possibly through his correspondence with Aristotle, a ploy that would render explicable the philosopher's own highly public reaction to the tragedy.

We will return to the subject of Aristotle's political activities and associations in due course, but enough has been said at this point to make it clear that the philosopher's involvement in the major historical currents of his era was both direct and significant. Philip and Alexander, Hermias and Mentor, Demosthenes and Antipater: it is power that conspicuously frames the ambit of Aristotle's personal biography, a circumstance that obliges one to consider whether his philosophical reflections are in any way similarly inclined.

Perhaps no intellectual contrast has been more belabored than that between Plato and Aristotle: the one an inspired genius, a man of marked poetic inclinations and a spiritual-mystical enthusiasm that devalued the phenomenal world and many of its mundane practices; the other more prosaic and pragmatic, and possessed of a mind that sought knowledge through a comprehensive analysis of the facts of experience and a rigorous ordering of the imagination by the dictates of logic. Such a characterization does convey an essential difference between the two—visually symbolized by Raphael's famous painting, which depicts Plato with hand upstretched towards the heavens, Aristotle demurring with palm turned down to the earthly realm—but it is no less important to note that the

pupil was profoundly and enduringly influenced by his mentor's philosophy. Even where he diverges most sharply from Platonic positions, the stimulus to his own creativity was more often than not a critical encounter with Plato's formulation of the problem. Charting the course of Aristotle's intellectual development, from his early days in the Academy to his mature phase at the head of his own school in the Lyceum, has accordingly been one of the more pressing concerns of modern scholarship. It is a task complicated by two formidable problems: the near total loss of Aristotle's earliest writings, the so-called exoteric discourses that survive only as isolated fragments; and the chronological uncertainties of the preserved corpus, consisting in the main of didactic treatises that seem to have been composed for lecture usage and study within the school. From the fact that several ancient commentators praised Aristotle's published offerings for their grace and style, it seems clear that the exoteric works mentioned occasionally by Aristotle himself in the surviving corpus were intended to provide a more popular or accessible treatment of his philosophy, whereas the unadorned didactic treatises explored the relevant issues in greater methodological and substantive detail. The difference was thus essentially one of form rather than content, and certainly not a matter of "secret doctrines" for an inner circle and pabulum for the masses—a theory later concocted by Hellenistic romance writers, but unambiguously disproven by Aristotle's own words.8 One of the paradoxes issuing from this literary dualism is that while Aristotle's public reputation in antiquity was based largely on his exoteric discourses, we must rely almost exclusively on the preserved corpus of didactic treatises, first edited by Andronicus of Rhodes sometime in the middle decades of the first century BC.

A number of scholars, initially guided by the pioneering philological research of Werner Jaeger, have argued that Aristotle adhered rather closely to Plato's doctrines early in his career, and began fashioning his own philosophy only after leaving the Academy.' This view has supplanted earlier static conceptions, but controversy still rages over specifics, most notably over the question of whether Aristotle ever fully accepted the central metaphysical components of Platonism, i.e., the Theory of Forms and the doctrines of anamnesis and metempsychosis. Much of the critical debate revolves around the fragments from two lost exoteric discourses, the Eudemus and the Protrepticus, both of which were among Aristotle's most celebrated publications. The Eudemus, subtitled On the Soul, was written to commemorate the death of an Academic colleague who had been killed in action during Dion's liberation of Syracuse (354 BC). Much like Plato's Phaedo, it presents various arguments in favor of the soul's immortality, and holds that the life of the psychê after death is superior to

its embodied existence. The Protrepticus, or 'Exhortation' to philosophy, was written around 350 BC in dedication to Themison, a petty dynast who ruled somewhere in Cyprus, and was presumably part of the general Academic policy of promoting linkages between philosophers and men of worldly power.11 Several fragments echo or invoke familiar Platonic doctrines, such as the primacy of the psychê over the body, the notion that lawgivers and statesmen need knowledge of philosophy in order to establish what is just and noble, and the view that the "yoking together" of body and soul is a punishment for past transgressions. The young philosopher also apparently accepts in some general manner Plato's fundamental ontology, for though no direct reference to the Forms can be found in the fragments, Aristotle does speak of "the everlasting and true," "the imperishable and stable," and of contemplating "the most exact things" in contrast to "imitations" or "copies," the paraphrastic language Plato had himself employed when discussing the Forms. 12 The evidence thus seems to support the view that in some of his earliest public writings, Aristotle was prepared to advocate certain basic tenets of his mentor's philosophy, a number of which he subsequently came to reject or radically modify when composing the didactic treatises. But in saying that, it does not follow, pace Jaeger, that Aristotle's thought passed through distinct stages: an orthodox Platonic phase, a modified Platonism, and then intellectual independence. Such an interpretation is too schematic, and the most telling evidence against it is the fact that even in the Protrepticus fragments, one finds several of the core concepts and principles of Aristotle's mature philosophy: the distinction between capacity and actualization, a naturalistic approach to causality, and the teleological orientation grounded in the concept of natural function. Nor should it be overlooked that the Academy was never intended to serve as a center for dogmatism; that would have contravened the Sokratic spirit that Plato himself retained and passed on to his pupils, many of whom are known to have taken issue with various aspects of their intellectual inheritance none more so than Aristotle. What stands of Jaeger's developmental thesis is a recognition that Aristotle's earliest exoteric works seem to be more compatible with his mentor's metaphysical orientation than are the later didactic treatises. The road to an understanding of Aristotle's own philosophy must accordingly traverse the course of criticism he directed against the Platonic system.

The Theory of Forms served as the integrative core of Plato's philosophy; ontologically, epistemologically, and axiologically, it provides ultimate grounding for most, if not all, of his major pronouncements about self and society, virtue and vice, truth and error. That Plato himself realized the theory did not permit of conclusive proof is clear from the problemat-

ical features he explored in his own *Parmenides* and also from his practice of combining rational argumentation with myth and metaphor in the presentation of his basic metaphysical hypothesis. Other Academics are known to have offered revised versions of the theory, most notably Speusippus and Xenocrates, and Plato in the closing years of his life apparently sought to bolster the Forms through closer integration with Pythagorean number theory (as evidenced by the mathematical cosmogony of the *Timaeus*).¹³ A critical examination of the Forms was thus a major preoccupation within the Academy, and from the evidence available it appears that Aristotle early on assumed the role of dissenting critic.

In the Categories, one of his first explorations in logical analysis (c. 353 BC), Aristotle challenged Plato's ontology by arguing that the predicate 'substance' or 'primary being' (protê ousia) belongs in the most valid and proper sense not to universals—such as the transcendental Forms—but to concrete particulars, e.g., this human individual x or y as opposed to the species "Man" or the genus "Animal," general categories that in Aristotle's revised ontology are ranked as forms of "secondary being."14 As he was to make clear subsequently in the Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle found the separate ontological status of the Forms a particularly problematical feature: not only did Plato's metaphysical hypostatization deny the Forms true substantiality, it rendered them ineffectual in the phenomenal world of genesis and change. Plato's thesis that the Forms are paradigmatic "causes," in the sense that concrete particulars "imitate" or "participate" in them, is dismissed by Aristotle as mere "empty talk and poetical metaphor," for no clear explanation of such "imitation" is ever provided, either by Plato or by others who have offered variations on the theory.15 Moreover, by ontologically separating the universals from the particulars, any such "participation" becomes impossible, for particular substances are always created not by universals but by existing particular substances: i.e., human beings beget human beings, horses beget horses, and so on. Far from solving the problem of causation, the Platonic Forms in effect postulate a duplicate realm of entities to be explained, "as if a man who wanted to count things thought that he would be unable to do so while they were few, but only after he had added to their number."16

Having so pointedly objected to Plato's bifurcation of reality, it is readily understandable why Aristotle's constructive enterprise is based on a reformulation of the relations between universals and particulars. Accepting Plato's epistemological postulate that the apprehension of universals constitutes true knowledge (epistêmê), Aristotle stresses that general categories or universals are not self-subsisting entities (as with the Platonic Forms), but qualities that can be realized or actual only in

substantiated particulars.¹⁷ Being or Substance, says Aristotle, is the composite of "matter" and "form," and while these two aspects are distinguishable analytically, they are ontologically inseparable: there is neither formless matter nor matterless form (excepting the case of God, the "unmoved mover" who is pure form18). Aristotle proceeds to define matter as the basic 'substance' or 'substrate' (to hypokeimenon) that, while indeterminate in itself, possesses the 'potentiality' (dynamis) upon which form operates to achieve 'actuality' (energeia). It is chiefly the form of a substance that constitutes its defining nature, to ti en einai, 'the what it is to be a thing', and this essence unfolds by way of a dynamic process of change or growth in which material potentiality passes through successive stages of determination owing to the inherent power of form to actualize itself (e.g., from acorn to tree).19

The relations between matter and form, potentiality and actuality, are further clarified in Aristotle's comprehensive account of causality, which he regarded as one of his most original contributions. Four basic modes of causality are postulated: the material cause, or "that out of which a thing comes to be and persists," such as the brass of a bowl; the formal cause, which constitutes the "determinate essence" of a substantiated entity, e.g., the bowl's configuration; the efficient cause, or "the primary source of the change or coming to rest," such as the artisan who makes the bowl; and the final cause, or telos, "that for the sake of which" a thing is done or made, e.g., the functionality of the bowl as a container. For the multiplicity of things that come to be, two general realms of causality are posited, that of physis, or 'nature', and that of technê, or 'art/craft'. In natural genesis, form is an immanent active force; whereas in technological production, form is imposed from the outside by the artisan.²⁰ In both realms, however, teleological considerations are primary, for "nature creates nothing in vain or without purpose" (epi to poly, 'for the most part'), while human creativity is similarly purpose oriented.21 Aristotle thus sides with Plato in rejecting the materialistic metaphysics of necessity advocated by the proponents of atomism, and supports his own position of teleological naturalism by pointing to the manifest order and regularity of the natural realm, evidenced above all by the uniform movements of the heavenly bodies, the functionality of the parts of living organisms, and the fact that animals procreate according to species—all of which Aristotle analyzed in great detail in his voluminous empirical studies on celestial phenomena, plants and animals (dissections included), and other aspects of ta physika, 'the things of nature'.22

Our review of the rudiments of Aristotle's philosophy of nature forms a necessary prelude to the study of his social philosophy; for though it is

widely held that Aristotle's "momentous step" beyond Plato was to sever ethics from metaphysics, such a contention misleads more than it informs. The truth, rather, is that Aristotle supplanted certain features of Plato's metaphysics with those of his own making, more "naturalistic" in contrast to "transcendental." Indeed, not only are his ethical and political treatises suffused with the terminology, assumptions, and principles of the Physics and Metaphysics, but he explicitly seeks to validate and objectify his normative assertions in an all-embracing hierarchical teleology, purportedly inherent in the natural order of things. That latter practice is particularly relevant for any attempted sociological exegesis, for at various critical junctures, Aristotle's ontology of nature is burdened with the onus of legitimizing an axiology of manifest ideological content.

The surviving Aristotelean corpus features three major treatises on "the philosophy of human affairs": the Eudemian Ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Politics. Like most of the other didactic treatises, each of these works is chronologically stratified, giving rise to considerable controversy over the proper internal arrangement of "books" and "chapters" (some of which were subjected to editorial redactions by the inheritors of Aristotle's writings).23 Problems are thereby posed for any detailed developmental analysis, but the fundamentals of Aristotle's social philosophy are readily discernable, the treatise form being inherently less ambiguous than the creative fusion of poetry and dialectics, art and science, which Plato had achieved in his dialogues.

Aristotle viewed ethics as an integral but subordinate branch of politikê, the latter being a comprehensive, practically oriented science that seeks to promote human flourishing, eudaimonia.24 Where ethical inquiry investigates the nature of eudaimonia on the individual level, particularly as it pertains to dispositions of character, political science encompasses the totality of social relations, all of which bear upon the realities and possibilities of human existence. As "man is by nature a social being," a politikon zôon, it follows that ethical reflection must be grounded in the sociological analyses germane to politikê.25 Aristotle's orientation here comports not only with Plato's Polis-centered ethics, but with conventional Greek conceptions of morality and value, as abridged most famously in the Simonidean verse, polis andra didaskei, 'the Polis teaches man'. The momentous intellectual transvaluation which establishes the primacy of ethics over politics, the individual over community, will achieve explicit and positive philosophical sanction only in the aftermath of the irremedial collapse of the traditional Polis-citizen framework (6.III, below).

The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's most mature and developed ethical treatise (it probably postdates the Eudemian Ethics by a decade or

so), opens with the following teleological thesis: "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly also every practical pursuit and purposive choice, seems to aim at some good; wherefore it has been well said that the good is that at which all things aim."26 As there are numerous arts and pursuits, it follows that "the good" will vary accordingly: thus health is the telos, or good, of medicine, victory the objective of military strategy, and similarly with other arts and sciences. It is clear, however, that the ends of some activities are subordinate to or encompassed by those of others—as, for example, the production of bridles is subordinate to the art of horsemanship, which in turn is subordinate to the art of military strategy. If, then, there is a telos that human beings desire to attain "for its own sake," which is complete and self-sufficient in itself, while all other actions are done ultimately for the sake of this one objective, it follows that this end will constitute 'the supreme good' (to agathon to ariston).27 Political science, which Aristotle defines as the most authoritative and comprehensive of the practical sciences, is assigned the task of not only specifying the nature of this supreme good, but of carrying out its social implementation (for "the telos of this science is not gnôsis but praxis"):28

For even if the *telos* is the same for the individual and for the Polis, still that of the Polis appears as greater and more complete or perfect, both to attain and to preserve. For though it is worthwhile to attain the good for one man alone, it is nobler and more divine to do so for nations and poleis.

Virtually everyone agrees, Aristotle continues, that the highest practical good is eudaimonia, commonly characterized as 'living well and doing well' (to eu zên kai to eu prattein).29 There is no agreement, however, as to the actual content of eudaimonia: the polloi and "most vulgar" identify it with hêdonê, i.e., physical pleasures and the life of enjoyment; men of action and "the refined" judge it to consist of honors and virtues; while philosophers in turn associate eudaimonia with the life of theôria, or 'contemplation'. After briefly criticizing Plato's Form of the Good as logically unsound, ontologically dubious, and useless for human praxis (all of which is prefaced by the famous remark that philosophers must prefer truth to friendship, though both are precious), Aristotle addresses the problem of eudaimonia from the perspective of his own philosophy of natural teleology. His starting point is the so-called ergon argument, based on the following axioms: "The ergon ('function' or 'work') of each thing is its telos"; "energeia ('actuality' or 'activity') is the telos"; and "by nature the telos is always good."30 With the good, the end, and function correlative by nature, it follows that eudaimonia, the highest human good, will correspond to 'the function of man' (to ergon tou anthrôpou).31 Aristotle deduces that the human ergon cannot be the mere state of living, consisting of nutrition and growth, since vitalism is characteristic of plants as well; nor can it be sentient life, for animals likewise partake of sensation. Reason or rationality, however, is peculiar to the human species, from which it follows that the distinctive human function must consist in "the activity of the psychê in accordance with reason." Since a function is performed well when it is performed in accordance with its own specific or 'proper excellence' (oikeia aretê), Aristotle concludes that "the human good is activity of the psychê in conformity with aretê, and if there are several virtues, with the best and most perfect." To be fully and completely eudaimôn, he adds, one must be able to actualize this human good over the course of a full lifetime, "for one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one fine day." "

Having established that the human ergon is defined by the soul's rational activity, Aristotle examines the nature of the psychê itself, with the aim of identifying its specific excellences. Two basic faculties—one rational, the other irrational—are posited, with the latter subdivided into separate appetitive and nutritive components, of which the first, to epithumêtikon, is said to "participate" in reason through its capacity to follow the injunctions of the rational element. The excellences of the human psychê are categorized accordingly: one set being 'cognitive' or 'intellectual' (dianoêtikê), encompassing traits such as wisdom and understanding; the other set being 'ethical' or 'moral' (ethikê), encompassing temperance, liberality, and the like.33 Intellectual excellences are said to derive primarily from instruction, ethical virtues mainly from habit, which entails disciplining the appetitive part so that it will adhere to the commands of reason. Proper character formation through the normative power of Polis law and early childhood socialization is therefore indispensable: "for our moral dispositions arise out of like activities," which is to say that we become brave, just, profligate, etc., to the degree that we conduct ourselves in corresponding manner.34

One speaks of ethical virtue and vice, says Aristotle, when actions or emotions issue from dispositions involving purposive choice, for praise and censure are appropriate only in circumstances where the agent is responsible. As to the determination of what constitutes ethical virtue and vice, Aristotle at this point introduces his celebrated doctrine of the Mean (to meson), which holds that excess and deficiency typically constitute vice, whereas adherence to moderation promotes and preserves excellence:³⁵

For example, one can be afraid or bold, feel desire, anger, or pity, and in general experience pleasure or pain, either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these at the right time, on the right occasion,

towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, this is both the mean and the best, which is in fact *aretê*. And similarly with regard to actions there is excess, deficiency, and the mean.

Thus courage is a mean pertaining to matters involving fear and confidence, operational between a vice of excess, which is rashness, and a vice of deficiency, cowardice. Temperance is a mean commonly involving the tactile pleasures of food, drink, and sex, with profligacy the vice of excess, insensibility the vice of deficiency. Most other actions and emotional reactions are to be similarly classified: modesty stands between shamelessness and diffidence; liberality between prodigality and meanness; sincerity between boastfulness and self-deprecation; friendliness between flattery and surliness; and so on.36 Aristotle explicitly states, however, that the Mean does not apply in all cases, seeing that certain emotional states and activities are intrinsically bad, such as malice, envy, adultery, and murder. Moreover, the triadic scale of excess-mean-deficiency is not to be taken as a uniform moral calculus, for Aristotle is insistent that ethical virtue be appropriate to circumstances as well as relative to agent and other. Thus liberality by a poor man is to be judged relative to his resources, liberality by a rich man relative to his. Finally, it should be noted that the Mean does not counsel any universal moderation, for differing circumstances will require corresponding actions and responses: to experience strong feelings of anger, for example, is perfectly appropriate in situations where great wrongs have been committed. Ethical virtue, in short, is ultimately dependent upon an actor's phronesis, or 'practical wisdom', which allows for a rational assessment of circumstances and a consequent determination of the proper course of conduct. Sokrates, Aristotle allows, was thus partly right and partly wrong: wrong in believing that all the virtues are forms of knowledge (they are rather dispositions), but right in holding that they cannot exist without the rational insight afforded by practical wisdom,³⁷

Aristotle's discussion of the intellectual virtues is based on a division of the rational component of the *psychê* into two faculties: one scientific (to epistêmonikon), which contemplates those things the principles of which are invariable; and the other calculative (to logistikon), which deliberates over things that admit of variation. Each part or faculty seeks to attain truth, but the scientific, being theoretical, does so for its own sake, whereas the calculative, being practical, does so for the sake of action or production. The basic intellectual virtues corresponding to the scientific or theoretical faculty are epistêmê (scientific knowledge), nous (rational intuition), and sophia (wisdom); those corresponding to the calculative are technê (technical insight or art) and phronêsis (practical wisdom).

Having reviewed the analytical keys to Aristotle's ethical orientation, let us turn to the concluding section of the Nicomachean Ethics (Book X), where eudaimonia, the telos, and "the human good" receive detailed consideration. He opens with a discussion of pleasure, a subject central to ethics inasmuch as moral conduct involves choices based upon assessments of pleasures and pains: appropriate assessments of what to enjoy and what to avoid will characterize virtue; inappropriate selections will constitute vice.38 Aristotle's position on pleasure emerges out of a critical encounter with various existing views, including the two philosophical polarities: one that hêdonê is the supreme good (he associates this theory not with Aristippus, but with Eudoxus, a fellow Academic); the other that no pleasure is good (the view of Speusippus). Against the ascetic position, Aristotle raises a number of telling observations, the most important being that all sentient creatures display a "natural" affinity for pleasure and an aversion to pain—a clear indication that pleasure must constitute a good.39 Against the thesis that hêdonê is the supreme good, Aristotle points to the great diversity of pleasures, ranging from the disreputable and harmful to the noble and beneficial, a circumstance that invalidates any unqualified hedonism. A closer examination of human conduct reveals that pleasures are inseparable from their corresponding activities, and as activities differ in moral value and goodness, so consequently do pleasures. Each activity, observes Aristotle, is in a way "perfected" or "completed" by its own intrinsic or particular pleasure, which sharpens, augments, prolongs, and improves the activity, just as pains and alien pleasures destroy or hamper it. It follows that the highest and most appropriate pleasures will be those that are intrinsic to the activities that characterize the ergon or function of man:40

Whether, then, the perfect and supremely happy man has one or more activities, the pleasures that complete or perfect these can be said to be human pleasures in the fullest sense, whereas other pleasures are secondary and of lesser degree, just like their activities.

Hence Aristotle's rank-ordered axiology, which subordinates bodily pleasures to those of the *psychê*, the activities of which constitute the true *ergon* of man and the basis of true *eudaimonia*.

The stage is at last set for a definitive account of human excellence, a final specification of the interdependence of pleasure and activity, activity and function, function and telos, telos and eudaimonia. Up to this point, human well-being has been shown to consist in activities of the psychê that are in conformity with the excellences of character and intellect. This definition is now refined so as to yield a characterization of the highest form of human existence:

If eudaimonia is activity in accordance with aretê, it is reasonable that it should be activity according to the highest excellence, and this will be the arete of the best part of us. Whether then this be nous (intellect or mind), or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and guide us by nature, and to have cognizance of the noble and divine, either being itself also divine or the most divine element in us, it is the activity of this element in accordance with its proper excellence (oikeia aretê) that will constitute perfect eudaimonia. And this activity is contemplation (theôrêtikê).

This exaltation of the philosophic life, with its marked Platonic affinities, is a necessary conclusion given the arguments that preceded: it is the best activity since it is the activity of nous, or 'mind', the best part within us; it is the most pleasant activity, since the exercise of wisdom is our highest function (and philosophia, adds Aristotle, "possesses pleasures marvelous for purity and permanence"); it is the most self-sufficient or autarkic activity, for contemplation more than any other pursuit can be conducted in isolation and with minimal external resources; it is an end in itself, for it seeks no practical result; and finally, it is the most leisured of activities, and scholê, or 'leisure', is a major distinguishing feature of true eudaimonia. The assessment of theôria as the activity that crowns the hierarchy of human activities is thus securely grounded—though it is a thesis not entirely free from ambiguities or even possible inconsistencies. For after having just characterized the energeia of nous as "the perfect, human eudaimonia," Aristotle goes on to add:42

But such a life as this will be higher than the human level: for it is not in so far as he is human that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present within him, and by so much as this part is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of aretê. If nous, then, is divine in comparison with man, so also the life of the nous will be divine in comparison with the human life.

The highest good for man is thus raised from the human to the divine plane, and though Aristotle's language is quite consistent with the Pythagorean-Platonic view that man's rational psychê is in some sense divine, his own framework, with its emphasis on "the distinctively human ergon," seems ill suited to express this theologically loaded conclusion. Moreover, after rejecting the traditional Greek injunction "to think thoughts befitting mortals" (a precaution against nemesis or divine retribution from the quixotic, envy-prone Olympian gods), Aristotle urges his audience "to achieve immortality (athanatizein) so far as is possible" and "to live according to the best part within," which is in fact the true self:43

That which is proper to the nature of each thing is also the best and most pleasant thing for it; and so for man, this will be the life of the mind, inasmuch as the mind more than anything else is man (nous malista anthrôpos).

The life of ethical aretê—justice, temperance, liberality, etc.—must accordingly be regarded as secondary, "for the activities of moral excellence are strictly human," whereas those of the nous are "divine."44 As an additional consideration, Aristotle points to the life of the gods, which, while undoubtedly characterized by surpassing felicity and eudaimonia, could not possibly encompass the ethical virtues, seeing that to credit them with temperance or bravery, for example, is to suppose that they have vile desires that need restraining or endure terrors and dangers for the sake of the noble—all of which, says Aristotle, would clearly be "trifling and unworthy of the gods." It follows that "the activity of god must be contemplation" and that "among human activities that which is most akin to the divine activity will be the greatest source of eudaimonia."45

Many commentators have found this thesis and its exposition inadequate.46 In addition to the ambiguities created by the seemingly inconsistent characterization of nous (concurrently the divine or most divine element in man, and also that which is most of all human and the true self), Aristotle's exaltation of the contemplative life is thought to leave little scope and even less motivation for the exercise of the ethical virtues—particularly as it is stated that the paradigmatic "contemplative gods" do not engage in any practical or productive activity. But if there are difficulties and unanswered questions here, there is nothing in Aristotle's account to suggest that he viewed contemplation and ethical virtue as mutually exclusive modes of living. On the contrary, he underscores that the philosopher must 'live as a human being' (anthrôpeuesthai), a condition that requires adherence to intellectual as well as ethical virtues if complete eudaimonia is to be achieved. 47 The distinctive dual nature of man-part human, part divine-only establishes what is best and paramount in his existence; it does not mandate a purging or negation of the human side. Indeed, given Aristotle's view of the human being as a living compound of form and matter, an ontologically indivisible koinônia, or 'communion', of psychê and sôma, the Pythagorean-Platonic eschatology of personal immortality and otherworldly salvation (which he may have countenanced in his earliest dialogues) is clearly abandoned, and so too is any rationale for devaluing the human condition.48 Moreover, it is important to keep in mind Aristotle's observation that while the perfect good' (teleion agathon) must be self-sufficient and complete in itself, this good will necessarily encompass various indispensable social relationships:49

For by the self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for one's self alone, living a solitary existence, but also in regards to parents, children, and wife, and in general for friends and fellow citizens, since man is by nature a social being (physei politikon ho anthrôpos).

Ethical aretê—though "secondary" to contemplation—will thus form an essential component of the truly eudaimôn life, inasmuch as the human prospect for well-being is necessarily set within a social context.

At the close of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle stresses the importance of Polis law and other forms of public socialization in fostering an affinity for *aretê*, a discussion that serves to preface the systematic analysis of social life found in the *Politics*. Aristotle opens this pioneering work of sociology with the following teleological thesis, the analytical foundation for the entire study:⁵⁰

Every polis is an association or community (koinônia) of some kind, and every community is formed for the sake of some good (for it is on behalf of what is deemed to be good that all actions are done by everyone). It is therefore clear that while all communities aim at some good, that which is the most supreme of all, encompassing all the others, aims at the most supreme of all goods. And this community is known as the Polis, the politikê koinônia.

To understand this highest form of human community scientifically, observes Aristotle, one must analyze its processes of genesis and growth and resolve the composite totality into its uncompounded elements. The primary form of human association is identified as the family or oikos, consisting not only of the basic relations of male, female, and offspring, but also—and this startles modern sensibilities—of master and slave. Aristotle contends that both of these relations are physikon, or 'natural', the first being grounded in the instinctual urge of all species to procreate, the second in the natural distinction between ruler and ruled, which operates "for the sake of security or safety." Aristotle discusses this latter relationship in greater detail later, but for the moment simply remarks that "the one who can foresee with his intellect is by nature ruler and master, the one who is capable of doing things with his body is subject and by nature a slave; wherefore master and slave are advantageously matched together." "

The next stage in the development of human association is the village, composed of several households related by common bloodlines. The unification or *synoikismos* of several villages in turn results in the complete or perfect *koinônia*, the Polis, which is said to be marked by the attainment of functional self-sufficiency:⁵²

The Polis comes into existence for the sake of life, but exists for the sake of the good life (to eu zên). Wherefore every polis exists by nature, inasmuch as the first associations [household and village] are natural. For the Polis is the telos of these, and nature is a telos, since what each thing is when fully developed, that we call its nature, whether it be man, horse, or household. Again, that for the sake of which a thing exists, its telos, is its chief good; and

self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good. From these things it is clear that the Polis is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a social animal, and that he who is *apolis* by nature and not misfortune is either lower or greater than man.

Though there are other gregarious species, anthrôpos is the animal best suited for social life, as humans alone possesses the faculty of discursive rationality (logos) and hence an ability to identify what is advantageous and harmful, just and unjust—the very qualities that inform and sustain their communal association. The Polis is therefore "prior by nature" to the household and the individual citizen—its primary constituent parts—inasmuch as a part can exist only according to its function and capacity within the whole.⁵³ In Aristotle's teleological sociology, society is thus a natural and necessary extension of human nature, which the Polis brings to fulfillment as the highest form of social organization.

The patriarchal household constitutes the fundamental associational unit within the Polis. When complete or in perfected form, the oikos is said to consist of free members and slaves, organized in the relations of husband-wife, father-children, and master-servant. Against those who regard slavery as both "contrary to nature" and unjust—being founded upon convention and the use of force—Aristotle holds that the practice is for the most part not only natural and just, but mutually advantageous. The slave is formally defined as 'a kind of animate property' (ktêma ti empsychon), a living 'tool' (organon) that the master employs in the technê oikonomikê, the 'art of household management'. Since property stands in relation to the oikos as part to whole, it follows that the slave has no independent existence and that his or her interests are subordinate to those of the master of the household. From these considerations Aristotle concludes that the natural slave is so constituted as to be unsuited for automony, an incapacity he attributes to intellectual deficiency: 55

For he is a slave by nature who is capable of belonging to another (and that is why he does so belong), and who participates in reason to the extent of perceiving, but not possessing it.

Aristotle contends that authority and subordination are necessary and expedient relations that pervade all of nature, and that from the moment of birth some things are "marked out to rule, others to be ruled." As examples, he mentions the rule of the psychê over the body, of males over females, and of humans over animals. The ergon or function of the slave is said to consist in "bodily service for the necessities of life," and in that respect he scarcely differs from domesticated animals. Significant, however, is the fact that Aristotle notices the difficulty confronting this position: 57

Nature wishes, therefore, to differentiate the bodies of slaves and free, the one strong for necessary service, the other correct and unserviceable for such activities, but serviceable for the life of citizenship (and this divides into the employments of war and peace). But often the opposite occurs, as some slaves have the bodies of freemen, and some freemen only the minds.

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This inability of "nature" to consistently actualize her intention or design does not suggest to Aristotle any need to abandon the theory of natural slavery; he simply shifts ground from the physical aspect of function to the intellectual. He observes that since everyone would agree that those who are markedly inferior in physical beauty should be slaves (note the Hellenic preoccupation with the human body, and Aristotle's aristocratic aesthetic), it is yet more reasonable to enslave those who are inferior in "the beauty of the psychê"—though internal excellence is admittedly less readily discernable.⁵⁸ A more serious problem of legitimacy concerns the procurement of slaves through war, which Aristotle concedes does on occasion enslave those who are unsuited, most notably "those of the highest birth" and Greeks generally. But though slavery is unnatural and unjust in such instances, the philosopher steadfastly affirms the legitimacy and mutual expedience of the institution for those who are "slaves by nature," a category that now seems to be largely coextensive with non-Greeks, barbaroi.59 The ideological underpinnings of this rationalization—and its congruence with prevailing historical currents—are surely too obvious to require comment.

Aristotle now turns from the slave's status as "animate property" to the broader subject of oikos management. He distinguishes between two basic forms of property acquisition: a "natural" mode, which is oriented toward securing the necessities of life and maintaining oikos selfsufficiency; and an "unnatural" mode, which is characterized by a pursuit of unlimited riches through commercial transactions. 60 Agriculture and stock-breeding are principal branches of the former; retail trade and usury are prominent forms of the latter. In a passage that Karl Marx subsequently quoted with approval, Aristotle observes that every article of property has a double usage, one that is akin or proper, namely its natural use or function (Marx's "use-value"), the other being its use as an article for exchange ("exchange-value").61 So long as exchanges are carried out for purposes of establishing natural usage for the participants, e.g., clothing to be worn for grains to be eaten, the transaction, bartering, is natural. With the introduction of coinage, however, (originally created to facilitate "use-value" trading of the more cumbrous necessities), an unnatural relationship has developed: exchanges are now conducted in an exploitative manner for the sake of superfluous and unlimited money making, chrêmatistikê. 62 This unnatural form of acquisition, says Aristotle, not only violates the proper function of property and wealth, which is to be of service as tools or instruments—not ends—in the self-sufficient good life, but also distorts many social activities by redirecting their objectives towards the accumulation of riches. For example, neither military strategy nor the medicinal art are "in accordance with nature" when pecuniary concerns override or interfere with their respective proper aims of victory and health.⁶³

It was customary for Aristotle to preface his own views on any subject with a critical appraisal of existing knowledge and opinions. In Book II of the Politics, which is concerned with the social organization of communities, both ideal and actual, we find him assessing the views of earlier theorists as well as the constitutional arrangements of various historical poleis. Plato's Republic is subjected to extensive criticism, much of it directed against the proposal for a "communism of family and property" among the Guardians. Aristotle objects that unity of that sort would prove excessive, and actually destroy the Polis, which is by nature a multiplicity and not simply an expanded oikos or individual. Moreover, since "men care most for their own personal or private possessions," it follows that proprietary communism would foster negligence (overconsumption as well as underwork), just as communism in family relations would "dilute" and weaken natural bonds of affection.64 Other notable objections include the charge that communism would eliminate the virtues of liberality in regard to property and temperance in regard to women, and that the Helot-like position of the Producing class-excluded from office, denied higher education, and forced to yield up their production to the Guardians—is all but certain to foment rebellion from below. As for Aristotle's general assessment of his mentor's greatest dialogue:65

Such legislation has indeed an attractive appearance, and it might appear to be humane (philanthrôpos). For he who is told about it readily welcomes it, thinking that a kind of wondrous friendship of each with all will ensue, especially whenever someone denounces the evils presently existing as due to the fact that possessions are not now owned in common... But of these evils none are caused by the absence of communism, but by human wickedness (mochthêria).

Other philosophers and statesmen, he continues, have also erred on proprietary matters, for while it is important that moderate and sufficient estates be preserved for the citizenry, "there is yet greater need to equalize desires, more so than properties." Seeing that the most heinous crimes spring not from a desire for necessities, but for excesses and pleasures ("the baseness of human beings is insatiable"), it follows that equal-

ity in property is no guard against the major forms of wrongdoing. 66 Political disturbances, moreover, are caused not only by inequalities of property, but also by inequalities in the allocation of honors: though the "multitudes" engage in *stasis* largely owing to economic grievances, the "refined" are agitated by perceived slights in status and privilege, which occur whenever "noble and base stand alike in honor." Aristotle's preliminary solution to this dilemma strikes a note that will be sounded repeatedly in the *Politics*: 67

The starting point in such matters, then, should be rather than equalizing estates, those who are by nature respectable (hoi epicikeis) should be trained so that they will not wish to engage in aggrandizement, and the base (hoi phauloi) so that they will not be able to do so; and this is possible if they are kept inferior but not treated unjustly.

The philosopher now offers a detailed review of the strengths and weaknesses of the institutions of several poleis noted for "good order," namely Sparta (judged by Aristotle to be too militaristic and austere), Krete (plagued by excessive factionalism), and Carthage (too greedy for wealth). There follows a supplemental commentary on the legislation of famous lawgivers (Solon is commended for granting the dêmos only the most necessary powers, that of electing archons and subjecting them to audit), whereupon Aristotle proceeds with his own analysis. His organizing principles are drawn from the elementary facts of Greek political practice: every Polis is a koinônia of citizens, and every politeia is framed by the distribution of civic rights, the most basic of which is participation in office (archê), broadly defined so as to include judicial functions, the assembly, the council, and magisterial posts. The shared ergon of the citizens is "the safety or preservation of the koinônia," and in conformity with the principle of self-government, Aristotle defines the aretê of the citizen as consisting in "the ability both to rule and to be ruled well."68 How this ruling/ruled relationship is institutionalized provides the fundamental criterion for the classification of constitutions, which vest sovereign power in the rule of either a single individual, the few, or the many. More important than this formal aspect, however, is the orientation of the ruling power, i.e., whether it governs for the common good or for partisan advantage. Aristotle combines these two criteria (political form and objective), and offers his well-known sixfold typology, subdivided into the three "correct" constitutions of kingship, aristocracy, and polity, and the three corresponding "perversions" of tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. 69 The functions of this scheme in the Politics are largely organizational and heuristic, for Aristotle proceeds to specify in meticulous detail not only the diversity of forms within each type, but also the overlapping or compound nature of most actual constitutions.

In the so-called empirical books of the treatise (IV, V, VI), Aristotle provides the first general sociology of Greek politics, an enterprise made possible by the systematic research carried out by his school into the constitutional case histories of 158 different communities (Aristotle's own Athenian Constitution is the lone surviving complete specimen). His most fundamental and enduring insight is that differences and changes in constitutional form are to be attributed to differences and changes in social composition, i.e., the merê, or 'parts' of a community. These he identifies on the basis of various criss-crossing criteria, most notably those of class (the rich, poor, and middle), occupation (farmers, merchants, craftsmen, day laborers), and status (the hereditary aristoi and the common dêmos).70 The basic division is said to be that between rich and poor, with the consequence that the two most prevalent constitutional forms are oligarchy and democracy, the one featuring domination by the euporoi, or 'wellprovided', the other by the aporoi, 'those lacking resources'. The fewmany distinction, says Aristotle, is secondary or "incidental," a consequence of the fact that everywhere the rich are few, the poor many; if a rich majority ruled it would still be oligarchy, just as a ruling minority of the poor would constitute a democracy.71 Aristotle regards the two dominant forms as "perversions" or "deviations," though within each there are subtypes of varying degrees of acceptability, measured by the extent to which they approximate their corresponding "correct" forms: aristocracy, which is rule for the common good by those few who are preeminent in aretê and paideia; and polity, a constitution based on modest proprietary assets and vesting authority with those of hoplite status, i.e., the prosperous and hoi mesoi. Aristotle's chief objection against both oligarchy and democracy is that partisan class rule—whether of the rich or the poor-necessarily undermines the civic koinônia, leading to factional strife and the rise of tyrants. In justifying the polity as the best practical constitution, Aristotle again makes plain his preference for moderation and balance:72

In all poleis there are three parts: the very rich, the very poor, and thirdly those in the middle. Since it is agreed that moderation and the mean are best, it is manifest that possession of the things of good fortune in a middle amount is best of all. For in that condition men are most ready to obey reason, whereas those who are exceedingly beautiful or strong, or nobly born or rich, and also those opposite to these, the exceedingly poor, weak, and dishonored, both these find it hard to follow reason. For the former become hubristic and agents of great villainy, the latter evil-doers and petty criminals. . . . Moreover, those who have an excess of fortune's goods—strength, wealth, friends, and other such things—are neither willing to be ruled nor

know how to be (traits acquired in the home during youth, for owing to the luxury in which they are raised they never learn, not even in school, the habit of obedience). On the other hand, those who are exceedingly in need are too humbled and abject. So that the one class knows not how to rule, but only how to be ruled like slaves, while the other does not know how to be governed by any rule, but only how to rule as master. Thence arises a polis not of free men, but of slaves and masters, the one class envious, the other disdainful.

Such a polarized condition, Aristotle continues, violates the communal ideal and precludes the possibility of to eu zên, the good life that is the telos of Polis society. In contrast, he points to the communal philia or friendliness that is characteristic of those poleis featuring large middle classes (essentially the yeoman-hoplites), and where greater material equality and similarity in customs serve to unite the civic body. As the middle classes are numerically small in most poleis, the polity form rarely occurs, with the consequence that civic violence frequently erupts "between the dêmos and the euporoi, and whichever of the factions happens to gain mastery over its opponent, it does not establish a communal or equal constitution, but rather seizes as the prize of victory an excessive dominance, in one case creating a democracy and in the other an oligarchy." Aristotle concludes this discussion with a historical addendum that confirms the fateful erosion of the traditional Polis koinônia that we have documented in earlier chapters:73

And it has now become an established habit among citizens of the poleis not even to desire what is equitable, but either to seek domination or, being conquered, to endure.

In the final two books of the Politics (VII and VIII), Aristotle offers his reflections on the ideal or best Polis, stressing-presumably in contradistinction to Plato-that one must proceed from possible, not impossible, conditions. Like Plato, however, and in conformity with the traditional Greek normative orientation, Aristotle maintains that a fundamental correspondence holds between society and self, polis and psychê, such that the excellences of the Polis "have the same capacity and form" as those of the individual, with the consequence that a similar homology will exist with regard to eudaimonia:74

The best life, whether separately for the individual or communally in the poleis, is the life in conjunction with aretê, and which is furnished with such external resources as are sufficient for the performance of virtuous actions.

The ideal Polis will thus be so constituted as to allow for the full attainment and exercise of the excellences of human nature by its citizens; and as human nature is inherently social, the excellences will necessarily exhibit a communal orientation.

Under the category of social resources and materials, Aristotle examines the size and nature of the population as well as the extent and nature of the territory. The civic population must be large enough to be "self-sufficing for the good life" but not so large as to preclude orderly self-government, which requires public knowledge of the personal abilities and moral character of the citizens. Although no numerical figure is offered, Aristotle's stated criteria suggest medium-sized communities like Thebes and Korinth, and possibly Athens as the upper limit with some thirty thousand full citizens. As to the "natural quality" or "character" of the ideal civic body, Aristotle rules out all non-Greeks, barbaroi, since "nations dwelling in cold regions and in Europe are full of high spirit but lacking in intelligence and technê," while "those in Asia are intelligent and skillful but spiritless." Neither savages nor slaves, and geographically situated in the ideal climatological mean, the Hellenic race alone partakes of both spirit and artful intelligence, which is why the Greek peoples "continue to be free and the best governed, and even capable of ruling all of mankind if they should ever attain constitutional unity."75 As to territory, Aristotle again stresses self-sufficiency and moderation, calling for just enough land and of such quality as to enable the citizens "to live a life of leisure that is both liberal and temperate."76

Given the centrality of leisure in Aristotle's account of human wellbeing, and his views on natural and unnatural modes of oikonomikê, it is not surprising that the social morphology of Aristotle's ideal Polis bears strong resemblance to Lycurgus' Sparta, where servile producers materially sustain a stratum of landowning citizens, who monopolize the primary functions of war and politics. Aristotle stresses that "not all the things that are necessary for poleis to exist are to be ranked as parts of a Polis," for some things are simply instruments and tools, a category that pointedly includes "animate property."77 Thus in the best, most noble politeia, "the citizens must not live either a banausic or a mercantile existence, for such ways of life are ignoble and inimical to arete; nor yet must they be tillers of the soil, for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for the performance of political duties."78 Craft and commercial occupations are accordingly reserved for metics, slaves, and freedmen, while agricultural production is to be assigned to slaves or barbarian perioikoi. The great antiquity of the "caste systems" of Egypt, Krete, and elsewhere is cited in support of this proposed "ideal" form of social organization.

Freed from the laboring burdens of self-maintenance, the citizens are to devote themselves fully to the communal life of civic aretê, the princi-

pal domains of which are politics and war, the latter entailing not only "defense against enslavement to others," but also the establishment of "mastery over those fit for slavery." Aristotle maintains that Nature has given the grounds for allocating these functions, inasmuch as younger men in their physical prime are best suited for the rigors of war, while the more mature, with their experience and wisdom, naturally make the best rulers. Communal solidarity is to be promoted by religious activities and by Spartan-style common messes, both of which will be sustained by the produce and revenues derived from public landholdings worked by slaves. More importantly, as "the good life" is inseparable from virtuous activity, and since ethical arete and intellectual excellence are fostered by habit and instruction, it follows that the lawgiver's most pressing concern will be the establishment of a proper educational system. Aristotle proceeds to outline the rudiments of his ideal communal paideia, but the treatise breaks off before completion. The necessity of supervising and censoring the cultural materials presented to the citizenry-and especially the young—is duly stressed, as is the the need to impart balanced training in all of the virtues (in contrast to Sparta's one-sided cultivation of martial aretê). The end result will be the spoudaios, or 'excellent' man, a perfect citizen capable of actualizing his human capacities within the social framework ideally suited to the betterment of his nature.

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The basic themes of Aristotle's "philosophy of human affairs" having been outlined, we can now attempt to identify the social factors that permeate his thought at both the analytical and evaluative levels. Before proceeding, it is instructive to quote the following negative assessment of prior efforts at sociological imputation:80

[T]he search for effects of social conditions in his metaphysics and sciences has led only to nebulous generalizations, which have not improved with frequent repetition, that the existence of a slave class in Athens explains Aristotle's supposed neglect of the mechanical arts and his preference of the theoretic over the practical sciences, that his universe reproduces the hierarchies and limitations of the society in which he lived, and that his science, falsified by the influence of an erroneous economy and a primitive social order, delayed the development which was to culminate in modern physics.

The "nebulous" studies alluded to were invariably plagued by an all too familiar reductionism: Aristotle's ethical and political views were first correlated with his aristocratic genealogy, his high political contacts, his substantial wealth and ownership of "animate" property-and thereupon dismissed or explained away as distortions tainted by class interests. That approach still finds adherents, as evidenced by a recent publication in which Aristotle is dubbed the "tactician of Conservatism," a partisan whose philosophical arguments are "fundamentally ideological," having been "forged as weapons to be used in the political struggles of his age."81 Through such one-sidedness, even the valid insights that can and must be gleaned from the sociological examination of Aristotle's world view are lost or distorted, with the consequence that such a mode of exegesis has hitherto failed to register positively in the annals of scholarship.

It will be recalled that similar difficulties beset the study of Plato. which we attempted to surmount by close examination of the volitionalcognitive patterns comprising the Platonic world view. Though Aristotle differs from his mentor in many significant respects, the three noetic patterns or modalities that we identified as central to Plato's thought—the Polis-citizen normative tradition, the cultural ethos of the aristocracy, and the exaltation of philosophic reason—are correspondingly prominent in the social discourse of Aristotle, their points of contact not always harmonious or consistent, and therefore suggestive of possible existentialideological intrusions.

In regarding the Polis as the highest form of social organization, as a "natural growth" that alone can perfect or completely actualize the distinctive capacities of the "social animal" man, Aristotle clearly expresses his fundamental adherence to the classical Polis ideal. 82 Though critical of Plato's Republic for its excessive subordination of the individual to the koinônia, and more particularly of the methods proposed for the attainment of that unity, Aristotle regards the Polis as "prior by nature" to the individual. In accordance with the relation of whole to part, he affirms that the good of the community is necessarily "more complete," "nobler," and "more divine" than that of the individual, though in a basic sense the good is said to be "the same" for both self and society. 83 Equally traditional is the criterion Aristotle employs in distinguishing "proper" from "perverted" constitutions: tendance of the common interest, i.e., social justice, which he acclaims as "the most complete virtue" since it entails adherence to Polis law and "the good of others" in the civic koinônia.84 At times Aristotle's identification with the Polis-citizen heritage even takes on the patriotic idiom that was commonly voiced in the major forums of public life:85

We must not think that any of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all belong to the Polis, for each one is a part of the Polis, and it is natural that the care of each part be directed towards the care of the whole.

The noble man does many things for the sake of his friends and country (patris); and if necessary he will even lay down his life on their behalf.

Aristotle is likewise conventional in his understanding of the principal task of lawgivers and statesmen, holding that "the greatest concern of

politikê is to produce a certain character in the citizens, namely to make them good men and doers of noble actions." With the exception of philosophers (whose way of life is so exalted that political standards are transcended), Aristotle consistently restricts "the good life" to those of civic status, an arrangement that presupposes the subordination or enslavement of others, the tillers of the soil and the artisans and body servants whose labors sustain the citizen's leisure for the public life of politics and culture. Notwithstanding Aristotle's strained attempt to legitimize this labor-leisure dichotomy with a theory on the mutual benefits of "natural slavery," the sociological imperative behind his logic is inadvertently disclosed in an intended fanciful remark: "supposing that every tool could perform its task automatically upon command, . . . then master-craftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves." Here, clearly, philosophy has ingested and affirmed the limits of existing social practice.

As was the case with Plato, Aristotle's celebration of Polis communalism is not without its partisan features. At several critical junctures, an aristocratic bias is on display that reflects the prejudices and perspectives of the *kaloikagathoi*, *hoi charientes*, i.e., the men of breeding, cultural grace, and nobility with whom Aristotle was affiliated by birth and social standing. Although seeming to lack the existential rancor that Plato vented against "the wretched multitude," Aristotle on occasion lapses into a similar invidious idiom, especially whenever discussing what he takes to be the "hedonistic" life-style of the masses:⁸⁸

The polloi and most vulgar suppose hêdonê to be the good.

The polloi thus show themselves to be utterly slavish (andrapodôdeis) by preferring a life suitable to cattle.

For although the "refined" man, who lives in regard to the noble, will be obedient to reason, the "wretched" man, whose desires are fixed on pleasure, must be chastised by pain like a beast of burden.

For it is in the nature of the *polloi* to be persuaded not by a sense of honor but by fear, and to refrain from wretched deeds not because of shame but because of punishment; for living as they do by passion, they pursue the pleasures akin to their nature ... and avoid the opposing pains.

The nature of desire is unlimited, and the polloi live for the satisfaction of desire.

For the polloi living disorderly is more pleasant than living temperately.

That the civic masses generally preferred the burlesques of the comic stage to discourses on logic, and the physical pleasures of food, drink, and eros to the cerebral pleasures of *theôria* is not to be doubted; but what renders Aristotle's characterization tendentious is its lack of balance, his comparative inattention to the dissolute excesses of his aristocratic brethren, whom Aristophanes and the other comic poets repeatedly lampooned for their pretentious refinement, licentiousness, and pederastic proclivities: "How could he not be a nobleman?" asks an Aristophanic character, "All he knows is how to drink and screw!" 89

Though not as stridently antidemocratic in his political pronouncements as Plato, Aristotle likewise regards democracy-and especially the Athenian version—as an inferior constitutional form, ranking it among the "perversions," albeit as "the least wretched."90 His partisan colors are on conspicuous display in his historical work The Athenian Constitution, wherein he expresses dissatisfaction with the mounting democratic trend that began in the Periclean era, and rather perversely praises the brief rule of the extremist oligarchy of the Four Hundred, hailing it as a time when Athens was "well governed." No less revealing is his remark that it was sound policy to revoke the citizenship rights that had been granted to those noncitizens who had courageously aided in the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants and the restoration of democracy, "for clearly some of them were slaves."91 Aristotle also frequently complains of the "excessive liberty" characteristic of democracies, likening them to households without authority, improperly affording license to children, women, and slaves, and in general allowing "each to live in whatever manner one likes."92 Given the congenital licentiousness of the many, their susceptibility to passion and imperviousness to reason, it follows that democracy, an inherently undisciplined arrangement, will be ill suited to promote the life of ethical and intellectual excellence that constitutes human well-being.

These varied criticisms do not, of course, Aristotle an oligarch make. Indeed, the philosopher is on record that oligarchy is an even worse constitutional perversion than democracy, and he frequently upbraids the plousioi for their 'rapacity', or pleonexia, which he contends is more destructive of civic concord than encroachments by the dêmos. Aristotle's practical politics calls for moderation between rich and poor, which can best be achieved if the wealthier, more "refined" citizens rule for the common interest through electoral consent and audit control by the dêmos. Such a position owes more to the tradition of Polis communalism than to class ideology, though it cannot be denied that Aristotle's political preferences are openly conservative, sharing with Plato and other antidemocrats the principle that true justice consists in equality among equals and inequality between unequals. Civic aretê is Aristotle's principal criterion for allocating political rights, but in its historical setting that

standard inevitably favored the *kaloikagathoi* and the "well-provided," men whose wealth and leisure enabled them to best serve the Polis in their capacity as knights and hoplites, as civic officials, and through costly liturgical performances. Far from abandoning the traditional association between material advantages and claims to moral and political superiority, Aristotle explicitly reinforces that linkage, maintaining that complete *eudaimonia* presupposes not only the excellences of mind and body, but also sundry "external goods," such as wealth, good birth, and political power. ⁹⁵

Aristotle's inclusion of external resources among the necessary constituents of "the good life" has caused considerable controversy among intellectuals, even in antiquity, many of whom found the Sokratic elevation of the *psychê* and ascetic indifference a more appropriate ethical stance. Aristotle does of course continue to rate the moral and intellectual excellences of the soul as primary, but having early on abandoned Plato's otherworldly eschatology, he was bound to accord greater value to the circumstances of mundane existence: 7

It is manifest that *eudaimonia* requires external goods in addition, since it is impossible, or at least not easy, to perform noble actions without the proper means and furnishings. For many activities require instruments for their performance, such as the use of friends, riches, or political power. And there are some externals the lack of which sullies felicity, such as good birth, fine children, and beauty. For surely he is not a happy man who is very ugly in appearance, or of low birth, or is solitary and childless, and still less so is one whose children or friends are utterly base, or who has seen good children and friends claimed by death.

Aristotle goes on to observe that we are all somewhat vulnerable to the vicissitudes of $Tych\hat{e}$, seeing that great disasters and setbacks will inevitably "mar our felicity" by the pain they cause and by the impediments they raise to our objectives. He stresses, however, that the good man is best suited to cope with adversity, owing to his "nobility and greatness of soul," attributes that will prevent him from committing hateful or base actions—and hence from becoming wretched or miserable—even should misfortune deny him supreme felicity. In addition to the strong dose of commonsense characteristic of Aristotle's thought, his position here rests on the notion that perfection or excellence in any capacity consists in "unimpeded activity" (which is intrinsically pleasurable), and that for various forms of action, externals are required for optimal performance and goal attainment. "8"

By including external resources as necessary accoutrements in the composition of the good life, Aristotle in effect restricts complete eudaimonia to those of high social status and material affluence, a decidedly

aristocratic perspective that rules out the possibility that laboring and commercial strata—whether free or servile—can ever participate fully in the life of moral excellence. Aristotle's status-based normative orientation is particularly visible in his account of the major ethical virtues, several of which pertain almost exclusively to an aristocratic life-style. Magnificence, for example, involves "suitable expenditures on a grand scale" in public and private settings, and as such it is a form of aretê unattainable both for the poor man, who lacks the resources (his vice will be paltriness), and the social parvenu, who lacks the distinguished bloodlines and reputation that attend ancestral wealth (his lavish expenditures will simply constitute vulgarity).99 An excellence even more strongly suffused with the aristocratic ethos is megalopsychia, or 'greatness of soul', a character disposition that Aristotle hails as "the crowning ornament of the virtues." The great-souled man is one who "claims much and deserves much," and what he claims and deserves above all else is time, 'honor', in recognition of his surpassing excellence and preeminence in noble deeds. These megaloi, or 'great men', bestride their milieu in a self-assertive manner that calls to mind the "agonal aristocrats" of an earlier era, "justly contemptuous" of lesser lights and indulgent in matters of conspicuous display, "preferring to own beautiful and useless things rather than fruitful and profitable, for thus is greater self-sufficiency revealed." A clue to the great-souled man's political persuasion is contained in the remark that "it would distress him to be dishonored or ruled by someone unworthy," a sentiment that expresses the commonplace objection to democracy that had been repeatedly voiced by preceding generations of hereditary nobles and reactionaries, from Theognis and Alkaios on down to the Old Oligarch. 100 Aristotle places high value as well on several character traits that are readily recognizable as components of aristocratic decorum and refinement, such as dignity, wittiness, propriety, and the like. Here too the great-souled man sets the proper tone and style, with his "slow gait, deep voice, and deliberate utterance." Such mannerisms are of course just that, "mannered," exemplifying the calculated and cultivated practices that have declared superiority, "breeding," throughout the ages. The fact that Aristotle presents such posturing in an ethical rather than sociological light provides striking confirmation of his own identification with the bearers of that tradition.

Aristotle's normative fusion of moral excellence, material affluence, and high social standing culminates in his conception of *kalokagathia*, the composite excellence that is said to be inclusive of all the particular virtues. His refinement of this traditional aristocratic appellation takes the form of an unabashed philosophical celebration of nobility:¹⁰¹

To the *kalokagathos* the things good by nature are fine and noble; for what is just is noble, and he is worthy of those things. What is fitting is also noble, and these things are fitting for him: wealth, noble descent, power. For the *kalokagathos*, then, the same things are both advantageous and noble; but for the *polloi* these things are discordant, for things absolutely good are not also good for them, whereas they are good for the *agathos* man.

Aristotle justifies this bifurcation along an axis of overlapping class and moral qualities (the *kaloikagathoi* and virtue, the *polloi* and vice) by observing that while the things that men contend over and value most—honor, wealth, bodily excellence, good fortune, power—are all "good by nature," it is possible that their use may be harmful to some men owing to their corrupt or weak characters. As the congenital deficiencies and banausic practices of the *polloi* render them prone to the misuse of natural goods, they are unsuited to living nobly, to *kalokagathia*, and so are incapable of the life of 'perfect excellence' (*teleios aretê*). As Aristotle expresses it in the final book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: 102

If discourses were sufficient to make men respectable, "large fees and many would they win," as Theognis says, and quite rightly, for to provide such discourses would be all that is needed. But as it is, while words appear to have the power to persuade and encourage the free and liberal among our youth, and to make a character that is both well-born and fond of refinement and noble things capable of being possessed by aretê, they are incapable of persuading the polloi to moral nobility (kalokagathia). For it is in their nature to be persuaded not by a sense of honor but by fear, and to refrain from wretched deeds not because of shame but because of punishment; for living as they do by passion, they pursue the pleasures akin to their nature . . . and avoid the opposing pains, having not even a conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, never having tasted it. By what logos could people of that sort be reformed? It is not possible, or at least not easy, to remove by logos the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character.

With the foregoing commentary we touch upon what is perhaps the central tension in Aristotle's philosophy: the inconsistency between his restrictive views on the capacity of the majority of human beings to lead lives of moral excellence, and his nonexclusive postulate that ethical virtue is acquired by habituation or training, intellectual excellence by learning. To express this tension in more general terms, there exists within the Aristotelean framework a partial rift or fissure between judgments and explanations that are couched in the language of naturalistic teleology and those that are grounded in sociology. We have noted, for example, how Aristotle's account of "natural slavery" is gravely compromised by the actual practice of slavery within Greek society, a reality that compels Aristotle to lamely observe that while "nature wishes to differentiate the

bodies of slaves and free," that design is not typically actualized. And when seeking to legitimize slavery on the grounds of differing mental capacities, Aristotle is again forced to modify his naturalistic orientation: for the thesis he advances—that "natural slaves" are so constituted as to lack entirely "the deliberative faculty" of the human psychê—is a form of intraspecies differentiation that finds no parallel in his biological studies of other species. ¹⁰³ Correspondingly, and despite the fact that he frequently includes eugeneia, or 'noble-birth', among life's valued goods, Aristotle concedes at one point that while "nature wishes" to breed agathoi from agathoi, that intention too is incompletely realized. ¹⁰⁴

From these points it is manifest that Aristotle's invocation of physis, or 'nature', is at times more axiological than scientific, conspicuously incorporating the prevailing standards of his own reference affiliations: the Greek assessment of barbarians, the free citizen's evaluation of slaves, the nobleman's disregard for commoners, and male attitudes towards females (said to lack an "authoritative deliberative faculty"). Of these polar orderings, the distinction between the two civic strata places the greatest strains on Aristotle's philosophy, inasmuch as he provides no account of any organic differences between aristoi and polloi, apart from flat assertions that the masses are "by nature" susceptible to passion and incapable of moral nobility. Such views stand strikingly at odds with Aristotle's inchoate "enlightenment" position on the social bases of moral and intellectual excellence, founded on the recognition that "we are not born good or bad by nature," but become so through our actions: 105

It differs not a little, then, whether we are trained from childhood on in one set of habits or another, but rather a very great deal, and indeed, it makes all the difference.

The emancipatory potential of Aristotle's sociological account of the practical origins of aretê—instruction for intellectual excellence, habituation for ethical—would thus seem to be logically incompatible with his exclusionary politics and his restrictive views on the common man's capacity for virtue and self-direction. It is true that Aristotle in the main attributes the political and moral deficiencies of peasants, craftsmen, and tradesmen to their "degrading" occupations, which are said to rob them of leisure and corrupt their bodies, souls, and minds with tasks and concerns suitable for slaves rather than freemen. Equally true, however, is the fact that Aristotle nowhere supports this assessment with evidence or reasoned analysis; it remains an ideological caricature of the dêmos, blind to the reality that ordinary individuals were as capable of justice, temperance, courage, and practical wisdom as were the propertied and cultured elite. The democratic ideal that regarded each citizen as a capable

and responsible moral agent, and thus worthy of full political inclusion in the civic life of the Polis *koinônia*, is simply ignored by Aristotle, never rebutted, its falsity assumed rather than proven. Though disappointing, Aristotle's disposition is not altogether inexplicable, for the prejudice that manual labor and commercial pursuits are inherently "ignoble and inimical to virtue" has always come rather easily to slave-holding landed gentlemen—even among those who attend to philosophy.

No sociological exegesis of Aristotle's philosophy can be considered complete without an examination of his controversial Macedonian affiliations. As noted in the biographical prologue, not only was Aristotle's youth spent in the royal ambience of the court at Pella, he also maintained life-long personal and professional relationships with the most powerful members of the Macedonian ruling elite, including King Philip, Alexander, and the viceroy Antipater. He served for several years as principal tutor to Crown Prince Alexander and the retinue of Royal Pages (a number of whom were destined to become kings and potentates in a world transformed by Alexander's conquests), and before that he served as trusted contact between Philip and Hermias, his tyrant father-in-law who controlled the strategic Troad region in northwest Asia Minor. Following Philip's crushing victory over the Greek alliance at Chaeronea in 338 BC, we have seen how Aristotle was called upon to provide territorial 'rectification' documents, Dikaiômata, which were instrumental in Philip's hegemonial reorganization of internal Hellenic affairs; and it has even been suggested that Aristotle's was the mind that worked out the constitutional details of Philip's "League of Korinth." 107 Whatever the reality on that score, it is quite clear that in the eyes of contemporaries, Aristotle was seen as a horse from the Macedonian stable, quite possibly "Trojan." For confirmation, one need only reflect on the philosopher's checkered association with Athena's city: compelled to withdraw for his own safety in the wake of Philip's sacking of Olynthus in 348 BC; his triumphal return and founding of the Lyceum in 335 BC, following Alexander's violent "pacification" of the anti-Macedonian resistance through the annihilation of Thebes; and finally his desperate flight from Athens in 323 BC, following news of Alexander's death and a quickly produced trumped-up indictment for impiety, concerned, he is alleged to have remarked, "lest he allow the Athenians to offend twice against philosophy," a pointed reference to the fate of Sokrates.

Given those personal associations and career connections with the Macedonian crown, is it not likely that Aristotle's political philosophy provides ideological warrant for the ascendancy of Philip and Alexander, and indirectly for the oligarchs and conservatives who swelled the ranks

of the "Philippizing" factions? Although that suspicion is of long-standing—first aired by Athenian democrats who publicly accused Aristotle and members of his school with having entered Macedon's employ—no convincing documentation has yet been offered, and the issue remains burdened by those "nebulous generalizations" and "one-sided interpretations" mentioned earlier.

Some measure of clarity is to be gained if we begin by distinguishing between intentional ideological support for the Macedonian cause on the one hand and general aristocratic or conservative sympathies on the other. To be sure, there was a strong "elective affinity" between the two positions, and we have already seen how Philip's Hellenic support was heavily dependent on the oligarchically inclined and propertied strata. That Aristotle was a conservative in his political preferences is not open to doubt, but it would be improper to assume a priori that the philosopher sought to champion Macedonian interests in his writings. Unfortunately, the evidence upon which any determination must be based is extremely limited, and what little there is defies easy comprehension.

The most relevant materials involve Aristotle's scattered reflections on monarchy or kingship, basileia, which in glaring contravention of conventional Greek attitudes, he regards as one of the "proper" constitutional forms, along with aristocracy and polity. Indeed, in certain sections he even maintains that kingly rule is 'the best constitution' (hê beltistê politeia) and 'the most divine' (hê theiotatê). 108 To appreciate the full significance of such remarks, one need only recall how the Greeks traditionally denigrated the Persians as "slaves" owing to their system of monarchical rule and generally defined Hellenic superiority in political terms: unlike barbarians, Greeks were freemen, citizens engaged in the morally elevating art of collective self-governance. Demosthenes' contemporary assessment is even more instructive, for it properly transposes what might appear academic in a philosophical treatise into the galvanizing rhetoric of political discourse: 109

What do you seek? Freedom? Then do you not see that Philip's very titles are utterly irreconcilable with that? For every king, every tyrant is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of law. Do not be so guarded in seeking deliverance from war that you find yourselves subject to a despotês.

We have already seen how Philip sought to gild his advancing hegemony with promises of peace and security for the Greeks, to be coupled with enriching conquests in the East; and further, how "Philippizing" politicians and various intellectuals rallied to his banner. The Macedonian's capacity to quell the raging fires of *stasis* and thus ensure "security" for the propertied formed a staple theme in Isocrates' partisan publica-

tions, as did the alleged "pan-Hellenic" nature of Philip's enterprise. Far from subjugating the Greeks, Philip would lead them in a triumphant crusade against Persia, utilizing the seized territories "as a buffer" to resettle the growing population of impoverished Greeks, revealingly characterized as "dangerous men who crave the possessions of others" (cf. 5.I). Aristotle himself offers nothing so direct and explicit regarding the Macedonian crown in his extant writings (treatises rather than "current affairs"), but one does find elements of an emerging monarchical ideology, congruent with the views that had been gaining support among the oligarchs and affluent apragmones who saw in Philip an acceptable "solution" to the interminable round of interpolis wars and eruptions of civic violence: 110

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A king wishes to be a guardian, so that the owners of properties (hoi kektêmenoi) will suffer no injustice and the dêmos will not be subjected to hubris.

Kingship has come into existence for the support of the refined (hoi epieikeis) against the dêmos, and a king is set up from among the refined classes on the basis of his surpassing excellence or the actions that spring from aretê, or through superiority in coming from a family of such quality.

The friendship of a king for those ruled by him is one of superiority in beneficence (euergesia); for a king does good for those he rules, inasmuch as being good he takes care that they may prosper.

The last phrase in particular—the king as *euergetês*, a doer of good deeds—is tellingly close to Philip's own propaganda, which not only portrayed the king as a defender of Hellenism, but repeatedly advertised the benefactions and favors that would be bestowed upon those who joined Philip "in friendship and alliance."

In addition to offering supportive remarks about the nature of royal rule, there are several discussions in the *Politics* where Aristotle seems to grant a higher theoretical legitimation to autocracy, a position some scholars have surmised implicitly sanctioned the imperial claims of Philip and Alexander. The most controversial passage is that which addresses the problem of establishing an appropriate political arrangement whenever there arise individuals of "surpassing excellence." Likened to "a god among men," Aristotle argues that the truly extraordinary man will act as a law unto himself, thereby precluding his equal membership in the *politeia*: such a one must either rule absolutely or be killed or ostracised. Aristotle accepts that banishments are partially just in "perverted" constitutions like democracies, but in the "best" *politeia* the man of exceptional *aretê* must not be so treated: "13"

It surely would not be said that such a man ought to be banished or removed; yet neither should he be ruled, for that would be as if men deemed themselves

worthy to rule over Zeus, dividing between them his offices. It remains therefore—and this indeed seems to be the natural course—for all to obey such a man gladly, so that men of this sort will be kings forever in the poleis.

Whether this loaded commentary owes its inspiration more to the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king or to Aristotle's own ties with the kings of Macedon is undeterminable given the nature of the evidence; but it is clear from subsequent remarks that Aristotle does not offer this autocratic formula as a universal normative injunction. He forthwith declares that "among people who are alike and equal it is neither expedient nor just for one man to be sovereign over all," and adds that kingship was more appropriate in the distant past when, with smaller populations, it was difficult to find men of outstanding excellence. It Indeed, the most serious objection that Aristotle raises against the autocratic principle is so damaging one wonders why he bothered to advance a hypothetical defense of virtuous absolutism at all:

He who calls for the rule of law seems to enjoin that god and reason alone shall rule, whereas he who commands that a man should rule imposes a wild beast. For appetite has that character, and passion similarly perverts the holders of office, even when they are the best of men. The law, however, is reason without desire.

Aristotle brings his quasi-aporetic discussion to a close by reaffirming that there are three "proper constitutions" (kingship, aristocracy, and polity) and that the best occurs whenever the community is administered by the best, "whether this be one man, a whole family, or a number of persons, surpassing in excellence all the others together." This flexible definition is precisely what one would expect given Aristotle's sociological pragmatism, i.e., his recognition that "a different *politeia* is just and expedient for different people" and that "the lawgiver and true statesman must be acquainted not only with the constitution that is the highest absolutely, but also that which is best relative to circumstances." 117

Was, then, the student of Plato also the servant of Philip? And did the philosophy accommodate the ends of a partisan politics? Much remains uncertain regarding Aristotle's actions in the political arena, but the charge that his writings provide either an open or veiled advocacy for the Macedonian crown seems unwarranted. What has been established, however, is the fundamental congruence or affinity between Aristotle's social philosophy and the nexus of interests—proprietary and imperial—that formed the joint bases of the Macedonian ascendancy. That Aristotle should continue to celebrate aspects of the Polis-citizen tradition while concurrently raising autocratic rule to legitimacy is perhaps inconsistent, but understandable in light of historical circumstance: the old world,

after all, had not yet passed, the new was still very much in travail. As with other members of his class and status, Aristotle was prepared to countenance a turn to "benevolent absolutism" as a solution to the crises then besetting Polis society—such, at any rate, seems to be the logic behind his reflections on the "man of surpassing virtue" and the material benefits to be gained from kingly rule.

In terms of practical politics, such a disposition would naturally endorse Philip's "alliance" with the Greek proprietary strata—and irrespective of the nature of his own service to the king, Aristotle is unlikely to have found much fault with the generally "conservative" form of Philip's domination. The king had adopted a conciliatory line following his victory at Chaeronea, and his hegemonic "settlement"—a judicious mixture of direct and indirect controls—was welcomed by oligarchical supporters and affluent sympathizers as a necessary bridle on "excesses" by the dêmos. Moreover, given Aristotle's antibarbarian predilections and his conception of war as a "naturally just means of acquisition," to be employed "against such of mankind as are fitted by nature to be ruled, but who do not wish it," we can safely assume his support for Philip's intended pan-Hellenic crusade against Persia.¹¹⁸

Those plans, however, were cut short by an assassin's dagger, and the royal mantle passed to a younger man, Aristotle's former pupil, whose ambitions and spear-won successes were to violently and abruptly usher in a world unanticipated by his teacher's lectures. The meteoric career of Alexander—a self-proclaimed "living god among men"—must therefore be recounted before we offer our concluding comments on the philosophy of Aristotle.

5.VII DIOGENES AND CYNIC ANTINOMIANISM

As a form of communication, albeit specialized, all social philosophies presuppose a favored constituency or audience, in George Herbert Mead's terms, a "generalized other" that serves as a primary point of reference for dialogical reflection. In the recently reviewed cases of Plato and Aristotle, we have seen how certain core ethical and political principles of their philosophies display a marked affinity or congruence with the aristocratic predilections of the *kaloikagathoi*. The social bases for that connection are rather obvious: both philosophers were themselves of noble or prominent lineage; both continued to function in that particular milieu, associating and keeping company with some of the most powerful and privileged individuals of the day; and both drew their scholastic followers primarily from the ranks of the leisured and prosperous few. Indeed, so transparent was the nexus to contemporaries that it provided grist for the

satiric mill of the comic poets, who frequently chided the philosophers for their pretentious elegance: "His cloak is white, his grey tunic fine, the soft felt-hat, the graceful cane, the luxuriant shoes—why need I give a long description? In a word methinks I'm looking at the Academy itself." Such jibes presumably gave no offense, for as conceived by the two founders and as practiced in the Academy and Lyceum, philosophy was restricted almost as a matter of course to members of the privileged strata, who alone possessed the requisite resources for a life of leisured contemplation, unsullied by the "degradation" of commercial or banausic pursuits.

This fusion of high social status with intellectual and ethical excellence was not the only philosophical tradition, however, for at the source there stood the remarkable figure of Sokrates. Notorious for his simple dress, plain fare, and general subordination of conventional values to the primacy of the psychê, the Sokratic call to virtue violated and transcended all established modes of social propriety. Among his many followers, it was Antisthenes who responded most positively to the ascetic, antinomian side of Sokrates, raising the principles of autarkeia and enkrateia, 'self-sufficiency' and 'self-mastery', to the highest ideals in a philosophy that sought eudaimonia in renunciation and endurance (5.IV). The marked "defensive" orientation of Antisthenes' ethics-i.e., the injunction to devalue conventional interests and standards and to fortify oneself behind the "unassailable walls" of the rational, autonomous $psych\hat{e}$ —we interpreted as a response to the crisis of social disorganization and normative anarchy then gripping Polis society in the aftermath of the ruinous Peloponnesian War. It is also likely that Antisthenes' humble origins—he was widely reproached for the fact that his mother was Thracian, quite possibly a slave-contributed to his ascetic disposition and manifest contempt for the material advantages of his social superiors. In any event, historians have not hesitated to characterize Antisthenes' moral philosophy—and the Cynic tradition he is said to have inspired—as "plebeian" or "proletarian," though it is more accurate to simply note the nonaristocratic orientation of this school, inasmuch as Cynicism cannot in any legitimate sense be regarded as an ideology of the poor or disprivileged.

If Antisthenes furnished the theoretical starting points for Cynicism, the first "practicing" Cynic was the celebrated Diogenes of Sinope (c. 400–320 BC). Various doxographic accounts entertainingly relate that Diogenes associated with Antisthenes as a pupil, but chronological considerations render it more probable that the elder man's writings served as the medium of contact. Hailing from a prosperous Greek colony situated on the southern shores of the Black Sea, Diogenes' turn to philosophy was

the consequence of his infamous banishment from his native land. The details behind this incident are obscure, but it appears that Diogenes' father—chief magistrate of the public treasury—was imprisoned over some real or alleged malfeasance regarding the coinage, the charge being "adulterating" or "defacing the currency." Diogenes was implicated in the affair and sentenced to exile. He migrated to Athens, and within short order proceeded to establish a reputation as the most eccentric "wise man" in Hellas.

Diogenes followed the ascetic path to autarkeia marked out by Antisthenes, but as in everything else he carried this position to its logical and existential extremes: he assumed the beggar's panoply of cloak, knapsack, and staff, and his preferred domiciles were public porticoes, temples, or discarded storage cisterns (the famous "tubs"). He proudly declared his independence by reciting how all the standard curses of Tragic drama had befallen him, for he was now "without polis or home, deprived of his native land, a beggar and a wanderer" and yet for all that he was a completely "freeman," while his contemporaries were "slaves" to false and artificial concerns.3 Capitalizing on the allegorical value of his criminal record, Diogenes proclaimed it his mission to 'deface the currency' (paracharattein to nomisma), by which he meant to expose or remove from circulation all the "counterfeit coins" of value, i.e., those false conventions (nomismata) that corrupt human existence and distract one from the natural path to well-being. Wealth, status, luxury, political aspirations and the like were all scorned and ridiculed by Diogenes as "ornaments of vice," as encumbrances that rob one of the freedom that attends the euteles or "simple" life:4

He freed himself from all fetters and traversed the earth without ties, fearing no tyrant, constrained by no law, unoccupied by public affairs, unencumbered by the nurturing of children, not confined by marriage, not possessed by any plot of land, unburdened by military concerns, nor driven from place to place for the sake of trade.

Given such a thorough antinomian disposition, it is hardly surprising that Diogenes is the first philosopher to openly repudiate the Polis ideal.

Men came together to form poleis so that they might not suffer wrongdoing from those outside; but then they turned about and did wrong to one another themselves and committed the most atrocious deeds, as though this had been the purpose of their coming together!

Disavowing all allegiance to any civic or political association, Diogenes proclaimed himself 'a citizen of the world' (kosmopolitês), an anarchic position of extreme individualism that emptied the citizenship ideal of all value. He is known to have written a *Politeia*, but the surviving

information indicates that this work, in contrast to Plato's, presented a radical negation of the institutions and functions of the historical Polis. In their place, Diogenes advocates a relapse into primordial primitivism, a romanticized stage where the scourges of property and politics, marriages and wars, have yet to make their appearance.

This thoroughgoing assault on the values and conventions of traditional society openly testifies to a profound disillusionment with prevailing patterns of life; it is, moreover, an indication that the Polis-citizen bond has become so tenuous in some circles that a corrosive anti-Polis message can emerge and register a significant cultural impact. Although Diogenes' personal alienation from Polis society was no doubt precipitated by the unfortunate circumstances of his own life, Cynicism as a social phenomenon must be understood as a form of "cultural primitivism," a pattern succinctly defined by Lovejoy and Boas as "the discontent of the civilized with civilization." Over the ages, that reaction has been prompted by diverse causes, but conspicuous in many cases is a high degree of institutional dislocation that undermines the attraction and compulsive power of traditional ideals and roles. As desiderata of the established normative code become more difficult to control or obtain owing to mounting social disorganization, their repudiation constitutes a reasonable strategy for psychic survival. Shorn of theatrics, Cynicism at its core offers just such a palliative.

Obsessed with the task of "defacing" the cultural coinage then in circulation, Diogenes devoted little attention to the minting of a new philosophical issue. The old watchwords of "nature" and "reason" were duly sounded, but these concepts were defined in largely oppositional, negative terms: the "natural" consisted in rejection of the "conventional," and rationality was understood as insight into the antinomian injunctions of nature. One accordingly finds in Cynicism no elaborate intellectual system that specifies the content of human excellence—the philosophical architectonics of the Academy and the Lyceum were dismissed as empty verbiage—but simply a way of life in open rebellion against prevailing standards. Nature alone was to be the norm, and having dispensed with the methodological rigor of scientific inquiry into the human condition, the Cynics readily turned to the animal kingdom for "ethical" guidance:⁸

Do you not see the beasts and birds, how much more free from trouble they live than men, and in addition how much more pleasantly, and how much healthier and stronger they are, and how each of them lives as long as is possible? Yet they have neither hands nor human intelligence; but over against these things they possess that greatest good, a freedom from possessions.

Because of their cultivated softness men live more wretchedly than the beasts. For these have water for their drink and grass for their food, and most of them go naked the year round; they never enter a house, nor make use of fire. Yet they live out the full span of time that Nature arranges for them, unless they are killed; and all alike go through life strong and healthy, with no need of doctors or drugs.

Diogenes even went so far as to defend incest on grounds that "cocks are not disturbed by such unions, nor are dogs or asses-nor do Persians object, and they are regarded as the best men of Asia." It was extremism of this sort that originally earned for Diogenes the abusive epithet of ho kynikos, 'the canine' or 'dog-like one', a label that he and his followers readily adopted with characteristic defiance.

For all his antinomianism, however, Diogenes regarded his mission as a humanitarian one, that of freeing men from false concerns and conventions. Rather than withdraw as a misanthropic recluse or retreat into the security of privileged subcommunities such as the Academy or Lyceum, Diogenes spent his life in the agoras and bathhouses, where by word and deed he would simultaneously mock his fellow man and demonstrate the path to natural self-sufficiency. To be sure, Cynic austerity would have lost much of its personal appeal had it been lived in private, without the luxuries and follies of others to serve as contrasting foil (Plato is alleged to have noted the "inverted vanity" of Diogenes' excesses10), but the educational intent of the movement was nonetheless genuine. Cynic methods of teaching were as unorthodox as its doctrines, featuring both uninhibited verbal expression (parrhêsia) and behavioral shamelessness (anaideia). Thus in street-corner diatribes or in his few written works, Diogenes would expound on the merits of cannibalism or complete sexual license; while in personal conduct he would shock the sensibilities of the citizenry by engaging in such acts as public masturbation, informing startled onlookers that "he wished he could just as easily relieve hunger by the rubbing of his belly."11 This was indeed "a Sokrates gone mad," as Plato reputedly remarked, but beyond the sheer delight in exhibitionism there was method to the madness: likening himself to the trainers of choruses, Diogenes declared that it was his responsibility "to set the notes a little too high, so that others might find the right key."12

Walking about with a lit lantern in broad daylight, departing from theaters at the very moment when audiences arrived, requesting that the Alexanders of this world step aside for the rays of the sun, and by offering a philosophy that sought to render the individual self-sufficient against the vicissitudes of fortune and the pressures of convention in an age of wrenching social upheaval, all this won for Diogenes immortal fame as well as a following of disciples who spread his message throughout the

Hellenic world. For the comic poets of an increasingly depoliticized, "bourgeois" age, the movement and its motley crew were prime sources for mockery and witticisms against dull conventionality. Monimus of Syracuse, for example, an ex-slave who became one of Diogenes' first converts, garnered publicity in one of Menander's comedies as "a wise man, but a little too disgraceful, . . . a squalid little beggar who declared that all human supposition is but illusion" (tuphos, literally 'smoke' or 'mist').13 More famous still was Krates of Thebes (c. 365-285 BC), a figure who gained instant notoriety when he renounced his immense fortune and social status in favor of the kynikos bios, the life-style of voluntary austerity and freedom. Less acerbic than his mentor Diogenes, Krates was greatly admired for his philanthrôpia, which he manifested in such practices as offering consolation to the distressed and in reconciling those at enmity. He earned the nickname "Door Opener" for his custom of making unannounced house calls, which he turned into forums for ethical edification. Plutarch, who wrote a biography of the sage, observed that "he passed his whole life jesting and laughing, as though on perpetual holiday," dismissing conventions and advocating the advantages of the simple life. 14 Several fragments from his own writings survive, including the famous allegorical Ode to Pêra, the word for the Cynic 'knapsack' or 'wallet' within which all life's essentials could be carried:15

Pêra is a polis set in the midst of wine-dark illusion (tuphos); fair and fruitful, exceeding squalid, possessing nought, into which there sails neither fool nor parasite, nor those who in a harlot's buttocks delight. But thyme and garlic it bears, and figs and bread. For which things' sake men do not wage war against each other.

Here we see the Polis symbolically supplanted by the ascetic's knapsack as the true standard of value, and the concluding theme of antimilitarism strikes a note repeatedly sounded in Cynic teachings. 16 Krates is also known to have denounced Polis society for the evils of stasis and tyrannical rule, both of which he traced to vain desires for luxury and extravagance. Declaring "disrepute and poverty to be his country," Krates repudiated the Polis-citizen bond in favor of Diogenes' anarchic "cosmopolitanism," and the only tie he accepted was his celebrated "Cynic marriage" to Hipparchia, a noblewoman who likewise renounced her privileged station for a life of practicing asceticism at Krates' side. 17

Given the hostile reaction to Sophism in the fifth century and the tragic fate of Sokrates, it stands to reason that had an extremist, anti-Polis philosophy such as Cynicism arisen in the Classical period, it would have met with moral outrage and stern repression. In the troubled fourth century,

however, the Cynics were not only free to propagate their antinomian message from within the very nerve centers of Polis society, but that message itself assumed a prominent place in Hellenic cultural discourse, exerting influence both at the level of everyday life (street corner preaching, satiric verses, and a rejection of scientific rigor rendered Cynicism accessible to a mass audience—a deliberate orientation) as well as upon subsequent intellectual developments, Stoicism most notably. How, then, is one to account for this remarkable degree of tolerance? The fragmentary historical record yields no definitive answer, but there are certain considerations that afford a measure of understanding. Most obvious is the fact that Cynicism's unrestrained assault upon conventional standards demonstrates in itself that traditional civic ideals no longer commanded unquestioned assent and reverence. Why that should have been the case in the fourth century we explained above, stressing that as intensified interpolis warfare ravaged the slender agrarian base of Polis society, the entire institutional and cultural matrix suffered dislocation, registered above all by the rising tide of murderous civic factionalism (5.I, II). Second, the mere fact that no efforts were made to suppress Cynicism suggests that the normative "sanctity" of the Polis had eroded considerably by mid-fourth century, for under existing lawcodes, the Cynics could easily have been charged with "corrupting the young," "impiety," or even "treason." That no defenders of the old values were forthcoming exposes the deep paralysis and confusion then besetting the cultural realm, as does the startling fact that Cynicism was not only tolerated, but also managed to achieve a measure of legitimacy, with its leading devotees recognized as important sages—even educators!—whose extremism fascinated and amused more than it repelled. Indeed, Diogenes himself was actually honored by the citizens who first banished him, for upon his death a commemorative statue was set up in Sinope that praised the Cynic for "revealing the lesson of self-sufficiency and the path to the least burdened existence."18 With this blatant contradiction of public honors for a man whose teachings were unreservedly antinomian, the fall away from the traditional Polis spirit has surely reached its nadir.

There is one additional consideration that renders the unexpected public license afforded Cynicism understandable, and that is its socially passive, apolitical orientation. For though the Cynics assailed many of the evils of the day unsparingly—stasis, political corruption, war, greed—their critique was so all-encompassing that the most pressing problems of social life were unavoidably trivialized. The Cynic message, moreover, was directed towards personal deliverance rather than societal reform, holding that the individualism of complete self-sufficiency offered the only viable opportunity for human flourishing. Oppressive or dehuman-

izing institutions and conventions were not to be refashioned in accordance with philosophic reason, as in Platonism, but simply rejected and dismissed outright as unnecessary and avoidable encumbrances upon the self. In an age of violent factionalism between rich and poor, a critique that suggested that the proprietary classes should be pitied and despised rather than dispossessed or envied—for the simple life was the good life—is unlikely to have troubled the dominant strata to any appreciable degree. On the contrary, it has been cogently surmised that to the powerful and privileged, "Cynicism may well have seemed an excellent philosophy—for the lower classes." 20

The antipodal relationship of Cynicism to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle needs little specification: whereas the latter two had stressed the interdependence of self and society, psychê and polis, the Cynics perversely measured the value of human existence by its independence from all social relations. For Diogenes and his followers, the Polis-citizen bond—far from raising the individual to his highest and most fully human capacities—was in reality a form of bondage, a mode of life that chained the individual to conventional and hence false ideals and pursuits. The Cynic, however, remained mired in negation, incapable of specifying in any affirmative, positive manner the content of aretê or of human wellbeing, content simply to mock and sneer at tradition. While others would come to agree that the Polis could no longer serve as the foundation and stage for moral excellence, they will manage to find a more constructive alternative than Pêra, the knapsack of mendicant sages.

The Hellenistic Age

The period of Greek history extending from the time of Alexander's eastern conquests down to the ascendancy of Rome as the ruling Mediterranean power is one of the most fascinating and important in the annals of Western civilization. With the triumph of Macedonian arms, the vast Middle Eastern landmass ranging from Anatolia to the Punjab, the Nile valley to the southern shores of the Black and Caspian seas—a territorial expanse of nearly two million square miles—became subject to Graeco-Macedonian forms of political, economic, and cultural domination. Though the young conqueror's sudden death in 323 BC unleashed a half century of internecine warfare between his ambitious generals, the subject peoples were incapable of capitalizing on the carnage to expel the invader (save in isolated northern and eastern fringes), and in due course the most successful of the "Successors" came to wear royal diadems in the kingdoms they carved from Alexander's grand empire. The consolidation of these patrimonial regimes required a massive influx of Greeks and Macedonians, not only for purposes of manning the hastily erected bureaucratic and military command structures, but for populating the countryside and newly planted urban settlements with the privileged subjects whose descendants would serve and sustain the royal power in years to come. Conquest and colonization were thus the twin creative processes that gave shape to the age, and prepared the ground for a contact between East and West that recast the patterns of civilization in ways that were to decisively influence the course of world history.

6.I ALEXANDER AND THE GRAECO-MACEDONIAN CONQUEST OF THE EAST

With an advance army of ten thousand men actively securing an invasion bridgehead in Anatolia, Philip's preparations for his long-awaited campaign of conquest against the Persians were in full swing when an assassin's dagger claimed the life of the Macedonian monarch in the summer of 336 BC. The obvious heir to his office and ambitions, the twenty-year-old Alexander (and son of Philip's estranged queen Olympias, likely mastermind of the assassination), had little difficulty in winning the traditional

ratifying acclamation of the Macedonian army, for whom he had already demonstrated his prowess in leading the cavalry charge that broke the Greek ranks at Chaeronea a scant two years earlier. But the young king-a "mere boy" sneered Demosthenes-was not immediately heir to Philip's reputation as the greatest ruler of the day, and those forces in Greece that had chafed under the hegemony imposed by the father now stirred at the accession of the son. Alexander reacted with the decisiveness that was to become legendary, quick-marching into Thessaly and forcing the local barons to acknowledge his hereditary claim to Philip's position as Tagos of all Thessaly. From there his army descended into central Greece, a massive show of force that at once dampened the ardor for rebellion and stilled the voices of opposition. The young warrior-king was greeted with fawning praise rather than hostile spearpoints, as offers of honorary citizenship were conveyed by penitent embassies, several of which (including the Athenian) hailed from communities that had recently voted honors for the "tyrannicide" who had slain his father! With Macedonian dominance reasserted, Alexander convened the sunhedrion of Philip's "Greek Confederacy" at Korinth and duly received confirmation as hêgemôn of the alliance, whose contingents he was shortly to lead against the Persians in accordance with the announced invasion.

Departing from Korinth in late fall—after reputedly having been asked by Diogenes the Cynic to "get out of his sunlight"-Alexander returned to Macedonia and prepared for a spring campaign to secure the Thracian and Illyrian dependencies that bordered his realm. Eventually successful after months of fierce fighting that carried the Macedonian banner to the southern banks of the Danube, Alexander was abruptly compelled to return to a Greece on the verge of full-scale rebellion. Abetted by Persian gold and emboldened by reports that Alexander had been slain in the northern wilds, anti-Macedonian factions were calling openly for the restoration of Hellenic freedom. Thebes took the lead by attacking the hated occupying garrison and by carrying out summary executions of prominent "Philippizers." The Arkadians, Eleans, and Argives likewise mobilized for war, and as the Athenians began their preparations, Demosthenes arranged for a delivery of arms to the frontline Thebans. In a stunning display of mobility, Alexander stormed down from the highlands with thirty thousand Macedonians, reaching the outskirts of Thebes within a fortnight—a move that paralyzed Athens and the other confederates. Immunity was offered to those Thebans who wished to "come over" and "share in the Common Peace," but at the defiant rejoinder that those interested in "destroying the tyrant of Hellas" should "come over" to Thebes, an enraged Alexander launched the assault. Despite heroic resistance, the combination of enemy garrison within and grand army

without proved too formidable, and the ancient city was sacked with heavy losses of life. Judiciously adopting his father's old ploy of playing weaker communities against the stronger, Alexander "entrusted" the fate of Thebes to those of his Greek allies who had participated in the slaughter: the Phokians, Plataeans, and sundry other Boeotians who had long resented Theban preeminence. Their proposal was horrific but not unexpected: enslavement for the thirty thousand surviving captives (excluding "priests and the friends and allies of Philip and Alexander"), annihilation of the city, and the distribution of Theban lands among neighboring communities. Only the sacred temples and the house of the poet Pindar were left standing, as one of the greatest of city-states was obliterated at the behest of the Macedonian monarch and his Greek dependents.³

With that object lesson in the realities of power indelibly planted, Alexander chose to overlook the indiscretions of the other would-be rebels—several of whom sent craven words of praise for his "just punishment" of the Thebans. In the same spirit he deferred to an Athenian appeal that he rescind his earlier demand that the leading anti-Macedonians, including Demosthenes, be delivered over to his custody. For the foreseeable future, the king could trust that his partisans throughout Greece would have little difficulty maintaining order in the aftermath of the terror at Thebes, their policy recommendations strengthened by the presence of strategically situated garrisons and by the memory that the Macedonian field army was but days march distant.

After arranging the homefront administration over the winter months—with his mother Olympias as queen and his father's viceroy Antipater as military commander and governor—Alexander set forth in the spring of 334 BC for the Anatolian coast. The army he led consisted of some forty thousand troops, nearly half Macedonians, while the remainder was comprised of Balkan tribesmen, Greek allies (about eight thousand), and sundry mercenaries. Accompanying offshore was an allied Greek fleet of 160 warships. Upon arrival, a ceremony was staged in which Alexander laid claim to all of Asia as "spear-won" territory, and then—in honor of his "ancestor" Achilles—he proceeded to Troy, now a backwater village but still renowned for preserving the tombs and other relics of Homer's heroes. Following a round of lavish sacrifices and athletic games to honor the gods, and upon receiving a gift of sacred "Homeric" armor from the priests of Athena's temple, a suitably inspired Alexander marched out in search of his destiny.

The course of Alexander's campaign of Asian conquest will not be recounted here save in broad outline, as we confine our focus to the relevant historical-sociological concerns. Of these the most fundamental is undoubtedly the military dimension, as attested by the astounding rapid-

ity and comparative ease of Alexander's monumental triumph. In this as in other matters, the young king was the beneficiary of his father's diligence, for the army he inherited-Philip's army-had passed through decades of professional reform and hardened combat prior to his ascension. The tactical articulation and diversity of the Macedonian armed forces-light and heavy infantry, the pike phalanx, shock cavalry, torsion-catapults and rams-was unrivaled, and so too its fighting commitment and loyalty, qualities that were sustained and cemented by patrimonial bonding and a reward structure of steady pay, bonus incentives, lucrative booty, and generous land grants (5.V). To this formidable fighting instrument Alexander added peerless generalship and the galvanizing spirit of heroic charisma: ever in the front ranks of battle, ever leading the decisive charge of the Companion cavalry against the foe. Persia's military organization, in contrast, was beset by fatal limitations. Notwithstanding immense advantages in manpower, the Persians had never managed to field an infantry equal to the phalanx of Greek hoplites—a reality not lost to the Great Kings, who routinely employed thousands of Greek mercenaries at the core of their ground forces following the fifth-century debacles at Marathon and Plataea. The Greek hoplite, however, was no longer master of the battlefield: the combination of Macedonian pike bearers and heavy cavalry had decisively exposed his liabilities on the plains of Chaeronea and elsewhere. Persia's aristocratic horsemen fully deserved their reputation for courage and skill, but here too they were surpassed by the Macedonians, whose adoption of shock tactics—with warriors mail-coated and spear-wielding typically proved too much for the lighter armed Persians, masters of the bow and javelin. In addition to combat deficiencies in heavy infantry and cavalry, the Persians proved unequal to the task of marshalling their superior numbers to full advantage, a shortcoming traceable in part to divisions within the military command between Persian nobles and Greek mercenary generals, whose mutual suspicions and disagreements over strategy loom large in the ancient chronicles. Against Alexander, the foremost tactician of his or perhaps any era, these divided counsels were to prove disastrous. As for the Persian superiority in naval forces, featuring a massive and able Phoenician contingent, this was early on removed from the contest, as Alexander boldly opted to suspend his own naval operations—a major drain on finances, and unreliable given that the Greeks who dominated his fleet were "ready to revolt" should circumstances permit. Rather than engage on sea, he executed the strategy of "conquering ships from dry land" by capturing all the major ports along the eastern Mediterranean, thereby denying his foe access to necessary logistical support.5

The Macedonian advance was also favored by the geopolitical terrain. Imperious rulers over a multinational empire, the Persians did not command unquestioned loyalty from many of their subject peoples, as plainly attested by the fires of rebellion that repeatedly blazed forth throughout the length and breadth of their realm: in Phoenicia, in Cyprus, Caria and Media, in Syria, Lycia and Pamphylia, Cilicia, Egypt, and of course in Greek Asia Minor.6 Alexander found it easy to don the mantle of liberator in such circumstances, either by backing aggrieved local factions against those who had prospered under Persian patronage or simply by offering less onerous terms of subordination. For the Persians, this problem of controlling disaffected or indifferent subject peoples compounded the already difficult task of defending overextended boundaries, as each step in retreat brought new supporters to the camp of the invader and denied the Great King access to manpower levies and tribute. The struggle for Asia accordingly came to hinge on a few decisive military engagements, as neither side could afford the risks of protracted campaigning: the invader hampered by financial constraints and the insecurities of time and distance; the defender fearful of ennervating mass defections. To these strategic difficulties confronting the Persian high command, one must add the destabilizing effects of recent intrigues at court, where powerful eunuchs and ambitious aspirants to the throne had exterminated the main line of the royal house. The result was the succession of a distant cousin and provincial outsider, Darius III, to the Achaemenid kingship in 336 BC. Immediately burdened with the task of subduing a long-standing Egyptian uprising, and only two years into his reign when invaded by the Macedonians, Darius held the rod of empire but weakly in his grasp.

Following the ceremonies at Troy, Alexander promptly marched out and routed the satrapal forces of Asia Minor in a battle on the banks of the river Granicus in June, 334 BC. The Anatolian seaboard was thereby opened for the Macedonian advance, and the first prize secured was the voluntary submission of the Lydians. Fully aware that Persian rule in Greek Ionia had been exercised through local oligarchs and tyrants, Alexander issued a proclamation calling for the establishment of democracies. It was a policy that won opened gates and popular support in most poleis, while those garrisoned with Persian troops were battered by the Macedonian siege train and stormed. Submissions from other Persian subjects followed readily as Alexander's army continued its advance, untroubled save for harassing opposition by mountain tribesmen.

In late autumn 333 BC Alexander was poised to begin his descent into the Levant when he was confronted at Issus by the Great King himself, in command of a vast host drawn from the interior of his realm and buttressed by thousands of Greek mercenaries. Once again, Macedonian

superiority in coordinated tactics, heavy infantry, and shock cavalry turned the tide of sheer numbers, compelling Darius to flee and abandon the royal baggage train, which contained his family and other rich prizes. The victory at Issus effectively delivered the western half of the Persian empire to Alexander, whose capture of the burgeoning treasury at Damascus erased his financial difficulties.

The march through Phoenicia was only slightly delayed by the sieges of Tyre and Gaza, both culminating in the wholesale slaughter and enslavement of the inhabitants—results that confirmed the prudence of neighboring cities that had offered timely acknowledgments of Alexander's supremacy. The semi-Hellenized kings of Cyprus likewise pledged themselves to the new conqueror, their naval forces a welcome addition to Alexander's apparatus belli. By the early autumn of 332 BC, Alexander was in Egypt, hailed as liberator and then crowned Pharaoh, the divine son of the gods Amun and Ra, Two events were to highlight the stay in Egypt: the laying of the foundations for Alexandria, the greatest of his many urban settlements, and the excursion to the famous oracle at Siwah in the Libyan desert, whose god Ammon had long been assimilated with the Greek Zeus. The purpose and significance of this celebrated pilgrimage are mysterious, but the court historian, the Peripatetic Callisthenes (Aristotle's nephew), was to record that Ammon's priest greeted Alexander as "the son of Zeus," a revelation that apparently contributed to the young conqueror's subsequent claims to divinity.8

After securing the administration of Egypt, Alexander marched out in the early summer of 331 BC with the intention of engaging the Persian king in a conclusive battle. Darius intended the same, his confidence raised by the full mobilization of troops he had mustered since the setback at Issus. In early October, the two armies assembled on the plain of Gaugamela just east of the Tigris, Alexander leading a force of some 40,000 infantry and 7,000 horsemen, the Great King marshalling an immense array of perhaps 200,000 men, including 30,000 cavalry, 200 scythed chariots, and several dozen Indian war elephants. So numerous were the enemy campfires on the eve of the battle, that for the first and only known time in his career, Alexander was moved to sacrifice a victim in honor of Fear. Though heavily outnumbered, the Macedonian phalanx and Companion cavalry struck with their usual coordinated efficiency a critical edge in the billowing dust storm that soon enveloped the battle—with Alexander himself commanding the charge that split the Persian ranks and drove an unnerved Darius from the field. The heartland of the Persian empire was now subject to Alexander, as first Babylon and then Susa surrendered to the young conqueror. While resting his troops in Babylon (where the native priests and peoples were gratified by Alexander's tendance of the local cults), news was received from Antipater that a Spartan-led rebellion in southern Greece had been crushed—reason having overruled passion in Athens, where Demosthenes himself had counselled against joining the ill-fated Spartan uprising.

By January, Alexander's grand crusade had fought its way through the Zagros mountains and reached Persepolis, the ancient capital of the Persians and reputedly the wealthiest city under the sun, enriched by centuries of tribute exacted from the many nations subject to Persian domination. Alexander now laid claim to this legacy, the royal treasury alone holding some 120,000 talents of uncoined gold and silver bullion. His troops were unleashed for an orgy of looting, and after several months' sojourn devoted to recreation, administrative concerns, and minor policing operations, the magnificent royal palace of Xerxes was put to torchafitting climax to the pan-Hellenic crusade of revenge, but not to Alexander's own ambitions. On reaching Ecbatana, his Greek allies were released from mandatory service, while the Macedonians were ordered into the field once more in pursuit of Darius, soon to be murdered by his own followers.

The next several years witnessed much strenuous marching and fierce fighting, as Alexander gradually subdued the arid steppes and rugged highlands of upper Iran and the Hindu Kush. By the summer of 327, his army had crossed the Indus and, through feats of war and reputation, brought the Punjab and the Indus river valley under Macedonian sway. Stirred by reports of a great civilization on the Ganges, Alexander planned additional conquests, but after eight long years of campaigning, his wearied Macedonians refused to march anywhere but home. Thus "vanquished by his own army," Alexander at last relented and gave orders for the return.

Administrative matters pressed upon Alexander as he reentered the Persian heartland in the spring of 324 BC, with many of the provinces of his expansive empire in a state of open rebellion or anarchy. Satrapal officials of proven or suspected treachery were deposed or put to death, and garrison troops that had pillaged rather than policed were summarily executed. These stern measures, coupled with the fact of Alexander's presence, sufficed to restore a measure of calm and order, preliminary to further administrative regimentation. Alexander was not fated to bring these plans to fruition: in his thirty-third year, and after a reign of only twelve, the son of Philip—or as some preferred, the son of Zeus-Ammon—died of a fever contracted after a prolonged drinking carousal, abetted by the numerous wounds he had suffered in the front ranks of battle.

The question of how Alexander intended to govern his vast, multinational dominions is one of the more contentious issues in modern schol-

arship.10 Two facts stand out, and must serve as the basis for any interpretation of Alexander the statesman. First, the warrior-king's victories did not so much transform the patterns of political rule in the Near East, as simply transfer the reigns of power. Administrative continuity was preserved through retention of existing imperial bureaucracies and the satrapal system, though Alexander did appoint additional military commanders and financial officials as a way of parceling power and layering authority.11 Garrisons of Macedonians and Greek mercenaries were planted to guard strategic points of empire, and along with the many new urban settlements (perhaps a score in all), they served to maintain supervisory control over the native populations that now owed their tribute and taxes to Alexander. The conqueror's second policy was far more controversial, for rather than subjugate the former ruling nationality, Alexander opted for collaboration with his vanquished foe, politically as well as militarily.12 Even during the initial campaigning, several of the Persian satraps who had acknowledged Alexander's supremacy were confirmed in their posts, and by 329 BC Asian troops had begun serving in the army. A year later Alexander ordered some thirty thousand Persian youth to be selected for training in the Macedonian art of war, with Greek the language of instruction. Revealingly, the king referred to these native conscripts as his epigonoi, or 'successors'. Mixed tactical units were soon marching on the parade grounds, and Persian nobles were being enrolled as Companions to the king. The most radical and imaginative of Alexander's policies, however, were those promoting racial fusion between Macedonians and Persians. The king set a personal example in 327 BC by marrying Roxane, daughter of a Persian nobleman, and three years later he arranged for more than ninety of his Companion officers to wed highborn Persian brides in a mass ceremony-Alexander himself taking two additional wives, a daughter of the deceased Darius and one from the preceding Great King. Nor were rank and file Macedonians neglected, as Alexander offered dowries to all troops who officially recognized their Asian mistresses as wives, a reward that more than ten thousand are said to have claimed. When it came time to discharge his oldest veterans, Alexander enjoined that their mixed-race offspring remain in Asia, where he himself would raise them "in true Macedonian fashion," to continue in the noble martial tradition of their fathers.13

It was in the aftermath of Gaugamela that Alexander began his notorious "Orientalizing," adopting elements of Persian dress as well as the pomp and circumstance of a Great King, replete with eunuchs, concubines, magi, and the like. All this was in keeping with Alexander's assumption of Darius' title, publicly confirmed by his use of the Persian royal seal in administrative correspondence with Asian subjects. Alexan-

der even experimented with extending to his Hellenic followers the Persian court ceremony of *proskynêsis*, the gesture of blowing a kiss to the monarch from a bowed or prostrate position—an act long regarded by Greeks as proof positive that "despotism" and "servility" were the defining features of Eastern society. To the overwhelming majority of Macedonians and Greeks, Alexander's collaborationist policies were as shocking as they were unwelcome. Enmity and disdain for "barbaroi" had been bred in the Hellenic bone for more than two centuries, and to see defeated Persians now sharing in the highest social, political, and military honors, and to see the son of Philip adorned in Persian garb and accompanied by "fawning" Asiatics, all this could not help but occasion a dangerous rift within the camp of the conquerors.

Though other factors were paramount in the refusal to march on to the Ganges (homesickness, fatigue, fear), this collective act of defiance undoubtedly constituted something of a protest against Alexander's recent "Orientalizing" manner. Undeterred, the king gave further cause for disaffection upon returning to Susa: in addition to the mass intermarriages (which the historian Arrian records "brought little satisfaction" to most of the Macedonians), Alexander's specially trained corps of thirty thousand Persian "successors" arrived in full Macedonian gear, and regiments of Asiatic cavalry were now brigaded with the Companions. When at Opis, Alexander decided the time was ripe for the discharge of his oldest veterans, the longsimmering resentment erupted into open mutiny. The troops bade the king dismiss them all and carry on with the aid of barbaroi and his divine "father" Ammon, a remark that so enraged Alexander that he ordered immediate executions for thirteen ringleaders. Following an angry speech, Alexander withdrew to his royal quarters and within days began assigning top military commands to his Persian supporters. Amid rumors that Alexander was reorganizing the army with Asian units entirely, the Macedonians broke down and begged their king's forgiveness. A grand feast of reconciliation followed, its deliberate arrangements artfully staged so as to convey Alexander's conception of the "new order" he was intent on fashioning. Senior Macedonians were accorded pride of place at the king's table, ringed closely, however, by members of the Persian elite, who in turn were ringed by distinguished representatives of other nationalities. Greek seers and Persian magi presided jointly over the religious ceremonies, and all the participants (upwards of nine thousand) shared in the libations, prayers, and festivities. The highlight of the ceremonial was Alexander's own prayer, which pointedly called for "concord (homonoia) and a sharing of the rule of empire (koinônia tês archês) between the Macedonians and the Persians."14

Under any circumstances, Alexander's statecraft appears visionary, but given that the grand crusade began as a pan-Hellenic war of revenge

against Persian despotism, the young conqueror's conciliatory policies are even more remarkable, and mystifying. The once popular thesis that Alexander believed in "the universal brotherhood of mankind" is now discredited, for it is obvious that his rudimentary plans preserved the fundamental distinction between rulers and ruled, with Macedonians, Greeks, and Persians occupying the positions of power and privilege. As to Alexander's decision to co-opt the defeated Persians, this probably reflects three fundamental considerations. First and foremost, without supplemental administrative and military assistance, the demands of his colossal empire would have severely strained the limited manpower resources of Macedonia; and seeing that Greeks of the mainland were still yearning for freedom. Alexander could scarcely have avoided some measure of reliance on the former ruling nationality. Second, it seems clear that Alexander found certain aspects of Persian life personally congenial, as evidenced by his marriages, the prominence of Persian grandees in the king's company, and his selective adoption of Persian apparel and various other accoutrements customary for a Great King. The third factor is more elusive and involves the complicated matter of Alexander's personality. Following the decisive triumph at Gaugamela, and coincidental with the "Orientalizing" trend, Alexander's behavior grew increasingly erratic, displaying signs of paranoia and possible megalomania: high Macedonian officers are purged and executed amid rumors of conspiracy; during a heated verbal exchange, a flushed Alexander spears and murders the Companion general Cleitus; the court historian Callisthenes, having refused Alexander's request for proskynêsis, is later charged with subversion and left to rot in a cage; a decree is issued ordering all Greek poleis to readmit their political exiles (a move to strengthen Alexander's partisans), with compulsion threatened for noncompliance; and, finally, the idolatrous demand that the Greeks "vote him a god" and establish cults in his honor. 15 The widening rift between his limitless ambitions and the provincial prejudices of his soldiers no doubt contributed to the king's high-handed autocracy and his accommodation with the Persians, but it seems all but certain that Alexander found the trappings of "Oriental despotism" very much to his liking.

If there is truth in the report that Aristotle had advised his young charge to treat "Greeks as friends and kinsmen, and barbarians as plants and animals" (a position not inconsistent with the philosopher's antibarbarian sentiments or his thesis that *barbaroi* are "slaves by nature"), then presumably he viewed his pupil's progress with growing unease. Alexander's degrading murder of Callisthenes is known to have strained relations with the Lyceum, but Aristotle's own surviving writings avoid all explicit mention of Alexander—silence perhaps being the most prudent course given the

cruel fate of his nephew. Other Greeks, however, were less reticent in expressing hostile judgments about Alexander's "Orientalizing," which was widely viewed as confirmation of the man's tyrannical hubris. As for his pretensions to divinity, this was a conceit that called for compliance, for rather obvious reasons of state. As one politician counselled, "We should not safeguard heaven, only to lose the earth"; though another was to render the popular mood more accurately: "Let him be recognized as the son of Zeus," mocked Demosthenes, "and if he wishes, the son of Poseidon too."

Admired by some, hated by others, the most common reactions to Alexander were astonishment and confusion over the alacrity with which old certainties were being overturned by the warrior-king's swift march of conquest. Even prior to Alexander's policy of Persian collaboration, a sense of impotence and anxiety appears in the assemblies and councils of old Greece, as exemplified in the orator Aeschines' prosecutorial speech against Demosthenes, which sought (unsuccessfully) to indict the democrat for treason, on a charge of having led the citizenry to ruin through his futile opposition to the Macedonian crown:¹⁷

In truth, what unexpected and unhoped for event has not occurred in our time? For it is not the ordinary life of men we have lived—we were born to furnish a tale of bewildering paradox for those who come after us. Is not the king of the Persians—he who once channeled Athos and bridged the Hellespont, he who once demanded "earth and water" of the Greeks, he who once dared to write in his letters that he was the master of all men from the rising of the sun unto its setting—is he not now struggling this very moment, no longer for lordship over others, but for the safety of his very person? . . . And Thebes, the polis of our neighbors, has she not in a single day been violently torn from the midst of Hellas? . . . And the hard-suffering Spartans, who once prided themselves as leaders of the Greeks; now they are to send hostages to Alexander, making an exhibition of their misfortunes, themselves and their homeland destined to suffer whatever may please him . . . And what of our own polis, the common refuge of the Greeks, which in former days would receive embassies from all over Hellas, each in turn finding safety with us—our polis now is no longer contending for leadership of the Greeks, but henceforth for the very soil of our own homeland.

Over the course of his meteoric career, Alexander had indeed transformed the patterns of life; the repercussions of his unexpected passing were to prove scarcely less tumultuous.

6.II WARS OF THE SUCCESSORS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF IMPERIAL PATRIMONIALISM

Alexander's death in June 323 BC posed an immediate crisis for the Macedonian command: not only had the vast spear-won empire revolved fully

around the remarkable person of their leader, but a king so preoccupied and so young had understandably given little attention to the matter of succession. His first wife, the Persian Roxane, was nearing the term of her pregnancy, and would shortly give birth to a son, Alexander IV. A lengthy regency would have to precede his possible reign, but who merited the office? There was another son, the bastard Heracles, born to Alexander's Persian mistress Barsine three years earlier, but his marginal status and tender age rendered him unsuitable, save as a pawn in forthcoming struggles. Within days the succession crisis led to an open breach between officers and the rank and file. Upon word that the generals, led by Perdiccas, preferred to wait for the birth of Roxane's child, the common soldiers rebelled and clamored for Arrhidaeus, Alexander's half brother and bastard son of Philip, whose liabilities—he was both epileptic and mentally retarded-mattered far less to them than his non-Persian blood. Following an armed scuffle and a blockade of the infantry by the cavalry, a compromise was reached whereby Arrhidaeus would share a titular kingship with Alexander's son (if such was Roxane's issue) under a governing protectorate of the three leading generals: Antipater in Europe, Perdiccas and Craterus in Asia.2 It was also decided that Alexander's policy of retaining the satrapal system be continued, though most of his Persian appointees were immediately replaced by Macedonians. Having temporarily settled their political differences (and not without a few murders), the Macedonian overlords now turned to the military challenge, which came not from conquered Asiatics, but from rebellious Greeks.

MORAL CODES AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN ANCIENT GREECE

In the course of campaigning, Alexander had secured newly won territories by founding military settlements composed mainly of mercenaries and aging or wounded troops. Thousands of Greeks had been deposited in such fashion in the upper Iranian province of Bactria, and upon rumors of Alexander's demise, these men now prepared to abandon the remote wilds for repatriation in Greece. Macedonian forces were quickly mobillized against them, and the desertion was suppressed by a crushing military assault and treacherous massacre of those who had surrendered under pledges of amnesty.3

Far more serious was the disturbance at the other end of the empire, where the city-states of Greece attempted to reclaim their lost independence. Despite Antipater's victory over the Spartan-led revolt of 331 BC. opposition to Macedonian hegemony had not abated, and with the welcome news of Alexander's death, anti-Macedonian factions immediately regained public influence. The usual fissuring along class lines manifested itself—as in Athens, where "men of property counselled for quietude (hêsuchia), while demagogues incited the multitude to war"—but many states mobilized and joined the Hellenic confederacy, rallying under the

banner of "freeing Hellas of Macedonian despotism." Military operations were entrusted to the Athenian Leosthenes, a gifted mercenary general and leader of some 8,000 troops recently discharged from service with Alexander. Upon receiving citizen levies from the Greek allies (Aetolia in the vanguard with 7,000 troops, followed by Athens with 5,500), Leosthenes stormed into central Greece, where he defeated the occupying Macedonians and their Greek supporters. Although the homefront ranks had been depleted over the years by Alexander's requests for reinforcements, the viceroy Antipater rushed southwards, intending to arrest the Greek advance just long enough for the arrival of relief contingents from Asia Minor. The Greek forces routed the Macedonians just north of Thermopylae (the victory sealed by the desertion of the Thessalians to the cause of Hellenic freedom), and Antipater was forced to fall back to Lamia, where he was subjected to siege (winter 323/322). The initial relief force was defeated in the following spring, but the outmanned and inexperienced Athenian navy suffered two crippling losses at sea, thereby allowing Craterus's larger army passage across the Dardanelles. By now financial strains were undermining the Greek war effort, as significant numbers of citizen-soldiers began returning to their own communities "to attend to private affairs," the demands of their farms undoubtedly exerting the greatest pull.5 Reinforced by Craterus' veterans, Antipater gained a marginal victory at Crannon and at once proceeded to the sacking of several Thessalian poleis. These reverses precipitated mass defections from the Greek alliance, as Antipater's divisive offers of separate treaties were siezed upon in an effort to avert annihilation.

The so-called Lamian War over, Antipater now dictated terms. In Athens-compelled to surrender unconditionally-the democracy was dismantled and replaced by an oligarchical constitution. Some twelve thousand of the poor were disenfranchised, effectively restricting full civic rights to nine thousand moderate to wealthy property owners—the natural base of Macedonian support. A garrison was imposed to maintain order, and leaders of the dêmos were hunted down and executed (Demosthenes preferring suicide to capture). Similar repressive measures were implemented elsewhere, as pro-Macedonian factions assumed power in oligarchical arrangements that were enforced by the spears of occupying

While Antipater was tightening the fetters of Macedonian hegemony in Greece, Alexander's generals in Asia were preoccupied with securing their own power bases. The conquered Asiatics presented no serious challenge, their reluctance to rise understandable given the record of Macedonian prowess and the familiar terms of dependency granted by Alexander and continued by his Successors. After all, a measure of local

autonomy supervised by co-opted native nobles and customary requirements of tribute and service had long been the norm in this ancient cradle of civilizations. Altogether unique, in contrast, was the situation facing the conquering overlords, with supreme authority in abeyance and immense powers shared among several dozen men of disparate talents, temperaments, and ambitions. According to a widely circulated story, a dying Alexander had prophesied that his friends would compete in "a great agôn about his tomb." Within a year of his passing, these "funeral games" began in earnest.⁷

For the next half century the Hellenistic world was to be convulsed by armed struggles between Alexander's Successors, a period of warfare and murder on the grand scale, mercurial shifts of fortune, inconstant alliances, and routine betrayals. A recounting of this tortured chronicle in all its fascinating detail will not be attempted here, but it is essential that we identify the salient geopolitical trends. Modern historians distinguish three phases that marked the emergence and consolidation of the Hellenistic order: Perdiccas' opening bid for supremacy (323–320 BC); the rise of Antigonus "the One-Eyed" and his son Demetrius, and their joint efforts to gain dominion over the whole of Alexander's territorial conquests (320–301 BC); and finally the triumph of dynastic regionalism, as achieved by Ptolemy in Egypt, Seleucus in the Near Eastern heartland, Lysimachus in Thrace and the Troad, and by various occupants of the Macedonian throne (301–270 BC).⁸

From the outset, the axis of conflict revolved around separatism and unification. A majority of generals favored some form of collegiate leadership that would allow each to hold sway within their own domains, but a select few aspired to a larger share of Alexander's inheritance. As regent of Asia, Perdiccas held decisive command in the initial allocation of offices and forces, and his first move took him north to Cappodocia, where his victories established his one trustworthy supporter, the Greek Eumenes, as regional satrap. Several matrimonial linkages were proposed among the generals to garner allies and cement the principle of collective rule, but Alexander's aging mother, queen Olympias of Macedonia, forestalled these plans with her own momentous proposal. Desirous of retaining supreme authority within her own family, she offered her daughter Cleopatra-Alexander's sister-in marriage to Perdiccas, who forthwith repudiated his recent match with Antipater's daughter. The die now cast, Perdiccas marched against Ptolemy in Egypt, trusting Eumenes to beat back the advancing counter from Antigonus and Craterus. Perdiccas' campaign, frustrated by a disastrous attempt at crossing the Nile Delta, ended ignominiously with the mass defection of his troops and the regent's own murder by his officers (320 BC).

The principle of collective leadership was preserved for the next several years, the viceroy Antipater in nominal command following Craterus' death in the battle against Eumenes. The two titular kings, the infant Alexander IV and the idiot Arrhidaeus, were sequestered in Macedonia, while Asian affairs were left to the generals on the spot. When the octogenarian Antipater died in 319 BC, leaving his veteran general Polyperchon as regent, the scramble for power broke out anew. Incensed over Polyperchon's appointment, Antipater's son Cassander joined ranks with Antigonus, whose own ambitions were loudly announced by his forced expulsion of several minor satraps in Anatolia.

In an effort to attract local Greek support, Polyperchon issued a proclamation calling for the removal of the oligarchies that had been imposed by Antipater. A propaganda ploy—for most of the garrisons were controlled by the supporters of his foe Cassander—the decree was successful in sparking another round of murderous civic conflict, the dêmos receiving support from Polyperchon, the beltistoi abetted by Cassander. As the two Macedonian rivals contended over the ruins of Greece, the struggle for supremacy in Asia entered a a new phase. By virtue of his command over the largest remnant of Alexander's veterans, and his access to immense treasury reserves, Antigonus was eventually able to destroy Eumenes and extend his authority eastwards into Upper Iran, leaving a trail of executed Macedonian officers in his wake. By the spring of 315 BC, Antigonus was able to claim Babylonia unopposed, as Seleucus sought refuge in Ptolemy's Egypt.

Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus now formed a coalition against Antigonus' manifest bid for universal empire. The "One-Eyed" responded by accepting Polyperchon as his ally in Greece and intensified the propaganda war by proclaiming that all Greek cities were to be "free, ungarrisoned, and autonomous," a policy that struck at the base of Cassander's position.9 The next several years were marked by incessant campaigning on both sides of the Aegean, but all strategic gains proved ephemeral. Of more lasting significance, each of the principal protagonists decided to assume openly the royal diadem, beginning with Antigonus and his son Demetrius in 306 BC, and imitated shortly thereafter by Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Cassander, and Seleucus (now back in Babylonia). The step from general to king was a formal one, but ideologically momentous, as it symbolized the intention to establish new sovereign dynasties within Alexander's divided legacy—the great conqueror's own family line having been ruthlessly exterminated over the preceding years.

The final drive of the Antigonids to wrest absolute hegemony began with Demetrius' shattering victory over Ptolemy's navy off Cyprus in 306 BC, the prelude to a joint invasion of Egypt. Seemingly poised for triumph, the assault had to be aborted in the face of gale-force winds that prevented a landing of Demetrius' fleet and a flooding Nile that frustrated the crossing of Antigonus' massive army. Operations were now to shift to Europe, where Demetrius would launch an invasion of Macedonia from his strongholds in Greece, while his father would march overland from Asia in a closing pincer. Anticipating the move, their opponents struck first as Lysimachus overran western Asia Minor in 302 BC, and Seleucus marched out from Babylon with a massive army and several hundred Indian war elephants, the price he had exacted from the Mauryan rajah Chandragupta in exchange for Alexander's Indian provinces. Linking forces with Lysimachus on the plain of Ipsus in central Anatolia, Seleucus and his elephants proceeded to trample out the hopes of Antigonus in one of the greatest battles in world history, a titanic struggle that involved upwards of 150,000 combatants.10

Ipsus thus confirmed the triumph of separatism, and with the fall of Antigonus the victors divided the spoils: Lysimachus added most of Asia Minor to his Thracian domains, Seleucus annexed the central Asian provinces, and Ptolemy laid claim to Phoenicia-Syria. Antigonus' mercurial son Demetrius survived the battle, and within weeks resurfaced in Greece, where he began a series of campaigns and intrigues that would eventually lead him to the Macedonian throne (294 BC). Warfare between the Successors was to continue virtually unabated over the course of the third and second centuries, but through all the vicissitudes of fortune, the dynastic principle of separate kingdoms endured to serve as the pivotal organizing basis for the Hellenistic experience.

For Alexander's Successors, the military imperative of securing territorial independence against their peers and rivals proceeded hand-in-hand with the task of establishing sovereign control over indigenous populations. As foreign usurpers lacking hereditary legitimacy, these self-made kings necessarily relied heavily on militaristic instruments of domination. Their initial claims to rule were in fact based on the right of conquest: the lands they held were 'spear-won territory', doriktêtos chôra, and as such the personal property of each respective warlord. The regime structure that was to emerge on that basis was essentially patrimonial, which is to say that the affairs of government were organized as a direct extension of the warrior-king's household, the "state" itself being embodied in the person of the sovereign. 11

Like Alexander, and for basically the same pragmatic reasons, the Successors readily adopted the existing administrative machinery within

their conquered domains—the only important changes being those of personnel, as Macedonian and Greek loyalists supplanted chief officials of the old order. In making these appointments of power and privilege, the Successors drew upon a retinue of companions that, in time, bore the formal title of *philoi*, or 'Friends', of the king. The essence of this relationship was personal, not legal or bureaucratic, and featured a bond of loyalty cemented through table fellowship, military commands, land grants, and the like. Beneath the controlling carapace of the king's representatives labored the extensive national, provincial, and local bureaucracies, whose functionaries were responsible for maintaining the orderly flow of decrees, records, supplies, and revenues that sustained the kingdom. As Greek became the official language of administration, colonials enjoyed privileged access to most midlevel positions as well, while aspiring natives were expected to Hellenize.

The mainstay of royal power was the armed force that the sovereign could command against any potential indigenous uprising or, more pressingly, the incursions of rival Successors. 14 The fragmentation of Alexander's empire had entailed the fragmentation of his grand army, and in the early chronicles we see that the Successors spared no effort to gain the services of Macedonian veterans—with more than a few campaigns turning on the largess that one commander would offer to subvert the troops of another. More reliable and permanent methods of recruitment were obviously necessary, and to that end the kings implemented the standard patrimonial practice of establishing military settlers, or klêrouchoi, within their conquered domains. Recipients of modest landholdings on condition of continued service (a term that in practice became hereditary), kleruch troops constituted a ready reserve to be called out for all major campaigning, and a valuable "policing" presence in the spear-won countrysides. While the Ptolemies tended to disperse their kleruchs thoughout the native villages of the Nile valley, the Seleucids generally preferred to cluster theirs in military colonies (katoikiai), often as appendages to the newly established polis settlements that served various administrative, economic, and cultural functions for the ruling dynasty and its supporters. Apart from the Macedonian veterans, the standing military forces of the Successors were composed primarily of mercenaries, whose services included campaigning in the field as well as garrison duty throughout the kingdoms. Asiatic troops were levied from the provinces, but for the most part were utilized only as naval or land auxiliaries, though more prominently as archers and, for the Seleucids, as cavalry.

Erected upon immense spear-won territories, these emerging patrimonial command structures were economically sustained in the traditional agromanagerial manner: i.e., through exploitation of the native masses, the enserfed peasants, or *laoi*, who were bound to the soil and obligated to yield produce, labor, and taxes to their overlords. Although the land-tenure arrangements that the Successors inherited varied considerably throughout their domains, the *laoi* system constituted the basic pattern. Apart from traditional holdings of the native priestly castes (the so-called temple lands) and the various assignations that the kings bestowed upon personal favorites, kleruchs, and the newly founded polis settlements (all of which utilized dependent native labor to some degree), the conquered territories were administrated as "Crown lands," with the indigenous peasant populations—the *basilikoi laoi*, or "Crown peasants"—cultivating the soil as the king's tenant-serfs. In Seleucid Asia Minor and in Lysimachus' Thracian and Anatolian dominions, chattel slavery continued to operate in agricultural practice, but elsewhere in the Hellenistic East dependent peasants toiled as the primary producers, with slavery largely confined to domestic service and craftwork.

Although the basic modes and forces of production were not transformed by Alexander's conquests, the acquisition of immense treasuries of gold and silver bullion, expansive tracts of land (much of it irrigated), and millions of native peasants long habituated to dependent servitude—all this could not but expand the scale of economic activity, particularly as the Successors intensified production in their efforts to sustain the swarm of occupying troops and officials who preserved these colonial regimes. On the basis of their imperial proprietorship—the land and all within it-the Hellenistic kings amassed tremendous fortunes through tribute, taxes, ground rents, and sundry trade monopolies, their entourage of friends and supporters richly endowed by acts of largess on the royal scale. In what has been called "the greatest colonial movement of ancient history," thousands of Greek emigrants flocked east to exploit the new opportunities for land, military pay, craft and commercial profit, swelling the royal capitals of Alexandria, Antioch, and Seleucia-on-Tigris (each with populations on the order of half a million), as well as settling in the scores of other urban foundations which carried Hellenism into the Near Eastern interior.16

Despite a considerable demographic imbalance, Macedonian veterans and Greek immigrants monopolized the positions of administrative, military, economic, and cultural dominance, thereby coalescing to form a new ruling stratum under the aegis of imperial patrimonialism. As successors, however, not only to Alexander, but to the traditional crowns of Egypt, Babylonia, and Persia, the Ptolemies and Seleucids did not implement overt racialist policies, even if their courts remained overwhelmingly Hellenic. Native aristocracies—particularly those that Hellenized—retained a measure of local authority and privilege, and the Successors

were generally conciliatory in their relations with the priestly castes. A native middle class of artisans and merchants is known to have arisen in many of the new cosmopolitan centers, attracted by the urban amenities and the opportunities for material gain. The burdens of conquest, in other words, weighed most heavily on the indigenous peasantry, whose lives had changed only to the extent that their masters now spoke koinê Greek rather than Persian.

In their soliciting of Hellenic immigrants, the Successors were motivated above all by the need to secure manpower for their burgeoning administrative and military complexes, and to enhance dynastic stability through the influx of reliable settlers who could contribute to the economic and cultural viability of their conquered dominions. In turn, the privileged status of the Greek colonials—minority enclaves amid teeming indigenous populations—depended upon preservation of the ruling patrimonial regimes. These mutual interests account for the accommodative relations between the Successors and their Greek subjects, though the realities of power enabled the kings to exercise a form of control and authority that comported ill with Hellenic traditions of civic freedom and self-government. Owing to the exigencies of continuing warfare, however, and the patrimonial practice of granting sundry privileges in exchange for loyalty or special service, relations between the kings and Greeks were somewhat variable and fluid.¹⁸

With regard to the hundreds of new urban foundations in the Greek East, the monarch presumed and exercised the right to tax, to claim tribute or "contributions," to garrison, to billet troops, to transfer and combine populations, to appoint royal overseers and local magistrates, and to regulate internal affairs through royal ordinances and letters that effectively dictated policy. According to circumstances, the king could also waive any of those royal prerogatives as an act of discretionary euergesia, or 'beneficence'. As for the established city-states that were situated within the territorial boundaries of the Successor kingdoms (mostly in Asia Minor, the Chersonese, and the Aegean islands), the kings routinely implemented the same practices, but were generally less intrusive in local politics and more willing to treat the cities as minor allies. The fact that these regions were among the more hotly contested theaters of war between the Successors explains the diplomatic courtesies, and the readiness with which armed occupation and tribute were imposed whenever such actions furthered royal interests. Relations between the Hellenistic kings and the Greeks of Hellas constitute a third pattern, and while recourse to garrisons, taxation, and royal overseers was likewise common, the fact that no Successor ever claimed "spear-won" dominion over Greece proper gave the geopolitical situation there a distinctive cast.

Political subordination had been the Greek lot ever since Philip's victory at Chaeronea (338 BC), but in the wake of the ill-fated Lamian War uprising (323-322 BC), the reality of Macedonian hegemony had grown decidedly more onerous, with occupying garrisons and pliant oligarchies of the propertied widely ensconced. On the death of the regent Antipater in 319 BC, contenders for the Macedonian throne soon reduced Greece to a staging ground for ruinous dynastic struggles and a resurgence in civic factionalism.19 Cassander's machinations quickly secured his primacy within Macedonia, and he exerted an iron grip over many Greek poleis through garrisons and local oligarchical support. In Athens, Cassander imposed his own royal epistatês, or 'overseer', Demetrius of Phaleron, a Peripatetic philosopher-politician who used his delegated authority to remodel the Athenian constitution along the lines of a moderate oligarchy so favored by his school.20 Aristotle's recommendations for basing the politeia on the middle classes were duly implemented: full civic rights were restricted by a property qualification that disenfranchised the poor; state pay was abolished for office, assembly, and jury duty; and the fleet was disbanded save for a token force of twenty vessels. The wealthiest supporters of the regime were generously rewarded by a cancellation of all liturgical responsibilities; though in keeping with the Peripatetic ideal of moderation, sumptuary ordinances were passed so as to restrict invidious extravagance and to check the dissipation of estates. Enforcement for the new order was provided by an occupying garrison of Macedonians, commanded by yet another "Aristotelean," the great philosopher's own adopted son, Nicanor.

Polyperchon and the Antigonids astutely sought to weaken Cassander's hold by appealing to the suppressed democratic forces, but their propagandistic slogan of "Greek autonomy" did little to change the reality on the ground. For the better part of two decades, these contending autocrats alternately "liberated" and "enslaved" the poleis, events that often precipitated savage reprisals against the losing factions.21 Macedonia relapsed into anarchy following Cassander's death in 298 BC, as various pretenders routinely murdered friends and kin, made and broke alliances, and ravaged the countryside through their endless campaigning. During the chaotic interregnum, a new threat arose in the form of marauding Celtic war bands from the north. Macedonia and central Greece were overrun and plundered by the invaders, who moved on to pillage and settle in Thrace and Asia Minor. By virtue of a victory over the Celts, Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius the Besieger, was able to assert his claim to the Macedonian throne in 276 BC, and through his cautious leadership the kingdom was restored to a measure of stabilty. The heavy yoke of Macedonian hegemony over much of Greece continued, however, fastened by strategically placed garrisons and by pro-Antigonid "tyrants" propped up by mercenaries and local oligarchs.²²

The Athenians, Spartans, and several lesser allies made yet another bid for freedom in the so-called Chremonidean War (267-262 BC), but the meager assistance offered by Ptolemy II fell short of his promises, and the Greek cause was gradually worn down by defeats, defections, and depleted treasuries.²³ Athens now bore the full weight of repression, as Gonatas imposed several garrisons throughout Attika, appointed local partisans and Macedonians to the highest offices, stripped the assembly of any vestige of authority, and deprived the city of its right to mint coinage. Declaring that "it was not enough to make the collar strong—the dog must also be made lean," Gonatas proceeded to drain off the surplus resources of the Athenians through various fiscal measures, presumably the standard royal touch of taxation and "contributions."24 Over time. some of these restrictions were mitigated, but Athens henceforth avoided all pretense to political leadership in Hellenic affairs, settling down to a neutral quietism and constrained to seek consolation in her status as a center of culture and learning.

For the overwhelming majority of Hellenes, the Hellenistic experience was thus marked by the diminution or absence of effective political powers. In the newly conquered and colonized Greek East, patrimonial kings exercised ultimate sovereignty over all the subjects within their realms, unaccountable to any representative institutions that might guarantee rights rather than privileges for the ruled. As Victor Ehrenberg has aptly observed, the Hellenistic kingdom did not comprise "a human community," a koinônia of citizens participating in a true commonweal, but simply ta basilika pragmata, 'the king's affairs', and administered as such according to his personal discretion.25 Indeed, in royal correspondence the populace is commonly identified by the revealing formula, 'those who are commanded by us' (hoi hypo hêmas tassomenoi), and from that basis no common citizenship ever evolved to empower or unify the disparate inhabitants of the spear-won domains.26 A measure of local autonomy was conventionally bestowed upon Greek communities within the successor kingdoms, but various royal instruments of control ensured that politics remained at a "municipal" level. As for Hellas proper, the intrusive presence of the Successors and their armed minions cast a withering pall on the traditional ideals of Polis freedom and autonomy. For more than half a century, Greece was convulsed by "the mutual rivalry of the dynasts" and, in the process, subjected to occupying garrisons, royal overseers, foreign taxation and tribute, and local leaders who owed their momentary ascendancy to the patronage of kings rather than the votes of citizens.27

With the effective demilitarization and depoliticization of its citizenry and a massive colonial exodus to the East, the classical Greek citystate, the Polis, gave way to dynastic empires and the Hellenistic city. There was, to be sure, continuity as well as change, and the emerging patterns of life owed much to traditional norms and institutional arrangements: nostalgia for past glories and the emigré complex of heightened veneration for worlds left behind were sufficient to check any total rupture. Sociologically, however, the contrast between city-state and city is fundamental, for it was precisely those relations that had made the Polis a distinctive form of social organization that were transformed or suspended by the triumphant forces of patrimonialism.

In the political sphere, civic self-governance may have continued in form, but municipalism and dependency henceforth framed the limits of the possible. Even where "democratic" constitutions prevailed—with or without the presence of garrisons and royal overseers—the curtailment of state pay mechanisms and the growing practice of attaching liturgical responsibilities to magisterial office (a move that de facto reserved executive power for the plousioi) combined to render illusory the true meaning of the term "rule by the demos."28 Particularly significant is the documentation that shows that many cities were heavily dependent on the voluntary—rather than liturgical—largess of wealthy 'benefactors', euergetai, who frequently intervened on a private basis to allay some fiscal crisis with a timely loan or donation, provide funds for famine relief, hire mercenaries in military emergencies, or contribute to the construction and upkeep of public facilities. It was not unusual for such men to belong to the extended retinue of the king's Friends, a position that enabled them to draw upon royal assets in aiding their native or adopted cities, and that in turn allowed the king to exercise control through influential local agents.29 As the old civic koinônia proved increasingly incapable of addressing the most basic public problems, a number of cities even resorted to the sale of citizenship as a means of restoring depleted treasuries, while elsewhere wealthy metics and foreigners were granted civic privileges in exchange for loans, donations, shipments of corn, and the like.30

The most consequential of the changes that determined the fate of Polis autonomy was of course the displacement of the citizen-hoplite by mercenary and patrimonial forces. Over the course of the Hellenistic age, the differentiation of military from civilian subjects proceeded apace, and the Greeks came to rely increasingly upon royal (or third-party) arbitration to settle boundary disputes—though skeletal forces of citizens and floating bands of mercenaries continued to engage in numerous petty conflicts.³¹ As the Greeks lost the initiative in war to the kings, their

appreciation of this once central activity declined accordingly. Ephebic institutions, which were responsible for imparting martial skills and patriotism to the young, became voluntary in many communities, rapidly declined in enrollment, and were shortly transformed into "social clubs" for sons of the wealthy.³² As the historian Polybius pointedly observed, "since the dynastic rule of Alexander, . . . our men of action have been released from the ambitions of military or political careers."³³

Religious developments correspondingly attest to the weakening hold of communalism, as traditional civic cults recede before the syncretic ferment that attended the conquest and colonization of the East. Although no subject is more intractable to generalization than Hellenistic religion, the trend towards individualism and universalism—and away from the forms of public coordination that had marked the worship of patron Polis deities—is unmistakable.34 The spread of partially Hellenized Oriental cults of stimulative emotional or ecstatic character is one of the hallmarks of the era, as is the intensified concern with salvation (sôteria) through personal union with the "savior gods" of the old and new mystery cults. Private cult associations multiplied rapidly, providing religious as well as social fellowship in a vast cosmopolitan world of newly mixed, multiethnic populations. The worship of living men as institutionalized in the Hellenistic ruler cults poses many interpretive difficulties—not least the assessment of religious as distinct from purely political motives—but that a measure of psychological dependency played a role is not to be denied. In an age of uncertainty, the awesome powers of the kings raised them above the mundane level, rendering them natural objects of both genuine and pragmatic supplication. As expressed in one of the more notorious paeans to royal divinity: "The other gods are either far away or have no ears; either they do not exist or they heed us not at all; but thee we see here present, not in wood or stone, but in truth. To thee therefore we pray. First, O beloved, grant us peace, for thou hast the power . . . "35 The remarkable rise in the cult status of Tychê, the goddess of blind fate, and the later vogue of Babylonian astrology, are to be similarly understood as manifestations of anxiety and powerlessness in a world where individuals have been sundered from life-enhancing collective bonds and the confidence that attends the practice of self-governance.³⁶

Perhaps the most striking departure from past practice is the erosion of citizen exclusiveness as it pertains to the sphere of kinship. In addition to the already mentioned outright sale of citizenship, many communities extended civic rights to individuals, groups, and even entire cities through proxenia grants and isopoliteia treaties, the former bestowing sundry privileges to those honored as "guest-friends," the latter conferring full rights of naturalization upon the citizens of another community. The

motives for these liberal dispensations varied according to circumstance, but fiscal and commercial considerations, the desire to promote friendly intercity relations, and the need to maintain populations in the wake of heavy emigration were the primary factors. The Successor kings frequently rearranged civic boundaries as well by requesting citizenship grants for loyal mercenaries, courtiers, and other associates; on occasion they even dictated the forced amalgamation of separate communities. In the Greek East, mixed populations were of course the norm, with colonists being drawn from all over the Hellenic world; and in the remoter regions of settlement, intermarriage with native women was not uncommon. As citizenship ranks were thus swelled by nondescent group members, the traditional notion of the Polis as the "sacred nurse" of her citizen offspring lost all symbolic as well as practical meaning. Not a koinônia tôn politôn, a civic body unified by shared political and military functions, confraternalism in cult, and blood ties mythic or real, but "a crowd of individuals" is the essential basis of the Hellenistic city.

6.III ETHICS IN A NEW KEY: THE RETREAT FROM POLIS-CITIZEN IDEALS AND THE INTERIORIZATION OF VALUE

Change within complex social formations is typically both multifaceted and uneven, a situation that follows from the fact that societies—notwith-standing the overall integration or articulation of institutions that may obtain—do not constitute organic unities, but differentiated ensembles of organized practice: economic, political, military, kinship, religious. Pressures for change and adaptation will vary within each of these sectors, resulting in variable rates of institutional and ideological development within the society as a whole. Changes can be linear and gradualist, preserving social order and continuity, or be more wrenching and disruptive, occasioning massive social upheavals. Some changes remain sectorial, institutionally circumscribed; others "spill over" and effect major structural transformations.

In preceding chapters we have attempted to explicate the historical dynamics of Polis society in such terms, beginning with its emergence out of the rubble of the Bronze Age collapse and the tangled skein of tribal migrations, to the integration and consolidation of its key institutions in the Classical period, and on to the fourth-century "crisis," a time of manifest social disorganization and structural upheaval. Amid all the complexities and contingencies, the marked correspondence between the military, economic, and political spheres stands as the determinant nexus, so balanced that the entire social order was effectively

centered on a specific pivot: the commune member as hoplite-warrior, landowner, and self-governing citizen. That distinctive pattern of social organization, its roles and institutions, provided the range of existential experience that found reflection—critical as well as idealizing—in the various forms of Hellenic culture: its poetic and dramatic arts, its architecture and sculpture, its philosophy and religion. Polis institutions and civic culture thus formed a dynamic complement on both the behavioral and normative levels.

As the institutional matrix of classical Polis society began rupturing under the impress of escalating militarism and widening polarities between rich and poor, the old ideals and injunctions of the traditional moral code were deprived of anchorage and efficacy. Internecine factionalism within the citizen body, a mounting aversion to combat service, unpatriotic avoidance of liturgical responsibilities, the secession from public affairs by growing numbers of the "uninvolved," and a willingness to sacrifice autonomy and independence in the pursuit of partisan and personal interests: these are the main lines of fissure that mark the foundational collapse of the Polis-citizen bond. The normative code being functionally coordinate with the status of citizenship and its core military and political roles, it necessarily followed that a retreat from civic standards would ensue as the desiderata of the conventional value system became increasingly difficult to obtain owing to dislocations within the institutional order. The social-psychological impulses behind that axiological reversal are not difficult to comprehend: as the demands of military service outstrip the citizen's technical and economic capacities, his receptivity to an orientation that decouples or distances the self from martial pursuits will increase accordingly; as the forums of public discourse become poisoned by factional extremism, and as the self-governing instruments of assembly and council are subverted by military tyrants, "Philippizers," occupying garrisons, and the intrusive presence of absolutist kings, a normative reorientation that devalues political participation and reduces the individual's communal commitments and identity will strike a responsive chord among growing ranks of the disillusioned and disaffected.

From Homer and Solon on to Plato and Demosthenes, the form and content of Hellenic ethics had remained framed by, and grounded in, a relatively stable and complementary nexus of militaristic and political functions, initially those of the agonal aristocrat, subsequently transmuted into those of the citizen of Polis society. Hellenistic ethics were to be geared to entirely different social correlates: not the citizen, but the demilitarized, depoliticized subject; not the commune member of an autonomous city-state, but the atomized inhabitants of cities and empires.

6.III.i Epicureanism: Pleasure and Tranquillity in the Garden

Epicurus was not the first philosopher to repudiate the Polis-citizen framework as the basis for human well-being—that distinction belongs to the primitivist Diogenes—but he was the first to offer a constructive alternative to the traditional normative code, in contrast to the Cynics, who did not advance appreciably beyond caustic negation. Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle had each accepted the central assumptions of the Polis-citizen ethos, namely, that individuals could achieve full stature, or aretê, as a human beings, and therefore eudaimonia, only as public-spirited citizens within a well-ordered community. Philosophic knowledge was of course raised to the highest good, transcending conventional standards of political and martial excellence; but as regards social life, the citizen still remained the carrier of human value, the Polis the ideal form of human community. Aristippus' doctrine of apolitical hedonism and Antisthenes' call to ascetic self-sufficiency were the first intellectual departures from that orientation, but it was only with Cynic antinomianism that an explicit anti-Polis message—subsumed within a larger anticivilization diatribe-found expression. Then came Alexander, and the new philosophical currents that followed in the wake of his world-transforming conquests were compelled to respond to a rapidly changing social environment, as the ascendant forces of patrimonial imperium and colonization rendered the classical Polis-citizen nexus outmoded in practical terms.

Nietzsche's intuition that every philosophy bears the imprint of biography is particularly apropos in the case of Epicurus, whose varied life experiences seem to translate rather directly into intellectual rationalization.2 At the time of his birth in 341 BC, the "new order" was still in travail, with Aristotle tutoring the future world conqueror while the boy's father was striking against Athens and the cause of Hellenic freedom. Epicurus himself was of Athenian descent, but despite the noble lineage of his genos, the Philaidai, Epicurus' family had fallen on hard times, his father reduced to the expedient of joining the kleruch-settlers who received expropriated lands on the island of Samos during the brief revival of Athenian imperialism in midcentury. Though affording thousands of citizens partial relief from land hunger and poverty, the status of the kleruch as an "outsettler" entailed a de facto diminution of citizenship rights within Athens, and thus carried a considerable social stigma. Epicurus' father labored under an additional handicap, for the occupation of elementary schoolteacher ranked exceedingly low on the scale of acceptable citizen pursuits (Plato, following popular prejudice, had recommended the position be reserved for slaves or metics3). Given the disprivileged status of his family background, it is most unlikely that the young Epicurus felt any natural or deep identification with the regnant Polis-citizen ethos. Subsequent taunts from his philosophical rivals—that he was a wretched Samian kleruch and a mere schoolteacher's son—must have only confirmed for him the hollowness of conventional standards.

Even more decisive for his ultimate alienation from the Polis ideal was the crisis and humiliation experienced by his family in 322 BC, when as a consequence of the Athenian defeat in the Lamian War, the kleruchs on Samos were summarily expelled by Macedonian forces. Driven into refugee status and deprived of what little material security they had on Samos (in his writings Epicurus complained bitterly of "the injustices of klêronomoi," i.e., the restored Samians, which suggests the settlers were displaced without compensation), the family took up residence as metics in nearby Kolophon.4 Epicurus joined them there a year later, for at the time of the war and the expulsion from Samos he had been serving his compulsory two-year ephebic military training in Athens. No ephebic class can have lived through a less propitious period for internalizing the ideals of the Polis-citizen ethos, as Epicurus and his cohort would witness firsthand the inability of citizens to contend against kings on the field of battle. The solemn pledge of every ephebe, "to defend and preserve the sacred boundaries of the community and its institutions," proved of no avail against the professional armies created by imperial patrimonialism. Repulsed in their bid for liberation from Macedonian hegemony, the Athenians were constrained to suffer the indignity of an imposed garrison, the dismantling of their democracy in favor of a collaborationist oligarchy of the propertied, and the executions and forced suicides of patriotic leaders such as Hyperides and Demosthenes. What stronger evidence was needed to confirm the inadequacies of traditional civic ideals?

Thus buffeted by misfortunes of family and country, the twenty-year-old Epicurus abandoned shield and spear and returned to an earlier interest in philosophy, studying under several distinguished sages of the Ionian region over the next decade, earning a livelihood on the side by offering instruction in rhetoric. After having mastered the main currents of science and philosophy, from the pre-Sokratics to the recent skeptical turn of Pyrrho (6.III.iii), Epicurus decided to stand forth as a professional sophos in his own right.

To secure a following, prospective and practicing sages would frequent the gymnasia that served as the public setting for the physical and cultural *paideia* of adolescent males, and there amid the shade trees and colonnades offer discourse and formal instruction. Epicurus chose to launch his career in Mytilene on Lesbos, a prosperous community well stocked with philosophers, most of them adherents to the Platonic-Aristotelean tradition. Though details are sketchy, we know that after only a

few months Epicurus was forced to hazard a winter sea voyage from the island, the content of his hedonistic teachings having incurred the hostility not only of other philosophers, but of the citizenry and the gymnasiarch responsible for supervising the grounds and protecting the young from corrupting influences. Fearing for his life, Epicurus sought protection in Lampsacus, a strategic city on the Asian Dardanelles recently brought under the sway of Lysimachus, a major player in the ongoing wars between Alexander's Successors. The chief steward of Lysimachus' dominions, the Syrian Mithres, befriended Epicurus on this occasion and granted asylum (a favor returned years later when Mithres fell from power and found refuge in Epicurus' Garden community). This act of supplication was to earn Epicurus the abuse of critics, who subsequently charged him with "shamefully flattering a barbarian"; but the security he was accorded in Lampsacus during this period (310–306 BC) proved instrumental in the development of his school.

Sheltered and supported by Mithres, the philosopher was introduced to several prominent residents of Lampsacus, the most notable being Idomeneus, a high official in Lysimachus' retinue who presently became Epicurus' chief patron. Other members of the so-called Lampsacene Circle included Leonteus and his wife Themista, the mathematician Polyaenus and his mistress Hedeia, the philosopher Metrodorus and his sister Batis (who married Idomeneus) and a brother Timocrates (who later bolted from the school and vented his revenge in a campaign of villification), and two younger men, Pythocles and Colotes. This group was welded into a close interpersonal association under Epicurus' tutelage and charisma, the members mutually supportive in emotional and intellectual as well as financial terms.

By 306 BC Epicurus was ready to return to Athens, still the mecca of philosophy and hence the natural setting for the promulgation of his developed views. Aided financially by Idomeneus and other devotees, Epicurus purchased a modest garden property just outside the city walls along with a house in a nearby residential district; the suburban site served as an instructional center, the residence as living quarters for Epicurus and an inner circle of disciples. The Garden—as Epicurus' school came to be popularly known—functioned both as an educational establishment and as a subcommunity of intimates sharing a way of life in accordance with the teachings of their revered leader. The community was hierarchically organized, with Epicurus bearing the twin titles of hêgemôn ('leader', 'guide') and sophos ('wise man'); Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus functioned as kathêgemones ('associate leaders') and philosophoi; next in rank came several kathêgêtes, or 'assistants', among whom numbered Epicurus' three brothers; and finally various untitled

members, pupils, and support staff. Epicurus' role was primary in every sense, for not only did the philosopher impart to his followers the precepts of personal well-being, he also assumed the traits of father-figure and godlike savior. Each member was required to offer a personal pledge of obedience: "I will be faithful to Epicurus according to whom it has been my choice to live"; and a celebrated dictum of the Epicureans was: "Act always as if Epicurus is watching."7 The leader himself declared that "the reverence accorded a wise man is a great good for those revering him," and scattered throughout the extant remains are numerous expressions in the idiom of apotheosis, such as the following request for a donative from one of his extramural disciples: "Send us for the care of our sacred body an offering of first-fruits."8 This pronounced religious tone and other unique facets of the Garden community, such as the strong emotional bonding of the membership and the conspicuous presence of women (many of them courtesans), readily exposed the Epicureans to misunderstanding and misrepresentation, as evidenced above all by the popular lexical equation of "epicure" with sensual profligacy.

By the time he presented himself as a professional philosopher in 311 BC, Epicurus was extremely well-educated, deeply versed in the poetic traditions that his schoolteacher father had imparted, and fully conversant with the philosophical traditions of the major sages. From this intellectual inheritance, Epicurus derived both stimulus and direction for many of his own views, though most of what was borrowed he creatively modified or transformed—hence his somewhat defiant claim that he was *autodidaktos*, 'self-taught', a point perversely underscored by the invective he and his followers poured upon their philosophical predecessors and peers.

The field in which Epicurus was most innovative—indeed revolutionary—was ethics, the centerpiece of his entire philosophical system. All other intellectual and practical concerns were subordinate to the objective of securing that pleasurable existence that Epicurus maintained could be found only in the life of *ataraxia*, 'untroubledness' or 'tranquillity'. Inquiries into the nature of the physical world and the bases of knowledge were thus never independent ends, but instrumental pursuits made necessary by the fact that human existence is deeply troubled by misconceptions about reality and confused by the seeming elusiveness of truth.

Philosophy, for Epicurus, was first and foremost a therapeutic calling: "Vain is the word of a philosopher that does not heal any human suffering; for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not expel diseases of the body, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the psychê." He accordingly devoted himself to the task of dispelling the accumulated assortment of false beliefs and customs that

he felt plagued the human condition. In addition to his strictly ethical works, Epicurus' voluminous writings included an encyclopedic tome On Nature in thirty-seven books (only fragments of which survive), along with several lesser treatises on various physical and epistemological subjects (also lost). Fortunately, as teaching aids for his disciples and as a means of popularization, Epicurus produced several epitomes or breviaries of his major works, three of which are extant in epistolary form: one on ethics, two on natural philosophy. Together with the preserved fragments and the doxographical accounts, and the epic poem De Rerum Natura ('On the Nature of Things') by the Roman Epicurean Lucretius (96–55 BC), these materials render the rudiments of Epicurus' science and logic readily accessible. 11

Given Epicurus' view that our greatest psychic disturbances are rooted in fears of the supernatural—vengeful gods, mythical monsters, animate celestial powers, postmortem sanctions—it is manifest why the materialistic, antiteleological explanation of nature found in fifth-century atomism should have appealed to him. The rigorously rationalized world view of Democritus had taught that all reality is reducible to the mechanical, purposeless combination and separation of *atomoi*, indivisible and imperceptible units of matter that are in continuous motion throughout a boundless void. Armed with this "disenchanted" ontology, Epicurus was able to ground his ethics on a terrestrial plane that could legitimize a pragmatic, individualistic hedonism, and simultaneously assail the religious-mythical trappings of both conventional belief and the transcendental eschatology that marked the high intellectualism of the Pythagorean-Platonic traditions.

Starting from the Parmenidean-Democritean proposition that "nothing can come into existence from the non-existent," and its corollary that "no existent can altogether cease to exist" (otherwise all things would have long since passed into nothingness), Epicurus proceeds to describe the nature of things in accordance with atomistic principles. 12 The basic constituents of reality, to pan, or 'the Whole', are "bodies and void," the former as atoms of varying size, weight, and shape that combine to form compounds, the latter as the space within which bodies move. From the coalescence of atomic compounds in temporarily determinate arrangements, innumerable kosmoi, or 'world orders', (such as the earth) arise throughout the infinite void, only to dissolve in time through the ceaseless process of change, i.e., the recombination of atoms into new aggregate structures. By attributing all such motion to mechanical necessity—the spontaneous interplay of countless atoms in a limitless void-Epicurus sought to remove the basis for any divine guidance or control of the universe. His characterization of the heavenly bodies as

"concentrated masses of fire" was likewise aimed at repudiating the astral theology favored by many in the Academy and the Lyceum.¹³ The movements of celestial bodies, whirlwinds and earthquakes, thunder, rain, and lightning are all to be understood as natural processes, not as the actions of the mythical gods of popular belief or of any Divine Demiurge imagined by the philosophers. Indeed, Epicurus' ethical concern with freeing humanity from the supernatural was of such primacy that he restricted the scientific quest for knowledge to the negative function of dispelling myths and false philosophy. Maintaining that we need not trouble ourselves with discovering correct particular explanations for celestial phenomena and other physical events, he insists that we should countenance any and all nonsupernatural explanations that do not contravene the senses and the principles of atomism.14 It is thus a matter of indifference whether a solar eclipse is due to the interposition of the moon or the temporary extinction of the sun's fire. So long as we do not regard such phenomena as manifestations of divine volition, our prospects for an "undisturbed existence" will remain open, and that, Epicurus contends, is the principal reason for engaging in scientific inquiry:15

Release from fears pertaining to the matters of highest importance would not be possible if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but rather lived in dread of what is told according to the myths. Hence without the study of nature there can be no attainment of pure pleasures.

Carried over into epistemology, the logic of atomism yields an empiricist orientation, as the ontological postulate that atoms and void are the basic constituents of reality necessarily reduces all sensations and mental processes to forms of physical contact between percipient and object. Epicurus' epistemological Kanôn, or 'Rule', is accordingly founded on the act of aisthêsis, or 'sensory experience', which consists in contact between the various organs of sense and the objects of physical reality.16 The sensations of taste and touch are immediate or direct, whereas those of sight, hearing, smell, and thought occur through mediated contacts, whereby the continuous emission or vibrated discharge of atoms from physical objects impinge on our respective sense organs. In the case of vision, discharged atoms in the form of a thin eidolon, or 'effluence', that replicates the object's external surface stream forth and strike the eye, thereby imprinting the image. Since effluences can be disrupted in transit by other bodies or be worn down over long distances, it follows that sensations alone do not provide the basis for judgments about externals. The Epicurean canon is accordingly complemented by two additional criteria, each a derivative of sensation: prolepsis, which is the act of 'preconception' or 'anticipation' based on the general concepts or memory

images that are formed in the mind from repeated sensory experiences; and ta pathê, 'the feelings' or 'reactions' of pain and pleasure that accompany all sensations. As the core elements of our cognitive framework, the prolepseis stored in the mind serve to organize ongoing sensory experiences, making ratiocination possible by allowing for recognition, classification, and analogical reasoning. The function of the third criterion the feelings of pleasure and pain that are caused by the atomic contacts involved in sensation—is essentially normative: as living beings organically constituted with a natural affinity for pleasure and an aversion for pain, it follows that we should be guided by our feelings in determining what are appropriate and inappropriate courses of action. In pointed contradistinction to the Platonic Theory of Forms and the various skeptical traditions that denigrated sensory experience, Epicurus thus validates reliance on the sensations and their conceptual and emotive derivatives (the prolepseis and pathe), thereby providing epistemological warrant for the pragmatic hedonism that formed the overriding concern of his philosophy.

Hedonistic values—most notably the appreciation of feasting, mousikê, and ta aphrodisia—had long occupied a significant place in mainstream Hellenic culture, though ever subordinate, first to the "Heroic" and then to the Polis-citizen ethos. At the close of the Archaic period, a pronounced "soft escapism" did come into vogue within certain aristocratic circles as a consequence of the unwelcome ascendancy of the dêmos and the concomitant erosion of hereditary prerogatives; but even among the aristoi this current did not seriously challenge the primacy of civic virtues or public concerns. The critical revaluation of conventional standards inaugurated by the Sophists in the fifth century proved far more unsettling, as the discovery of cultural relativism robbed many of the old ideals of their sacrosanct authority. Though a majority of the new intellectuals earned their livelihood by teaching the young how to succeed in the arenas of Polis life, and hence retained an appreciation (now made rational) of the prevailing normative code, there were others, rightist extremists in the main, whose doctrines of physis-egoism sought to unfetter "superior" individuals from the artificial constraints of nomos, a position decidedly favorable to hedonistic impulses. The subject of pleasure and its role in the good life remained a lively topic in intellectual discourse thereafter, as a welter of positions encompassing various ascetic and hedonistic principles found articulation over the course of the fourth century.¹⁷ The social scene was marked by a similar ferment, for while the sages were wrangling over the nature of hêdonê, a growing number of citizens, the socalled apragmones—disillusioned by decades of war and factionalism and the consequent eclipse of the city-state by imperial powers—began turning to compensatory modes of self-indulgence, in the domains of eros, luxury, and aesthetic refinement. Epicurus was heir both to the philosophical debates of his predecessors and to the social changes that brought depoliticization and demilitarization to the Polis—a dual inheritance that was to fundamentally inform his ethical project, which interjoined hedonistic and ascetic principles within an arching framework of apolitical quietism and withdrawal.

Although the doctrine that pleasure is the highest good had been voiced before, most notably by Aristippus, the hedonism of Epicurus broke new ground. Proceeding from the familiar principle that "naturalness" should serve as the norm, he founded his ethics on the observation that "all living creatures from the moment of birth are well disposed to pleasure and opposed to pain, naturally and without the aid of reason."18 This innate disposition is restricted in scope, however, for it is primarily oriented towards maintaining the steady and harmonious motion of the atoms constituting our body-mind compound. We naturally strive not for indiscriminate pleasures (that is only the consequence of vain, "perverting" opinion) but for the elimination of those disturbances and pains that attend unsatisfied essential needs: e.g., with regard to our bodily nature; "The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to shiver with cold."19 Thus while "pleasure is our first and inborn good," the selection of particular pleasures, their value, must be determined with reference to human needs or desires, some of which Epicurus deems natural and necessary (such as those for food, shelter, and security), some natural but unnecessary (sex and fine foods), and others unnatural and unnecessary (public honors and riches).20 As he explains in the Letter to Menoeceus, his extant epitome on ethics:21

Whenever we say, then, that pleasure is the *telos*, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those consisting in sensual enjoyment, as is supposed by some who are ignorant of our teachings, or who disagree or misinterpret them, but by pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of disturbance in the *psychê*.

Pleasure in the true and full sense is thus restricted to the satisfaction of our natural and necessary needs, which by releasing us from pain establishes that atomic equilibrium of bodily health and mental tranquillity that constitutes 'the life of blessedness' (to makariôs zên).²²

Epicurus' emphasis on the primacy of painlessness—"the limit of the magnitude of pleasure is the absence of all pain"—is related to his distinction between two variants of pleasure, one of which he termed katastematic or "constitutional," the other kinetic or "active."²³ The former, hêdonê katastêmatikê, is the pleasurable feeling of well-being that follows the elimination of pain through the satisfaction of want or need. Pleasures en kinêsei seem to be of two kinds, one form arising during the actual process of want-satisfaction (e.g., relieving hunger through the act of eating), the other being produced by various activities (music, dance, etc.) that supervene upon katastematic or painless states and thus qualitatively vary, but do not quantitatively increase our magnitude of pleasure.24 Since the elimination of pain marks the limit of full pleasure—a thesis less puzzling if one considers that for much of his adult life Epicurus was wracked by intense physical pains from strangury and dysentery—it follows that katastematic pleasures will be more pleasurable and essential than kinetic, and hence more choice worthy. Epicurus' hedonism is thus of a distinctly pragmatic or calculating mode, with sundry conventional "kinetic" pleasures ("drinking-bouts and revalue and elry, intercourse with boys and women, and the delicacies of the table"25) openly dismissed or devalued, not because they are intrinsically bad, but because "the things productive of certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater than their pleasures."26 That is to say, in addition to the long-term deleterious consequences of certain hedonistic pursuits, unnecessary pleasures generally require considerable effort and resources for their satisfaction, thereby exposing the individual to the caprice of Tychê ('Chance') and the malice of other men. As Epicurus explains in one of his Kuriai Doxai, a catechism of forty 'Sovereign Maxims' or 'Basic Doctrines' in epigrammatic form intended for easy memorization:27

He who understands life's limits knows how easy it is to procure that which removes the pain of want and makes the whole of life perfect and complete. Hence he no longer has need of those things that are won by struggles (agônas).

This was indeed a new style hedonism, for by equating full pleasure with painlessness, i.e., the katastematic order or repose of our atomic body-soul complex, Epicurus was able to adopt certain ascetic elements inherent in the ideal of autarkeia ('self-sufficiency'), thus uniting in his ethics the strengths of earlier systems that had stood in opposition. In accordance with the doctrine that "Natural wealth is both limited and easily obtainable, while the wealth of vain fancies extends without limit," Epicurus counsels that we moderate our desires in conformity with natural and necessary needs and admit natural but unnecessary pleasures only if they bring no disturbances in their wake.28 In practical terms this injunction resulted in a restrained, modest life-style for Garden members, the leader himself setting the standard:29

I teem with pleasure in my body when I live on bread and water, and I spit upon luxurious pleasures not for what they are, but owing to the annovances that follow them.

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Given the telic primacy of pleasure, however, it follows that recourse to any ascetic stance is strictly instrumental:30

We regard autarkeia a great good, not so that in all cases we will use little, but so as to be contented with little if at times we should lack much, being genuinely convinced that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it.

There is a limit also to frugality, and he who disregards it suffers nearly the same as the one pursuing unlimited extravagance.

Hence the periodic celebratory feasts and symposia that highlighted the Garden routine and the apparent interchange of sexual partners among the inner circle of members.31

Similarly instrumental is Epicurus' conception of aretê and to kalon, 'virtue' and 'the noble' respectively, the primary terms of value and commendation not only in the conventional normative code, but also in the philosophical refinements offered by Plato and Aristotle. Against these prevailing standards Epicurus advances a bold axiological reordering:32

We should honor the noble and the virtues and such things as these, if they provide pleasure; but if they do not provide it, we should renounce them.

I spit upon to kalon and those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure.

Such provocative language—no doubt intentional as a means of gaining recognition amid the din of philosophical chatter—accounts for much of the hostility incurred by the Epicureans, but practice was rather less radical than theory. Appreciative that virtuous living is typically conducive to pleasure, in the form of health of body and tranquillity of mind, Epicurus accords aretê a significant functional role in his ethical teachings:33

It is not possible to live pleasantly without also living prudently, nobly, and justly; nor is it possible to live prudently, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly.

And phronesis ('practical wisdom') is even more precious than philosophia, for from it spring all the other virtues, and it teaches us that we cannot lead a pleasant life without phronesis, nobility, and justice, nor a life of phronesis, nobility, and justice without pleasure. For the virtues are naturally bound together with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. Epicurus' apparent rapprochement with conventional standards here is more verbal than real, however, for two basic reasons: first, the mere demand that the virtues become serviceable to pleasure entails an important axiological revision in their content; and second, as we shall discover below, the anti-Polis orientation of Epicurus' social philosophy necessarily transvalued those traditional virtues that were largely coordinate with the military and political roles of the citizen.

Had Epicurean ethics been judged solely on the basis of its tempered hedonism-which accorded primacy to katastematic painlessness, pursued the "ascetic freedom" of autarkeia, and deemed the virtues inseparable from a life of pleasure—it is most unlikely that this philosophy would have gained the reputation for profligacy and immorality that it did within both popular and intellectual circles.34 The slanderous charges of renegades from the school who accused Epicurus of leading his followers in acts of debauchery and gluttony cannot be invoked as the primary cause for this widespread negative perception; nor can it be explained by the conspicuous presence of celebrated courtesans in the Garden community.35 These "scandal" factors undoubtedly contributed, but what clearly rendered Epicurus' call to pleasure suspect and offensive was the radicalism of the antireligious and antipolitical doctrines he employed to sanction it.

Epicurus regarded the conventional beliefs of religion and myth as the greatest source for human anxiety and distress, a problem he maintained was only compounded by the theological and eschatological speculations of philosophers. Doctrines that subjected the workings of nature and human destiny to volitional divine powers unavoidably unsettled man's psychic quietude by enslaving him to forces beyond his control, and the fears of possible postmortem sanctions could not but torment temporal existence.36 To allay these anxieties and concerns was the primary function of Epicurus' physics, which explained the workings of nature in accordance with the unending and purposeless rearrangement of atomic matter in a limitless void. Somewhat surprisingly, Epicurus did not altogether banish divine beings from his metaphysical universe, for he believed their existence was confirmed by the fact that all known peoples hold to some notion of divinity and also by the reported mental images of the gods that many individuals are said to experience, especially during dream states. The "atomic gods" he introduced in his own theology, however, were pointedly far removed from ordinary conception: "It is not he who denies the gods worshipped by the polloi who is impious (asebês), but rather he who accepts the beliefs of the polloi about the gods." The very first doctrine in his collected Kuriai Doxai accordingly deals with the true nature of divinity:37

A sublimely blessed and indestructible being neither experiences trouble itself nor causes it for another, and therefore it is affected neither by anger nor by partiality; for all such things are found only in the weak.

Epicurus reasons that the supreme felicity and serenity that logic dictates must belong to the gods necessarily presupposes they are unburdened by the taxing responsibilities of cosmic governance, thereby precluding their involvement and interest in human affairs. Much like the members of his own Garden following, who also abstain from public concerns, these hedonistic gods reside withdrawn in the intermundial spaces between worlds, there preserving their atomic compounds in blissful painlessness and tranquillity. Properly conceived, the gods can serve as exemplary role models for those aspiring to ataraxia; but there can be no point in sacrificial offerings, rituals of purification, the consultation of oracles, or the numerous other practices that anxious multitudes turn to in their irrational dread of the supernatural and their fear of divine nemesis.

Having thus removed the spectre of divine malevolence (and with it the hope of divine solicitude, cried the critics), Epicurus turned to related anxieties regarding death and the afterlife, the subject of his second doctrine in the Kuriai Doxai:38

Death is nothing to us, for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us.

While accepting traditional views that the psychê constitutes the vital life-force of the body, Epicurus rejected all dualistic positions—popular as well as philosophical—that accorded the psychê transcendental status. Life depends on the functional interdependence of coexistent, compounded flesh and soul atoms, and as all sensory experience is psychosomatic, the exhalation or dispersal of soul atoms upon death will invariably result in a complete and permanent loss of sensation; i.e., "when we are, death is not present, and when death is present, we are not."39 By establishing birth and death as the termini of human existence, Epicurus repudiated all eschatological notions of personal immortality, ranging from the religious-mythical tales of postmortem sanctions in Hades (or paradisal bliss in Elysium) to the cycle of rebirths proclaimed by various philosophers:40

We are born once, and there can be no second birth; for all eternity we shall be no more. Yet you who are not master of the morrow postpone your delight. But life is ruined in delaying, and each one of us dies without enjoying leisure.

In light of what was discussed earlier regarding the religious temper of the dawning Hellenistic era, within which the quest for personal salvation

via mystery cults appeared particularly prominent, Epicurus' assertion that his doctrine on the finality of death offered a healing balm for humanity ("it renders the mortality of life enjoyable . . . by removing the yearning for immortality") strikes a curious note, notwithstanding its promised freedom from an afterlife of everlasting torments. Indeed, this denial of an otherworldly existence, coupled with a radical negation of conventional religious-mythical belief, readily explains why the poet Lucretius, in championing Epicurus' philosophy for a Roman audience, concedes that he needed "all the pleasant honey of the Muse" to overlay the seeming bitterness of this logos, from which "the vulgus, the multitude, recoil in dismay."

Iconoclastic in theological matters, Epicurus was yet more antinomian in the domain of politics and civic responsibilities. For while he advised his followers to participate in conventional cultic practices despite their doctrinal profanity—apparently so as to avoid charges of impiety—the Epicureans openly rejected the demands of citizenship and the normative authority of the Polis, not simply in doctrine but in practice as well.¹³

The individualism inherent in the self-regarding focus of hedonism is typically accompanied by some form of rationalized devaluation of communal concerns. In the earlier case of Aristippus, we have seen how public service was regarded as a kind of "voluntary suffering," an unnecessary burden that the wise man avoids by living as a resident alien or metic within various communities of his own choice and not as a citizen chained to civic obligations. For the expanding ranks of citizen apragmones, 'the uninvolved', a broadly similar evaluation covered both their measured retreat from public life and their compensatory elevation of private pleasures. Epicurus likewise regards civic service as unrewarding toil, but far more prominent in his rejection of traditional communal claims is the factor of danger, i.e., his perception of the public domain as an arena of mortal struggle and harm rather than as the context for moral and aesthetic fulfillment.44 In this critical reassessment one finds direct philosophical rationalization of profoundly altered social conditions, for as the Polis declined as an independent power unit capable of preserving its own autonomy, the destiny of its citizens became increasingly subject to the autocratic whims of foreign potentates and the outcomes of battles in which the citizen no longer played a commanding role. Uncertainty was the rule of the day amid the wild fluctuations of fortune that characterized the wars of Alexander's Successors, with their attending court intrigues and murders, the meteoric rise and fall of factions and personages dependent upon patrimonial favor, and the imposition of garrisons that alternately "liberated" and "enslayed." Little wonder, then, that of his forty Kuriai Doxai, Epicurus devoted a full nine to the pressing problem of gaining asphaleia ex anthrôpôn, 'security against other men', doctrines VI and XIV registering the anxiety of this tumultuous era in most instructive fashion:⁴⁵

In order to obtain the assurance of safety against other men, which is a good thing given the nature of political domination and kingly power (archês kai basileias), any means whatsoever are to be taken to procure this.

While security against other men is attained up to a point by the power to banish and the use of material abundance, the most certain and uncorrupted security arises from a life of quietude (*hêsuchia*) and withdrawal from the *polloi*.

This urgent quest for security, asphaleia, constitutes the regulative impulse of Epicurus' entire social philosophy, which finds concise summation in the school's notorious twin watchwords: Lathe Biôsas, 'Live Hidden' or 'Unknown'; and mê politeuesthai, comprehensively translatable as 'abjure the life of citizenship and take no part in politics or governing'. By advocating withdrawal from the turbulence and danger of the public realm to the tranquillity and security of private existence, Epicurus radically overturns the central normative assumptions of traditional Hellenic culture. Where Solon had argued that without communal devotion and justice no man can hope to escape the "public evils" of the day, which hurdle courtyard walls and lay hold of each man, "even if he flees to the innermost recess of his bedchamber," Epicurus conversely maintains that security is most certain for those who abandon the public arena and retreat into a private Garden sanctorum. Where war poets such as Kallinos and Tyrtaios had spoken of noble self-sacrifice on behalf of the Polis koinônia, sentiments subsequently enshrined in numerous memorial epitaphs to those who fell in the cause of Hellenic freedom against Persia and Macedonia, Epicurus' chief disciple Metrodorus declares "it is not binding on us to save the Hellenes." Where Aeschylus had sanctified the Polis as "mother and dearest nurse" of her citizen offspring, Epicurus contends that society is nothing more than a utilitarian "compact" arranged for purposes of forestalling mutual injury and injustice. Where Pericles had condemned as "useless" those citizens who took no part in public affairs, Epicurus enjoins us "to free ourselves from the prison house of ta politika." And where Demosthenes had stressed the inseparability of freedom and active service on behalf of the civic koinônia, Epicurus champions an inner freedom among friends far removed from all "servitude to mobs and dynasts."46

Having so utterly repudiated the normative authority of the Polis and the citizenship ideal, Epicurus quite logically extended his critique

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to encompass those philosophical systems that had incorporated major elements of the traditional civic creed. The Platonic aspiration to reconstitute the Polis-citizen bond on a higher plane through the union of philosophy and political power is openly derided, with the Academics dismissed as "toadies of tyrants" and their program belittled as a misguided attempt to create lawgivers, "would-be Lycurguses and Solons."47 Aristotle's teleological conception of the Polis as a "natural growth" functional for to eu zên, 'the good life', is likewise challenged, opposed doctrinally by Epicurus' contention that "man is not by nature social (koinônikos)" and his conception of society as an "atomistic" agglomeration of individuals whose capacities as human beings are not enhanced or brought to fulfillment through civic existence, but who simply seek a self-serving utilitarian security.48 And it was presumably on account of Aristotle's close working relations with the Macedonian court and the tyrant Hermias that Epicurus assailed him personally as a polypragmôn, one 'meddlesome' or 'active in public affairs', and hence as "a more severe opponent of the life of safety than those who compete openly in the agônia (contest, struggle) of politikê."49

In light of the foregoing assault on civic-based values, the revolutionary significance of the Garden community of intimates should now be clear: its primary function was to supplant the crumbling Polis koinônia as the existential basis for the good life, by offering its members the security, self-sufficiency, justice, and pleasures that the larger sociopolitical unit had difficulty providing under the new circumstances of patrimonial domination. The Garden constitutes a strategic secession of the alienated, joined by those who acknowledge neither the privileges nor the responsibilities of citizenship, the status that had traditionally served as the prescribed medium for the manifestation of human excellence and as the integrative link between individual and society.

No longer animated by communal ideals, the Epicurean feels free to renounce the burdens of public service in favor of the personal rewards of friendship:50

Of all the means which wisdom furnishes for the attainment of blessedness throughout the whole of life, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship (philia).

What the friend provides above all else, Epicurus maintains, is security, for while friendship is, like all other human associations, ultimately based on utility (there being "no natural koinônia among rational creatures"), its trustworthiness is enhanced by the voluntary nature of the relation and the bonds of affection that are nurtured by shared interests

and experiences.⁵¹ In a world beset by turmoil and danger, it is the cultivation of friendship—not the pursuit of political power—which offers the most reliable path to safety:⁵²

All those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbors, thus lived with each other most pleasantly in possession of the firmest trust, sharing in the most complete intimacy...

The Garden's status as an alternative community to the Polis is strikingly indicated by its very membership, which included individuals drawn from groups that were disprivileged within or excluded from the civic koinônia-women, slaves, metics, and non-Greeks-but who were pointedly regarded as equals within the Garden. 53 Women in particular played a prominent role, and though many were courtesans, their activities were not limited to sexual servicing; Leontion for one is known to have participated vigorously in the intellectual life of the school, chairing many philosophical discussions and writing a celebrated critical treatise against Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor at the Lyceum. Epicurus' house slaves were similarly recognized as "fellow students of philosophy," and the slave Mys (manumitted by Epicurus in his will) managed to achieve a minor reputation as a sage in his own right. Here, clearly, was a new kind of synoikismos, founded upon the voluntary and intimate ties of friendship rather than the hereditary blood ties of citizenship or other traditionally ascribed status criteria.

Epicurus' remark that "this little Garden does not whet your appetite, but quenches it" expresses well the all-embracing objective of the subcommunity.54 In accordance with the enjoined transfer of value from citizenship to friendship, human energies that formerly had been channeled outwards into the public arena were to be henceforth conserved within a private circle. One consequence of such closure was the high emotional intensity among Garden members and the effusive terms of endearment and acclaim that they showered upon one another, e.g., being hailed in language traditionally reserved for addressing the gods, the extensive and open use of affectionate nicknames and diminutives, and the excessive thanksgiving, jubilation, and excitement over commonplace actions.55 In addition to the amplified conviviality of the daily Garden routine, special occasions for rejoicing were instituted to celebrate birthdays, and commemorative rites patterned after domestic cults for the dead were established for deceased members, thereby reinforcing the "familial" nature of the Garden association. It was customary for Epicureans to preface their writings with short dedications to other members, and numerous eulogistic biographies were composed to honor those whose lives had graced the Garden community. Such practices give clear meaning to Epicurus'

famous assertion that "friendship is an immortal good," for through these memorial cults and written eulogies, a record of the blessings of past friendships was preserved, affording perpetual contentment for the living and inspiration for those who followed in subsequent generations.⁵⁶

Having outlined the commanding philosophical tenets and normative routines that gave ordered existence to life within the Epicurean Garden, we must now consider the possible social-psychological motivations that inspired and sustained this innovative theory-praxis enterprise. An obvious starting point is suggested by the sociological generalization that subcultures or alternative communities typically constitute some form of compensatory or adaptive response to problems rooted in the social position and life experiences of the groups or strata concerned. 57 In terms of doctrine, practice, and constituency, Epicureanism conforms to that pattern, featuring a thorough intellectual repudiation of the normative claims and ideals of the Polis tradition, a segregated mode of life expressive of total alienation from the public sphere, and a membership composed primarily of the disaffected and socially marginal (noncitizens, women, and even slaves).

The institutional dislocations that marked the "decline" of Polis society over the course of the fourth century rendered much of the traditional normative code impractical, anachronistic. Given the dependency of conventional virtues upon performance in the political and military spheres, it readily followed that as the public arena was transformed by the suppression of Polis autonomy and the eclipse of the citizen-hoplite, commitment to inherited ideals became increasingly difficult to sustain. As the citizen lost control over the assembly and the battlefield, it became psychologically expedient to emancipate self-image and life-style from pursuits that could no longer satisfy the material and ideal needs of the actors involved. A heroic but futile effort was made by some to preserve what the patriot Demosthenes repeatedly invoked as the old dianoia, the civic-minded 'mentality' or 'spirit' of the preceding generations; but while aspects of that devotion survived in muted fashion-every historical moment presents a shifting collage of residual and emergent cultural forms—a growing number of citizens found a more realistic and comforting alternative in the private pleasures of apolitical quietism. The Epicurean philosophy of hedonistic disengagement is one current in that rejectionist tide, and its professed ideals of security and tranquillity are to be understood as core elements in a theoretically reflective response to the normative crisis occasioned by structural depoliticization and demilitarization. Registering the acutely felt tremors of social disintegration most plainly are the Epicurean edicts "live hidden" and "abstain from politics," prescriptions that identify the public arena as the locus of danger, distress,

The Epicurean project clearly transcends, however, the mere negation of Polis-citizen values that had limited Cynicism to anarchic eccentricity. Where the Cynic was content to mock and scandalize, Epicurus offered an affirmative way of life on the basis of a kind of voluntary "collective exile," encamped within-but safely apart from-the crumbling walls of Polis society. New associational units were to be formed among trustworthy and devoted friends, with whom it would be possible to enjoy the pleasures of intimacy and fellowship unburdened by the responsibilities and dangers of public life. The symbolic resonance of the "garden" label itself testifies to this dual function-sheltering yet enhancing-for the image of the garden in human civilization has always been that of an enclosed paradise, a setting of sustenance and repose fashioned through the selective imposition of order and harmony on the wild and the chaotic. As an alternative community, the circumscribed Garden was intended to supplant the Polis as the organizational basis for human fulfillment, while simultaneously providing safe haven against the buffeting storms of political and military misfortune—the painful effects of which the founder had himself experienced in earlier days. Withdrawal is, of course, ever the natural strategy for those lacking

either the capacity to rule or the inclination to serve; it is a resignatory substitute for engagement, testifying to one's awareness of an inability to influence or control the external course of events. To overcome that disquieting impotence is the underlying rationale for Epicurus' call to narrow the range of interests and activities, to flee the "prison house" of public affairs in exchange for a private life of hedonistic quietude shared among intimates. For the sake of "security against other men," the existential focus is radically shifted from citizenship to friendship, from Polis to Garden. So stated, the rupture indeed appears total, but it is instructive to note that while Epicurus repudiates the Polis-citizen heritage, functional analogues of that framework are conspicuously operational within the new "cloistered" life orientation. Much of what the Polis had demanded of its citizens—obedience to sacred Nomos, liturgical services to benefit the koinônia, civic loyalty and devotion, and even self-sacrifice in the ranks of battle-the Epicurean pleasure Garden was to demand of its constituency. Thus all members of the sect were sworn to obedience to the founder and his precepts, while wealthier followers were also called upon to sustain the community through contributions in provisions and money.

Epicurean friendship assumed the traits of loyalty and devotion formerly

bound up with civic commitments, not excluding a readiness to sacrifice

one's own life on behalf of friends, a position that surely strains the the-

oretical individualism that undergirds Epicurus' ethics. The public feasts and festivals of the Polis are paralleled by various interpersonal celebrations inside the Garden, just as the bestowal of public honors upon patriotic citizens has its counterpart in the Epicurean practice of composing eulogistic biographies of Garden associates. Even civic cults of the war dead have their Garden equivalent, in the instituted memorial services for deceased members. Since the differences between these commitments and practices are more a matter of range and scale than substance—the Polis encompassing the entire civic community, the Garden embracing a narrow circle of friends—one must ask whether Epicurus' forceful rejection of the claims of the wider public association constitutes a defensive retrenchment rather than a philosophical affirmation.

On strict "atomistic" principles, as expressed in the thesis that "there is no natural koinônia among rational creatures" and its corollary that even friendship is founded upon self-interested utility, one finds theoretical justification for a distinction between self and other, but none what-soever for the Epicurean dichotomy of Polis and Garden, collectivities both. The premises of egoistic hedonism pose dilemmas for the practice of friendship as well as for the life of citizenship, though the former association undoubtedly permits greater control over benefits and services. Hence it would appear that the Epicurean policy of public disengagement is based not on philosophical theorizing, but on a sociological assessment of how best to achieve security and well-being, a position clearly implied by entry VII in the Kuriai Doxai:59

Some men have sought to become renowned and notable, thinking that they would thus provide for themselves security against other men [on the basis of "power and wealth" is Lucretius' illuminating gloss]. If, then, the life of such persons is secure, they have attained the natural good; but if it is not secure, they do not possess that which from the beginning they have striven for in accordance with what is proper (oikeion) by nature.

Here the means for obtaining security and tranquillity are considered secondary to the objective, and though Epicurus repeatedly commends "the life of quietude and withdrawal from the polloi," it is clear that his opposition to public involvement is more pragmatic than principled. Such a stance—coupled with the conspicuous retention within the Garden of functional analogues to traditional civic commitments and practices—strongly suggests that the ethos of Epicureanism was conditioned more fundamentally by the existential reality of a collapsing Polis-citizen framework than by the intrinsic imperatives of logic or theoretical reason. The rationalized withdrawal, in other words, constituted something of a forced retreat.

Was, then, life in the Garden nothing more than a partial and condensed substitute for the much richer and manifold—but now vanishing—experiences of the free citizen? Many scholars have rendered such a judgment, but unfortunately more for purposes of rank-ordering the ancient schools of philosophy than for clarifying the social psychological bases of the modes of discourse involved. That latter task is challenging in the case of Epicurus, given the loss of his major written works; where with Plato and Aristotle sociological imputation is facilitated by voluminous extant compositions that enable us to discern the volitional-cognitive patterns that inform their respective world views, the surviving materials from Epicurus' publications provide a narrower base for such an enterprise. Fortunately, the codified maxims and epistolary digests present the self-designated core of his philosophy, leaving little ambiguity over Epicurus' fundamental principles.

In order to situate his thought within its defining historical context, let us attempt to relate the main lines of Epicurus' ethics to the three noetic modalities that we identified as comprising the analytical-evaluative core in the social philosophies of Plato and Aristotle: the Polis-citizen normative tradition, the residual ideological ethos of the aristocracy, and the exaltation of philosophic reason.

There is no ambiguity regarding Epicurus' stance towards the traditional civic culture: he openly rejects the moral claims of the Polis and its corresponding citizenship ideal, offering in their stead the secluded Garden experience and the pleasures of friendship. An unbridgeable chasm accordingly separates Epicurus' "atomistic" doctrine of self-regarding hedonism from the Platonic-Aristotelean position that stressed the mutual interdependence of self and society, psychê and polis. As ancient critics observed, the relationship of Epicureans to the Polis was not simply unpatriotic, but entirely parasitic. For while acknowledging that the civic koinônia provided a legal-political order that restrained men from reverting to the "savage life of beasts," the retiring Epicureans nonetheless felt no obligation to reciprocate through public service. 61 Indeed, Epicurus carried his individualism to such lengths that he viewed the established legal order from the vantage of personal utilitarianism, granting that the wise would not necessarily adhere to nomos if it were possible to avoid detection. This calculating opportunism derives from his shocking thesis that "Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear arising from the apprehension that one will not escape the notice of those authorized to punish such acts."62 Disregard for the elementary principles of social life could not be expressed more clearly.

Hostile to the traditional civic culture, Epicurus appears to have been uninfluenced by the aristocratic legacy that had so significantly framed the

political and ethical predilections of Plato and Aristotle, despite occasional remarks suggestive of a kindred animus against the *dêmos*, or "multitude." Himself the son of a disprivileged kleruch-settler, Epicurus was far removed from the social milieu of his distinguished Philiad ancestors, and there is nothing in the biographical record to suggest any personal identification with the hereditary nobility. Whenever Epicurus speaks dismissively of "the praise of the *polloi*" or their "bestowal of honors," decries public life as entailing "servitude to mobs," or brands the majority of men as "raving," such remarks are essentially nonpartisan and indifferent to the class and status distinctions that had loomed large throughout Greek history and in the political discourses of his two major philosophical predecessors. 63 For Epicurus the only valid criterion in determining human value is true friendship, an interpersonal association that can encompass lowborn as well as high, women no less than men, and that is similarly open to noncitizens, slaves, and even "barbarians."

By thus ignoring the invidious or parochial standards of class, gender, citizenship, and race, some scholars have seen grounds for hailing Epicurus as a revolutionary egalitarian; but this is a fantasy fired more by their aversion for the antidemocratic and authoritarian strains in Plato and Aristotle than by anything that the founder of the Garden either explicitly proclaimed or practiced.⁶⁴ For while Epicurus does indeed negate the conventional lines of division within Polis society, what he affirms is scarcely revolutionary in any political sense, as is clear from his own expressed exclusion of the mass of humankind from the purview of his philosophy:⁶⁵

It was never my intention to be appealing to the multitude; for what appealed to them, I did not know, and what I did know was far removed from their perception.

In short, Epicurus' apolitical hedonism did not seek progressive social transformation but personal escape, and those few who joined in the secession were accorded value, while those "outside" the Garden remained of no account. As a program of disengagement, this brand of sectarian elitism was even more conservative in its practical implications than the so-called reactionary reforms advocated by Plato, which had envisaged relief on a communal, if hierarchical basis.

With respect to the third cognitive modality, philosophical reason, we have observed how Epicurus diverged from the Platonic-Aristotelean project not only in rejecting the transcendental aspects of earlier thought, but in subordinating abstract theorizing to practical wisdom, *philosophia* to *phronêsis*. Dialectics and mathematics were dismissed as superfluous exercises, and within the Epicurean canon, "reason" was not licensed to

soar beyond the mundane reality of sensory experience to any speculative higher realm of truth or being. And though Epicurus accepted the Sokratic conception of philosophy as a therapeutic or regenerative calling, by severing ethics from politics he pointedly restricted his care to the private sphere. In effect, the sage's reason is reduced to the calculation of risks, to the pursuit of private pleasures within the constraints imposed by existing conditions. With Epicurus, philosophical reason renounces its claim to transfigure reality and rests content with achieving narcissistic deliverance from the trammels of public commitment.

Uninspired by any of the three cognitive orientations that were fundamental to the analytical-evaluative complexes of Plato and Aristotle—save as points of critical departure—it is necessary to look elsewhere for the driving impulse of Epicureanism. We are not without clues, for the marked prominence of medical metaphors in Epicurus' diction—and more specifically his correlation of philosophy with *hygieia* of the *psychê*—suggests one should proceed by examining the "maladies" he sought to cure and the "health" he sought to promote.⁶⁶

Epicurus deemed the greatest and most common sources of human anxiety and distress to be rooted in fear: fear of the gods and celestial phenomena; fear of death and possible postmortem sanctions; fear of harm and injury from other men; and fear regarding the unpredictable and shifting tides of Tychê.67 Against the first two sets of concerns, Epicurus offered the healing balm of atomism, a purportedly true account of the nature of reality that dispenses with divine powers as agents in cosmic or human affairs, and removes the sting of death by limiting it to complete anaisthêsia, the permanent loss of all sensation and consciousness. Against the remaining concerns Epicurus counselled a withdrawal from public life, the cultivation of intimate friendships within an alternative subcommunity, and the adoption of an ascetic hedonism that limits one's desires to such necessities as are easily procurable. The ills as diagnosed all bespeak vulnerability, uncertainty, while the remedies as prescribed constitute not preventive but immunological measures, those of denial and distancing. Read sociologically, the patient profile of the Epicureantormented by insecurities of mind and person-registers the pathologies of a malfunctioning system, a social order culturally disoriented and politically enfeebled.

Epicurus' dicta on religion and death present a puzzling interpretive challenge, for it is not at all clear why prevailing views about the gods should be held responsible for "the greatest disturbance in our souls," nor why the philosopher should have regarded his "death is nothingness" doctrine as emancipatory and comforting. As religions go, Greek polytheism was not particularly oppressive or demanding, either with respect

to practice or belief: framed within the routines of domestic and communal life, ritual adherence served to satisfy the basic requirements of mainstream religious experience. For those requiring more than traditional observance, numerous "alien" gods and mystery cults were available; yet even here the evidence does not suggest any mass stampede motivated by terror or fear, but a rather calculating hope, mingled with conventional anxieties, for divine assistance and afterlife blessings. Of course, the indeterminacy of those tangled theologies and rituals—lacking the systematization that comes with canonic texts and professional priesthoods—may have been a problem for those requiring greater clarity and certainty, deficiencies not to be found in the dogmatic rationalism offered by the founder of the Garden, whose teachings were hailed by his disciples as "the holy rites of divinely-spoken truth."69 The violent dawn of the Hellenistic age was a time of considerable religious ferment, and amid the confusing welter of practices and beliefs it can be surmised that many will have succumbed to the darker side of their religious inheritance: the terrifying threats of eternal torment in Hades; vengeful spirits and gods; the oppressive fear of incurring pollution through ritual oversight or inadvertent contact with the unclean. To those so troubled, the doctrine of carefree atomic gods in the intermundia and the finality of death may have indeed proved a welcome deliverance; but the Epicurean creedwhich vested all in the brief span of mortal existence—was clearly unsuited to address the needs of the overwhelming majority keen on securing apotropaic aids and otherworldly compensation.70

Less difficult to interpret are Epicurean fears of other men and of Tychê, as both forms unambiguously attest to doubt and anxiety regarding one's ability to forestall harm from external sources. Epicurus' obsessive concern with obtaining asphaleia ex anthrôpôn, 'security against other men', marks a new departure in Greek ethical discourse and clearly constitutes a response to the dissolution of the old civic solidarity and the erosion of the citizen's martial prowess and political sovereignty. The traditional koinônia tôn politôn, which had integrated public and private and had provided "psychic anchorage" in the form of fixed role requirements and normative standards, suffered irremedial rupture as the processes of demilitarization and depoliticization undermined the citizen's capacity for autonomous self-direction. Existentially experienced, the "decline of the Polis" brought exposure to new uncertainties and a troubling dependency on the arbitrary dictates and shifting fortunes of patrimonial warlords struggling for ascendancy within Alexander's fragmented legacy. The intensified concern over Tychê simply represents this feeling of impotence in its most abstract and generalized form. The need to offset or neutralize the distress and anxiety engendered by the new reality of

political subordination gave rise to various strategies of psychological adaptation, all of which were to feature a distancing of the self from the public arena and a corresponding elevation of the private sphere. Hence the defining social trends commonly used by historians to distinguish the Hellenistic Age and its culture: the rise in personal luxury and conspicuous consumption; a trend toward greater individualism in the visual arts, featuring both an unprecedented focus on "personality" and a fascination with pathos, with psychological reactions to mercurial shifts and reversals of fortune, all accompanied by a pronounced shift away from the previously dominant and idealized "masculine aesthetic," as women, children, the elderly, and even the destitute and physically disabled become subjects for realistic representation; the "domestication" of humor in Middle and New Comedy, featuring a focal shift from civic concerns to a situational comedy of manners centered on the "bourgeois" familial themes of romance and property; the marked increase in private club associations, the thiasoi and eranoi that brought individuals together for shared religious interests, fellowship, and mutual aid; the heightened quest for personal salvation through mystery cults and the explosive surge of interest in astrology and magic.71

Epicurus' secessionist philosophy of hedonism was similarly motivated to free the self from pursuits no longer affording fulfillment, and to empower the individual within a strategically circumscribed and controlled domain, detached from the wider world of hostile powers. As for goddess Tychê, the Epicurean sought to limit her influence by a parallel "contraction" on the individual plane, cultivating self-sufficiency through a rational limitation of one's desires to easily procurable essentials. Dependency or exposure, whether to the compulsions of mobs or monarchs or to the limitless cravings of an undisciplined psychê, was a vice and danger to be avoided at all costs—hence the injunction to 'Live Hidden', Lathe Biôsas, and the ascetic safeguards against hedonistic excess.

From the "illnesses" diagnosed and the "therapies" prescribed, it seems clear that the driving impulses behind Epicureanism were ego defensive rather than affirmative, an interpretation that receives additional support from examination of Epicurus' conception of hygieia, the conditions of human well-being. Particularly striking is the fact that so many Epicurean ideals take the form of privative contentments, revealingly conveyed in the language of negation: a-taraxis (imperturbability), a-ponia (absence of toil or suffering), a-lupia (painlessness), a-phobos (to be without fear), a-pragmosunê (uninvolved in public affairs), a-leitourgia (unburdened by liturgical services), to a-thorubôs zên (the undisturbed life). Indeed, for Epicurus even the highest objective is the attainment of a neutral state: the katastematic pleasure of complete painlessness, which con-

sists in a "stable condition of the flesh" and "serenity of mind." What is of primary value here is the escape from sufferings and toils-kakôn apophugê—rather than any positive exultation and joy in a way of life that strives to realize and expand all human potentialities.72 Epicurus would of course reject the implied criticism in that characterization, for by denying that man is by nature a social or koinônikos animal, Epicurus rejects in principle the Aristotelean notion that human capacities are fully realized only through active participation in social life—an intellectual elaboration of the "Polis teaches man" theme of mainstream culture. In practice, however, we did observe that the Garden association featured a number of "functional analogues" of the repudiated Polis-citizen framework, which in itself strongly suggests that substitutes for a devalued public life could not be dispensed with. Hence also the exaggerated intensity of interpersonal relations within the Garden, the hypertrophy of feeling and the elevation of mundane actions to the status of events calling for special praise and celebration: e.g., disciples sending supplies of grain being hailed for their "godlike" and "munificent" contributions; the visitations greeted with unbounded enthusiasm; the mutually bestowed accolades repeatedly recollected as divine blessings; etc.73 All the evidence available suggests that these amplified behavioral patterns are to be understood as adjustive reactions, compensatory for the abandoned opportunities to manifest excellence and gain self-esteem and gratification in the wider public arena-

From the foregoing it should come as no surprise to learn that ancient critics directed heavy fire against Epicurean standards.74 Their so-called good-the escape from pain-was belittled as "entirely trivial"; their excitements and joys over small interpersonal comforts and services were invidiously contrasted with the public achievements and benefactions of the great lawgivers, statesmen, and sages; their delights were likened to those of "slaves or prisoners released from confinement"; and their katastematic pleasures were dismissed as "fit for corpses" rather than the living-this latter judgment coming from the champions of kinetic hedonism, the Cyrenaic followers of Aristippus. Perhaps the most revealing witticism was that offered by Arcesilaus (c. 318-242 BC), leader of the Academy during its so-called Middle or skeptical phase, who upon being asked why pupils from other schools sometimes defected to the Epicureans, but from the Garden no converts were ever made, sharply replied: "Because men may become eunuchs, but eunuchs can never become men."75 Whether or not this barb was specifically aimed at the apolitical, secessionist aspects of the school, there is no reason to doubt that the formulae Lathe Biôsas and mê politeuesthai were widely viewed as entailing a kind of self-inflicted "castration," a severing of the self from that full humanity that is to be experienced only within the framework of civic life. Against the turbulent backdrop of a collapsing Polis-citizen order and the violent forging of patrimonial empires by Alexander's Successors, the Epicurean philosophy of hedonistic withdrawal promised the security of friendship and a tranquillity of mind unburdened by fears of the supernatural and unconcerned by useless civic honors and responsibilities. As a strategy against psychic distresses caused by theological uncertainties and the political devitalization of public life, it proved remarkably successful, as evidenced not only by the replication of the Garden organization elsewhere in the Hellenistic world (e.g., Alexandria, Antioch, and later in Rome), but also by the significant and enduring influence of Epicureanism on the history of Western thought.

Yet clearly the teachings and the practice of the Garden could not command the loyalty and adherence of more than a limited number of like-minded individuals: crowded cloisters, after all, are self-defeating, and the privilege of renouncing civic obligations can be extended only so far without precipitating mass anarchy, thereby ruining the prospects for any enclaved sanctuary. Other responses to the institutional and normative crisis of Polis society were therefore very much in need, and in Stoicism we shall discover a philosophy that, like Epicureanism, frees the individual from the disturbances of the external world but does so not through a strategy of segregated withdrawal, but through an axiological reappraisal that promises inward immunity from all that transpires outside the self.

6.III.ii Stoicism: The Ethos of "Self-Hardening"

The points of contrast between the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies are many and well-known. Where Epicurus regards pleasure as the telos, Zeno and his followers deem moral virtue the only good. While the Epicurean universe is conceived as a mechanical interplay of atomic particles, endlessly combining and separating without purpose to form and destroy innumerable kosmoi, Zeno offers a vitalistic conception of a single world order in which all matter is penetrated and rationally organized by a divinely providential and animate pneumatic power. Where Epicurus sees contingency and chance in the random motion and contact of atoms, the Stoic discerns a purposeful and rigid determinism in which every event and action takes place in accordance with the Divine Logos. Where Epicurus removes his "atomic gods" to the leisured and carefree spaces of the intermundia, Zeno identifies God and world in an all-embracing pantheistic monism. While Epicurus holds that the psychê is simply an atomic compound dissolvable upon death, the Stoics regard the souls of human beings as apospasmata, or 'fragments' of the Divine, into which they are reabsorbed during the periodic conflagrations that bring to a close each

identically repeated world cycle. Even in terms of philosophical life orientation the two schools stand in marked contraposition, as Nietzsche discerned and expressed in his inimitable style:

The Epicurean selects the situation, the persons, and even the events that suit his extremely irritable, intellectual constitution; he gives up all others, which means almost everything, because they would be too strong and heavy for him to digest. The Stoic, on the other hand, trains himself to swallow stones and worms, slivers of glass and scorpions without nausea; he wants his stomach to become ultimately indifferent to whatever the accidents of existence might pour into it.

In praxis as in theory, the Epicurean and Stoic systems thus stand in direct opposition: atomism against pantheism, hedonism against virtue, refined withdrawal against heroic "self-hardening." Yet these polar differences cannot conceal what is shared in common, for at their ethical cores both philosophies exhibit a pronounced individualism and a cosmopolitan disregard for the Polis-citizen heritage. As the two distinctive and preeminent intellectual developments of the dawning Hellenistic era, each constitutes in its own way a response to the fourth-century "crisis" and the metastatic legacy of Alexander. Having shown in the preceding section how Epicurus' philosophy was related on a number of critical points to the processes of demilitarization and depoliticization that undermined the institutional anchorage of the traditional normative code, we will now attempt a complementary analysis of early Stoicism.

A methodological difficulty must be acknowledged at the outset: no complete treatise by any of the early Stoics has been preserved.2 Our source materials consist solely of isolated quotations and doxographical summaries provided by later writers, many of whom were hostile to Stoicism. Given the abridged nature of this evidence, the detailed argumentation that sustained Stoic doctrines is often lacking or opaque, thereby rendering elusive the task of critical evaluation. Fortunately, the most fundamental and general themes and positions are reported by a variety of sources, which has allowed for a consensual reconstruction of the main lines of Stoic thought. There is, alas, one additional challenge. Unlike Epicureanism, Stoicism was a remarkably protean and adaptive philosophy, exhibiting significant changes over the course of its long history—particularly so after it was carried to Republican Rome and there gained acceptance among members of the ruling Patrician order, only to undergo still further mutations during the Imperial era. As our concern here is with the social origins of Stoicism, our focus will be restricted to the so-called Old Stoa, which was founded by Zeno at the close of the fourth century and raised to doctrinal completion by the prolific Chrysippus during the second half of the third.3

That Stoicism represents an intrusion of "Semitic" or "Oriental" elements into Greek philosophy has long been a popular thesis regarding the school's cultural roots. What proponents of this theory point to is the striking fact that nearly all of the prominent early Stoics originated in lands on the periphery of mainland Greece, mostly in and around Asia Minor and the Levant, and that several of them were charged with grammatical and stylistic "barbarisms" in their use of the Greek language.4 Unfortunately, this undeniably significant social profile is then used for purposes of underwriting highly speculative attempts to identify purported "foreign" or "Semitic" elements—mainly religious—that the early Stoics supposedly inherited in their native milieux and then transposed into philosophical discourse, thereby "contaminating" the spirit of Hellenic rationalism. As critics have rightly observed, this practice is—to say the least-methodologically unsound, not only on account of the nebulous content of the key operational term "Semitic," but also because any such reconstruction is obviated by the fact that we possess little information pertaining to the cultural views of the non-Hellenic peoples of the Near East during this period. There is, moreover, no need to speculate about possible "foreign" influences when, as we shall document in due course, Hellenic antecedents can be readily found for precisely those views that some scholars have mistakenly and invidiously labeled "Semitic."

In saying that Stoicism is to be understood as an essentially Hellenic development, we do not intend to minimize the significance of Stoicism's sociobiographical roots outside the Greek mainland; on the contrary, it is imperative that the relevance of this fact be properly interpreted. As noted earlier, life in the Hellenic periphery had from the outset been subject to diverse circumstances and influences: the colonial experience, contacts and exchanges with foreign cultures, the geopolitical realities of frontier vulnerability—all of which served to modify in various ways the inherited Polis-citizen traditions of the Greek heartland. A more cosmopolitan orientation naturally flourished in the multinational regions of the eastern Mediterranean basin, where suzerainty had long been exercised by conquering overlords. Alexander and his Successors were simply the most recent installment of occupying dynasts, in whose train moved thousands of desperate and adventurous Greeks keen to "cash in" on the spoils and opportunities afforded by imperial patrimonialism. In these colonial environments—with urban populations subject to royal authority and shielded by professional soldiers—the political and military functions that structured and defined the citizen's life experience in traditional Polis society were much altered and reduced in scope, and therefore of far less normative significance. Little wonder, then, that for the early Stoics, nearly all of whom hailed from communities without established traditions of political autonomy and civic exclusiveness, there is no evidence of any identification with classical Polis-citizen ideals, but rather a quintessentially "Hellenistic" understanding that reduces the Polis to an administrative unit and place of residence and regards the citizen as little more than a municipally minded urbanite. To characterize the situation somewhat schematically, one could say that whereas the Athenian-born and "vanquished ephebe" Epicurus registers an inner revulsion and repudiation of the classical normative inheritance, the Stoics—existentially "outside" and uncommitted to that tradition—proceed to construct their social philosophies in accordance with the altered reality of the Hellenistic experience.

As preserved biographical details regarding the founder of Stoicism make plain, Zeno was the first notable philosopher to emerge from a Hellenistic social context.5 A native of the Cyprian city of Citium, a mixed settlement of Phoenicians and Greeks that had been ruled for centuries by partially Hellenized Phoenician dynasts (usually in a subordinate alliance with the Persian Great King), Zeno was born the year in which Alexander shattered Darius' forces as Issus (333 BC), and as a youth he saw his island pass over into the Macedonian sphere of control. Himself apparently of Phoenician—though clearly Hellenized—descent, Zeno inherited the merchant calling of his father and for a time traded in the valuable Tyrian purple between the Levant and Aegean. In his early twenties, he abandoned this lucrative career for a life of philosophy in Athena's city, thereby satisfying an ambition he had nurtured since childhood, when his imagination had been stirred by the "Sokratic books" his father regularly brought home on return voyages from Greece. Zeno's advanced studies in the philosophical capital were extensive and diverse. Sources record a lengthy personal discipleship with the famous Cynic Krates, as well as attendance upon leading Academics and the Megarian masters of logic and linguistics. Zeno also studied closely the writings of the pre-Sokratic physikoi, finding in the all-controlling Logos of Heraclitus a particularly compelling metaphysical vision.

After more than a decade of preparation, Zeno came forward as a philosopher in his own right sometime shortly after 300 BC, choosing as his venue the famous portico in the Athenian agora known as the Stoa Poikile, a colonnade emblazoned with mural frescoes depicting various historical exploits of the Athenians at war along with suitable mythical representations. In this most public of places he quickly gathered a following of disciples, initially referred to as "Zenonians," but soon thereafter as Stoikoi, men from the Stoa Poikile.

Although intellectual developments within the Old Stoa cannot be charted with chronological certitude—it is often difficult to determine

whether Chrysippus is offering original positions or simply codifying the doctrines of Zeno-the historical record leaves no doubt as to the early dependence of Stoic ethics upon Cynic principles, an obvious by-product of Zeno's years of close association with Krates. This intellectual inheritance featured three core principles: the ideal of ascetic self-sufficiency; an emphasis on virtue as the only true good (with all externals and conventions dismissed as valueless or as "ornaments of vice"); and an anthropological dualism in which a few were wise and "free," living naturally, while the many were fools, living as "slaves" fettered to artificial, unnatural concerns. These positions Zeno retained in refined form, but his break with Cynicism was fundamental, involving among other things a repudiation of Cynic "shamelessness" in behavioral practice and a rejection of Cynic indifference to dialectics and natural science. Zeno's interests in the logical and physical subfields of philosophy testify to a growing awareness that the Cynics had not only failed to buttress their ethical views with a convincing ontology of human nature, but had similarly failed to articulate a philosophical rationale for Cynic normative criteria. Apart from the didactic element latent in their "shock" therapy, the Cynic call to virtue was basically devoid of positive content, as primitive naturalism and a mocking antinomianism did not go far in providing a constructive guide to moral conduct and eudaimonia.6 From the new philosophical directions he was to chart, we can see that Zeno's principal aim was to overcome the untenable Cynic antithesis between "nature" and "convention," but to do so-and here was the challenge-without jeopardizing Cynic ideals of complete self-sufficiency and independence.

Zeno's reforming enterprise appears to have opened with an expansive reconceptualization of the nature of physis, or Nature—a turn to metaphysics that would yield an ethical axiology that succeeded in moderating Cynic extremism while still safeguarding the individual from all "external" disturbances. In regarding as "natural" whatever contravened the "conventional," the Cynics had operated with an essentially unreflective, negating conception of physis. Against the rich legacy of metaphysical speculation and science that had been inaugurated by the pre-Sokratics, this viewpoint was indeed primitive; given Zeno's extensive philosophical training, it is not at all surprising that he should have abandoned it. Despite the many important differences in the cosmological systems of earlier physikoi such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, one common feature was their adaptive transferal of traditional religious predicates to the realm of Nature, itself conceived as a unified and ordered totality governed by immanent yet "divine" powers or forces. The Apeiron of Anaximander, Heraclitus' Divine Logos, the Love and Strife of Empedocles, Anaxagoras'

Nous, or Mind: these were singular expressions of a shared quest for a naturalistic theology. In returning to this philosophical heritage (and not Mesopotamian mythology or the Hebrew scriptures!), Zeno significantly altered and upgraded the role of metaphysics for ethical inquiry. The search for a naturalistic human good, for *eudaimonia*, was henceforth to be conducted with reference to a universal cosmic Nature, the ordering principle of all the particular entities encompassed therein. The Stoic telos of "living consistently with *physis*" thus presupposes an awareness of the interdependence of self and universe—a fundamental and decisive shift from the traditional citizen-Polis axis.

In their developed philosophy of Nature, the Stoics postulated a monistic pantheism in which God and world were identified as forming a unitary continuum: God as the "active" principle extending throughout the whole as "creative fire" or "thermal pneuma," rationally fashioning each existing thing; matter as the "passive" substance through which the Logos that is God immanently operates.8 The cosmos is divine, rational, and animate owing to the pneumatic penetration of the whole by God, who is also in some sense the psychê of the universe (the ruling or hegemonic part of which is localized in the heavenly aether or, according to Zeno's successor Cleanthes, the sun). Because this orientation was less inductive science and more religious metaphysics, the Stoics troubled little over terminological precision, poetically employing God, Logos, Mind, Destiny, Zeus, Nature, and other labels as equivalents for the same pantheistic principle. What was of overriding moment was recognition that the universe is a rationally organized complex, providentially arranged by a Divine power with whom human beings enjoy privileged kinship owing to their possession of reason, itself said to be consubstantial with the Divine Logos as part to whole.9 Though this cosmological pantheism would embroil the Stoics in difficult if not intractable problems of theodicy and determinism (discussed below), it did enable them to ground their ethics in a comprehensive ontology, and so provide for a fundamental redefinition of personal identity and meaning in reference to a divine and universal order. 10 Here, in short, was a turn to the cosmic at a time when the civic no longer framed the ambit of meaning and purpose. As we shall see, many of the more inspirational aspects of Stoicism were rooted in the micro-macrocosmic parallels that they enunciated with an almost prophetic fervor.

The interdependence of ethics and metaphysics in the Stoic system gave new meaning to the old principle that "nature is normative," for the "natural" is now redefined with reference to a cosmic totality. The Stoic telos of "living consistently with physis" thus enjoined a twofold but interrelated homologia, 'consistency', both with human nature and with an all-embracing cosmic order:11

For our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole. And therefore the telos is living in accordance with nature, which is in fact the life in accordance with both our own nature and that of the whole, refraining from every action forbidden by the universal law (ho nomos ho koinos), which indeed is the right reason (orthos logos) that pervades all things and is identical with Zeus, the leader who governs all that is. And this very relation constitutes the virtue of the eudaimôn man and is the smooth-flowing life, when all actions promote harmony (symphônia) between the spirit within each individual and the purpose of the one who orders the whole.

The true meaning of virtue and vice, good and evil, must therefore be defined in accordance with this micro-macro framework: proper conduct entails *homologia*, or 'conformity', with the pattern of the rationally ordered whole; improper conduct entails nonconformity.

A central thesis of Stoic ethics, first propounded by Zeno, is that a life in conformity with Nature is at once a virtuous life, "since physis leads us to aretê."12 This is said to occur developmentally, as Nature constitutes the newly born and young to instinctively pursue self-preservation—the socalled 'first impulse' (prôtê hormê) that leads one to repel what is harmful and accede to what is oikeion, or 'akin'. Only later, with adolescence, does human rationality or logos come into play, "supervening as a craftsman to guide impulse."13 The fully human life is therefore a life "in accordance with reason," and since human nature has been distinctively endowed with rationality, it is also a life "in accordance with physis." For the vast majority of human beings, however, the attainment of full rationality is "perverted" by deleterious environmental factors, typically in the form of corrupting interpersonal associations and the pursuit of deceptive or false externals.¹⁴ As a consequence of such perversions, the vast majority of human beings fail to live consistently either with their own nature or with the universal cosmic nature, and therefore fail to attain virtue and true eudaimonia.

The Stoics thus broaden the notion of *physis* to encompass a providentially ordered cosmos while still retaining the basic Sokratic equation of virtue, reason, and well-being. They proceeded to modify the content of those inherited terms, however, in such a manner as to yield a radically distinct axiology. The traditional tripartite schema of things "good, bad, and intermediate" is adopted, with the latter renamed as 'indifferent' (*ta adiaphora*), but the elements encompassed by these categories are rearranged according to principles that offer a partial synthesis of Peripatetic and Cynic positions.¹⁵

Aristotle's penchant for fusing conservative common sense with philosophical reason is nowhere more clearly on display than in his axiology, which assigns considerable intrinsic and instrumental value to goods of

the body and to externals such as wealth and power, though both categories remain subordinate to excellences of the psychê. In marked contrast, the gainsaying Cynics jettisoned all that was extraneous to the soul and regarded virtue the only true and consequential good, vice the only true and consequential evil. In social as well as biological terms, the Peripatetic evaluation is obviously more realistic, being existentially congruent with the empirical manifold of actual human experience. Unfortunately, pragmatic realism in this regard carries with it the disadvantage of exposing the individual to the vicissitudes of Tychê, as desiderata such as health, beauty, power, riches, and the like are not entirely within the agent's control. Cynicism overcomes that problem, but only at the prohibitive cost of antinomian independence and an ascetic extremism that denies the full range of human needs and capacities. In the turbulent Hellenistic Age, a promise of unassailable self-sufficiency was not to be surrendered lightly, and given Zeno's long association with Krates, it stands to reason that he himself was not inclined to do so.

The ethical axiology advanced by Zeno and his followers accordingly reproduced at its core the Cynic inventory of things good, bad, and indifferent: under ta agatha were enrolled the four cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage, along with all that is or partakes of virtue; under ta kaka, thoughtlessness, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, and all that is or partakes of vice; and under ta adiaphora, life, death, honor, dishonor, pain, pleasure, wealth, poverty, sickness, health, and all things similar to these. As to why so many seemingly natural goods were to be regarded as "indifferents," the Stoics explained concisely: "that which can be used both for good and for bad is not itself a good"; and since strength, beauty, wealth, power, etc., can all be used for virtuous as well as vicious ends, they are ipso facto ethically indifferent. 17

Having thus secured the unrivaled independence and self-sufficiency that is afforded by adherence to the Cynic axiology, Zeno proceeded to effect his accommodation with conventional standards. Relative values are now reintroduced within the category of the indifferent, creating subdivisions of 'things preferred' or 'promoted' (ta proêgmena), and 'things rejected' or 'demoted' (ta apoproêgmena). Included among the "preferred indifferents" are all those things that are naturally oikeion, or 'akin', to human beings, and which can contribute to the "consistent life" when used properly, such as health, strength, material resources, and the like. In contrast, the "rejected" or "demoted indifferents" include all those things naturally allotrion, or 'alien', and which therefore do not contribute to the "consistent life," such as disease, weakness, and poverty. Thus while virtue is the only absolute and intrinsic good, vice

the only absolute and intrinsic evil, and as such the sole respective bases of eudaimonia and kakodaimonia, the Stoics recognize that within the wide range of things morally indifferent, some are kata physin, 'in accordance with nature', and therefore worthy of selection in the course of a "smooth-flowing life," while others are para physin and therefore unworthy of selection. Indeed, virtue and vice are characterized as dispositional states of the psychê that are exercised in the selection and avoidance of things that are morally indifferent, but of relative value in living conformably with human nature. The existential significance of this position, about which more will be said below, is that the actual attainment or avoidance of "preferred" and "rejected indifferents" does not affect the well-being of the Stoic, since it is the rational disposition or intentionality of his psychê—and not the practical results issuing from it—that alone matters. With this radical internalization of morality and eudaimonia, the individual is fully shielded from the external world, which he fearlessly approaches in a frame of mind that is psychologically prepared to countenance either worldly success or misfortune, both of which will rate as "indifferent" to one whose life is in harmony with the cosmic totality and who recognizes the providential rationality of all that transpires.

An additional bridge to conventional standards was provided by Zeno's notion of the 'appropriate act' (to kathêkon), defined as "an action that in itself is adapted or akin (oikeion) to the arrangements of nature." As such, appropriate actions possess relative value since they contribute to living consistently with nature; they are to be considered morally 'correct actions' (katorthômata), however, only if the agent's intentionality is virtuous; e.g., if a deposit is returned because the agent understands what justice is and desires it for itself rather than out of fear of punishment. With this distinction the Stoics were able to regard behavioral conformity with most traditional rules and norms as natural and akin—honoring parents, care for one's native land, assisting friends—and therefore worthy of accomplishment and of value in moral progress, while still insisting that the mark of virtue is a patterned and conscious conformity with whatever is enjoined by the universal Logos.

Thus armed with the notions of "preferred indifferents" and "appropriate actions," the Stoic could dispense with the Cynic's garb of threadbare cloak and knapsack, and more importantly his antinomian primitivism, and by so doing was able to reenter the mainstream of civilized existence. Herein lies one of the keys to Stoicism's remarkable popularity during the Hellenistic period, for where the Cynics found security and well-being in renouncing social conventions, and the Epicureans in apolitical withdrawal, the Stoics simply required an axiological revision, a change not so much in everyday routines and pursuits but in the cognitive

estimation of good and evil, virtue and vice. Inwardly detached from the consequences of all external acts and events—for everything, even misfortune, has rational purpose in the great cosmic drama—the Stoic remains ever free since he alone is master of his own *psychê*, his emotions and desires.

Simple in theory perhaps, but challenging in practice; and since the principal avenues by which the external world gains entry and intrudes upon the self are paved by desire, feeling, and judgment, it follows that these psychological processes must be ordered properly if eudaimonia is to be secured. That overall state of control the Stoics identified as virtue: "a fixed disposition of the psychê that renders the whole of life consistent," which is another way of saying that virtue is "reason itself, consistent, certain, unwavering."21 As for the content of arete and kakia, the Stoics retained the Sokratic formula that equated virtue with knowledge and well-being, vice with ignorance and wretchedness. Each of the primary moral excellences is thus defined in epistemic terms: practical wisdom, phronêsis, is the knowledge of good and evil, or of things to do and not to do (a comprehensive definition that made phronesis the fundamental virtue); courage, andreia, is knowledge of what is and is not terrible, or of things to endure and not to endure; temperance, sôphrosunê, is the knowledge of things to be chosen and avoided; and justice, dikaiosunê, is the knowledge of allocating things in accordance with the worth of object and recipient.²² The corresponding vices are analogously defined as forms of ignorance.

At this point, however, the Stoics initiate a fundamental break with the Academic and Peripatetic traditions by introducing a radically new psychology. In place of the prevailing model of an internally segmented psychê, with its rational, appetitive, and spirited "parts" in perpetual tension or open conflict, the Stoics postulate a uniformly controlled but polydynamic psychê, unriven by any opposition between rational and irrational components.²³ This rejection of the "divided self" notion carried far-reaching implications, inasmuch as the denial of an independent and separate organic source responsible for 'passions' and 'emotions' (ta pathê) necessarily alters the conceived relations between these phenomena and reason, and hence the prospective modalities by which such "disturbances" might be removed or controlled. The positing of a unified, body-permeating, pneumatic psychê, with its diverse functions or capacitations ities governed by the so-called hêgemonikon, or 'ruling faculty', centered in the heart, entails that the passions are in some sense psychosomatic reactions dependent upon processes of ratiocination. Zeno characterized this relation by defining ta pathê as "violent flutterings" or "morbid disturbances" of the psychê occasioned by false axiological judgments. This position was later modified by Chrysippus, who held that faulty appraisals are intrinsic to such affective phenomena, as pathê like anger, fear, and desire are not simply visceral feelings, but complexes of feeling and judgment in which reason itself—the operation of the controlling hêgemonikon—is in error (as distinct from being "overcome" by irrational emotive forces emanating from other parts of the soul or body). The pathos fear, for example, arises whenever an agent's sensory apparatus receives the stimulus of a 'presentation' (phantasia) that the mind assents to or judges as entailing the probability of some form of harmful consequence, a judgment that at once engenders a hormê, or 'impulse' to act accordingly. Every such "passion," therefore, being "reason perverse and intemperate," must be suppressed, and our dispositions towards particular pathê—a proneness to anger, for example, or cowardice—fully extirpated if the psychê is to function properly, i.e., in conformity with our rational nature and the rational order of the cosmic whole.

Hence the much-maligned and misunderstood Stoic ideal of apatheia, the 'absence of passions' that gave to "stoical" its lexical currency of emotional impassivity and detached imperturbability. Why this ideal was disparaged will be considered below, but at this point a proper understanding of the position requires close attention to Stoic terminology and classification. The "passions" are to be extirpated not because they are emotions per se, but because, by Stoic definition, they are morbid disturbances of the psychê, "excessive impulses" manifesting perverse ratiocination by the ruling hêgemonikon.25 All such errors in judgment are due to false axiological appraisals, i.e., an overestimation of things that are intrinsically adiaphora, 'indifferent', as in the case of fearing bodily injury when pain (even life itself!) is an indifferent; or in cravings for wealth and power even though, as "externals," these are likewise morally indifferent. In sum, we attain apatheia in the Stoic sense when—as a consequence of forming a stable and true understanding of what is good (virtue), bad (vice), and indifferent (everything else)—we act in the world in such a way as to no longer value false objectives. So disposed, one removes all grounds for fear, grief, desire, and pleasure (the primary "passions"), as well as their numerous derivative pathê, such as hesitancy, malice, anger, shame, pity, sexual lust, and so on. Though such an unyielding figure will indeed appear callous and distant—for him even the loss of spouse or child is a providentially determined "indifferent" that is to be accepted without grief or recrimination—the Stoics did not advocate complete insensitivity. It is only the violent perturbations of the pathê that are to be eradicated, not the various eupatheiai, or 'good emotions', which constitute rationally controlled feelings that attend and supervene on actions in accordance with nature. Thus in place of the excessive impulse of desire,

the Stoics advocated "purpose" or "well-reasoned appetency," i.e., an orientation towards virtue and preferred indifferents; in place of fear, they advocated "caution" or "well-reasoned avoidance," i.e., an aversion to vice and relegated indifferents; and in place of pleasure, they advocated "joy" or "well-reasoned elation," i.e., an appreciation of appropriate and virtuous conduct.²⁶ Still austere and detached, the *eupathês* Stoic is at least recognizably human.

Up to this point we have been emphasizing the individualistic, "self-hardening" aspects of Stoicism: an axiology that renders individuals immune from outward circumstance and the apathetic ideal that severs all emotive ties of dependency. One of the more remarkable features of this philosophy, however, was the peculiar synthesis that it sought to achieve between a principled individualism and the ties of sociality. That ambition, more successful on a practical than on a theoretical level, was an evolving one and attained full universalistic significance only in the Roman period. 27 As we have already observed, however, Zeno's break with Cynicism was in large part prompted by his opposition to its sharp nature-convention polarity. From its very inception, Stoicism was more attentive to the social dimension than either the antinomian Cynics or the secessionist Epicureans, though this concern would not entail any revival of previous perspectives, customary or intellectual. In pointed contrast to Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics did not exalt a philosophically refined Polis-citizen nexus as the basis for the good or virtuous life, an option precluded by an axiology that, by definition, rendered all institutional arrangements morally indifferent and inconsequential. The Stoic starting point is accordingly less parochial, less concrete historically: given that human beings are naturally constituted to live in collectivities, it follows that ethics must be attuned to the imperatives of social life. That recognition would enable Stoic moralists to avoid the antisocial excesses of other postcivic philosophies, but it remained essentially "abstract" and hence problematic in specification of the communal and in the demarcation of its moral claims. Indeed, in the absence of an established institutional basis upon which to ground an ethos of communal obligation—which the abandoned Polis-citizen bond had traditionally provided—all efforts by the Stoics to harmonize the social and the self-regarding strains in their philosophy would founder in discordance.

The Stoics have often been credited with espousing a universalistic ethos, one centered on the principle of the "unity" or "brotherhood of mankind" and its related notion of the oikoumenê, or 'inhabited world', as a common inheritance in which the universal norms of divine physis, "Natural Law," are to apply. But though that perspective is clearly artic-

ulated in our sources from the Roman period (Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius), there is no compelling evidence for ascribing the "brotherhood" ideal to members of the Old Stoa. On the contrary, most of the surviving source materials suggest that the early Stoics were far more interested in the distinction between the wise and virtuous few and the ignorant and vicious many than with any possible "unity" or "fellowship" based on humanity's shared kinship with the Divine Logos. The universalistic social elements implicit or latent within the Stoic system, in other words, were for the most part made explicit only with the Middle and Late Stoa, in conjunction with Rome's expanding suzerainty over the Mediterranean world.²⁸

Just how far removed the founder himself was from any notion of "universal brotherhood" may be seen in the preserved fragments of his Politeia, or 'Republic', a work said to have been written "on the Dog's tail," i.e., when Zeno was still closely associated with the Cynics. 29 Offering both a radical critique of contemporary society and a prescription for the ideal communal life, Zeno's Politeia is based on the exclusionary principle that "only the spoudaioi (the 'good' or 'virtuous') are citizens, friends, kindred, and free," whereas all those who are not virtuous, the phauloi, or 'wretched', are necessarily "hateful, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another."30 Membership in the ideal community is accordingly restricted to the spoudaioi, who alone are capable of true citizenship and civic concord. In keeping with the Cynic-Stoic opposition or indifference to conventions and externals, Zeno removes from his ideal many standard Polis institutions and their familiar trappings, banishing such things as lawcourts (in a community of the virtuous, no wrongdoings will be committed), gymnasia (physical training is unnecessary for moral excellence and without function in the absence of warfare), the use of currency (virtuous friends will share all things in common), and temples and religious statuary (unnecessary for belief, unworthy of the gods, and fashioned by vulgar banausoi whose products are "without value").31 A more notorious proposal enjoined abolition of the traditional family unit and its replacement by a Cynic-style "community of women," in which complete freedom of intercourse is to be allowed for purposes of promoting "paternal affection for all children alike and the cessation of jealousies arising from adultery."32 Standardized unisex clothing is advocated as a counter to the false valuation of fashionable luxury, its styling to leave no part of the body entirely covered, presumably as a means of facilitating natural sexual attractiveness. Although Zeno's indebtedness to the cultural primitivism of the Cynics is on display in these radical proposals (doxographers tended to be disproportionately interested in the scandalous and the unusual), the key philosophical point is that Zeno composed this ideal for

the spoudaioi alone, as a way of illustrating his principle that moral virtue—irrespective of social and political arrangements—is sufficient to ensure correct action and well-being. No such koinônia is possible for the perverted phauloi, whose passion-ridden pursuit of false values necessarily destroys the basis for any true fellowship. Though later Stoics would come to disown the more shocking features of Zeno's "Republic," for members of the Old Stoa these positions remained authoritative, as confirmed by the adherence of both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, Zeno's two successors, to the wise-ignorant, spoudaioi-phauloi dichotomy.

The foregoing leads directly to the controversial subject of Stoic cosmopolitanism. What needs to be stressed from the outset is the apolitical content of this term, for the true "Stoic Republic" does not represent a concrete legal-political community, but an ethical-religious "association" of the wise based on their kinship with each other and their shared understanding of the Divine Logos. Zeno's Politeia, in other words, offers more than a utopian description of the ideal community of the virtuous; it also represents in metaphorical or symbolic form the actual relationship of wise and virtuous individuals to their own societies, in that for them, lawcourts, gymnasia, temples, property, political rights and the like are all matters of indifference in comparison with the overriding concern of achieving homologia, or 'consistency', with their own rational nature and the cosmic order. Conventional politics is philosophically transcended, for "strictly speaking," the only true Polis is that of the cosmos or "the whole," which has as its sovereign constitution "the right reason of Nature."33 A similar universalistic conception is offered for Law, Nomos, which is defined as the "will" of Zeus, the "plan" of Nature, "exhortative of things that must be done and dissuasive of things that must not be done."34 Hence the Stoic paradox that only the spoudaioi are true citizens, just, and law-abiding, for they alone are members of the Cosmopolis and adhere to the Nomos of Divine Nature; whereas the phauloi are all exiles, unjust, and lawless, since their "citizenship" is limited to those "earthly poleis" the laws and constitutions of which the Stoics hold are in error (hamartêma), inconsistent with the orthos logos of Zeus-Nature,35

As with the other aspects of their ethical philosophy, however, the Stoics once again manage to effect a pragmatic compromise with existing circumstances. The selfsame Stoic whose life is oriented towards serving the Divine Logos is also enjoined to participate in political life, "if nothing hinders," and to contribute so far as he is able "to the restraining of vice and the promotion of virtue." Such conduct is said to be "preferred" on the grounds that human beings are "communal by nature." As with other "preferred indifferents," however, the Stoic is not person-

ally committed to the consequences of participation: should vice continue to flourish in the public realm despite his best efforts, this will in no way diminish his own self-sufficient virtue and well-being, which depends solely on intentionality or disposition. The appeal of such an orientation is immediately compelling, for while allowing the Stoic to engage selectively in public life, it shields one's psychê from whatever failures might arise in practice. It should accordingly come as no surprise to learn that a number of early Stoics accepted invitations to attend at various royal courts, where they served as table companions, educators of the young, and in some instances as advisors and administrators.³⁸ Zeno himself was repeatedly implored by the Macedonian king Antigonus Gonatas to join the court at Pella, but claiming old age and other responsibilities, he declined and sent in his stead two younger disciples. One of these, Persaeus of Citium, not only tutored Gonatas' son, but advised the king on foreign policy matters, and eventually assumed command of the Macedonian garrison that had been imposed on Korinth as a "fetter" to restrain Hellenic aspirations for autonomy. Another of Zeno's disciples, Sphaerus of Bosporus, served as both counsellor and administrator for the Spartan king Kleomenes, who sought to restore the lost glories of his polis by reestablishing the ancestral constitution of Lycurgus, based upon equitable land redistribution and the old virtues of simplicity, endurance, and martial discipline. Further instances of active involvement can be documented for other Stoics as well, but all told these do not add up to any obvious political program or persuasion. From the fact that none of the three leaders of the Old Stoa-Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus-ever accepted court positions and consistently refrained from all political activity themselves, one can reasonably conclude that ta politika was not ranked highly in the scale of "preferred indifferents." Indeed, given their negative assessments of the phauloi and their devaluation of conventional politics, Chrysippus' explanation for why he himself abstained undoubtedly speaks for most of the other early Stoics as well: "If a worthless man participates in political affairs, he will be disagreeable to the gods; if a useful man, to the citizens."39 Under such circumstances, it is surely better that one personally honor and serve the true politeia—that of the divine cosmos—by establishing a life-pattern that is in agreement with the 'purpose of Nature' (to boulêma tês physeôs).40

The manner and degree to which ethics and metaphysics are interdependent within the Stoic system constitutes one of the distinctive features of this philosophy, the source of its comprehensive range and internal coherence, but also of its more dubious existential postulates. A closer examination of the connecting links here should thus help clarify the social

psychological predilections that were operative in the genesis of Stoicism's uniquely accommodative yet disciplined creed.

The Stoic enterprise of rendering individuals immune from the external course of events has as its foundation a quasi-religious premise that the entire cosmos is a rationally and providentially arranged totality. No harm can befall the Stoic precisely because he has discerned the Logos and conscientiously assents to live in agreement with the dispensations of Nature-God, whatever they may bring him personally: riches or poverty, health or disease, freedom or slavery, life or death. Without that fortify ing faith and moral idealism, the strength of will or character necessary to endure Stoic forms of "self-hardening" would surely also be lacking, seeing that their principal technique for dealing with the painful blows of tragedy and misfortune does not entail removal of the objective sources of suffering, but rather an axiological reinterpretation of the harmful as both personally indifferent and cosmically purposeful. That subjective transformation is credible only if one accepts the speculative micromacrocosmic metaphysics and accedes to the subordination of the self within the grand scheme of universal providence.

While offering individuals a comprehensive frame of meaning and guidance, the Stoic integration of human action within the divine order of Nature also raised serious intellectual difficulties. Most pressing for ancient critics were those related to preserving moral responsibility within a system of universal determinism, and of reconciling the existence of evil and suffering with a beneficent Providence. In accordance with their pantheistic monism, which identified God as the Logos that providentially governs and orders the whole as an immanent, all-pervading pneumatic power, the Stoics were logically inclined towards a universal determinism. As Chrysippus was to express it: "No particular thing, not even the slightest, can have come about otherwise than in accordance with the Universal Nature and its Reason."41 The operation of the Divine Logos in or through Nature creates a unified world system wherein "all things happen according to Destiny," which in addition to being commensurate with God, Logos, and Providence, is also specifically definable as "a certain natural arrangement of all things, following upon each other and moving in succession from eternity, their entwinement such as to be unalterable."42 Since human existence is an integral part of the cosmic whole, it follows that our agency too falls within this universal causal nexus, a situation that places severe strains on any ethic of moral responsibility particularly so for the Stoics, inasmuch as they adhered to the strongest possible form of determinism, that of "Eternal Recurrence," whereby each world cycle was to be endlessly repeated in exact detail, our lives included.⁴³ Thus bound within an unbreakable chain of causality, how can agents be held accountable for their conduct? Does not the notion of a recurrent, cyclically closed determinism destroy the very meaning of virtue and vice, seeing that all action—including the formation of our own moral characters—unfolds in accordance with the *Logos* that is Destiny?

The Stoic response—not entirely clear or consistent—was based on the unique and privileged position of human beings within the cosmos: as creatures of reason, our souls are fragments of and consubstantial with the Divine Logos. Destiny as it applies to the human sphere thus operates in conjunction with the rational nature of human beings, a dual form of causality-external and internal-which Chrysippus proceeded to illustrate with his famous example of the cylinder, the rolling motion of which requires both the external stimulus of a push and the internal or constitutive cause of the cylinder's round shape.44 In the case of human action, external causes take the form of various "presentations" or stimuli that impinge on our sensory apparatus, whereas the internal cause rests with the human capacity to cognitively judge or assent to the stimulus and therein occasion corresponding impulses to act. Analogous to the shape of the cylinder is the state or disposition of the psychê, which if virtuous will respond to stimuli in the appropriate manner, if vicious, inappropriately. This renders actions "attributable" to human agents, but since the Stoics elsewhere stress that the disposition of the psychê-character formation—is itself the product of heredity and upbringing, both of which are embedded within the universal causal nexus, it must be conceded that this response does not resolve the conundrum of determinism and personal freedom. Chrysippus' notion of "co-determined causality," external and internal, makes the individual actively integral to the process and hence accountable in those terms, but in denying the possibility that the agent could have acted otherwise, the door remains open to amoral fatalism. 45 As one clever wit was to observe, whereas the atomic determinism of Democritus renders the individual a slave to necessity, the Chrysippean position makes him hêmidoulos, a 'half slave'.46

Moral responsibility within Stoicism thus seems to be curiously restricted to the fact that human beings—owing to their rational constitution—are constrained to consciously assent to what is providentially fated to happen in any event, a necessary "cooperation" between human participants and the cosmic order that Cleanthes famously characterized as follows: "Destiny leads the willing, but the unwilling are dragged along." Destiny leads the willing, but the unwilling are dragged along. So framed, Stoic moral freedom, eleutheria, takes on a peculiar meaning: everything transpires according to necessity, but he who recognizes the necessary as necessary registers his agreement or consistency with the Divine order, thereby elevating necessity to the sphere of virtuous reason. Critics, needless to say, regarded this as a specious redefinition, for

the regress problem—i.e., what causes that recognition of necessity, the breakthrough to virtue?—remains, as in all deterministic systems, conspicuously unresolved.

Equally unsuccessful in dispelling the objections of rival philosophers was the Stoic attempt to reconcile their belief in Divine Providence with the manifest presence of evil and suffering in the world. Cleanthes provided the first response to this difficulty in his Hymn to Zeus, where he suggests that the actions of the vicious somehow fall outside God's providential design: "No deed on earth is done apart from thee, O God, nor throughout the divine heavenly firmament nor in the sea, save whatever evil men in their own folly accomplish."48 Cleanthes immediately stresses that even these transgressions of independent origin are fitted into the cosmic plan by God, but quite clearly this was a theodicy that could be purchased only at the cost of bartering in exchange the immanent omnipresence of the Logos and the corresponding notion of universal determinism. As that price would have reduced the entire Stoic system to intellectual bankruptcy, Chrysippus duly reiterated Zeno's equation of Destiny with Providence and sought an intrinsic rationale for evil and misfortune. His basic line of defense was to argue that particular evils are functional for greater ends and that imperfections among the parts subserve perfection of the whole.49 Horrific wars or plagues, for example, serve to relieve surplus populations, while bedbugs bite to prevent oversleeping—crude rationalizations that left critics wondering why a beneficent Providence would have allowed such problems to arise in the first place. Somewhat more ingeniously, Chrysippus argued that since contraries presuppose each other, the good could not possibly exist without evil, justice without injustice, bravery without cowardice, and so on. This too failed to satisfy, as critics questioned why the world needed to be filled with all manner of evil, rather than a few negative exemplars. As final confirmation of Chrysippus' grave difficulties with this issue, one need only consider his suggestion that "evil spirits" are possibly to blame for the world's afflic tions, a thought consistent with popular superstition to be sure, but obviously of no compelling intellectual value. In the end the Stoics were thus driven to seek refuge behind their axiology, which insisted that vice alone is truly evil, while everything conventionally so regarded—famine, disease, death, poverty, etc., -is in actuality only "indifferent." By definitional fiat, the scale of evil is greatly reduced and the virtuous are spared, but even here an inconsistency remains: if the world is thus shown to be providentially ordered, how can the Stoics simultaneously maintain that the overwhelming majority of humankind, the phauloi, are "all mad, ignorant, impious, and lawless, living at the height of misfortune and utter unhappiness?"50

Though our review of early Stoicism has been selective (in particular, we have neglected important contributions to logic, linguistics, and epistemology), enough has been said about the essential principles of Stoic ethics and metaphysics to enable us to undertake our main objective, that of specifying the existential linkages between this mode of discourse and the wider social context from which it emerged.

In charting the historical development of Greek philosophical ethics, we have repeatedly commented upon the centrality of the Polis-citizen normative tradition: initially as an integrative orienting basis, but eventually as an encumbrance to be renounced for the sake of individual wellbeing. The attempt by Sokrates to overcome Sophistic relativism took as its point of departure the interdependence of psychê and polis, a lead that would culminate in the comprehensive civic-based systems of Plato and Aristotle. In the apolitical hedonism of Aristippus and the ascetic self-sufficiency of Antisthenes we witnessed the first signs in the sage's devaluation of the Polis-citizen heritage—an individualistic turn presently followed by Cynic antinomianism and the Epicurean strategy of secession from the dangers and burdens of public life. In Stoicism, one finds neither a commitment to the classical Polis-citizen nexus nor, alternatively, a deliberate negation (save perhaps for a few residual elements inherited from the Cynics). The sociological basis for Stoic particularism in this regard is to be located in the geographically peripheral and culturally interstitial origins of the creators and early proponents of this homologously "hybrid" philosophy. Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes of Assos, Persaeus of Citium, Herillus of Carthage, Sphaerus of Bosporus, Chrysippus of Soli: these were intellectuals whose formative life experiences were unconnected with any of the civic traditions celebrated in poleis of the Greek heartland, but who emerged in "Hellenized" enclaves, a few from colonial frontiers, a majority from the Hellenistic East, where a cultural cosmopolitanism had long flourished alongside diverse patterns of political absolutism. Living in an age when kings and vast territorial empires dominated the political and cultural landscapes, the Stoics-themselves not heirs to the glorious histories of Athens or Thebes, Sparta or Argoshad no personal experience of the classical bonding of citizen to Polis and were accordingly freed from the necessity of relating their discourse to that traditional framework, either affirmatively or in opposition.

That a "Hellenistic reality" served as the experiential basis for Stoic social philosophy can best be demonstrated by brief consideration of Stoic conceptions of both Polis and citizen. We have already noted how the Stoics insisted that the only true Polis is that of the cosmos or heaven, the only true politeia that which embodies the Logos of Nature; all existing or "earthly" poleis and constitutions, in contrast, are dismissed as

vice ridden and error bound. The only true citizens, correspondingly, are the wise or spoudaioi who personally adhere to the Natural Law of the Cosmopolis, whereas the phauloi, i.e., conventional citizens, are all "exiles, enemies, unjust, and lawless." Where morality transcends social reality in such abstract fashion, it is obvious that the traditional normative function of politics can retain no significant value. Moreover, even when the Stoics descend from their lofty cosmopolitanism and address mundane political matters, in accordance with their distinction between "preferred" and "demoted indifferents," they do not relate their ethical injunctions to the classical Polis-citizen nexus, but to the circumscribed Hellenistic reality of the city as residential and administrative center, and the citizen as municipally minded urbanite. In characterizing the conventional Polis as simply "a multitude of men inhabiting the same place under the administration of law," or as "a dwelling contrivance, fleeing to which it is possible to give and receive justice," the Stoics provide accurate descriptions of urban conglomerates such as Alexandria, Antioch, and the other colonial cities of the Hellenistic Near East, but a substantively pale rendering of the old "political guilds" of Athens, Thebes, and the other classical city-states.⁵¹ Prior to their eclipse by the forces of imperial patrimonialism, these poleis had constituted true associational communes, founded upon confraternalism in religious cult and kinship descent, citizen militias and the practice of self-governance; within each the status of citizenship had provided the integrative axis for a normative ethos that impressed upon each member the necessity and virtue of sundry communal obligations that were central not only to the preservation of the civic koinônia, but to notions of personal fulfillment and positive selfimage as well. The fact that these now-faded ideals found neither support nor opposition within the Old Stoa only confirms that the march of social change—coupled with attending criticism by the Cyrenaics, Cynics, and Epicureans—had exposed their irrelevance for continuing ethical discourse. By the close of the fourth century, philosophical attention and popular concerns had alike shifted ground, away from the Polis-citizen bond and toward problems of individual well-being in a world where the scale and nature of war and politics had bypassed both Polis and citizen, effectively reducing the one to a "city," the other to a "civilian."

In preceding chapters it has been shown that as traditional civic modalities for the manifestation of excellence and self-worth were compromised by the processes of demilitarization and depoliticization, "individualism" gained increasing favor, both in the form of public disengagement, as apragmosunê and its attending cultivation of personal pleasures in eros, luxury, and aesthetics, and as a theoretically conscious devaluation of the communal, as with the Cyrenaics, Cynics, and Epi-

cureans. Stoic individualism was less categorical: its axiology permitted the option of public or political participation—indeed, this ranked as a "preferred indifferent" if circumstances allowed—while the individualistic objective of complete inward independence from all that transpires outside the self remained primary. The achievement of that goal was predicated upon a comprehensive interiorization of moral life, which limited aretê and eudaimonia to a rational disposition of the psychê and which raised intentionality to the sole criterion of virtue and vice. By thus overturning the performance-oriented, "shame-culture" standards of the traditional ethos and its emphasis on the material and honorific rewards of virtue, Stoicism assured, in principle, the inviolability and self-sufficiency of the individual, which is sustainable only on the basis of a radical anticonsequentialism. The insulation of self thereby achieved, however, posed serious problems for the accommodation of the social that the Stoics-in contradistinction to the Cynics and Epicureans-regarded as natural and oikeion, 'akin' or 'proper' for human beings.

This tension between the self-regarding aspects of Stoicism and its recognition that human existence is irreducibly social characterizes many of the core doctrines of the school: e.g., the insistence that good and bad are absolutes permitting of no degrees, coupled with a readmission of "preferred" and "demoted indifferents"; the contention that there are no intermediate states between virtue and vice, coupled with acknowledgment that nonvirtuous but "appropriate actions" have value; the transcendental cosmopolitanism, coupled with recommendations to engage in temporal political affairs. If critics were wrong to assail all this as casuistry, as mere sophistical wordplay, one must concede that the attempt to preserve the self-sufficiency of virtue while still enjoining active social participation entailed a delicate balancing act, one that was not free from a few spills. This difficulty is perhaps most sharply crystallized in the paradoxical Stoic thesis that 'all sins are equal' (isa panta ta hamartêmata), according to which it is maintained that the malicious killing of an animal, for example, constitutes no greater error or sin than the murdering of one's own parents or spouse. 52 To be sure, the Stoics softened the practical implications of this principle by adding that while vices or sins are equal, punishments are to be differentially applied on the basis of how many virtues and responsibilities are violated (e.g., in patricide the offender slays the man who begat, raised, and educated him, whereas the master who murders a slave is not so extensively obligated and hence commits fewer offenses). But this peculiar qualification notwithstanding, adherence to anticonsequentialism here, the comparative disregard for the social repercussions of vicious action, clearly yields an unacceptable and unworkable principle for living in society. Similarly impractical is

the Stoic insistence that "all those who are not wise are equally vicious." unjust, unreliable, and ignorant," seeing that "the man a cubit from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk 500 fathoms, so neither are they any the less in vice who are approaching virtue than they who are a long way from it."53 As with the "equality of sins" paradox, this denial of shades of virtue and vice can be maintained only if solipsistic standards prevail, i.e., if one regards the individual as a self-contained monad rather than as a contributing member of a human community: societies, after all, can tolerate a modicum of petty vice or dishonesty, but rampant lawlessness or gangsterism are altogether different matters.

The Stoics, in short, do not appear to have worked out a coherent theory of social obligation that could countenance their anticonsequentialist individualism. The one mediating link available was their concept of oikeiôsis, 'endearment' or 'affinity', which was used to specify those things naturally akin or fitting for us as human beings, beginning ontogenetically with our instinctive endearment to ourselves, the so-called prôtê hormê, or 'primary impulse' towards self-preservation. One late source adds that Zeno and his followers used oikeiôsis as the foundation for justice, presumably in the sense that, if unperverted, human beings come to feel a natural endearment to members of their own kind, a derivation apparently of the instinctual love of parents for their offspring.54 Unfortunately, just how this extension arises is never explained or specified, nor do we have any account of how the self-preserving and the social forms of oikeiôsis are to be reconciled. Since ancient critics assailed the Stoics on those very points, one must assume the problem was never adequately resolved, which in principle appears impossible, given that any form of oikeiôsis beyond the self would expose the individual to various emotive ties of dependency and commitment, thereby threatening the core ideal of psychic invulnerability.

No doubt the Stoics were carried to this conundrum by the logical implications of their central ethical premises, and above all by their desire to insulate virtue and well-being from all that lay beyond the power of the individual. A correlation worth noting, however, is that this doctrinal tension within Stoicism between the self-regarding and social orientations mirrors quite strikingly the reality of the Hellenistic experience, wherein the dissolution of the Polis-citizen bond had gravely undermined the once axiomatic identification of private and public interests. In the past, communal solidarity and devotion had been fostered by the corporate bonding of the citizenry through military service and collective selfgovernance; but as these activities were transformed and reduced in scope by the displacement of citizen militias by mercenary professionals and pat-

rimonial armies, and by the suppression of the citizen's political sovereignty by foreign monarchical domination, it followed that a devitalized citizenship could no longer provide the integrative basis for a communally shared interest orientation. With the loss of his ancestral functions in war and politics, the citizen-who in practical terms was now little more than a privileged civilian—was deprived of the institutional supports that had for so long made the identification of self and society a functioning reality within the Polis framework. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, who could still invoke the then fading legacy of civic obligation as a means of harmonizing individual and social interests, the Stoics-living in the aftermath of Alexander's world-transforming conquests—could not regard citizenship as a convincing carrier of either communalism or individual fulfillment. Their qualified intention to reinstate a social commitment to ethics—a position that in the interim had been repudiated by the Cyrenaics, Cynics, and Epicureans—thus foundered against a historical reality that no longer offered a suitable institutional basis for sustaining an ethos of civic responsibility. The gemeinshaft that was the Polis had given way to the gesellshaft of the

There are several other pronounced tensions or obscurities within Stoicism suggestive of existential influence, and when these are read sociologically, the social-psychological motivations and interests involved in the development of the Stoic world view stand exposed in sharper relief. Undoubtedly the most celebrated of these discordant notes is the aforementioned controversy regarding determinism and human agency, a logical impasse rooted in the Stoa's adherence to a metaphysical pantheism that conflated God, Nature, and Destiny. Chrysippus ingeniously attempted to preserve moral responsibility within this determinant world system by positing two forms of causality, internal and external, thereby assigning to human rationality a coordinate role within the infinitely ramified and providential chain of cause and effect. But that position only succeeded in redefining "moral freedom" as a recognition and willing assent to the inevitable order of the universal Logos, a recognition that was in turn bound up in the nexus of eternal recurrence. Why the Stoics found that delimitation acceptable will be considered shortly, but we must first note that the implications for human praxis are not as debilitating as the critics had charged. To the objection that predetermination removes all incentive for deliberate action, since fated future events cannot be altered (the so-called Lazy Argument), the Stoics replied by stressing the interconnectedness of causal sequences. If it is fated that you will recover from an illness, for example, the act of calling in a doctor may be a necessary "condestinate" fact in that causal chain; or again, the act of exhorting others to virtue retains purpose and value, seeing that the education thereby provided might be condestinate with the fated sequence whereby certain individuals achieve moral insight.⁵⁵ More immediately, inasmuch as personal destinies remain subjectively open and unknown to those who must live them (despite their objective determination within the universal causal chain), it follows that the Stoic view neither obviates the need for rational planning and choice, nor fosters a paralysis of the will.

The primary ethical-psychological import of Stoic determinism thus clearly lay elsewhere, i.e., in fortifying the individual against whatever sufferings and misfortunes the external course of events might bring, and in discharging the anger and anxiety that typically accompanies social powerlessness. The former objective is attained in a straightforward manner by regarding all that transpires—and most pointedly those things conventionally deemed injurious or traumatic—as providentially determined in accordance with the Divine Logos, the individual is able to rationalize personal misfortunes as functional within the cosmic whole, thereby transforming that suffering into a sense of service—a technique of adaptation commonly afforded by religious faiths. The other psychological function of Stoic determinism—that of providing relief or compensation for feelings of comparative impotence—must be situated against the backdrop of a shattered Polis-citizen framework and the imposition of patrimonial forms of domination and control. With the citizen's capacity for self-direction circumscribed by the processes of demilitarization and depoliticization, it became increasingly necessary to free the individual from psychic distresses thereby engendered, as evidenced by the lessening of personal commitments to the civic koinônia in the form of apragmosunê, the rising popularity of soteriological mystery cults, and diverse philosophical responses ranging from ascetic antinomianism to a withdrawn and secluded apolitical hedonism. The Stoics had the same "insulating" objective in view, but offered instead a more accommodative "inner transformation," based on a self-regarding axiology that reduced everything outside the psychê to indifference, and a form of providential determinism that absolved the individual from any feelings of failure, guilt, or anxiety that might arise over an inability to influence events and thus objectively control one's own destiny.56 The intellectual and emotional attractions of such a doctrine for those who could no longer chart the courses of history—but who were buffeted by its shifting tides—are plainly evident: by situating the very real experience of powerlessness within a providential fatalism, the individual is not only released from the impossible and ego-threatening task of ordering the future, he is even entitled to assign positive meaning to his homologia, or 'agreement', with Destiny.

The overriding need to gain independence and immunity from the world is also manifest in another well-known controversy within Stoicism, that pertaining to the apparent inconsistency of stressing the normative value of physis while simultaneously professing an axiology that judges the things that accord with nature, ta kata physin, as morally "indifferent." If living in agreement with nature is the telos, asked the critics, why should not ta kata physin rank as "goods" and their opposites as "evils," especially since the Stoics allow that health, strength, beauty, and the like are all by nature oikeion, 'akin' or 'fitting' for human beings, whereas disease, weakness, deformities, and the like are all by nature allotrion, or 'alien'? In maintaining that virtue is wholly constitutive of eudaimonia, the Stoics were of course compelled to deny that wealth or poverty, freedom or slavery, health or disease are in any way contributory to either well-being or wretchedness, conditions that depend solely on the moral disposition of one's psychê. But this categorical stance did not make it clear why some indifferents should be "preferred" and others "demoted" if all are alike noncontributory to virtue and eudaimonia. Such an exclusive ordering also complicated—if it did not totally undermine—the normative role of nature, inasmuch as living in agreement with the Logos of the universal Nature could at times entail willing acceptance of poverty, disease, or some other "demoted indifferent," i.e., the very things toward which our human nature is congenitally opposed.57 In Stoicism, the 'natural' seems to coincide ultimately with whatever transpires, a rationalizing "agreement" with Fate that removes any ethical or existential tension between the actual and the possible.

While seeking adamantine stability, the Stoics thus appear to waver and oscillate, shifting between the Cynic extreme of self-sufficient virtue and the Peripatetic insistence that eudaimonia, as the perfect and "unimpeded" exercise of virtue, requires a modicum of "external goods" for its realization. Tilting towards Cynicism, the Stoics affirm the absolute selfsufficiency of virtue as a dispositional state; tilting towards the Peripatetics, they acknowledge that some things are naturally oikeion, or akin, and hence to be "preferred" in living consistently with nature. That these polar orientations were never satisfactorily reconciled can be attributed to a particular impasse between logic and existential realism within the Stoic system. By insisting that moral goodness and the "preferred" status of various externals constitute two logically distinct and incommensurable scales of value—one absolute, the other relative—the Stoics quite sensibly freed virtue from any dependence upon incidentals such as wealth, power, beauty, and the like—a liberation all the more appropriate as the traditional manifestations of aretê had lost purpose and meaning with the dissolution of the Polis-citizen bond. But in maintaining that virtue alone

is sufficient for eudaimonia, and that health, strength, and all the other "preferred indifferents" contribute nothing to well-being-despite being "in accordance with nature" and oikeion for human beings-the Stoics not only overturned conventional wisdom and standards, but also strained the credibility of their own central principle regarding the normative function of nature. To be sure, the ultimate Stoic solution of invoking providential Destiny to neutralize or transvalue individual misfortune could be applied to show that in subserving the totality, the partial nature also serves itself. But this appeal to the cosmic still leaves unexplained how the equation of the consistent life with the virtuous life can be harmonized with the position that while "preferred indifferents" have value in contributing directly or indirectly to consistent living, they nonetheless do not contribute to virtue or well-being! No doubt the psychological need to guarantee eudaimonia against the vicissitudes of Tyche and to fortify the individual with a faith in his own capacity to attain virtue unaided by "conventional goods" proved too compelling for the Stoics to abandon their impregnable ideal, whatever the partial concession to reality in the form of naturally "preferred" and "demoted indifferents" might otherwise existentially demand.

The absolute harmony with Nature that is virtue belongs only to the sophos, the wise man or sage whose actual existence the Stoics conceded was a rarity, but who nonetheless served as the practical standard and inspiration for their ethics.58 A brief sketch of the qualities lavished upon the Stoic sage should help further clarify the intellectual and emotive appeals of their philosophy. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect in the Stoic portrait of the sophos is its remarkable capacity to preserve the cold and pallid abstractness of his virtue, his indifference to all externals, while yet adorning his existence with all the varied colors drawn from the spectrum of "conventional goods," suitably transvalued in accordance with the Stoic axiology. Thus of the sage it is said that he alone is truly free, for by consciously and willingly following the Divine Logos he does nothing against his will or by constraint; he alone is truly rich, for it is the possession of virtue that yields the greatest profits and self-sufficiency that renders one independent of all needs; he alone is truly king, for the art of proper governance depends upon knowledge of things good and evil and of what should and should not be done, a selfruling capacity that renders him anupeuthunos, or 'unaccountable' to other men; he alone is truly beautiful, since the radiance of his harmonious soul makes all else pale in comparison; he alone is law-abiding and a true citizen, since he belongs to the heavenly cosmopolis and upholds the Divine Nomos; he alone is truly eudaimôn, since all the conditions of genuine well-being are contained in virtue. As a protreptic technique, this rhetorical assimilation of conventional desiderata to the Stoic ideal was undoubtedly inspiring, for in an age of upheaval when many of the traditional modes of want-satisfaction were compromised and uncertain, a doctrine that promised fulfillment on the basis of an inner transformation carried an intuitive and panhuman appeal, especially since the required axiological shift rested solely with the individual: to master one's own psychê was to master the world—while leaving the world as it is!

Listening to these words in the agora brought a bracing comfort to many in their personal lives, but a whole-hearted adoption of Stoicism was obviously reserved for the select few. As Cicero observed, Stoic maxims are better sipped than drained in deep draughts. For once the Stoic paradoxa are subjected to close scrutiny, it becomes clear that the promise of inner plenitude and independence can be purchased only at the cost of a radical devaluation of all outward circumstance: one remains inwardly free, even if reduced to slavery; one remains inwardly rich, even if trapped in grinding poverty; one remains inwardly a king, even if powerless to check the commands of others; one remains inwardly beautiful, even if one's body is horribly disfigured by disease; and one remains inwardly eudaimôn, even if one is subjected to excruciating tortures on the rack. Attitude becomes all, displacing concerns with pragmatic attainment. Although the annals of history present us with the inspiring spectacle of heroic figures cast from such a mold, Chrysippus' own remark that "the exceeding grandeur and beauty of our teachings seem like fiction and not on the level of man and human nature" surely accords more closely to the mundane realities of life.59 Indeed, the inner strength of resolve to subject oneself to the rigors of Stoic self-discipline—the sundering of all emotive ties of attachment and the rough-hewn inflexibility of a protracted will unmoved by the shifting currents of fortune-stems ultimately from a profound religious conviction that the Divine purpose is being served through all that transpires. But the truism that what passes as reasoned faith for one is deemed self-delusional by another is applicable in this case as well, and as the intractable difficulties that confronted the Stoa over questions of providence and theodicy manifestly confirm. We are thus driven to the conclusion that it was not so much the intellectual coherence of their system-which it admittedly possessed once one accepted a few central metaphysical assumptions—but rather the psychological comfort that Stoicism afforded that proved its greatest attraction.60 And from the strictness and severity of its ethical regimen—aptly characterized by Nietzsche as a form of "self-tyranny"-one gains the impression that Stoicism was born out of a deep-rooted sense of social alienation and powerlessness, a mistrust and unease about the world that manifests itself above all in the ideal of inner detachment. In that sense the

Epicurean strategy of physical withdrawal into a Garden paradise and the Stoic strategy of psychological withdrawal into an autarkic self can be seen as functional analogues, despite their profound differences in practice and doctrine.

In terms of popularity and influence, Stoicism was the dominant philosophy of the Hellenistic Age, a fact not surprising given the wide range of pressing social-psychological needs that it addressed. In a world where mercurial shifts of fortune were commonplace, the Stoics celebrated a form of inner well-being that could be maintained even against the most unsettling of circumstances. In a world where genuine autonomy had been scaled back by imperial kings and their professional armies, the Stoics discovered a higher form of freedom in a fatalistic but "willing" compliance with Destiny's providential decrees. In a world where the prospects for social melioration were poor, limited both by a comparatively inelastic productive base and by vested interests of the powerful, the Stoics enjoined all and sundry to seek salvation from within, to overcome the apparent objective sources of their misery not by eradicating or changing them, but through an axiological transvaluation that assessed as "indifferent" all that fell between moral virtue and vice. In a world where the individual had been loosened from the ties of civic communalism. the Stoics offered a loftier membership in the heavenly cosmopolis and its constitution of "right reason." And in a world where the opportunities for manifesting excellence and self-worth through the traditional forms of public service were compromised and reduced by changed political and military realities, the Stoics accommodated by internalizing virtue and by invoking anticonsequentialism, positions predicated on the assumption that the true arena of aretê was not civil society, but the individual psychê or soul. There is an undeniable quality of heroism in all this, an inspiring confidence in the capacity of the human will to find solely within itself all the resources necessary to guarantee well-being against the hazards of fortune—a trait that accounts for the many accolades that Western moralists have bestowed upon Stoicism throughout the ages. But that heroism remains more private than public, and thus carries with it no animating zeal or commitment for progressive social change, for overcoming the debilitating gulf between actuality and potentiality, between immediate existence and future possibilities. Endurance is the Stoic watchword, and this inclines towards an acceptance and stabilization of existing conditions, which are widely denounced but not objectively rectified. Moreover, in the process of securing that self-contained immunity, the Stoic is forced to abandon what is perhaps the most precious dimension of the human experience, namely, that Dionysian exultation and joy in life that

comes only with an exuberant psychic commitment to its manifold possibilities. Rightly judging that such commitment entails exposure, the Stoics opt to forego the attendant risks—and therewith the potential rewards—in favor of a personal inviolability based upon detachment. Although fatalistically prepared to countenance both worldly success and misfortune, it is obvious that Stoic forms of "self-hardening" are best suited to ages of adversity, where dislocations in the social realm render traditional patterns of life unstable. In likening their philosophy to "a well-fortified polis governed by reason," the Stoics inadvertently disclose the compensatory function of their enterprise.

6.III.iii Syncretism Triumphant: External Unfreedom and the Quest for Inner Plenitude and Immunity

The retreat from Polis-citizen values found several forms of expression in late fourth-century philosophical discourse: the mocking antinomianism of the Cynics, the "cloistered" apolitical hedonism of the Epicureans, the detached cosmopolitan individualism of the Stoics—these were the most notable variants. Despite the widely differing nature of these orientations, each manifests a basic intention of freeing the individual from disquieting or deleterious external circumstances, which in addition to the random misfortunes of "blind Fate" also pointedly encompass those ancestral civic ideals and practices that no longer permit satisfaction or assured realization under the changed conditions of patrimonial domination. In response to the collapse of the traditional koinônia tôn politôn, the 'community of citizens', the well-being of the private individual comes to the fore as the most pressing of normative concerns, a problematic of such general relevance that it formed a unifying theme within contemporary moral discourse. A detailed portrait of the entire philosophical landscape is precluded by the paucity of surviving sources, but brief sketches of the other prominent currents should suffice to confirm our argument that ethical reflection in the early Hellenistic era was decisively patterned by the existential dilemmas posed by the erosion of the Polis-citizen bond.1

The Skepticism articulated by Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BC) slightly antedated the rise of the Epicurean and Stoic schools, and his stated ideals of tranquillity (ataraxia) and passionless indifference to externals (apatheia) undoubtedly exerted influence on both Epicurus and Zeno.² After an uneventful career as a painter and student of philosophy, Pyrrho joined Alexander's campaign of eastern conquest, one of the most remarkable expeditions ever undertaken in world history. As a member of the massive camp-following of support staff and entertainers, Pyrrho wit-

nessed firsthand the destruction of centuries-old empires and was brought into contact with a remarkable variety of peoples and cultures, ranging from Anatolia to Egypt, Babylon to Persia, the Hindu-Kush to the Indus river valley. Celebrated encounters with "wise men" of the East enliven the narrative histories and travel accounts of Alexander's march, and in the preserved fragments relating to Pyrrho's biography it is maintained that he himself was influenced by Persian magi and the Gymnosophists, the "naked philosophers" of India, presumably Hindu and Buddhist ascetics. On returning to his native Elis, he attracted a small gathering of pupils, later known as the *Pyrrhôneioi* or *Skeptikoi*, upon whom it fell to disseminate his nihilistic principle that objective knowledge of reality is unobtainable—he himself, perhaps as a mark of skeptical consistency, having opted to refrain from written expression.

The basic tenets of Pyrrho's Skepticism appear to be preserved in a fragmentary extract from a lost work by his most famous pupil, the poetphilosopher Timon of Phlius (c. 320-230 BC), best known for his Silloi, or versified 'Lampoons' that parodied the views of the "dogmatic" philosophers. In this important (but unfortunately decontextualized) passage, Timon records Pyrrho's doctrine that the attainment of eudaimonia is contingent upon a recognition of the nature of things, and the cultivation of an appropriate attitude towards the phenomenal world based on that recognition. Seeing that the true nature of things is "equally indifferent, unstable, and indeterminable," apparently owing to the fact that sensory experiences never reveal things as they are intrinsically, but only how they circumstantially appear relative to the perceiving subject (i.e., as phainomena, or 'appearances'), it follows that "neither our sense perceptions nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods."3 Seeing that ratiocination is also dependent on evidence of the senses—the mind having no immediate intuition of externals-philosophical "reason" is denied access to reality as well, thereby rendering the world objectively unknowable.4 From this radical epistemology of subjectivism, Pyrrho concludes that our attitude towards the world should be one of complete agnosticism, consisting of epochê, or 'suspension of judgment', and aphasia, 'nonassertion' about the ultimate or underlying nature of things. So disposed, one will be able to regard things with absolute calm, unagitated by passion or desire, since the refusal to judge necessarily results in an attitude of indifference and nonattachment.5

In regard to everyday practice—a necessity "since we are not capable of complete inactivity"—the Skeptics followed the promptings of subjective *phainomena* and prevailing customs as guides for conduct. Inner inviolability and freedom were to be preserved by remaining neutral or noncommittal in these pursuits, braced by an awareness that nothing is

intrinsically or objectively good or bad, just or unjust, noble or dishonorable.⁶ Human well-being is thus fully internalized, as all outward striving is devalued as meaningless, or in the Skeptic's idiom, "no more this than that." In short, one overcomes the world by denying it value through a nihilistic resignation that secures inward immunity by the severance of all external interests—an orientation not unlike that of the world-negating Indian sages who are said to have so impressed Pyrrho during his sojourn in the East.⁸

A more time-honored compensatory strategy for the frustrations of public life was the retreat into a private realm of eros, luxury, and aesthetic refinement. Initially cultivated by sections of the aristocracy disaffected by the curtailment of hereditary prerogatives with the rise of the hoplitedêmos (3.II.iv), this "soft escapism" was pursued with renewed intensity by the wealthy apragmones, or 'uninvolved' ranks of the citizen-body, throughout the calamitous course of the war-ravaged and faction-plagued fourth century (3.I,II,V). This practice received its philosophical codification with the wandering sophist Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435–355 BC), one of Sokrates' younger companions and the first known proponent of ethical hedonism (5.IV). At the close of his life Aristippus opened a philosophical school in his native Cyrene, which was subsequently led by his remarkable daughter Arete, and afterwards by his grandson Aristippus, popularly known as mêtrodidaktos or 'mother taught'." By the early Hellenistic era this school had gained considerable notoriety for its more "robust" version of hedonism, which in contrast to the Epicurean ideal of "katastematic" painlessness—dismissed by the Cyrenaics as "fit for corpses"—emphasized the positive joys of "kinetic" pleasures.

Proceeding from Protagoras' "man-measure" doctrine, which highlighted the subjective relativity of sensory experience, the senior Aristippus had concluded that since knowledge is restricted to our own particular sensations or emotional states, the only reasonable course of action is to pursue favorable or pleasant subjective sensations. Complete sensual abandonment was not encouraged, however, as it was recognized that excesses over the long term could prove ruinous to both health and purse. To "master pleasures without being overcome" was the Cyrenaic watchword, and their objective was to experience the delights of refined stimulation or 'gentle motion', leia kinêsis, an ideal intuitively appealing and congenial to the apragmôn set of demilitarized slaveholders. Such self-centered absorption left little room for civic commitments or public service, and Aristippus' rejection of active citizenship as a form of "voluntary suffering" remained authoritative within his school. As one later member was to express it: "The wise man will do everything for his own sake, for

there is none other whom he regards as equally worthy to himself."19

Particularly vigorous in championing the principle of egoism was Theodorus of Cyrene (flor. c. 320-270 BC), surnamed the 'Atheist' or 'Godless One' (Atheos), and whose views were expressed with a Cynicstyle "freedom of speech" and "shamelessness" that outraged more than enlightened.11 His arguments assailing religious belief are unfortunately not preserved (apparently owing to the later censorship efforts of Christians), though in antiquity he was regarded as one of the two or three foremost proponents of atheism. Since the doxographers were inordinately interested in his antinomian character and bantering encounters with other sages and Hellenistic kings, his philosophical doctrines are but sketchily preserved: the wise are self-sufficient and have no need of friends; theft, adultery, and sacrilege are not base by nature, but are said to be so in order to restrain the foolish; the wise man should openly indulge his erotic passions; joy is the telos, grief the evil to be avoided; it is unreasonable for the wise to sacrifice their lives on behalf of their country (patris), for that would entail throwing away wisdom to benefit the foolish.12 These open declarations require no detailed exegesis, as the surface meanings conceal no deeper truths. With Theodorus, the selfregarding orientation of hedonism has simply succumbed to a decadent and selfish opportunism.

No less notorious, but for quite different reasons, was the philosopher Hegesias (flor. c. 280 BC), another Cyrenaic whose appellation Peisithanatos, the 'Death Persuader', heralds the immanent negation of the hedonistic principle. Accepting the central Cyrenaic doctrine that pleasure constitutes the good, pain the evil, Hegesias concluded that since the human condition is beset by all manner of physical pain and mental suffering, the attainment of eudaimonia is "altogether impossible." The optimum to which a wise man can rationally aspire is the mere mitigation of suffering (an obvious rapproachment with Epicurus' negative ideal of painlessness as pleasure), the attainment of which presupposes an inner conviction that even life itself is adiaphoron, or 'indifferent' (a bridge to the Stoics).14 The option of suicide as a means of escape was accordingly advocated by Hegesias, with such persuasiveness that his lectures were said to have induced many to kill themselves by fasting, a procedure recommended in one of his books. It is reported that King Ptolemy II, alarmed by these "suicide crazes," prudently banned Hegesias from lecturing in his realm. Indeed, so bleak was this philosophy of pessimism and despair that it lacked even the impulse to seek comfort on the interpersonal level, as Hegesias categorically denied the existence of gratitude, friendship, and beneficence, holding that all such actions invariably proceed from self-interested motives of utility.15

The syncretic tendencies that one finds among the Hellenistic Cyrenaics is on display with the later Cynics as well, the most celebrated of whom was Bion of Borysthenes (c. 335-245 BC), a prostitute's son and ex-slave who stitched together various philosophical strands from all the major schools. 16 As befit both the times and his own fortune-tossed existence. Bion placed "adaptability to circumstance" at the core of his teachings: "If the wind blow fair, no harm in spreading your sails to it; but should it change, then wrap yourself in your virtue and endure what fortune may send, and see to it that, if fortune must strike you down, she strike down a man, not a worm."17 Whether demonstrating his caustic wit before the hard-drinking Companions of the Macedonian royal court or before the multitudes in the public agoras and gymnasia, Bion's metier was the diatribe, a literary genre featuring heavy doses of satire and parody intermixed with coarse anecdotes, memorable metaphors, and verses from the poets. Since this style of communication was better suited to open-air moralizing with common rather than cultivated audiences, the subject matter addressed was typically far removed from the rarefied mists of metaphysics or the rigors of logic and dealt plainly but vividly with the concerns of everyday life: health and disease, wealth and poverty, freedom and slavery, war and peace.

Several examples of the diatribe form survive in the partially preserved works of one of Bion's followers, Teles of Megara (flor. c. 260–240 BC), whose own paltry observations are braced by extensive quotes and paraphrases drawn from the writings of earlier Cynics and other philosophers. The familiar Hellenistic themes of self-sufficiency, inner inviolability against the hazards of fortune, and the moral irrelevance of status distinctions, political power, and material riches are all conspicuously on display: 19

Just as the good actor performs well whatever role the poet assigns, so too must the good man perform whatever goddess Tychê assigns. For she, says Bion, just like a poetess, sometimes assigns the role of first-speaker, sometimes that of second-speaker; sometimes that of a king, sometimes that of a vagabond. Do not, therefore, being a second-speaker, desire the role of the first.

And Poverty would say to the man who complains, "Why do you fight with me? Are you deprived of any noble thing because of me? Of temperance? Of justice? Of courage? You aren't in want of life's necessities, are you? Or aren't the pathways filled with vegetables and the springs overflowing with water?"

Therefore one should not attempt to change circumstances or the state of affairs, but rather prepare oneself for them just as they are, which is the very

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thing that sailors do; for they do not attempt to change the winds and the sea, but prepare themselves so as to be able to cope with these elements as they toss and turn.

If you make yourself over into one who disdains pleasure, one who does not discredit hard toil, who holds good and bad repute as equal, and who does not fear death, then you will be able to do whatever you wish without distress.

This rather simple moralizing, basically an ego-defensive call for endurance and for limiting one's existential commitments and ambitions so as to minimize the possibility of pain and anxiety, undoubtedly seems paltry when set against the inspiring Polis ideal of collectively raising each individual to the height of his human capacities. It must also be granted that in the aftermath of the eclipse of the citizen-soldier and the suppression of Polis sovereignty—the twin institutional pillars upon which the ideals of civic communalism had been sustained—the insular principles of detached individualism and adaptability to circumstance were not untimely. In an age of patrimonial domination, the Polis-citizen framework could no longer serve as the integrative basis for a meaningful code of human striving and fulfillment—and no philosopher of the age thought otherwise.

Particularly relevant in this regard is Teles' discussion of exile, which he composed with arguments drawn primarily from the writings of Stilpo (c. 360-280 BC), the noted Megarian philosopher and one of the teachers of Zeno the Stoic.20 To appreciate the cultural significance of the remarks to follow, let us recall that banishment from one's native land had been regarded as one of life's greatest tragedies throughout the Archaic and Classical periods, entailing the loss of landowning privileges and all political rights, the exclusion from cultic practices, and severance from the associations and activities of kin and community. Theognis' pained observation that "no man is a friend and faithful comrade to an exile" and Alkaios' bitter lament of "longing to hear the assembly summoned and the council" bear eloquent testimony to the citizen's dependence upon the koinônia tôn politôn for his emotional well-being, just as the oft-quoted line from Attik tragedy, "without polis or home, deprived of his native land, a beggar and a wanderer," confirms the exile's material and status deprivations. For Hellenistic moralists, however, exile is no longer viewed as entailing a self-destroying "social death" nor indeed any hardships or sufferings whatsoever:21

"What do you say?" asks Stilpo, "From what goods or what sort of good things does exile deprive one? Those of the psychê, of the body, or of externals? Sound reasoning, proper conduct, does exile deprive you of these?

Surely it does not deprive you of courage, of righteousness, or of any other virtue? . . . And surely it does not deprive you of any bodily goods? Or are not health, strength, keen eyesight and hearing the same if a person is in a foreign land? . . . Nor, surely, does exile deprive one of external goods, for are not many to be seen who have become more prominent in their affairs regarding possessions once they have become exiles?"

Teles next addresses the complaint that exiles are denied political power, lack freedom of speech, and are everywhere distrusted as outsiders:²²

But then again, some exiles command garrisons in the cities for the kings, and are entrusted with whole nations, and also receive great gifts and tribute.

To illustrate the point, Teles proceeds to list several well-known exiles who rose to positions of great power and privilege through service with the kings of Macedonia and the Ptolemies of Egypt (i.e., the kind of men who in Demosthenes' day were reviled as "traitors" who betrayed the cause of Greek freedom in exchange for Philip's bribes of wealth and power). And against the objection that exiles are deprived of the satisfaction of ruling in their own countries, Teles counters:²³

But then neither do women who stay at home, nor children, nor these adolescents here, nor those who are past their prime. But this is not annoying to them, is it? . . . And what is the difference between ruling and living as a private man (idiôteuein)?

With apolitical evaluations such as these, the entire Polis-citizen heritage is openly abandoned, its place supplanted by an individualistic ethos that clings desperately to internalized standards of excellence and well-being. These restricted concerns alone are within the "private man's" limited powers of control, a "civilian" who now stands stripped of his military and political capacity to chart his own destiny and that of his commune, and who must accordingly seek to compensate for that impotence by radically devaluing the external course of events.

The retreat from Polis-citizen ideals thus occurred along all philosophical fronts during the Hellenistic period, as the Cynics, Cyrenaics, Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics each sought to distance the well-being of the individual from the collapsing Polis framework and to detach aretê, or 'virtue', from its former dependence on communal service through performance in the roles of warrior and self-governing citizen. But what of those two most famous of schools, the Academy and Lyceum, whose respective founders, Plato and Aristotle, had situated their ethics firmly within the Polis-citizen normative tradition? The paucity of surviving source materials precludes a comprehensive

appraisal; but on the limited evidence available, most historians have concluded that while many of the sages who followed the two greatest philosophers of antiquity were first-rate thinkers in their own right (several Peripatetics in particular are credited with outstanding contributions in botany, zoology, mineralogy, physics, astronomy, and geography), they were generally unsuccessful in upholding the grand fusion of ethikê and politikê that had characterized the social philosophies of Plate and Aristotle 24

phies of Plato and Aristotle.24 Much of the intellectual activity in the Academy after the death of the founder was focussed on the unresolved status of the Platonic Forms, with both Speusippus (c. 407-339 BC) and Xenocrates (c. 396-314 BC), the two immediate successors, offering major revisions that drew heavily on the numerological metaphysics of the Pythagoreans (Plato himself having initiated that trend with the geometrical cosmology in his Timaeus). Discussions regarding the soul's immortality and the divinity of the heavenly bodies were also extensive within Academic circles, but apparently undistinguished by qualities of sophistication and originality. Mathematics and astronomy were stronger suits, as indicated by the scientific achievements of Heraclides Ponticus (c. 388-315 BC), whose calculations confirmed the motion of Venus and Mercury around the sun and who deduced the axial rotation of the earth (thereby earning Copernicus' admiration as a distinguished precursor). Academic contributions to the ethical and political branches of philosophy, on the other hand, were surprisingly slender. The morose Speusippus, whose thesis that pleasure is an evil received early criticism from Aristotle, openly abandons the reformist dimension of Plato's thought by redefining eudaimonia as mere 'freedom from disturbance' (aochlesia), a curiously negative and private ideal far removed from Plato's own expansive vision of remolding both citizen and Polis in the light of philosophical reason.25 As for Xenocrates, he won praise and renown more for his own personal integrity and moral probity than for anything he said or wrote on the subject, and in maintaining that the purpose of philosophy is "to put to rest the tumult and confusion in the affairs of life," he too inclines towards the individualistic and ego-defensive impulse that was steadily supplanting the traditional concern with Polis-citizen ideals.26 The views articulated by the succeeding generation of Academics, led by the aristocrat Polemo, his erômenos Crates, and the wealthy metic Crantor, are even more scantily reported in the surviving fragments and doxographic summaries—a likely sign of waning intellectual power. Of the three, it was Crantor (c. 340-290 BC) who attained a measure of prominence, primarily for his work On Mourning, which served as a model for later writers of popular consolation literature, and for his assaults on the Stoic ideal of apatheia, which he charged "could not be attained except at the cost of brutishness in the soul and callousness in the body." The ultimate proof that the core principles of Platonism were no longer capable of commanding devotion and conviction within the school came with the accession of Arcesilaus to the headship of the Academy in 268 BC, for his was a program of dialectical Skepticism. Hereafter the Academics assumed the critical function of destroying the epistemological, ontological, and ethical "dogmas" of their philosophical rivals (chiefly the Stoics and Epicureans), while they themselves refrained from any positive assertions in the manner of Pyrrho's "suspension of judgment." ²⁸

The Peripatetic school did not undergo a similar radical transformation, but as scientific specialization progressed in accordance with Aristotle's comprehensive program of empirical research, the distinctive philosophical features of the master's teachings declined in importance.²⁹ Under Theophrastus (c. 370-286 BC), Aristotle's longtime companion and successor in 322 BC, the Lyceum enjoyed a preeminent position in Hellenistic intellectual life, as attested by the scores of students who flocked to his lectures. A man whose prodigious scholarship was based on a diligent practice of empirical investigation ("doctrines must accord with the findings" was his motto), Theophrastus pioneered the scientific study of such fields as botany, zoology, mineralogy, and the history of philosophical thought. Not hesitant to criticize and modify various of Aristotle's positions, Theophrastus generally adhered to the essentials of his predecessor's system, as in upholding the doctrine of natural teleology: "physis does nothing in vain, least of all in the primary and most decisive matters." He was particularly content to follow Aristotle's lead in social philosophy, where he empirically supplemented rather than analytically transformed his mentor's principles. Like Aristotle, Theophrastus believed that eudaimonia presupposed a modicum of external goods in addition to virtue and physical well-being, and he allowed that "Tychê has the terrible power to take away the fruits of our labors and to overturn our seeming felicity."30 In the field of political philosophy, Theophrastus produced a massive historical-comparative study, On Laws, and wrote a number of treatises on monarchy (one of which he dedicated to Cassander, the Macedonian regent) and several on constitutional matters, including How Poleis can be Best Governed and On the Best Constitution (all of which survive only in fragments or mere titles). As we documented earlier (6.II), the views expressed in such works were manifestly influential in shaping the political practice of Demetrius of Phaleron, Theophrastus' pupil and Cassander's autocratic governor of Athens following the violent suppression of the democracy in 318/317 BC. During his ten-year reign, a number of Peripatetic policy recommendations were instituted: property restrictions

that excluded the poor from citizenship; the elimination of compensatory pay for assembly attendance, jury duty, and officeholding; the abolition of liturgies that drained the middle classes and alienated the wealthy; and sumptuary legislation that checked the dissipation of estates and restricted the scope for invidious conspicuous display. When driven from power in 307 BC, Demetrius fled to Alexandria in Egypt and sought the patronage of Ptolemy I, whom he served as court librarian and philosopher. Given the turbulence of his career, it should come as no surprise to learn that his most celebrated literary composition while in exile was a treatise on the vicissitudes of Fortune!³¹

Throughout the third century the Peripatos continued to excel in the physical sciences and in various branches of historiography (flourishing both in Athens and in the new haven of Alexandria), but the school conspicuously failed to produce any significant social philosophers during this period, and the few ethical fragments that survive bespeak the rapid ascendancy of eclecticism. Thus the Athenian Lyco (c. 299-225 BC), who succeeded the great natural scientist Strato as head of the Lyceum in 268 BC, offered "the true delight of the psychê" as the new telos, a formula that clearly owed more to the principles of Cyrenaic hedonism than to Aristotle's ideal of contemplation or his praise of civic virtue. Indeed, Lyco's notoriety came not from his ideas but from an extravagant life-style, which featured lavish symposia, munificent acts of liberality, and conspicuous consumption in the form of fashionable raiment, litter bearers, and the like. 32 Even more eclectic in ethical matters was Hieronymus of Rhodes (c. 290-230 BC), who followed Epicurus in exalting the life of hêsuchia, 'quietude', and in holding that the only true good is painlessness; he also resurrected Speusippus' ideal of aochlêsia, 'freedom from disturbance', and designated "the undisturbed life" as the true telos.33

An intellectual defense of the traditional Polis-citizen ethos was mounted neither in the Academy nor in the Lyceum, as the Platonic-Aristotelean fusion of ethics and politics was early on abandoned in favor of the self-centered individualism that was distinctive of Hellenistic thought generally. That the towering philosophical achievements of Plato and Aristotle could not lay claim to greater loyalty is somewhat surprising from an intellectual point of view, and to have been eclipsed in ethical discourse by the Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics perhaps even more so. But history had moved on inexorably, radically transforming the existential points of reference, and thereby undermining the practical viability and appeal of all arguments that presupposed the normative supremacy of the Polis

koinônia. To the extent that the Platonic and Aristotelean conceptions of eudaimonia were dependent upon the classical bonding of citizen to autonomous community, to that extent their ethical counsels and injunctions were anachronistic in an age when effective military and political powers were wielded by kings rather than citizens.

Epilogue: On Reductionism, Relativism, and the Sociology of Morals and Philosophy

Any attempt to explicate intellectual or artistic "creativity" by reference to purported extrinsic "conditioning factors" runs the risk of reductionism, and invariably raises the daunting spectre of relativism. These issues are particularly sensitive whenever philosophical or scientific ideas are involved, for here claims to validity and universalism are basically intrinsic to the enterprise, unlike the generally recognized historical limitations on other forms of cultural expression, such as music, poetry, the visual arts. Before attempting to draw together the strands of argument and interpretation laid down in preceding chapters, let us briefly reflect on these controversies anew.

Art and philosophy as immaculate conception, as self-contained discourses of free and autonomous spirits? Or art and knowledge as social mimesis, as ideological reflexes of constellations of vested and partisan interests? Stated in their extreme forms, these polar reductionist dispositions—conventionally labeled "idealistic" and "materialistic"—would find few adherents today, though each has long served to provide an orienting compass for research in the field of cultural studies. It is a classic case of divided strengths and opposing weaknesses, an analytical fissure that readily suggests synthesis and an integration of perspectives as the most natural corrective. A balanced understanding of cultural creation must be based on recognition that artists and intellectuals respond not only to the shifting frames of existential experience, to social roles and institutions and to ideological configurations of power and privilege, but also-and fundamentally-to the inherited conventions and technical demands and possibilities of their own respective mediums. The internal-external polarity has always been something of a false opposition, for cultural producers typically function within institutionally organized "professional" settings, with their own modes of recruitment and training, their own traditions and standards of performance, their own linkages to the wider society and to sustaining networks of patronage. A comprehensive specification of the bases of cultural production must accordingly encompass both social dimensions, i.e., the immanent dynamic that obtains within the specialized roles, establishments, and ideologies that 468

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constitute the "milieux of practice" of artists and intellectuals, as well as the ambient nexus of social relationships within which the creators and codifiers of cultural forms function and operate.1

If the pitfalls of reductionism are thus avoidable through the adoption of inclusionary and balanced research strategies, the dilemmas of relativism, unfortunately, pose rather more complex and obdurate challenges. Here it is essential that we begin by attempting a few schematic distinctions, between "conventional" norms and moral codes on the one hand and "philosophical" reflections on social life on the other.

Historical and anthropological research has overwhelmingly and unambiguously documented what might be termed the "substantive" or "relative rationality" of moral codes. That is to say, the elementary imperatives of social cooperation and coordination, and therewith the processes by which power relations are rationalized and legitimated, give rise to idealized standards and principles of performance, i.e., to normative codes that mobilize and reinforce the requisite emotive commitments and cognitive judgments for functional proficiency under existing conditions of life. Qualities of mind, body, and character-the domain of "ethics"—are linked to the performance of socially mandated tasks, which in turn serve to regulate the allocation of prized rewards and resources, such as authority, wealth, prestige, respect, security, etc. Different social formations will feature distinctive modes of hierarchy and cooperation, thus placing different premiums on specific forms of action and their corresponding characterological traits. The normative ideals and "virtues" of Homeric or Viking warriors, for example, will differ quite substantively from those of medieval artisans or modern merchants, while sharing a formal similarity as regards pragmatic effectiveness in the perpetuation of their respective modes of existence. Serviceability to the life processes of its carriers forms the basic impulse of conventional codes of morality.

Moral traditions thus constitute relatively coherent ideological complexes of values, principles, and norms that are functionally congruent with prevailing social routines—as stabilized in roles and institutions and their attending modes of performance and aesthetic expressiveness (style, decorum, etc.). Conventional moral judgments and truths will invariably display a substantive "local" content, in that the justifiability of beliefs and actions—as regards both means and ends—is necessarily conditioned by, and thus relative to, the existential constraints, the diverse historical and structural arrangements, under which particular social classes, strata, and communities operate.

Philosophical ethics, a much rarer historical development, can be distinguished from traditional morality primarily on the basis of its

greater critical and rational coherence. Indeed, philosophical reflection typically takes as its point of departure the inherited amalgam of functioning beliefs and practices, which it subjects to theoretical scrutiny, exposing limitations and inconsistencies and thereupon proposing "rational" adjustments or alternatives. Where conventional morals operate on a pretheoretical, axiomatic or assertive basis, the social and ethical philosophies offered by intellectuals are grounded in explicitly reasoned and critically reflective meditations. Such theoretical work typically proceeds by way of classification and abstraction, modes of cognition that initiate a shift from the particular to the general, the concrete to the conceptual. The specification of "objective" or "transcendent" truths is thus basic to the philosophical enterprise, though these universalistic aspirations tend to founder on the particularistic circumstances of their genesis: the production of philosophical knowledge—like other forms of cultural creation—is ever bound up within a complex nexus of determinant social relations. Among the more influential of these "localizing" factors are: the specific social origins and affiliations of the leading intellectuals and their respective audiences; the inherited fund of linguistic-cognitive conventions that both guides and limits perception and theoretical expression; the consensus of norms, values, and beliefs that frames the regnant world views or social psychologies of the major groups and strata; and most generally, the institutional ordering of the society in question, its forms of polity, economy, religion, etc. Hence the characteristic duality or tension between the "formal" and the "substantive" that is to be found in all social philosophies, as the quest for generalizable or timeless truths about justice, virtue, the good, the divine, courage, hierarchy and equality, the public and the private—is informed by modes of reasoning and affect that bear, to varying extent, the circumstantial impress of specific socialhistorical contexts.2

What, then, of the relativistic implications of our own attempted sociology of the moral codes and social philosophies of the ancient Hellenes, a particularly pressing question given the legacy of that cultural complex as a repository of insights and ideals regarding the human condition?

On one level, our analysis has charted the progressive alienation of philosophic reason from the communal or public sphere: where Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle had each sought the mutual reformation and fulfillment of self and society, as framed by the Polis-citizen tradition, the philosophers of the early Hellenistic era effectively sundered that linkage, proffering individualistic creeds that dispensed with civic functions and ideals. As we have documented, that "theoretical" distancing of morals from the Polis-citizen nexus was itself precipitated by the "practical"

rupturing of that bond. The traditional commitments of the citizen to the task of furthering the interests and glory of his Polis, a task that publicly demonstrated one's aretê and secured the personal honor that brought eudaimonia in its train, those commitments necessarily weakened as the processes of demilitarization and depoliticization—fueled by mounting factionalism and fatally accelerated by the rise of imperial patrimonialism—undermined conventional pursuits and practices. As the norms of citizenship were thus compromised by structural transformation, strategies for minimizing the ties that bound the individual to the collapsing Polis framework proliferated apace.

The initial form of "disengagement" assumed the operative guise of hêsuchia, that "quietist" disposition adopted by the citizen apragmones, the leisured 'uninvolved' whose cultivation of private pleasures would find theoretical expression in the apolitical hedonism of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. The ascetic self-sufficiency counselled by Antisthenes represented an alternative method of securing the individual psychê against "external" disturbances and discomforts, an orientation presently extended by Diogenes and the Cynics, whose antinomian "cosmopolitanism" offered a primitivist negation of the entire civic tradition. With Alexander's world-transforming conquests, the institutional frames of existential experience—political, economic, military, religious—were greatly enlarged in scale, as the insular and autonomous order of the Polis suffered eclipse by the expansive and hegemonic forces of Empire. As the objective conditions of life thus passed through the crucible of change, philosophic discourse registered that transition in the form of two decidedly "postcivic" ethical systems: Epicureanism, with its contractive retreat into a subcommunal realm of controlled pleasures and tranquillity among trusted intimates; and Stoicism, with its transcendental vision of a cosmic politeia of the wise and the virtuous, each personally shielded from this-worldly suffering and misfortune by an axiological calculus that renders all that transpires outside the self as adiaphoron, 'indifferent', to those capable of discerning the universal rationality of the Divine Logos.

When thus situated within the flowing currents of living history, the criteria by which social philosophies are evaluated and assessed must necessarily widen to include considerations of pragmatic viability or effectiveness. And in those terms, it is all too apparent that the social views of Plato and Aristotle—organically rooted in the life experiences of a passing Polis-citizen order—were rendered increasingly anachronistic by the transfiguring course of events; just as, correspondingly, the range of individualistic options offered by the Hellenistic schools—existentially attuned to the realities of an emerging empire-subject constellation—gained in plausibility and appeal.

A pragmatic appraisal of the respective merits and value of these philosophies along the foregoing lines may seem cogent sociologically, but it scandalously calls into question a long-standing philosophical communis opinio: that the intellectual achievements of Plato and Aristotle tower over those of their Hellenistic successors, whose contributions have oft been derided as entailing a "decadent subjectivism" or a "failure of nerve". How, then, is this difference between the sociological and philosophical assessments—which raises the issue of relativism in such pressing fashion—to be explained, and perhaps more importantly, is there any possibility of combining or reconciling the two orientations?

The rendering of comparative evaluations of philosophical systems is obviously a complex, multifaceted, and somewhat arcane and undeveloped art, but I would venture that two considerations loom disproportionately large, in this particular instance certainly, but perhaps in most others as well. The first concerns what might be termed the self-society relationship, while the second turns on corresponding conceptions of human excellence.

The social philosophies of Plato and Aristotle are both Polis-based, in that their conceptions of virtue and vice, human purpose and well-being, are heavily informed by traditional notions of civic identity and communalism. The status of citizenship provides for them a meaningful and functional frame for human action, just as the primacy of the Polis koinônia provides for an ordering of goods or objectives, a linkage of private and public. Ethics here, as in the traditional civic culture, is subsumed within a more arching vision of the political. In marked contrast, the Cyrenaics, Cynics, Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics all pointedly reject or dispense with the ideals of Polis communalism and citizenship, in favor of "monadic" or "status-free" conceptions of individualism. In that sense, the Platonic-Aristotelean tradition is at once more "local" or narrow, in that it presupposes a specific type of community, with specific social roles and statuses, but also more balanced or comprehensive, in that it seeks the requisite integration of self and society on a mutually enhancing basis. The Hellenistic schools, having detached their ethical injunctions from substantive politics, attain greater abstraction or universalism thereby, but in consequence are also more one-sided, i.e., largely self-referential and without adequate attention to questions of community. The Cyrenaic voluptuary, the sardonic Cynic, the Pyrrhonian nihilist, the Garden recluse, the imperturbable Stoic—notwithstanding significant differences in existential praxis—all share this in common: the overriding objective for each is psychic harmony or inviolability, not the fulfillment or perfection of self through the cooperative performance of social tasks and functions that sustain the necessary and ontologically prior project of communal living.

The absence of anything approaching a viable communalism in early Hellenistic philosophy—while accurately mirroring the atomizing realities of patrimonial domination—thus stands as a central limitation, all the more glaring when set against the inspirational Polis ideal of collectively raising each citizen to the height of his physical and spiritual capacities through socially approved modes of agonal, expressive striving. In place of a fully rounded life of civic activism, one encompassing both the political and the personal—from assembly to gymnasium, theater to symposion—as mediated by the integrative creed and experience of citizenship, the Hellenistic schools substitute one-dimensional conceptions of human well-being, oriented towards either ascetic detachment or hedonistic self-absorption, and featuring purely private, subcommunal, or "cosmic" identities and affiliations. This is plainly a narrowing of the range of human experience and possibility, as principles of inward immunity and self-sufficiency gain currency only through a forced disavowal of those communal bonds that allow for a full and meaningful realization of interactive human needs and interests. The enjoined retreat from the public arena, with its compensatory amplifications of the personal and the cosmic, enables the individual to philosophically devalue the very real devitalization of citizenship that attended the ascendancy of empire, but as the surfeit of characteristically negative Hellenistic ideals suggests—ataraxia, apatheia, autarkeia, apragmosunê, aponia—these are essentially "coping" mechanisms rather than "correctives", and as such confirm the inability to conceive more constructive or affirmative responses.

Each of the Hellenistic schools thus registers as sociological fact the wreckage of the old order and consequent "freeing" of the individual from traditional civic supports and attachments. Under such circumstances, the creation of more circumscribed domains for human fulfill ment and purpose—i.e., the "interiorization" of value—presents a more workable life-strategy than any grand architectonic project of reconstituting the self-society bond, as envisaged by Plato and Aristotle. What Hellenistic philosophy thus gains in pragmatic or circumstantial viability on the individual or subjective level, however, it clearly loses in its capacity ity to criticize, and so possibly overcome, the obdurate facticity of a shattered communalism and the loss of collective powers of self-governance and autonomy. Since "externals" have been transvalued as irrele vancies or "indifferents" to the task of securing personal well-being now largely conceived as a "psychic" or internal disposition, unconnected with substantive social manifestations—the injustices and sufferings that prevail in the real world are left unchallenged. The subjective experience of "deliverance" or "security" achieved by those who subscribed to such doctrines was certainly not illusory, but a philosophy that renounces or ignores the responsibility of critically and imaginatively transcending objective social limitations in the human condition must, at best, be judged expedient or provisional rather than constructively preparatory.

A somewhat paradoxical but instructive conclusion is suggested by the preceding reflections, one that might just provide passage out of the relativist impasse. For despite the central importance of verisimilitude and accuracy in philosophical reflection, it nonetheless appears possible for a social philosophy to be too "valid" or "realistic" in a sociological sense to constitute the very best in philosophy. That is to say, a philosophy can be sociologically valid-i.e., attuned and adjusted to the social historical realities of its time and place-but thereby inadequate or incomplete philosophically, if by philosophy we mean a fundamental disposition towards critical rationalism. It is the historically shifting, dynamic gap between existence and the ideal that provides philosophy with its essential purpose: to rationally challenge the constraining and limiting features of the real, the actual, by an imaginative transcendence to authentic (as distinct from utopian) possibility. A social philosophy that ingests its world uncritically—ontologizing as "nature" or "necessity" the inequities and repressions and constraints that are specific to prevailing social conditions—not only renounces the primary obligation of reason, it invariably inclines towards ideology or a calculating pragmatics.3

The sociological exegesis of moral codes and philosophies—far from entailing any nihilistic relativism-allows us to evaluate such traditions with reference to their immediate circumstances of realization as well as their potential for effective trancendence. It is only by attending to both of these dimensions—the pragmatic and the transforming—that we can hope to avoid anachronistic appraisals as well as uncritical or relativistic acceptance of all that has hitherto passed for truth and virtue. Sociology and philosophy thus appear to be bound in a continuing and necessary dialogue.4 For the assessment of any philosophy's pragmatic viability and its capacity for constructive transcendence, as well as its manifest or latent ideological content—whether reactionary or utopian—can be determined only on the basis of accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the social-historical realities that comprise that philosophy's object. Sociology, being no less prone to reifying or ontologizing the momentary conditions it observes, correspondingly requires the critical, transcending edge of philosophy to avoid similar ideological capitulations. The challenge of relativism is not to be overcome by unrealistic appeals to universals or absolutes, but by reflexive recognition that the human condition is a socially variable and historically dynamic complex: determination of what is existentially "necessary" and what is "possible" must be made on a recurring basis.

Glossary of Greek Terms

- agathos—good, brave, noble; when used as a label of social identification, hoi agathoi, those distinguished by birth and rank.
- agôn—contest, struggle; from whence agônia, the competitive striving for excellence and distinction that constitutes the principal animating current of Hellenic culture.
- apolis—the condition of being without a country, without civic rights, most commonly as a consequence of enforced exile from one's native polis.
- apragmones—those 'uninvolved' citizens, typically wealthy, who minimized their civic commitments through apragmosunê, i.e., a deliberate disengagement from public affairs in favor of sundry private pleasures and interests.
- aretê—excellence, prowess, proficiency (most notably in battle); later transmuted into the more generalized notion of virtue.

aristoi—the best men in birth and rank, i.e., aristocrats or nobles.

autarkeia-self-sufficiency.

autourgoi—self-workers, i.e., the citizen farmers or peasants.

barbaroi-non-Greeks.

beltistoi—the best in birth and rank; a synonym for aristoi.

dêmos—the community of citizens generally, but more commonly used as a label for the civic masses, as distinct from the aristoi.

dikê—that which is right, proper, just.

douleia—servitude, bondage, slavery; e.g., the Spartan Helots were deemed douloi tou koinou, 'slaves of the community'.

eleutheria—liberty or freedom; liberality as a personal virtue.

esthlos—the action, object, or person that is good or noble.

eudaimonia—literally 'having a good demon or spirit inside one', i.e., the joy that attends prosperity and worldly success; for philosophers, the ideal of human flourishing, well-being, for which 'happiness' is a somewhat pale rendering.

eunomia—the political ideal of 'good order', later a rallying cry for oligarchs and conservatives yearning for lost hereditary privileges.

hetairos-comrade, companion, friend.

hetaireia, hetaireiai—club, faction; associations that typically combined social fellowship with political concerns and mobilization.

isonomia—the political ideal of 'equal order', generally understood as entailing civic equality within the civic body, particularly in the legal sphere.

kaloikagathoi—the noble and the good, i.e., those of privileged birth and cultural refinement.

kakos, kakoi—bad, vile, worthless, lowly born; a term of derogation used by the hereditary aristoi in reference to commoners, the lower strata.

koinônia—community, fellowship, that shared in common; most classically as the koinônia tôn politôn, the community of citizens.

klêros-one's share, allotment, i.e., plot of land.

logos—reason, word, speech; for philosophers, the rational, whether as cosmic principle or as individual reason.

moira-portion or share, generalized as fate or destiny.

oikos—the household, encompassing familial as well as proprietary relations.

paideia-socialization, education.

pneuma-the breath of life, spirit.

polis, poleis-city-state, i.e., the civic collectivity.

politeia—constitution, the allocation of citizenship rights.

polloi-the many, the civic masses.

psychê—the life-force or soul.

stasis-civic strife, factionalism.

themis—that which is right, customary, proper.

timê—honor, respect, distinction; as embodied in *philotimia*, the love of honor.

Tychê—the goddess of fate.

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INTRODUCTION: THE POLIS AND THE "SPIRIT" OF HELLENISM

- 1. Simonides, frg. 95, in J. M. Edmonds, Lyra Graeca, vol. II; Jacob Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte, vol. I, chapter 2, "Die Polis." Two modern variants on Burckhardt's theme are Pierre Vidal-Naquet's "Greek Rationality and the City" and Oswyn Murray's "Cities of Reason."
- 2. Among the more significant studies in this area are Max Weber, Economy and Society, and his various works on the major world religions; Henri Frankfort, et al., Before Philosophy; Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism; Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China; J.-P. Vernant, Les Origines de la pensée grecque; G. E. R. Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience, and Demystifying Mentalities. For a stimulating comparative overview, see the special issue of Daedalus, "Wisdom, Revelation, and Doubt: Perspectives on the First Millennium B.C." An interdisciplinary follow-up is The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt.
- 3. In addition to the works cited above, M. T. Larsen, ed., Power and Propaganda: A Symposium on Ancient Empires, and B. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China.
- 4. See especially Lloyd's Magic, Reason and Experience, and his more recent The Revolutions of Wisdom.
- 5. The later Greeks themselves inaugurated this "decadence" and "decline" theme, when reflecting on their earlier history and past "glories" while under Roman domination. For an introduction, see the stimulating article by E. L. Bowie, "Greeks and Their Past in the Second Sophistic."
- 6. Eduard Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 17; Moses Hadas, The Essential Works of Stoicism, pp. vii-viii; M. I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks, p. 154; Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, p. 100.
- 7. F. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, p. 23; C. B. Welles, "Alexander's Historical Achievement," pp. 227–28, to which I have appended a line from Welles' *Alexander and the Hellenistic World*, p. 137.
- 8. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 3. For a fuller treatment, see David Sedley's "The Protagonists," wherein the following is noted: "It has always been tempting to see [Hellenistic ethical philosophy] as a deliberate response to a cry for help—an attempt to restore moral purpose to life in an age when dynastic rule had stifled the old type of participatory city-state and was depriving the Greek citizen

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of a role in the politics in his own city. This claim has not yet been substantiated (p. 3)." The study presented here aims to provide that documentary support, though the sociological interpretion to be advanced will depart from the "standard view" in several significant respects.

1. THE END OF THE BRONZE AGE

- 1. For an excellent overview, see M. I. Finley, Early Greece: The Bronze and Archaic Ages. Still relevant thematically is V. Gordon Childe's panoramic, What Happened in History. A penetrating sociological synthesis is offered by Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1, which also contains a valuable bibliography.
- 2. Essential for the immediate post-Mycenaean phase is Anthony Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece. See also Robert Drews, The Coming of the Greeks, which critically appraises existing interpretations; his recently published The End of the Bronze Age, advances a compelling military explanation for the collapse of the chariot aristocracies at the hands of javelin-hurling barbarians.
 - 3. Thucydides I.2 (book-section).
- 4. Anthony Snodgrass, Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment; see also his An Archaeology of Greece, chapter 6, where his earlier depopulation thesis is modified by the suggestion that the adoption of pastoral practices is likely to have contributed to the abandonment of fixed settlements.
 - 5. See A. Andrewes, Greek Society, chapter 3.
- 6. Andrewes has discussed this more fully in his *The Greek Tyrants*, chapter V.
- 7. A thorough investigation calculating the number of classical poleis is E. Ruschenbusch, "Die Zahl der griechischen Staaten und Arealgrösse und Bürgerzahl der Normalpolis," who estimates some seven hundred and fifty communities in the core area alone.
- 8. For various revealing accounts of the "European miracle" of the fifteenth century, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; E. L. Jones, The European Miracle; John Hall, Powers and Liberties; and Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1.

2. DARK AGE GREECE

2.I Social Structure: The Oikos and the Community

1. The account presented here owes much to the following distinguished studies: M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*; Oswyn Murray, *Early Greece*; J. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece*; and A. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece*.

2. The military nature of the tribes and phratries is examined in V. Ehrenberg, The Greek State, chapter I. A thorough investigation is D. Roussel, Tribu et Cité.

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- 3. Max Weber, General Economic History, chapter XXVIII, is fundamental on the social origins of citizenship and civic communalism; the quoted passage is found on pp. 320–21.
 - 4. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 471-505.
 - 5. See John Boardman, The Greeks Overseas.
 - 6. See Martin Nilsson, Homer and Mycenae, pp. 235-41.
- 7. Michael Jameson, "Private Space and the Greek City," chapter 7 in *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander*, edited by O. Murray and Price.
 - 8. V. Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p. 58.
 - 9. M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus, pp. 83-84.
- 10. On the coupling of martial prowess and discursive skills, see *Iliad* II.273 (book-verse), XVIII.105ff., XVIII.252; *Odyssey* XIV.491. Several interesting parallels with ancient Germanic practices are drawn out by W. G. Runciman, "Origins of States: The Case of Archaic Greece."
 - 11. Odyssey II.32; II.44.
- 12. On the potential threat from an offended or hardpressed commons, see Odyssey III.214–15, XVI.95–98, 114, 375–83, 425–27. As in other aspects, the early Viking Age here displays a similar constellation: see P. Foote and D. Wilson, The Viking Achievement.
- 13. It must be stressed that the warrior-nobles do not simply command, but must cajole and negotiate with their social inferiors. To appreciate the sociological significance, try imagining a commoner like Thersites mocking and rebuking Pharaoh, Hammurabi, or the Chinese Emperor, the way he does Agamemnon and Odysseus.
- 14. On the paradox of communalism and civic factionalism, see M. I. Finley's illuminating introduction to *The Legacy of Greece*, along with his own opening chapter to that edited volume. See also Nicole Loraux, "Reflections of the Greek City on Unity and Division."
- 15. The most thorough study of civic factionalism over the fifth and fourth centuries is that of H.-J. Gehrke, Stasis.
- 16. The term "political guild" is Weber's; see especially "The City," chapter XVI in *Economy and Society*. J. K. Davies's "Athenian Citizenship: The Descent Group and the Alternatives" is an essential read.
 - 17. Iliad XVIII.497-508; on oath-taking, XXIII.571ff.

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- 18. Ibid., IX.156; on the principle of kin vengeance, Odyssey XXIV.433-35. Aristotle reviews the legal functions of the Heroic kingship in Politics III.ix.7-8.
- 19. In addition to Weber's comparative work on the similarities and differences between the ancient and the medieval city, see M. I. Finley's "The Ancient City: From Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond," reprinted in his Economy and Society in Ancient Greece.
- 20. T. Kelly, A History of Argos, and for Athens, A. Snodgrass, Archaic Greece. Robin Hägg, ed., The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C., contains many valuable archaeological reports on various regions and communities.
- 21. Iliad V.478-81, XV.496-98; Odyssey XIV.64. An excellent overview of the domestic scene is offered by W.K. Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece. Analytically insightful is Sally Humphries, The Family, Women and Death.
- 22. See A. Snodgrass, An Archaeology of Greece; Finley's The World of Odysseus provides a close analysis of the economic life depicted in the epics.
- 23. See especially Odyssey II.252, "Come then, all people disperse now, each to his own holdings" (Richard Lattimore's translation).
- 24. Weber discusses domestic slavery in Economy and Society, pp. 692–94. Comprehensive is Orlando Patterson's Slavery and Social Death. Among the more revealing passages in Homer are Odyssey XIV.55–71, XV.350–79.
- 25. Odyssey I.357. The predominance of female slaves in this early period can be explained in terms of social control and labor requirement factors. For the broader implications, see Gerda Lerner's The Creation of Patriarchy.
 - 26. Odyssey XIV.288-89, XV.415-19.
- 27. An excellent introduction is to be found in A. R. Burn's The World of Hesiod.
 - 28. Hesiod, Works and Days 363, 382.
 - 29. Ibid., 176-78.
 - 30. For the distribution of war spoils, Iliad I.135-71, XI.704-5.
 - 31. Hesiod, Works and Days 451-52.
 - 32. Ibid., 340-41.
- 33. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece*, remains basic. Mate selection practices in the epics are examined by M. I. Finley in "Marriage, Sale and Gift in the Homeric world," reprinted in his *Economy and Society*.
 - 34. Iliad II.363 and IX.63.

- 35. See the discussion in O. Murray, Early Greece, chapter 3.
- 36. Hesiod, Works and Days 344-45, 397-402.
- 37. For an overview on the social position of women, see S. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves.
 - 38. An example of concubinage in the epics is Odyssey XIV.200-5.
 - 39. Hesiod, Works and Days 695-705.
- 40. For landholding patterns see Alison Burford Cooper, "The Family Farm in Greece."
 - 41. Hesiod, Works and Days 376-80.
- 42. Much of the darkness enveloping early Greek demography is dispelled by Robert Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World*, a highly original interdisciplinary study.
 - 43. Odyssey XIV.220-28.
 - 44. Odyssey XVII.382-87 (Richard Lattimore's translation).
 - 45. Hesiod, Works and Days 25-26.
- 46. As late as 403 BC, approximately 80% of the Athenian citizens were landholders. Chester Starr's *The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece*, 800–500 BC provides an account of land tenure arrangements and agrarian productivity. Thomas Gallant's *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece* offers an analytically compelling reconstruction of the life situation of the typical peasant household.

2.II Norms and Values: The Ethos of the Warrior-Aristocracy

- 1. The literature on "Homeric culture" is extensive, but among the more salient studies are Werner Jaeger's Paideia; E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational; M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus; A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility; and H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus.
 - 2. For a similar martial constellation, see Marc Bloch's classic Feudal Society.
- 3. The socialization practices of the aristoi are cogently reviewed by H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, chapter 1.
 - 4. Iliad II,198-202.
 - 5. Aristotle, Politics 1256b.
 - 6. Iliad II.225-31; cf. I.154-57, XI.670ff. on pillaging.
 - 7. Odyssey VIII.159-64, XIX.395-96.

- 8. Iliad XII.310-21; as defenders of their native land, the Trojans naturally give greater expression to these principles than the invading Greeks. Cf. Odyssey XIV.199-258, which also underscores the warrior's communal service.
 - 9. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals.
- 10. A notable exception is the swineherd Eumaeus, Odysseus' loyal servant, who, though a slave, is given the epithets dios ('divine' or 'godlike') and esthlos ('noble' or 'good') on several occasions (XIV.3; XV.301; XV.558), and is said to lead an agathos bios, a noble or 'good life' (XV.491). Adkins, Merit and Responsibility and elsewhere, ignores this evidence, and in general limits his otherwise stimulating studies by adhering to rather monolithic, one-sided conceptions of Hellenic moral codes. Perhaps he was overly influenced by the "common value system" approach then current in functionalist sociology. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, offers several telling criticisms of Adkins' "competitive"/"cooperative" dualism but is himself inclined to emphasize cultural "continuity" to such an extent that essential differences between the Homeric, Archaic, and Classical normative orientations are effectively blurred.
- 11. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, entry 45. It should be noted, however, that Nietzsche bypasses the issue of the warrior's communal obligation to his city, as succinctly rendered in Hektor's remark, "One interpretation of an omen is best, and that is to fight for one's homeland (patris)," Iliad XII.243.
 - 12. Iliad XI.784.
- 13. The shame-culture aspects of Homeric society are examined by Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, chapters I and II.
 - 14. See Alvin Gouldner's stimulating Enter Plato, pp. 81-98.
 - 15. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, chapter xi.
 - 16. Iliad XII.322-28.
 - 17. Odyssey I.236–42, V.306–12, XIV.365–71.
- 18. An authoritative survey is offered by Walter Burkert, Greek Religion. Martin Nilsson's A History of Greek Religion is still of considerable value.
- 19. I have explored these issues at greater length in "Intellectuals and Religion in Ancient Greece: Notes on a Weberian Theme."
- 20. Herodotus II.53, observes that it was Homer and Hesiod "who composed for the Greeks the genealogy of the gods, gave the gods their names, distributed their honors and functions, and depicted their forms."
- 21. Iliad XI.807; XVIII.490-505; I.196, 445; 204-6; Odyssey XIV.420-21. Walter Burkert, Homo Necans, provides a brilliant analysis.
 - 22. Weber, Economy and Society, chapter VI.

- 23. Burkert, Greek Religion, is particularly attentive to the archaeology.
- 24. See Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, chapter V.
- 25. M. Nilsson, Greek Folk Religion, p. 115.
- 26. See Weber's short account in Economy and Society, pp. 403-7; still worth consulting is N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City, chapter II, "The Worship of the Dead."
- 27. For the importance of the family hearth, see Nilsson's Greek Folk Religion, pp. 72-76. More analytical is L. Gernet, The Anthropology of Ancient Greece, chapter 15.
 - 28. Odyssey XIX,303-5.
 - 29. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution LV.3-4.
- 30. On this fundamental distinction, see Weber, Economy and Society, p. 414.
 - 31. Aristotle, Politics 1252b27-29.
 - 32. See the discussion in Burkert, Greek Religion, chapter III.
 - 33. Iliad IX,498.
 - 34. Ibid., XXIV.602-17.
 - 35. Odyssey VII.120; VIII.575; IX.175.
- 36. Iliad XVI.435; Odyssey III.326. Lloyd-Jones is accordingly quite mistaken when he asserts that moira "is in the last resort identical to the will of Zeus," The Justice of Zeus, pp. 5, 166.
- 37. Iliad XXIV.533, VIII.69, XXII.209, XVI.658, XIX.223; Odyssey VII.197.
 - 38. Max Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 472-73.
- 39. A stimulating exegesis is offered by Walter Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy.
 - 40. Odyssey XI.475-76.
 - 41. Ibid., XI.488-91.
 - 42. Iliad XXIV.523; Odyssey VI.188-90.
- 43. talasiphronos, polytlas; an excellent account of Homeric vocabulary can be found in G. S. Kirk, Homer and the Epic.
- 44. Adkins in particular regards the Olympians as morally bankrupt, whereas Lloyd-Jones adopts the counterposition. As usual, Weber's brief remarks set the

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issue in its proper perspective; see Economy and Society, chapter VI, sections ii.5, "Ethical Deities and Increasing Demands on Them," and i.4, "Pantheon and Functional Gods."

- 45. Odyssey XIV.83-84.
- 46. Ibid., XIV.284; Iliad XVI.384-88.
- 47. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, provides a comprehensive account of the emergence of several Olympian deities from primordial nature spirits.
 - 48. Nilsson's Greek Folk Religion is particularly attentive to these issues.
- 49. Weber's discussion of the religious propensities of peasant strata is found in chapter VI of *Economy and Society*.
- 50. I discuss this at greater length in "Intellectuals and Religion in Ancient Greece."

3. ARCHAIC GREECE

3.I Social Structure: The Emergence of Polis Society

3.I.i Social Change in the Early Archaic Age

- 1. The present discussion owes much the following studies: V. Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates; A. Andrewes, Greek Society; M. I. Finley, Early Greece: The Bronze and Archaic Ages; O. Murray, Early Greece; A. Snodgrass, Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment; and L. H. Jeffrey, Archaic Greece: The City-States, c. 700-500 B.C., a detailed developmental treatment along regional lines.
- 2. Snodgrass, Archaic Greece, chapter 1. All questions regarding demography must now take into account Robert Sallares' The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World, which provides a comprehensive contextual analysis and concludes in favor of a substantial population boom for this period, contra Ian Morris' Burial and Ancient Society.
 - 3. Snodgrass, Archaic Greece, pp. 35-38; Sallares, The Ecology, chapter III.
- 4. An excellent survey is provided by Jeffrey Hurwit, The Art and Culture of Early Greece, 1100-480 B.C.
 - 5. See Burkert, Homo Necans.
 - 6. Weber, Economy and Society, chapter XVI, section ii, "The City."
- 7. See Weber's discussion of "citizenship" in his General Economic History, chapter XXVIII.
 - 8. See Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants, chapter I.

- 9. A very detailed survey is offered by L. Whibley, Greek Oligarchies.
- 10. Aristotle, Politics 1297b35-1298a4.
- 11. A comprehensive treatment can be found in John Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*.
- 12. On the major economic developments of the period, see Chester Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 800-500 BC; M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, The Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece; and Karl Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man.
- 13. M. I. Finley provides a critical overview in his *The Ancient Economy*; see also P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. Whittaker, *Trade in the Ancient Economy*.
 - 14. Hesiod, Works and Days 646-48.
- 15. On slavery, see Finley, The Ancient Economy, chapter III, and the related essays in Economy and Society in Ancient Greece.

3.I.ii Hoplites and Tyrants in an Age of Transition

- 1. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 474-76 (Martin Nicolaus's translation).
- 2. W. K. Pritchett's multivolume *The Greek State at War* is comprehensive; the best general synthesis is Yvon Garlan, *War in the Ancient World*. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix provides a useful list of the major interpolis conflicts in his *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 218–20.
 - 3. Snodgrass, Archaic Greece, pp. 130ff.
 - 4. Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte, vol. I, p. 308.
- 5. Aristotle, *Politics* 1256b23-26; 1255b38-39. I explore this more fully in "Military Technology and Socio-Cultural Change in the Ancient Greek City."
- 6. Aristotle, Politics 1297b16–23. Only the wealthy could afford the expenses involved in maintaining horses. An informative review of Archaic cavalry practices is provided by P. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare. On the military and social significance of the stirrup, see the brilliant essay by Lynn White, Medieval Technology and Social Change, chapter I.
- 7. The subject of the "Hoplite reform" is explored in A. Snodgrass, "The Hoplite Reform and History"; P. Cartledge, "Hoplites and Heroes"; J. Salmon, "Political Hoplites?"; A. J. Holladay, "Hoplites and Heresies"; and in various articles collected by Victor Hanson, Hoplites.
 - 8. See Salmon's cogent discussion in "Political Hoplites?"
- 9. See P. Krentz, "Casualties in Hoplite Battles." Victor Hanson provides a masterly account of actual hoplite combat in his *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*.

- 10. See Murray, Early Greece, p. 133. In the colonial world and in Ionia, the history of tyranny is complicated by relations with neighboring foreign powers-Carthage in the west, Persia in the east-and so our discussion here is confined to those cases where tyranny constituted a response to internal developments. The best survey remains Andrewes' The Greek Tyrants, usefully supplemented by H. W. Pleket's "The Archaic Tyrannis."
 - 11. Aristotle, Politics 1315b27-29.
 - 12. Aristotle, Politics 1305a22-26.
 - 13. Thomas More, Utopia, p. 23.
 - 14. Aristotle, Politics 1315b13-23.
 - 15. This is the interpretation offered by Andrewes, Greek Tyrants, p. 65.
- 16. Alkaios' embittered attacks on Pittakos are preserved in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers I.81.
 - 17. Aristotle, Politics 1285a30-b1.
- 18. Alkaios, frg. 129, in E. Lobel and D. Page, eds., Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta.
 - 19. Herodotus III.82; Plato, Republic 565d.
 - 20. Aristotle, Politics 1310b12-17.
- 21. Polykrates gained the tyranny of Samos in part because of external military threats, as did Dionysios of Syracuse. For details on the former, see G. Shipley, A History of Samos.
 - 22. Both Snodgrass and Salmon incline to this view.
- 23. See especially Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants; Murray, Early Greece, chapter 9; and Snodgrass, Archaic Greece, pp. 115ff.
 - 24. M. I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks, p. 29.

3.I.iii Sparta's Perfection of the Warriors' Guild

- 1. For early Spartan history, I have relied heavily on Paul Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, and P. Oliva, Sparta and Her Social Problems. M. I. Finley's learned sociological piece, "Sparta and Spartan Society," is a necessary read, reprinted in his Economy and Society.
 - 2. Tyrtaios, frg. 4, in E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca.
 - 3. Tyrtaios, frg. 4.
 - 4. Terpander, frg. 4, in Anthologia Lyrica Graeca.

- 5. Alkman, frgs. 10 and 100, in Anthologia Lyrica Graeca.
- 6. Herodotus, I.65; Thucydides, I.18.
- 7. See W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy, chapter 5.

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- 8. Aristotle, Politics 1306b38-1307a3; Tyrtaios, frg. 8.
- 9. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants, p. 75.
- 10. Here I follow Finley, "Sparta and Spartan Society," in his Economy and Society. Also useful is Ehrenberg's From Solon to Socrates, chapter 2.
- 11. See Oliva, Sparta and Her Social Problem, for an overview of land tenure arrangements. In comparative terms, Spartan klêroi were rather substantial, as the estimated size for the typical hoplite farm in Athens is between fifteen and twenty acres; see Alison Burford Cooper, "The Family Farm in Greece," and V. N. Andrevey, "Some aspects of agrarian conditions in Attica in the fifth to the third centuries."
 - 12. Pausanias, Guide to Greece III.21,6.
 - 13. Xenophon, Hellenika III.3.6.
 - 14. Plutarch, Lycurgus 28.
 - 15. Thucydides IV.80: V.31.
 - 16. See R. T. Ridley, "The Economic Activities of the Perioikoi,"
 - 17. See Aristotle's reflections, Politics 1265b32-a2.
- 18. See, e.g., Herodotus VI.61, VII.134; Xenophon, Hellenika V.3, A. J. Holladay's "Spartan Austerity" provides an informative overview.
- 19. See Henri Marrou's learned discussion in A History of Education in Antiquity, chapter 2.
 - 20. Plutarch, Lycurgus 16.
- 21. Marrou relates that in Thebes and Krete it was customary for a hoplite to offer his pederastic "beloved" a suit of armor along with other weaponry, A History of Education in Antiquity, chapter 3.
 - 22. Xenophon, The Constitution of the Spartans I.4.
 - 23. Plutarch, Lycurgus 15.
 - 24. Plutarch, Lycurgus 25.
 - 25. Ehrenberg's From Solon to Socrates provides a cogent reading.
 - 26. See E. Rawson, The Spartan Tradition in European Thought.

- 27. Sparta as 'man tamer' (damasimbroton) comes from the poet Simonides, quoted in Plutarch's Agesilaus 1.
 - 28. Herodotus I.66.
- 29. Ste. Croix's The Origins of the Peloponnesian War provides a discerning overview of Spartan foreign policy.
 - 30. Thucydides I.19.

3.I.iv Toward Democracy in Athens

- 1. In addition to the general surveys of the Archaic period already mentioned, see Philip Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*, which also provides several instructive anthropological comparisons.
 - 2. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution III.6.
- 3. See Weber's historical overview in Economy and Society, chapter II, sections 6 to 13 in particular.
- 4. On this contentious subject, see the lucid discussion in Murray, Early Greece, pp. 223-26.
 - 5. Solon, frg. 1, verses 71-73, in Diehl's Anthologia.
- 6. There are slightly differing versions of the Kylon affair: Herodotus V.71; Thucydides I.126; Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution* frg. 8; and Plutarch, Solon 12.
 - 7. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution II.1-2.
- 8. Ibid., II.2 (edouleuon hoi penêtes tois plousiois), (hê de pasa gê dia oligôn ên); also V.1, 'the many were enslaved to the few' (tôn pollôn douleuontôn tois oligois).
 - 9. Plutarch, Solon 2.
 - 10. Solon is quoted to that effect in Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution V.3.
- 11. On the social crisis in Athens, see Finley, "Land, Debt, and the Man of Property in Classical Athens," reprinted in his *Economy and Society*, chapter 4; and Murray, *Early Greece*, chapter 11, who revives the earlier theory of Fustel de Coulanges.
- 12. Finley stresses the role of labor services in "Debt-bondage and the Problem of Slavery," *Economy and Society*, chapter 9.
 - 13. Solon, frg. 24.
- 14. Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution* VII.3-4. Solon's classification scheme is somewhat obscure, for the highest group is given a purely economic

label, whereas the next two seem to be based on a military criterion: the hippeis constituting the cavalry, the zeugitai the hoplites whose shields were "yoked together" in the phalanx. The thêtes are essentially a residual category, presumably encompassing all the lower sections of the dêmos. How the nonagricultural sectors, such as craftsmen, were classified is not known, nor do our sources relate how census arrangements were carried out. An interesting example of social mobility is preserved by Aristotle, who cites verses inscribed on a statue dedicated to the gods in celebration of an individual's rise from the ranks of the thêtes to the hippeis—quite a leap upwards (section VII.4).

- 15. Aristotle, Politics 1274a16-24.
- 16. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution IX.1-2.
- 17. Plutarch, Solon 19.
- 18. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution VIII.4-5.
- 19. See Gagarin's comprehensive Early Greek Law.
- 20. Solon, frg. 3.30-39.
- 21. Solon is quoted in Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution XII.1-2.
- 22. Ibid., XII.2.
- 23. Ibid., V.3; XII.5.
- 24. See Aristotle's review, The Athenian Constitution XIII.4-5.
- 25. Aristotle, Politics IV.ix.
- 26. Ibid., 1313b18-26.
- 27. Ibid., 1314b39-1315a4.
- 28. Herodotus V.94; VI.35.
- 29. Ibid., V.66 (to dêmon pros-hetairizetai).
- 30. Ibid., V.77.
- 31. The Kleisthenic reforms are discussed in Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, chapter 4; Murray, Early Greece, chapter 15; and W. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy, chapters 8 and 9. Most detailed is David Whitehead, The Demes of Attica.
 - 32. Aristotle, Politics 1319b20-21.
 - 33. N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City, chapter IV, section vii.2.
 - 34. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution XXI.3 (anamisgesthai to plêthos).

- 35. See the informative analysis of G. Vlastos, "Isonomia."
- 36. Herodotus V.90-96.

3.II Norms and Values: The Articulation of the Polis-Citizen Bond

3.II.i Aristocratic Supremacy in the Early Archaic Age: Hereditary Virtue and the Agonal Ideal

- 1. Among the more informative works are E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational; W. Jaeger's multivolume Paideia; and A. W. H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece. An excellent source book, featuring both literary and epigraphic materials, has been compiled by M. Crawford and D. Whitehead, eds., Archaic and Classical Greece.
 - 2. For Homer as the "educator of Hellas," see Plato, Republic 606e.
- 3. Extended discussions can be found in J. Coldstream, "Hero Cults in the Age of Homer," and Ian Morris, "Tomb Cult and the 'Greek Renaissance.'"
- 4. A technical philological analysis for those with competence in Greek is offered by D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*; for a general account, consult C. M. Bowra, *Landmarks in Greek Literature*, chapters 3 and 4.
 - 5. See G. Kirk, Homer and the Epic, chapters 19 and 20.
- 6. A vast literature has grown up around the "literacy" question, first brought to prominence in Jack Goody's *Literacy in Traditional Societies*. For details on the Greek situation, see Rosalind Thomas' *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*.
- 7. Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens. For a comprehensive treatment of the Greek case, accompanied by superb pictorials, see Michael Poliakoff's Combat Sports in the Ancient World.
 - 8. Odyssey VIII.159.
- 9. For an authoritative survey, see H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity.
- 10. Alkman, frg. 100, in Diehl's Anthologia Lyrica Graeca. For Ares and the Muses, see Pindar, Pythian Ode I.
- 11. This central institution is examined in O. Murray, "The Symposium as Social Organization," and more comprehensively in his edited volume, Sympotica.
- 12. Alkaios, frg. 363, in Lobel and Page, eds., Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta.
- 13. The best account remains Jacob Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte, vol. IV, chapter II, "Der koloniale und agonale Mensch."
 - 14. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1367a28-33.

3.II.ii The Dêmos in Dependency: Peasant Values and the Cry for Social Justice

- 1. An excellent overview is provided by A. R. Burn, The World of Hesiod.
- 2. Hesiod, Works and Days 11-26.
- 3. Odyssey VIII.523-30 (translation by Richard Lattimore).
- 4. Homer's celebration of combat is expressed in the style of "narrative realism," which provides graphic description of the physical and emotional dimensions involved; see the illuminating remarks by Nietzsche in "Homer's Contest," The Portable Nietzsche. For comparative purposes, consult Marc Bloch's fascinating account in Feudal Society, chapter XXII, "The Life of the Nobility."
- 5. The key work on the cultural forms of peasant protest is James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.
 - 6. Cited in Plutarch's "Sayings of Spartans," Moralia 223a.
 - 7. Hesiod, Works and Days 308-13.
- 8. For a discussion of other "peasant virtues," see the excellent study by Walter Donlan, The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece, chapter 1.
- 9. This basic point of political sociology was first registered by Aristotle, *Politics* 1318b4.
 - 10. Hesiod, Works and Days 225-47; cf. Odyssey XIX.109-14.
 - 11. Hesiod, Theogony 201-2.
 - 12. Hesiod, Works and Days 252-53.
 - 13. Ibid., 276–80; 248–51.
 - 14. Ibid., 270-73.
- 15. Ibid., 202–11. The use of animal fables to convey oppositional social attitudes is a well-known practice among oppressed strata, beginning with the miscellaneous tales attributed to the Greek slave Aesop (sixth century BC?) and as further exemplified in the Reynard the Fox tales of medieval Europe and the Brer Rabbit stories which flourished under the regime of plantation slavery in the Old South.

3.II.iii The Rise of Hoplite Heroes and Codification of the Polis Ideal

- 1. See Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, pp. 115-16, 283.
- 2. A penetrating account of the social psychological consequences of formation discipline is offered by Weber, chapter X in From Max Weber.

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- 3. A comprehensive examination of "temperance" and its historical vicissitudes can be found in Helen North, *Sophrosyne*.
- 4. The heavy hoplite shield alone weighed in at some sixteen pounds, and with cuirass, greaves, helmet, massive spear and supplemental sword, the warrior fought with fifty to seventy pounds of armament. This helps explain the conspicuous presence of body servants who carried armor for their hoplite, and the tendency to don equipment just prior to engagement. On these and related details, see Hanson, The Western Way of War, especially chapter 6, "The Burden of Hoplite Arms and Armor."
- 5. P. Greenhalgh, "Patriotism in the Homeric World," offers an astute and much-needed corrective on this issue.
- 6. Tyrtaios, frg. 10.1-4, 18, and frg. 11.4-6, in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, vol. I.
 - 7. Tyrtaios, frg. 12.23-39; cf. Kallinos, frg. 1.18-20, in Edmonds.
 - 8. Tyrtaios, frg. 12.1-20.
 - 9. Hesiod, Works and Days 192.
- 10. Solon, frg. 3.1-29, in Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca. The rather pointed phrase regarding "malevolent men in associations dear to the unjust" is clear reference to the oligarchically minded hetaireiai or 'political clubs' which served as centers of factional intrigue.
 - 11. See J. Goldstein, "Solon's Law for an Activist Citizenry."
- 12. For a wider discussion on the "moderation" theme, see Helen North, Sophrosyne.
 - 13. Solon, frg. 24.18-20.
- 14. Michael Gagarin's Early Greek Law is particularly informative on the social context of law creation in the early Polis.
- 15. This and other relevant material is assembled and cogently examined in Victor Ehrenberg, "When did the Polis Rise?" For Argos specifically, see T. Kelly, A History of Argos. See also the important study by Snodgrass, Archaeology and the Rise of the Greek State.
- 16. See the sections on Thales, Solon, Chilon, Pittakos, Bias, Kleobulus, Periander, and Myson in Book 1 of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, which collects the various gnomic sayings and anecdotes of the Seven Sages.
 - 17. Archilochus, frg. 22; and Phokylides, frg. 12, both in Diehl's Anthologia.

- 3.II.iv Troubled Aristocrats, Confident Commoners, and the Contest for Status Honor and Self-Affirmation
- 1. An excellent overview is provided by Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal*; see also P. A. L. Greenhalgh, "Aristocracy and its Advocates in Archaic Greece." Mannheim's pioneering work is now available in a full English translation, Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge.

Notes

- 2. M. L. West's "The Life and Times of Theognis," and Ronald Legon's Megara provide two differing reconstructions of early Megarian social history. See also the interpretive and exegetical offerings in *Theognis of Megara*, edited by T. J. Figueira and G. Nagy.
 - 3. Theognis, Elegies 1109-12, in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, vol. 1.
 - 4. Ibid., 1117-18; cf. 523-24.
 - 5. Ibid., 53-60.
 - 6. Ibid., 173-78; cf. 315 (many agathoi are poor).
 - 7. Ibid., 649-52; 669.
- 8. The Spartan Aristodemus is quoted by Alkaios, frg. 101, in Lobel and Page, eds., Poetarum Lesborium Fragmenta.
 - 9. Theognis, Elegies 979-82, 382-83, 315-18, 149-50, 155.
 - 10. Ibid., 183-92.
 - 11. Ibid., 193-96.
 - 12. Ibid., 621-22.
 - 13. Here I follow Legon's interpretation.
 - 14. Theognis, Elegies 947-48 (a state official?), 543 (a judge?), 147-48.
- 15. Ibid., 69–72, 101–4, 113–14, 955–56; on the difficulty of finding trustworthy comrades, 73–76, 77–78, 79–82, 87–92, 93–100, 415–16, 641–46, 697–98, 851–52; on having been betrayed, 575–76, 811–14, 861.
 - 16. Ibid., 119-24; cf. 117-18, 963-64.
 - 17. Ibid., 61–65.
 - 18. Ibid., 1071-74.
- 19. Ibid., 213-18. The "boneless one" is Hesiod's phrase, Works and Days 524.
 - 20. Aristotle, Politics 1304b35-40.

- 21. Theognis, Elegies 289-94.
- 22. Alkaios, frg. 130, in Lobel and Page, eds., Poetarum Lesborium Fragmenta.
 - 23. Theognis, Elegies 1197-1202; cf. 825-32, 341-50.
 - 24. Aristotle, Politics 1302b31-1304b40, 1300a15-19.
 - 25. Theognis, Elegies 847-50.
 - 26. See the discussion in Murray, Early Greece, pp. 199ff.
 - 27. Mimnermus, frg. 1, in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, vol. 1.
 - 28. Theognis, Elegies 973-78.
 - 29. Scholia 890, in Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry.
 - 30. See Walter Donlan, "The Origins of Kalos Kagathos."
- 31. An informative overview is provided by P. Kidson, "The Figural Arts." Comprehensive is J. Hurwit, The Art and Culture of Early Greece.
 - 32. M. Bowra, Landmarks in Greek Literature, p. 108.
- 33. Pindar, Nemean Ode III.40-41; Olympian Ode IX.100; Pythian Ode VIII.44-45; Olympian Ode X.20-21; cf. Olympian Ode XII.13, Nemean Odes VI.8, XI.12, Isthmian Ode III.13-14, and Pythian Ode X.20.
 - 34. Pindar, Pythian Ode VII.10ff.; cf. Olympian Ode II.95ff.
 - 35. Pindar, Pythian Ode X.71-72; Nemean Ode IX.49.
- 36. Fundamental is the work of Sir Kenneth Dover, Greek Homosexuality. See also G. Devereux, "Greek Pseudo-Homosexuality and the Greek Miracle"; J. Ungaretti, "Pederasty, Heroism and the Family in Ancient Greece"; and the same author's informative review of Dover, "De-Moralizing Morality: Where Dover's Greek Homosexuality Leaves Us." Alvin Gouldner's perceptive observations in Enter Plato, pp. 60–68, have not received the attention they deserve. On Sappho and "lesbianism," see Dover's discussion, pp. 171–84.
 - 37. Theognis, Elegies 19-38.
- 38. On gender inequalities in ancient Greece, consult the essays in Sexual Asymmetry: Studies in Ancient Society, edited by J. Blok and P. Mason. A valuable source book is Women's Life in Greece and Rome, edited by M. Lefkowitz and M. Fant. Valuable pictorial evidence is offered in Claude Bérard, "The Order of Women."
 - 39. See Kenneth Dover, "Classical Greek Attitudes to Sexual Behaviour."

- 40. Aristotle, *Politics* 1325a5-6. It is worth noting that Hellenic standards of feminine beauty incorporated the laboring dimension noted by Aristotle, in that whiteness of skin—an indicator of a leisured and segregated "interior" existence—was a prized attribute.
 - 41. Anakreon, frg. 359, in Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry.
- 42. Both Murray, Early Greece, and Donlan, The Aristocratic Ideal, are proponents of this thesis.
- 43. See Weber's illuminating discussion of the peasant as the "carrier" of ancient Greek democracy, *Economy and Society*, chapter XVI, sections iv and v.
 - 44. Basic is T. Gallant's Risk and Survival.
- 45. On the agrarian foundations of Greek religion see Nilsson, Greek Folk Religion.
- 46. Homeric Hymn XXX, "To Earth the Mother of All," in H. G. Evelyn-White, ed., Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Homerica.
- 47. See the comprehensive treatment in A. Burford, Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society.
 - 48. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 477, 494 (Martin Nicolaus translation).
- 49. Plato, Republic 495de; Aristotle, Politics 1328b39-41; cf. Politics 1278a21; Herodotus II.167.
 - 50. The materials quoted are drawn from Burford's Craftsmen.
 - 51. Homeric Hymn XX, "To Hephaistos."
 - 52. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 109-11 and, more generally, 443-506.
 - 53. G. Kirk, The Nature of Greek Myths, pp. 136-44.
 - 54. Homeric Hymn XVIII, "To Hermes," 13-15.
 - 55. Ibid., 116.
 - 56. Ibid., 170-71.
- 57. Norman O. Brown, "The Homeric Hymn to Hermes," in Hermes the Thief, pp. 66-89.
 - 58. Homeric Hymn XVIII, "To Hermes," 30-35.
 - 59. Ibid., 166-73.
 - 60. Ibid., 513-17.
 - 61. Plato, Cratylus 407e.

- 62. Brown, Hermes the Thief, p.87.
- 63. Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, chapter 3, is the modern point of departure.
 - 64. William McNeill, The Rise of the West, p. 205.

3.II.v From Myth to Science, and the Occult: The Quest for Knowledge and Salvation

- 1. G. E. R. Lloyd, Early Greek Science, p. 8. Lloyd's work provides not only the best introduction to this field, but also the most detailed. See also his Magic, Reason and Experience and The Revolutions of Wisdom.
- 2. See Nietzsche's brilliant analysis of the agonal dimension in his early Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.
- 3. I have discussed these issues at greater length in "Intellectuals and Religion in Ancient Greece."
- 4. Xenophanes, frgs. 16, 15, 14, pp. 168-69, in *The Presocratic Philosophers*, edited and translated by G. Kirk, J. Raven, and M. Schofield.
 - 5. Xenophanes, frg. 11, p.168.
 - 6. Ibid., frgs. 23, 26 and 25, p. 168.
 - 7. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, and Burkert, Greek Religion.
 - 8. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger.
 - 9. See now Walter Burkert, Ancient Mystery Cults.
 - 10. Theognis, Elegies 877-78; Anakreon, frg. 44, in Diehl's Anthologia.
- 11. See the judicious account in Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism.
- 12. On the tyrants and popular religion, see Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Ancient Greek Philosophers, pp. 57-58.
- 13. See E. L. Minar, Jr., Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory; and more generally, T. J. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks.

4. CLASSICAL GREECE

4.I. Slavery and the Material Foundations of Classical Civilization

1. The introductory quote derives from Percy Bysshe Shelley, "A Discourse on the Manners of the Ancient Greeks Relative to the Subject of Love," in Shelley's Prose, edited by David Clark. The passage from Marx is on p. 479 of the Grundrisse.

- 2. Max Weber, Economy and Society, chapter XVI, and his Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations and General Economic History.
- 3. As classically discussed in M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy; see also C. Mossé, The Ancient World at Work.
 - 4. Karl Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man, p. 1.
 - 5. Aristotle, Politics 1257a32-35 (H. Rackham's translation).
- 6. Hermippos, Stevedores, frg. 63, quoted in J. K. Davies, Democracy and Classical Greece, pp. 110-11.
- 7. On the pottery industry, see Burford, Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society.
 - 8. See D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic.
 - 9. Marc Bloch, French Rural History, p. 35.
 - 10. Hesiod, Works and Days 299-302.
- 11. Most informative are Robin Osborne, Classical Landscape with Figures, and T. W. Gallant, Risk and Survival.
- 12. Fundamental are Ste. Croix's Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World and the collection in M. I. Finley's Economy and Society. A valuable source book is Thomas Wiedemann's Greek and Roman Slavery.
 - 13. M. I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology.
 - 14. See Georges Duby, The Early Growth of the European Economy.
- 15. M. I. Finley, "Debt-Bondage and the Problem of Slavery," in Economy and Society.
- 16. M. I. Finley, "Between Slavery and Freedom," in his Economy and Society; and "The Emergence of a Slave Society," chapter II in Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology.
- 17. See Thucydides VIII.40, and the materials in Wiedemann's *Greek and Roman Slavery*, pp. 84–86. Most comprehensive is John Boardman and C. E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson, eds., *Chios*.
- 18. Ellen Wood's *Peasant-Citizen and Slave* is compromised by a failure to address all the varied evidence in favor of widespread ownership, apparently animated by an idealistic disposition to distance or exculpate the citizen-peasantry from the inhumanities of chattel slavery.
- 19. The "structural logic" of the situation can perhaps best be seen in comparison with the phase of "primitive accumulation" in the genesis of capitalism. As Marx discerned and documented, the forcible expropriation of peasant pro-

ducers from their own means of production constitutes an essential precondition for the emergence of both a mass market and its structural adjunct, a wage-labor system; see especially Capital, vol. I, Part VIII.

- 20. See Finley's "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour?" reprinted in his Economy and Society.
- 21. These estimates for the servile populations of Athens, Boeotia, and Sparta come from Ehrenberg's *The Greek State*, pp. 32-39; for Korinth, see J. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, p. 168. M. H. Hansen's Demography and Democracy is the most recent interpretation.
- 22. As consultation with the source materials collected in Wiedemann's Greek and Roman Slavery readily confirms.
- 23. On slavery in the Old South, see K. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution; E. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll; and the more specialized offerings in The Slave Economies, vol. 1, edited by E. Genovese.
- 24. Ste. Croix's The Class Struggle provides the most comprehensive treatment.
 - 25. Thucydides VII.75; Theophrastus, Characters 25.4.
 - 26. See Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece, p. 31.
 - 27. Xenophon, Poroi IV.15.
- 28. On public slaves, see David Lewis, "Public Property in the City," pp. 254-58.
- 29. See the evidence assembled in Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle*, pp. 506–7. On the subject of slaves in agriculture more generally, see the judicious account by Michael Jameson, "Agriculture and Slavery in Classical Athens." Also useful is C. Mossé, *The Ancient World at Work*, chapter 5.
 - 30. Aristophanes, Ploutos, 517ff.
 - 31. Xenophon, Memorabilia II.3.3.
 - 32. Aristotle, Politics 1256a23--27.
- 33. Ste. Croix examines the economics of "breeding" in *The Class Struggle*, pp. 231-41.
 - 34. Marx, Das Kapital, vol. III, chapter xlvii, pp. 841-42.
- 35. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 245 (M. Nicolaus translation); Das Kapital, vol. III, p. 806 (freien bürgerlichen kolonien) and p. 858 (freien Parzelleneigentums selbstwirtschaftender Bauern als herrschende).
 - 36. Euripides, frg. 1019, in A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta.

4.II The Persian Challenge: Military Triumph and Cultural Affirmation

- 1. See J. M. Cook, The Greeks in Ionia and the East; M. I. Finley, Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest; most comprehensive is J. Boardman's The Greeks Overseas.
- 2. Still the most detailed account is A. T. Olmstead's History of the Persian Empire. J. M. Cook's The Persian Empire provides a valuable scholarly update.
 - 3. Herodotus VI.19.
 - 4. Ibid., VII.133.
 - 5. Ibid., VII.61ff.
 - 6. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire, p. 231.
 - 7. Thucydides I.23.
 - 8. Herodotus VI.32, VIII.141-44, IX.90, IX.98.
 - 9. Ibid., VI.109.
- 10. The epitaph for the Megarian war dead is quoted in Legon's Megara, p. 173. The second epitaph is by Simonides, frg. 127, in Edmonds' Greek Elegy and Iambus, vol. II. The third is preserved in Plutarch's Moralia, 870a-71c. For a sampling of Simonides' patriotic epitaph compositions, see frgs. 116-36 in Edmonds.
 - 11. Pausanias, Guide to Greece I.43.3.
 - 12. Herodotus VII.211.
 - 13. Hippocrates, treatise XVI.14-36.
 - 14. Aeschylus, Persians 241-42.
 - 15. Ibid., 591-97.

4.III The Classical Polis: Institutions and Normative Ideals

- 1. Book One of the *Politics* is given over almost entirely to this theme; see especially 1252a1-6 and 1275a22-34. W. G. Runciman has coined the neologism "citizen-state" to capture the sociological fundamentals of the ancient Greek political experience; see his "Doomed to Extinction: The *Polis* as an Evolutionary Dead-End."
- 2. The most detailed study remains V. Ehrenberg's *The Greek State*; Weber's comparative analysis in "The City," chapter XVI in *Economy and Society* addresses the key sociological issues.

- 3. On the linkage between military and political power, see *Politics* IV.iii.1–3, IV.x.9–11, VI.iv.3–6.
 - 4. Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians I.2-3.
- 5. See J. K. Davies, "Athenian Citizenship: The Descent Group and the Alternatives," and the fine study by P. Siewert, "The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens."
- 6. Despite its age, Fustel de Coulanges' The Ancient City, Book III, chapter XII, provides a most useful overview.
 - 7. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.
- 8. W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. I, chapter 3, provides a detailed summary of the evidence pertaining to war booty.
- 9. On the collective ownership of mines, see Herodotus III.57, VI.47. One of the characters in Aristophanes' Wasps 657-60, mentions in passing the major sources of public revenue. See now the informative essay by Lucia Nixon and Simon Price, "The Size and Resources of Greek Cities."
 - 10. On military pay, see Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. I, chapter 1.
 - 11. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "Political Pay Outside Athens."
 - 12. M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy, p. 151.
- 13. J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families: 600–300 B.C., p. xvii. See also Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens.
 - 14. Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians I.13.
- 15. Aristotle, Politics 1304b20-1305a7 (the general account), 1305a1-5 (specific cases).
 - 16. Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice, p. 41.
 - 17. Herodotus VII.104.
 - 18. Ehrenberg, The Greek State, pp. 77-80.
- 19. For both Marx and Weber, the historical appearance of formally "free labor," i.e., labor freed from various customary and status constraints, and separated from the means of self-maintenance, is a structural precondition for the rise of capitalism.
 - 20. See the discussion in Kenneth Dover, Greek Popular Morality, p. 288ff.
 - 21. Simonides, frg. 53, in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, vol. II.
 - 22. Herodotus VI.27; Pausanias VI.9.

- 23. This is Plato's characterization, Republic 376e.
- 24. Traditional Greek educational practices are reviewed in Plato's *Protagoras* 325dff.

- 25. Simonides, frg. 542, in Campbell's Greek Lyric Poetry.
- 26. Simonides, frg. 93, in Edmonds' Greek Elegy and Iambus, vol. II.
- 27. Simonides, frgs. 121D and 122D, in Campbell's Greek Lyric Poetry.
- 28. The paradigmatic case is the famous funeral oration of Pericles, as represented in Thucydides II.35—46. For an analytically insightful overview of the "cultural landscape" of public space within the Polis, see Tonio Hölscher's "The City of Athens: Space, Symbol, Structure."
 - 29. See H. C. Baldry, The Greek Tragic Theatre, for a concise overview.
- 30. J. K. Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece*, p. 17. For a thoughtful analysis of the plays with reference to their social and political context, see S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy*.
 - 31. Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes 14-20.
 - 32. Ibid., 477-79.
 - 33. Aeschylus, Suppliants 365-69.
 - 34. Ibid., 369–75, 397–99.
 - 35. Ibid., 604, 948-49, 699.
 - 36. Aeschylus, Eumenides 517-25.
 - 37. Ibid., 430 (Richard Lattimore's translation),
 - 38. Ibid., 690-702.
- 39. See Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece, pp. 90-93.
 - 40. Aeschylus, Eumenides 858-66.
 - 41. Sophocles, Antigone 182-83, 368-75, 661-77.
 - 42. Ibid., 450-57.
 - 43. Ibid., 707-11, 723.
 - 44. See G. Zuntz, The Political Plays of Euripides.
 - 45. Euripides, Suppliants 399-407.
- 46. Ibid., 429-41; the quoted phrase is in fact the very formula used to open each meeting of the Athenian assembly.

4.IV The Sophists and Sokrates: Critical Rationalism and the Revaluation of Conventional Morality

- 1. An excellent overview is provided by G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement; also useful is W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists.
 - 2. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, chapter 6.
- 3. Karl Mannheim's cursory attempt to trace Sophism to a purported clash between the mythical thought patterns of a declining nobility and the analytical disposition of a rising urban artisanate is, I regret to report, quite wild and unfounded; see *Ideology and Utopia*, pp. 9–10.
- 4. "There's no long-haired noble who hasn't been buggered" was the standard view in Attik comedy. Quoted in Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal*, p. 80.
 - 5. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 17.
 - 6. Plato, Gorgias 452de.
 - 7. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, p. 80.
 - 8. Protagoras, quoted in Diogenes Laertius, IX.51.
 - 9. Plato, Theatetus 152a6-9.
 - 10. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.32.
 - 11. Plato, Theatetus 172a1-5, 167c4-5.
 - 12. Plato, Protagoras 319a-27e.
 - 13. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 144.
- 14. Antiphon's doctrine of physis is quoted and discussed in Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour, p. 107ff. Cf. Thucydides VIII.68; Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1232b7-10.
 - 15. Plato, Republic 338c, 338e, 358cd.
 - 16. Plato, Protagoras 359b.
 - 17. Plato, Gorgias 483cd.
 - 18. Ibid., 491e-92c.
 - 19. Ibid., 492e.
 - 20. Protagoras, quoted in Diogenes Laertius, IX.51-52.
- 21. See Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, pp. 179-80; and Burkert, Greek Religion, pp. 313-15.
 - 22. Kritias, quoted in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, I.54ff.

- 23. For Homer's representation of the afterlife, see *Iliad III*.278ff., XIX.259ff.; Odyssey XI.575-600. For Aeschylus, Eumenides 267ff., 339-40.
 - 24. Pausanias X.28-32.
 - 25. Plato, Protagoras 318e-19a.
- 26. In addition to Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, see Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, pp. 19–27.
 - 27. The antisophist legislation is quoted in Plutarch, Pericles 32.
 - 28. Euripides, Hecuba 488-91; 799-801; Iphigeneia at Aulus 1034-35.
- 29. Euripides, Heliades, frg. 70; Trojan Women 885–87; Bellerophon, frg. 292. The influence of Prodicus is likely in Bacchae 272ff., and in Suppliants 201–13.
- 30. Euripides, Ion 448–49, 440–43, 1312–19; Mad Hercules 1340–46. See also the account of the public reaction to a performance of the Melanippe in Plutarch's Moralia 756bc.
- 31. Sophocles is quoted in Aristotle's *Poetics XX*. Nietzsche's assessment of Euripidean dramaturgy is offered in *The Birth of Tragedy*.
- 32. An excellent survey on the legacy of Greek tragedy is provided by T. G. Rosenmeyer, "Drama."
 - 33. Euripides, Phoenician Women 499-502, 504-10.
 - 34. Euripides, Cyclops 316-41.
 - 35. Euripides, Bellerophon, frg. 286.1-12.
 - 36. Euripides, Hippolytus 612; Aeolus, frg. 19.
 - 37. Bowra, Landmarks in Greek Literature, p. 192.
- 38. Dover, Greek Popular Morality, makes excellent use of this insight, as does Victor Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes: A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy.
 - 39. Aristophanes, Frogs 1008-9.
 - 40. Ibid., 1014-17.
 - 41. Ibid., 954-57.
 - 42. Aristophanes, Clouds 112-18.
 - 43. Ibid., 225-31.
 - 44. Ibid., 365, 399-402.

- 45. Ibid., 1009-22. An informative account of Hellenic conceptions of physical beauty is offered in Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, pp. 69-81.
 - 46. Aristophanes, Clouds 1071-78.
 - 47. Ibid., 1421-24, 1427-29.
 - 48. Ibid., 1476-77.
- 49. The literature on Sokrates is too vast for comment, but for a balanced overview with an excellent bibliography, W. K. C. Guthrie's A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. III, is a good place to start. Further specifics and controversies can be found in the collection edited by Gregory Vlastos, The Philosophy of Socrates.
 - 50. A. E. Taylor, Socrates, pp. 37-45.
 - 51. Plato, Apology 22cd.
- 52. Demetrius' biographical study is briefly mentioned in Plutarch's Aristides
 1.
- 53. See Aristotle's assessment of Sokrates' contributions to philosophy, Meta-physics 1078b, 987b1-6, 1086a37-b5.
- 54. The virtue-knowledge equation is found most prominently in the following Platonic dialogues: *Protagoras* 361ac, *Gorgias* 460b, and *Meno* 87cff. See also Aristotle's comments in the *Eudemian Ethics* 1216b3-8.
- 55. Plato, Euthydemus 281e and Phaedo 69ac; Xenophon, Memorabilia III.9.5.
 - 56. Plato, Phaedo 69b.
 - 57. Plato, Gorgias 527e.
 - 58. See Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour, pp. 106-19.
 - 59. A comprehensive recent treatment is David Clark's Toward the Soul.
- 60. On Pythagorean and Orphic dualism, see Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism.
 - 61. Xenophon, Memorabilia IV.3.14.
 - 62. Plato, Meno 88cff.
 - 63. Plato, Apology 29d.
- 64. Plato, *Protagoras* 345e. On the famous "dialogue" between Sokrates and Euripides over this matter, consult the latter's *Medea* 1078ff., and *Hippolytus* 308ff.

- 65. Plato, Protagoras 351bff.
- 66. Alban Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought, p. 107; Ellen and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory, chapter 3.
 - 67. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, section 7.
 - 68. Plato, Apology 30ab.
- 69. Sokrates' objections to the lot mechanism are related in Aristotle's Rhetoric 1393b.
 - 70. Xenophon, Memorabilia III.6.
 - 71. Plato, Gorgias 521de, 464bff.
 - 72. Ibid., 513e.
 - 73. Ibid., 521de.
- 74. Sokrates gives an account of his conflicts with politicians of both stripes in Plato's *Apology* 32be. Critics have not been overly impressed, however, for while accepting that Sokrates refused to comply with the oligarchs' order to arrest Leon of Salamis, they observe that he did nothing to try and warn the victim and made no effort to join the opposition to the tyrannical junta.
- 75. Xenophon relates that Kritias had developed a strong antipathy for Sokrates following a personal rebuke by the sage for pederastic excesses, *Memorabilia* 1.2.29–38.
 - 76. Ibid., III.7.
 - 77. Plato, Gorgias 515a-19d.
 - 78. Aristophanes, Birds 1281-84.
- 79. See the discussion in M. Montuori, Socrates: Physiology of a Myth, pp. 190-91.
- 80. Plato tries to explain why the philosopher has little chance of improving or taming the "Alcibiades" type in *Republic* 491a–95c.
 - 81. Plato, Crito 46b.
 - 82. Ibid., 49a, 49c.
 - 83. Ibid., 50ab.
 - 84. Ibid., 50e-51b.
 - 85. Ibid., 52d.
 - 86. Ibid., 53c.

87. Consult the excellent survey edited by H. Spiegelberg, *The Socratic Enigma*, which traces the image of Sokrates from antiquity to the present among the leading intellectuals of Western civilization.

4.V Democratic Imperialism and the Expansion of Athenian Power

- 1. Thucydides I.23; the Pentekontaetia is covered in I.89-118.
- 2. My account in this section relies heavily on the outstanding work of scholarship by Russell Meiggs, The Athenian Empire.
- 3. For a discussion of the much debated formal organizational structure of the Delian League, see Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, pp. 298-307.
 - 4. Thucydides, I.99.
 - 5. Ibid., I.98.
 - 6. For the details, consult Meiggs, The Athenian Empire.
- 7. Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians I.14. The "usefulness" of the chrestoi refers to the historical fact that their greater wealth had enabled them to best serve the Polis in war and peace, i.e., by outfitting themselves in the costly hoplite panoply and by devoting their leisure time to civic affairs.
 - 8. Ibid., III.10-11.
 - 9. Ste. Croix, "The Character of the Athenian Empire."
 - 10. Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians III.2.
- 11. Thucydides II.13; Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander VII.1.27; Aristophanes, Wasps 657-60.
- 12. For all its age, A. Zimmern's The Greek Commonwealth remains a mine of information and insight.
 - 13. The oligarchical view is presented in Plutarch's Pericles 12.
- 14. See the discussion in Finley, "The Athenian Empire," pp. 51-53, in his Economy and Society.
- 15. This striking formulation undoubtedly refers only to the acquisition of a surplus, and not daily necessities, seeing that Weber emphasizes the agrarian foundation of the Polis economy throughout his writings.
 - 16. Thucydides I.115.

4.VI The Peloponnesian War, Civic Factionalism, and the Rupturing of Polis Communalism

- 1. Thucydides I.23.
- 2. See J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon.
- 3. Thucydides III.65.
- 4. Ibid., I.140; see III.15 for an illustration of how agricultural imperatives could compromise the Peloponnesian military effort.
 - 5. Ibid., II.13.
 - 6. Ibid., I.80, 121, 141.
 - 7. See Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, pp. 314-15, 359.
 - 8. Ibid., pp. 327-32.
- 9. Thucydides I.19. For an informative account of Spartan foreign policy, see Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, chapter 4.
- 10. A detailed study of "betrayals" during the war is provided by Luis Losada, The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War.
 - 11. Thucydides III.81.
 - 12. Ibid., III.82-82.
 - 13. Ibid., V.23.
 - 14. Ibid., V.24.
 - 15. Ibid., VII.87.
 - 16. Ibid., VII.27ff.

5. FOURTH-CENTURY GREECE AND THE DECLINE OF THE POLIS

5.I Hegemonial Rivalries, Class Struggle, and the Deepening Crisis of Social Disorganization

1. Xenophon's Hellenika is the primary narrative source for this period; Diodorus' Universal History and various of Plutarch's Lives also preserve relevant material. Literature on the "decline of the Polis" theme is extensive, though generalized rather than specific in sociological focus. Among the more important treatments are: Gilbert Murray, "Reactions to the Peloponnesian War in Greek Thought and Practice"; F. W. Walbank, "The Causes of Greek Decline"; C. Mossé, Athens in Decline; J. K. Davies, Democracy and Classical Greece, chapters

- 7–12; J. Pecirka, "The Crisis of the Athenian Polis in the Fourth Century B.C."; E. Welskopf, ed., Hellenische Poleis: Krise, Wandlung, Wirkung, 4 vols. A. W. Gomme's "The End of the City-State" makes several sensible observations but confuses the issue by suggesting that since Macedonian hegemony did not entail territorial absorption of the Greek poleis, the latter were still "free." The Greeks themselves thought otherwise, as indicated by the fact that their early uprisings against Macedonian domination invariably invoked the old ideals of "freedom" and "autonomy." Runciman's "Doomed to Extinction: The Polis as an Evolutionary Dead-End," though insightful on a number of points, errs in underplaying the destructive synergies between external pressures, i.e., the ascendancy of Macedon, and the strains of internal conflict between rich and poor within a fragmenting civic order.
 - 2. Xenophon, Hellenika V.1.31.
 - 3. Ibid., V.2.25-37.
- 4. An informative account of Thebes in this period is provided by John Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony*, 371–362 B.C.
- 5. The second Athenian confederacy is discussed by G. T. Griffith, "Athens in the Fourth Century."
 - 6. Xenophon, Hellenika VI.4.1-16; Plutarch, Pelopidas 20-23.
 - 7. Xenophon, Hellenika VI.5.28-29.
 - 8. Ibid., VII.5.26-27.
 - 9. Ibid., III.2.26.
 - 10. Ibid., IV.6.1ff.
 - 11. Ibid., VI.2.
- 12. Thomas Gallant, Risk and Survival, shows that ancient peasants normally sought to lay aside in storage a food supply of some ten to sixteen months, pp. 94-98.
- 13. Aristotle makes the interesting observation that a good seasonal harvest owing to peace can actually raise property values within a community sufficiently to bring about a change in the constitution, *Politics* 1306b9–16.
- 14. Victor Hanson's Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece provides a superb overview, correcting many past misconceptions. His general conclusion—that military devastation of the countryside was rarely effective—is overstated, however, and fails to consider the slender margin of surplus that sustained the typical smallholder, for whom even a partial loss of the seasonal harvest threatened ruin. Hanson also tends to undervalue capital losses in plundered slaves, livestock, and implements of production. The recent work by Gallant, Risk and Sur-

vival, provides a detailed analysis of the "razor-thin" line that separated the peasant oikos from survival and disaster (and this without consideration of the manmade hazards of warfare!)

- 15. David Asheri, Leggi Greche Sul Problema Dei Debiti, provides references and a discussion of all the major cases on record in Greek society from the sixth to the first century BC.
- 16. Among the more important sources, see Isaeus XI.41ff.; Demosthenes XXIII.207-8; Lysias VII; Xenophon, Oeconomicus XX.21-29.
- 17. Aristophanes, *Ploutus* 218–20. The comedy, produced in 388 BC, is filled with much embittered satire over the realities of poverty "in the present time."
- 18. The most important work in the field is Ste. Croix's The Class Struggle. See also the collected papers of Alexander Fuks, Social Conflict in Ancient Greece, and Andrew Lintott, Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City.
- 19. On stasis in Cyrene, Diodorus XIV.34; in Korinth, Diodorus XIV.86 and Xenophon, Hellenika IV.4.1-6; in Rhodes, Diodorus XIV.97; in Thebes, Xenophon, Hellenika V.4.1-2; in Argos, Diodorus XV.57-58; in the Peloponnese, Diodorus XV.40; in Tegea, Xenophon, Hellenika VI.5.6-9. Thucydides' judgment is rendered in III.82-83.
- 20. See Aristotle, *Politics* 1305a4-8, 1309a15-21, 1266a38; Plato, *Republic* 566e, *Laws* 684de, 736cd; Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 259.
 - 21. Plato, Republic 422e-23a; Aristotle, Politics 1279b18-20.
 - 22. Plato, Laws 832bc.
 - 23. Plato, Republic 555d7-56a1, 564b-65b.
 - 24. Aristotle, Politics 1307a18-20, 1318a26-27.
- 25. Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 493–94 (Nicolaus' translation, though I have rendered Marx's *gesteuert werden* as 'managed' rather than 'corrected' in the last sentence).
 - 26. Ibid., pp. 476, 475.
- 27. For representative characterizations, see Diodorus XV.45; Lysias XXXIII; Xenophon, *Hellenika* VII.5.27; Aristophanes, *Ploutus*; and Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*.
- 28. For an excellent overview, see Fuks, "Isocrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece," reprinted in his Social Conflict in Ancient Greece.
 - 29. Isocrates, Panathenaicus 14.
 - 30. Isocrates, Address to Philip 38ff.

- 31. Isocrates, Panegyrikos 6.
- 32. Ibid., 115-16.
- 33. Ibid., 167-68.
- 34. Ibid., 173-74.
- 35. Ibid., 82.
- 36. Ibid., 187.
- 37. Weber, Economy and Society, p. 1364.

5.II Mercenaries, Military Monarchs, and the Erosion of Citizen Politics

- 1. Aeneas Tacticus, On the Defense of Fortified Positions.
- 2. Ibid., I.3, 6-7, III.3, V.1-2.
- 3. Ibid., XXX.1-2.
- 4. Ibid., XIV.1-2.
- 5. Xenophon, Hellenika VI.5.6-22, VII.4.18, VII.4.36-39.
- 6. See Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, pp. 188-95.
- 7. Martin Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion, p. 293, and Greek Folk Religion, pp. 89-90.
 - 8. Discussed by Nilsson, Greek Folk Religion, pp. 113-15.
 - 9. Plato, Republic 364c; cf. Laws 933ae.
 - 10. As suggested by Isocrates, Areopagiticus 29-30.
- 11. The authoritative studies on the subject are H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, and G. T. Griffith, Mercenaries in the Hellenistic World.
- 12. The changing patterns of warfare are examined in Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon. See also the collection in Hanson's edited volume, Hoplites.
 - 13. Xenophon, Hellenika IV.5.11-19.
- 14. Pay and provisioning matters are discussed in Griffith, Mercenaries in the Hellenistic World, chapter 10.
 - 15. Isocrates, On the Peace 44; Plato, Laws 630b.
 - 16. A thorough account is offered by Wheeler, "The General as Hoplite."

- 17. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 227.
- 18. There are parallels here with the ascendancy of mercenary warfare in the Renaissance period, as astutely noted by Machiavelli in various of his writings, most notably the *Discourses on Livy*, *The Arte of Warre*, and *The History of Florence*.
 - 19. Xenophon, Hellenika III.4.15.
 - 20. Ibid., V.2.20-23.
 - 21. Ibid., VI.2.10-12.
 - 22. Isocrates, On the Peace 41-48.
- 23. The growing aversion to military service among the wealthy is examined in Paul MacKendrick, *The Athenian Aristocracy*, 399–31 B.C.
- 24. Illustrative are Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazousai* 197-98, 601-3; Isocrates, *Areopagiticus* 35 and *On the Peace* 19-21, 128; Demosthenes, XIV.25-29, XLVII.20. For a general treatment of growing "quietism among the upper class," see Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece*, chapter 11; he pursues that theme in Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens, chapter VII.
- 25. The "state mercenary" phenomenon is discussed in Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers.
 - 26. Plutarch, Agesilaus 36-40.
 - 27. Diodorus, XVI.34, 40, 44.
- 28. The declining value of the old citizen-hoplite ethos is unambiguously confirmed by an elderly Plato, Laws 630bc, where it is noted that "there are great numbers of mercenaries (misthophoroi) who are ready enough to take a firm stand and fight to the death in the kind of warfare of which Tyrtaios speaks, nearly all of whom otherwise prove themselves to be reckless, unjust, hubristic, and the most senseless of men, save for rare exceptions." Under such altered circumstances, it is clear that martial valor can no longer serve as a major criterion in the determination of public honor or of personal identity and self-worth.
- 29. Mercenary autocracies are examined in Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, chapter 10; see also Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. II, chapter III.
 - 30. See Finley, Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest.
 - 31. Thucydides VI.17.
- 32. Aristotle reports rates of 20%, in contrast to the 1 or 2% conventionally resorted to by most poleis for the financing of wars or major public works, *Politics* 1313b26-30.

- 33. The basic facts of Jason's career are recounted in Xenophon's Hellenika VI.1.
 - 34. Ibid., VI.1.5-6.
 - 35. Ibid., VI.4.32.
 - 36. Aristotle, Politics 1306a20-32.
 - 37. Aeneas Tacticus, On the Defense of Fortified Positions XII.2-3.
- 38. For an account of the tyranny at Heraklea-Pontica, see Lintott's Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City. The assassination of Klearchos by Academic philosophers is celebrated in Chion of Heraclea, edited by I. Düring, where it is expressed that Plato "endeavors to make philosophy appear to his disciples as not incompatible with an active life, in fact as something with its face turned towards practical life as well as towards contemplation" (V.1).
 - 39. Xenophon, Hellenika VII.1.45.
 - 40. Ibid., VII.3.12.
- 41. Isocrates, Letter to Timotheos, Epistle VII.4-9; cf. his letters to Evagoras of Cyprus.
 - 42. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, p. 100.

5.III Plato and the Dilemmas of Politics and Reason: The Polis as Philosophical Project

- 1. See the account in Diogenes Laertius, Lives III.6.
- 2. For reasons that will become clear as we proceed, passion and ideology tend to intrude prominently in the assessment of Plato's legacy. For an evenhanded and learned treatment of the evidence, the issues, and rival interpretations, the best account remains W. K. C. Guthrie's A History of Greek Philosophy, volumes IV and V. See also G. Vlastos, ed., Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, 2 vols., and G. Grube, Plato's Thought. A lucid overview of the enduring lines and changing fashions in the history of Platonic scholarship is offered by E. N. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato.
- 3. The best known works in this regard are Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. I; Alban Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought; and more recently, Ellen and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory.
- 4. Seventh Letter 324b8-326b4. The historicity of this document is disputed by few scholars today; for a full discussion, G. Morrow, Plato's Epistles.
- 5. This was the communis opinio of ancient commentators as well, as conveyed in Cicero's On the Commonwealth I.10. For a detailed account of the Pythagorean connection, see J. S. Morrison, "The Origins of Plato's Philosopher-Statesman."

- 6. Aristotle, Metaphysics 987a32-b6, 1086a37-b5, 1078b30-32.
- 7. This position is articulated most clearly in Phaedo 74d-75b, 100cff.
- 8. It should be noted that Plato generally places his eschatological myths at the end of his dialogues, after the main logical and empirical proofs for his positions have already been presented. The myths thus serve to reinforce the preceding rational argumentation, rather than function as alternatives. The hypothetical nature of the Forms is repeatedly stressed (e.g., Republic 532d, Parmenides 135ab, Philebus 58a-59d, Laws 965bc); but Plato insists that they are the only plausible solution to sundry metaphysical and ethical issues, cf. Timaeus 51d.
 - 9. Phaedo 74aff.
- 10. Phaedrus 247cff.; note also the treatment of Plato's views on the soul by the comic poets, preserved in Diogenes Laertius, Lives III.28.
 - 11. Phaedrus 250c; Phaedo 81b.
- 12. For the Academy as an educational institution, H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Academy*; Winspear, *The Genesis of Plato's Thought*, offers a political account, as does A.-H. Chroust, "Plato's Academy," who holds that the school was "a center of subversive or anti-democratic political activities," p. 28.
 - 13. Discussed by Field, Plato and His Contemporaries, pp. 38-39.
- 14. For the connections between philosophy and pederasty, see Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, chapter 3.
- 15. The functions of the symposion are noted in Plutarch, Moralia VI.686aff.; Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists X.419c, XII.547f, V.186b. See also Plato's Laws 639cff.
- 16. The primary sources for the reconstruction of "Academic politics" include: Plutarch, Moralia XIII.1126cff.; Plutarch, Dion; Athenaeus, Deipnosophists XI.506e-509f; and Diogenes Laertius, Lives III.24, 28.
- 17. The starting point for this controversy is Karl Popper's *The Open Society* and its Enemies. See also the collection of essays edited by T. L. Thorson, *Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat?*
 - 18. Republic 331a-36a.
 - 19. Ibid., 338c.
 - 20. Ibid., 370b, 371e.
 - 21. Ibid., 401bc.
- 22. Ibid., 376eff., 382ae (alêthôs pseudos); the actual 'fiction' is related at 414b-15e.

- 23. Ibid., 416a.
- 24. Ibid., 416e.
- 25. Ibid., 417ab.
- 26. Ibid., 419a. The phrase "monastic austerity" was coined by F. Cornford, The Unwritten Philosophy, p. 130.
 - 27. Republic 429c-30c.
 - 28. Ibid., 430e-32a.
 - 29. Ibid., 433a.
 - 30, Ibid., 434ab.
 - 31. Ibid., 435b-36a.
 - 32. Ibid., 441c-42d.
 - 33. Ibid., 444b.
 - 34. Ibid., 444de.
 - 35. Ibid., 449eff.; 462bc.
 - 36. Ibid., 471cff.; 473de.
 - 37. Ibid., 484cd (at some points I have followed Paul Shorey's translation).
 - 38. Ibid., 491a-94d; 496ae.
 - 39. Ibid., 497ac; 499bc.
 - 40. Phaedrus 352e.
 - 41. Seventh Letter 327ab.
 - 42. Ibid., 327d-28c.
 - 43. The entire campaign is properly contextualized in A. Fuks, "Redistribution of Land and Houses in Syracuse in 356 B.C. and its Ideological Aspects," reprinted in his Social Conflicts in Ancient Greece, pp. 213–29.
 - 44. Plutarch, Dion 37.
 - 45. Seventh Letter 335e-36b, 332e-33a; Plutarch, Dion 53.
 - 46. M. I. Finley, "Plato and Practical Politics," chapter 6 in his Aspects of Antiquity.
 - 47. Seventh Letter 336ab.
 - 48. Laws 709e-12b.

- Notes
- 49. Politikos ('Statesman') 286d, 276c, 292c, 293de.
- 50. Ibid., 293b-96c, 296c-97b.
- 51. Ibid., 297e, 300b-301a.
- 52. Seventh Letter, 334c, 330d-31d.
- 53. Laws 715de, 875ad; cf. the excellent historical study by G. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City.
 - 54. Ibid., 732e, 714a.
- 55. Ibid., 739aff., 831cff., 806de, 743aff., 919c; emphasis on martial training is offered at 830d–33b and 922aff. Plato's recourse to slavery here is unacceptable from a modern point of view, but understandable given the limits of the ancient economy. Even in our own technologically advanced societies, toil by the many continues to sustain leisure for the few.
 - 56. Ibid., 691dff.
 - 57. Ibid., 643e.
 - 58. Ibid., 663aff., 797d, 656dff.
 - 59. Ibid., 720b-23e, 688e.
 - 60. Ibid., 854a.
 - 61. Ibid., 716c.
 - 62. Ibid., 907d-909d.
 - 63. Ibid., 964e.
 - 64. Ibid., 965b-66b, 966c-68b, 964b.
 - 65. Ibid., 969ac, 962de.
- 66. For a discussion of these principles, consult Lucien Goldmann, Method in the Sociology of Literature. A learned overview is Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory.
 - 67. Republic 557aff.
- 68. See the important article by Gregory Vlastos, "Slavery in Plato's Thought."
- 69. On this traditional obligation, Gorgias 513e, Laches 187ab, and Protagoras 318e-19a.
 - 70. Gorgias 515eff., Republic 558c, Laws 757bc.
 - 71. Republic 428e-29a, 494a, 474c; Politikos 292e, 293a.

- 72. Republic 496c, 493ab, 586b, 588c. I have explored this issue in greater detail in "Enlightenment Psychology and Political Reaction in Plato's Social Philosophy: An Ideological Contradiction?"
- 73. Republic 444b, 442b; in this connection see the pioneering study by F. Cornford, "Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato."
 - 74. See Republic 586e-87a, 590ce.
 - 75. Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte, vol. I, p. 296.
 - 76. Republic 518c-19b; 485de; Timaeus 44bc.
 - 77. Meno 81cd.
 - 78. Laws 731c, 860de, 863eff.
 - 79. Gorgias 468aff.; Republic 506aff.
- 80. As John Rist perceptively notes in his highly original Human Value, p. 41.
 - 81. See, for example, Phaedrus 245cff., Phaedo 80aff., Politikos 309cff.

5.IV The Minor Sokratics and the Onset of Normative Individualism

- 1. See C. Field, Plato and His Contemporaries, and Henri Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, chapters V and VI.
- 2. The primary source for the Megarian school is Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers II.106-12.
- 3. For Aristippus, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives II.65-104. Erich Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta, collects all the extant passages.
 - 4. Aristippus, frgs. 19, 55, in Mannebach; Diogenes Laertius, Lives II.75.
 - 5. Xenophon, Memorabilia II.1.1-34.
- 6. See Euripides, Antiope, frg. 200. This passage along with other relevant materials is cogently assessed by Victor Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics." L. B. Carter's The Quiet Athenian provides a detailed treatment.
- 7. For Antisthenes, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives VI.1-19. Dudley's A History of Cynicism remains the most comprehensive account.
- 8. Aristotle discusses Antisthenes' views on logic in Metaphysics 1024b, 1043b, and in Topics 104b. It is widely assumed that Plato is alluding to Antisthenes in Theatetus 201a-202c, Euthydemus 283d-85d, and Cratylus 429aff.
 - 9. Xenophon, Memorabilia I.6.10.

- 10. Xenophon, Symposium IV.34ff.
- 11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VI.11.
- 12. Antisthenes' parable of the lions and the hares is related in Aristotle, *Politics* 1284a14–17: to the hares' demand for equality, the lions respond, "Where are your claws?" See also Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* VI.5–6. The other passage is in Stobeaus' *Florilegium* 45.28.

Notes

- 13. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, essay III, "What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?"
 - 14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VI.13, VI.12.
- 15. For a contemporary restatement of the traditional view, i.e., the notion that individual well-being presupposes the Polis framework, see Isocrates' *Plataicus*, which presents the lamentations and concerns of those whose polis had been destroyed in war.
 - 16. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VI.11.

5.V The Macedonian Conquest and the Suppression of Polis Autonomy

- 1. On the geopolitical situation in Greece following the great intra-Hellenic war, see T. B. Ryder, Koine Eirene; see also the collection of essays in S. Perlman, ed., *Philip and Athens*.
- 2. The two most informative books on Macedonian history are N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, 2 vols., and J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism.
- 3. In addition to the two works cited in the previous note, see also Hans Delbrück's classic *History of the Art of War*, vol. I, chapter 1, "The Macedonian Military System."
- 4. See Robin Lane Fox, Alexander the Great, p. 74, The rapid expansion of the Macedonian armed forces is registered in the following figures: at the outset of his reign in 358 BC, Philip could field an estimated ten thousand infantry and six hundred horsemen (Diodorus XVI.4.3); six years later the infantry had doubled to twenty thousand and the cavalry had quintupled to three thousand strong (Diodorus XVI.35.4); by 340 BC, Philip's forces had risen to a total of some thirty thousand imperial troops (Diodorus XVI.74.5).
 - 5. Hammond and Griffith, Macedonia, pp. 230-58, 296-328.
- 6. Ibid., pp. 218-30, 259-95, 554-66; H. D. Westlake's Thessaly in the Fourth Century is also of great value here.
- 7. Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, pp. 294–95, stress the class-based divisions within Thessaly that abetted Philip's ascendancy—the landed barons serving as the principal supporters of the Macedonian monarch.

- 8. Diodorus XVI.69.8.
- 9. The intrigues and turmoil in Euboea are fully examined in P. A. Brunt, "Euboea in the Time of Philip II."
- 10. Demosthenes, On the Crown, is the locus classicus on the role of "Philippizers" and "traitors" as seen from the democratic point of view. Pausanias, Guide to Greece VII.10.1-3, observes that of all the Greek poleis, only Sparta was untouched by the tendency to collude with Philip for partisan advantages.
- 11. Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, chapter V, sections ii and iii.
 - 12. Ibid., p. 293.
- 13. The avoidance of military obligations by the wealthy is noted even by their ideological ally Isocrates, *Peace* 20, 128, and *Areopagiticus* 35.
- 14. Demosthenes, Third Philippic 56ff., and On the Chersonese 40; see also Hammond and Griffith, Macedonia, pp. 321-28.
- 15. Demosthenes, Third Philippic 27, 57; On the False Embassy 260; Pausanias, Guide to Greece IV.28.4, V.49.
- 16. Demosthenes, On the False Embassy 294-95, 334; Plutarch, Phocion 15. See also Legon's comprehensive Megara.
 - 17. Demosthenes, Fourth Philippic 4-5.
 - 18. Demosthenes, On the False Embassy 259ff., 295, 314.
- 19. See the excellent account offered by Markle, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip."
 - 20. Isocrates, Letter to Philip 120-23.
 - 21. Isocrates, On the Peace 20, 128; Areopagiticus 21.
 - 22. Isocrates, To Nicocles, Nicocles, and the Letter to Timotheus.
 - 23. See the discussion in Hammond and Griffith, Macedonia, pp. 514-16.
- 24. Werner Jaeger's Demosthenes is particularly informative on this aspect. See also the important recent study by Mogens Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes.
 - 25. Demosthenes, On the Navy Boards 25-26.
 - 26. Demosthenes, On the Liberty of the Rhodians 20-21, 33.
 - 27. Demosthenes, First Philippic 11-12, 40ff., 16, 19.
 - 28. Ibid., 21, 50.

- 29. Demosthenes, First Olynthiac 28.
- 30. Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, pp. 318–19 convincingly rebut the attempt by G. Cawkwell, "Demothenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates," to dissociate Philip from the Euboean turmoil.
- 31. For an informative brief account, see Ste. Croix, "Theorika." Cawkwell's "Eubulus" provides a useful broader discussion.
 - 32. Demosthenes, Third Olynthiac 30-34.
 - 33. Ibid., 36.
 - 34. Demosthenes, On the False Embassy 192-94, 196-98, 305-9.
- 35. Demothenes quotes from Eubulus' alarmist speech in On the False Embassy 291.
 - 36. Demosthenes, Second Philippic 25.
 - 37. Demosthenes, On the Chersonese 41-42, 46, 52-53, 59.
- 38. E. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery, provides a definitive treatment. A concise account of Philip's siege apparatus is offered by Hammond and Griffith, Macedonia, pp. 444–49. J. Warry's Warfare in the Classical World combines descriptive analysis with numerous invaluable illustrations of weaponry, battle formations, and the like.
- 39. Demosthenes, On the Crown 102ff., provides the details on this form of corruption; see also his forensic speech, XXI.155.
- 40. Demosthenes, On the Crown 107-8 and forensic speech XLVII.20ff., recount how the spread of corruption has led to failures in proper provisioning, inadequate readiness, and other grave military deficiencies.
- 41. Philip's dispensations over the defeated Greeks are fully examined in C. Roebuck, "The Settlements of Philip II in 338 B.C." See also Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, pp. 604–46.
- 42. Hyperides, frg. 18B, number 3, in *Minor Attic Orators*, vol. II, edited by J. O. Burt; Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 41.
 - 43. Demades, On the Twelve Years 13.
- 44. Aristotle's role in the boundary rectifications affair is discussed by Roebuck, "The Settlements of Philip II," pp. 217–18, and by Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, pp. 617–18.
- 45. Philip's so-called League of Korinth (a modern designation) is fully examined in Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, pp. 623-46.
- 46. The treaty inscription is presented in a most useful source book edited and translated by Philip Harding, From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the

Battle of Issus, entry 99. Other aspects of the treaty are mentioned in Pseudo-Demosthenes, Fourth Philippic 15–16, a work usually attributed to Hyperides, Demosthenes' war-party colleague.

- 47. Hyperides, Against Philippides frgs. 10, 15B, and passage 10.
- 48. Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 46-52; the grave-stone epigram is entry 98 in Harding's source book.
 - 49, Demosthenes, Funeral Speech 23-24.

5.VI Aristotle's Social Philosophy and the Sociology of Power

- 1. The story of Hermias is fully recounted in D. E. W. Wormell, "The Literary Tradition concerning Hermias of Atarneus."
 - 2. See Ingemar Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition.
 - 3. Plato, Sixth Letter 322c-23d.
 - 4. Düring, Aristotle, Part III, section IV.
- 5. See Hammond and Griffith, A History of Macedonia, vol. II, pp. 518–22. Anton-Herman Chroust, Aristotle, chapter XIII, "Aristotle, Athens and the Foreign Policy of Macedonia," is wildly speculative in most instances but astute on the subject of Mentor.
- 6. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* V.6; for Aristotle's "Hymn to Virtue" in honor of Hermias, see V.7-8.
- 7. For the range of Aristotle's synoptic scholarship and science, see the listed titles of his works in Diogenes Laertius, Lives V.22-27.
 - 8. See especially Eudemian Ethics 1217b20 and Politics 1278b30-35.
- 9. Werner Jaeger, Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. John Rist's The Mind of Aristotle follows up on the developmental theme, building on the more specialized philosophical and philological contributions of the past few decades.
- 10. Regarding Aristotle's lost dialogues, I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen, eds., Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century.
- 11. Aristotle, Protrepticus frgs. 46, 47, and 49, in Ingemar Düring, Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles.
 - 12. Ibid., frgs. 106-7, 105, 50, 49, 48.
 - 13. See Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics I.6.
 - 14. Aristotle, Categories V.
 - 15. Aristotle, Metaphysics 991a8-14, 991a20-23, 987b10-14, 992a25-30.

- 16. Ibid., 990b2-4.
- 17. Ibid., 1003a5ff.
- 18. The complexities of Aristotle's theology cannot be reviewed here, but see Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion*, chapter VII.3.4.
 - 19. See Metaphysics V.2, IX, and Physics II.
 - 20. Metaphysics VII.7.
 - 21. Physics II.8.
- 22. For an overview of Aristotle's achievements in the natural sciences, see Lloyd, Early Greek Science, chaper 8.
- 23. The tangled history of the Aristotelean corpus is discussed in Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought.
 - 24. Nicomachean Ethics X.ix; cf. especially 1095a6-7.
 - 25, Politics 1253a1-7.
 - 26. Nicomachean Ethics 1094a1-3,
 - 27. Ibid., 1094a23.
 - 28. Ibid., 1095a6-7, 1094b8-12.
 - 29. Ibid., 1095a18-21.
 - 30. Ibid., I.vii.
 - 31. Ibid., 1097b25.
 - 32. Ibid., 1098a7-20.
 - 33. Ibid., I.xiii.
 - 34. Ibid., II.
 - 35. Ibid., II.ii, vi.
 - 36. See Eudemian Ethics II.iii.
 - 37. Nicomachean Ethics 1144b17ff., 1145a2-6.
 - 38. Ibid., 1104b8-1105a13.
 - 39. Ibid., 1153b25ff.
 - 40. Ibid., 1176a24-29, 1176a3-5.
 - 41. Ibid., 1177a12-18.

- 42. Ibid., 1177b27–32.
- 43. Ibid., 1178a5-9.
- 44. Ibid., 1178a9–10.
- 45. Ibid., 1178b7-33.
- 46. See the collection in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2, edited by J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji.
 - 47. Nicomachean Ethics 1178b5-7.
 - 48. See Aristotle, De Anima ('On the Soul').
 - 49. Nicomachean Ethics 1097b8-12.
 - 50. Politics 1252a1-8.
 - 51. Ibid., 1252a24-35.
 - 52. Ibid., 1252b30-1253a5.
 - 53, Physics 361a13-15.
 - 54. Politics 1253b33.
- 55. Ibid., 1254b21–23. Note that Aristotle does not examine the actual productive services provided by these "animate tools," nor does he attend to the differences between male and female slaves—his analysis remains highly abstract, "distant" from realities that were undoubtedly too uncomfortable for detailed scrutiny and commentary.
 - 56. Ibid., 1254a22-24.
- 57. Ibid., 1254b28-34. Aristotle subsequently states that the slave lacks to bouleutikon, 'the deliberative faculty' of the freeman, 1260a11-14.
 - 58. Ibid., 1254b34-1255a3.
 - 59. Ibid., 1252b8-9, 1285a20-23.
- 60. Ibid., I.iii. See the penetrating account offered by M. I. Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Analysis," chapter II in Studies in Ancient Society.
- 61. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 85; cf. pp. 59-60, 152. For an insightful exegesis, see Castoriadis, "Value, Equality, Justice, Politics: From Marx to Aristotle and from Aristotle to Ourselves," Crossroads in the Labyrinth, pp. 260-339.
 - 62. Politics 1258b1-3.
 - 63. Ibid., 1258a8-14.
 - 64. Ibid., II.i.

- 65. Ibid., 1263b15-23.
- 66. Ibid., 1266b29-32, 1267b1-2.
- 67. Ibid., 1266b38-1267a5, 1267b5-9, cf. 1318b33-8, 1319a2-4.
- 68. Ibid., 1277a25-28.
- 69. Ibid., III.iv.
- 70. Ibid., IV.iii.
- 71. Ibid., 1279b16ff., 1290a30ff.
- 72. Ibid., 1295b1-24.
- 73. Ibid., 1296a23-37, 1296b1-3; cf. the political oath that Aristotle records at 1310a9-11, whereby oligarchs in a number of poleis swear to the following: "I will be ill-disposed towards the *dêmos* and plan whatever evil I can against them."
 - 74. Ibid., 1323b40-1324a2.
- 75. Ibid., 1327b24-33. Some scholars see in the last line a possible connection with the expansionist vision of Alexander.
 - 76. Ibid., 1326b30-33.
- 77. Ibid., 1328a23-25; see also 1333a21-23, "the inferior exists for the sake of the superior."
 - 78. Ibid., 1328b33ff.
 - 79. Ibid., 1256b23ff.; cf. 1255b37-38.
- 80. Richard McKeon, ed., "Introduction," The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. xv.
- 81. Ellen and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory, p. 209.
- 82. See the discussion by John Rist, "Aristotle: The Value of Man and the Origin of Morality."
 - 83. Nicomachean Ethics 1094b8-12, cf. 1099b30-33.
 - 84. Ibid., 1129a31-1130a15; Rhetoric 1366b3-4, 1366b34-1367a1.
- 85. Politics 1337a28-32; Nicomachean Ethics 1169a18-22, 1115a30-32; cf. the remark that suicide is "an injustice against the Polis," 1138a9-14.
 - 86. Nicomachean Ethics 1103b2-7, 1099b30-33.
 - 87. Politics 1253b33-1254a1.

- 88. Nicomachean Ethics 1095b14-17, 1095b19-21, 1180a10-13, 1179b11-15; Politics 1267b4-6, 1319b32-322, 1317b12.
- 89. Aristophanes, Frogs 738. It is true that in Rhetoric II.16, Aristotle notes that the "wellborn" are not typically individuals of "noble character" and indeed contends that the majority of them turn out "worthless" or "paltry." All the more surprising, then, that these assessments make no appearence in the major treatises on ethics and politics.
 - 90. Nicomachean Ethics 1160b20-21.
 - 91. The Athenian Constitution XL.
 - 92. Politics 1317b12.
- 93. Aristotle delivers a scathing indictment of the *neoplousioi*, the 'new rich', in *Rhetoric* II.16.
- 94. Politics 1318b28ff.; note that Aristotle frequently credits the dêmos with superiority in collective adjudication—a point pursued in Irving M. Zeitlin's Plato's Vision.
- 95. For a comprehensive listing of conventionally esteemed goods, see Rhetoric I.v.
 - 96. See, for example, the assessments in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations.
- 97. Nicomachean Ethics 1099a31ff., 1101a14-18; Politics 1332aff., 1323b40ff.
 - 98. Nicomachean Ethics 1153bff.
- 99. Ibid., 1122b27ff.; Eudemian Ethics 1231b28ff. An excellent discussion on this is provided by Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, chapter 7, where it is noted that Aristotle's account of the virtues "treats upper-class Greek life as normative," p. 67.
- 100. Nicomachean Ethics 1125a11-13, 1124a25-27; Eudemian Ethics 1232a19ff., especially 1232a40-b14.
 - 101. Eudemian Ethics 1249a7-13.
 - 102. Nicomachean Ethics 1179b4-18.
 - 103. Politics 1260a11-14.
 - 104. Ibid., 1255b2-5; cf. 1283a35-38.
 - 105. Nicomachean Ethics 1103b23-25; qualified at Politics 1316aff.
 - 106. Dover, Greek Popular Morality, provides a comprehensive account.
- 107. This is the stated opinion of N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, vol. 2, p. 638.

- 108. Nicomachean Ethics 1160a36-37; Politics 1289a39-b1.
- 109. Demosthenes, Second Philippic 25.
- 110. Politics 1310b40-1311a1, 1310b8-12; Nicomachean Ethics 1161a10-14.

- 111. The best study in this regard, though one-sided in certain critical respects, remains Hans Kelsen, "The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy." P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime," tries to offer a self-contained philosophical interpretation, heavily Straussian.
 - 112. Politics III.viii.
 - 113. Ibid., 1284b29-34.
 - 114. Ibid., 1288a1-3.
- 115. Ibid., 1287a29-34. It is likely that Aristotle's divided discussion on monarchy reflects something of his own ambivalent social position: born in a small Greek polis, Stagira, that was subsequently obliterated by his principal patron, the king of Macedon, Aristotle throughout his life continued to move back and forth between the civic world of the Polis and the company of aspiring dynasts and imperators.
 - 116. Ibid., 1288a15-19.
 - 117. Ibid., 1287b39, 1288b22-28.
 - 118. Ibid., 1255b38-40, 1256b23-27.

5.VII Diogenes and Cynic Antinomianism

- 1. Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists 544f-545a. Equally revealing is the account preserved in the fragments of Teles, 103-119, who reports that a young student of the Academy and Lyceum, one Metrocles of Maroneia, eventually could not keep up with the sumptuous life-style demands and so transferred his loyalty to Krates the Cynic: "For in the former case he had to have shoes, . . . then a cloak, a following of slaves, and a grand house; for the common table (sysstia) he had to see that the breads were pure, the delicacies above the ordinary, the wine sweet, the entertainment appropriate, so that here there was much expense. For among them such a way of life was judged to be 'liberal.'" Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VI.94-96.
- 2. The best general account is Donald Dudley, A History of Cynicism; see also G. J. D. Aalders, Political Thought in Hellenistic Times.
 - 3. Dio Chrysostom, Orations VI.30-34.
- 4. Maximus Tyrius is quoted in Arthur Lovejoy and George Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*, pp. 146-51.

- 5. Dio Chrysostom, Orations VI.25-26.
- 6. Several of the more notorious of Diogenes' actions and precepts are recorded in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* VI.20-82; his "cosmopolitanism" is cited at VI.63.
 - 7. Lovejoy and Boas, Primitivism, p. 7.
 - 8. Dio Chrysostom, Orations X.16, IV.21-23.
 - 9. Ibid., Orations X.29-30.
 - 10. Diogenes Lacrtius, Lives IV.26.
 - 11. Ibid., VI.69.
 - 12. Ibid., VI.35.
 - 13. Ibid., VI.83.
 - 14. Plutarch, Moralia 226e.
 - 15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VI.85.
 - 16. Ibid., VI.92; cf. Maximus Tyrius, Dissertation XXXVI.
 - 17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VI.96-97.
 - 18. Ibid., VI.78.
- 19. See M. I. Finley's stimulating account, "Diogenes the Cynic," in his Aspects of Antiquity.
 - 20. Lovejoy and Boas, Primitivism, p. 123.

6. THE HELLENISTIC AGE

6.I Alexander and the Graeco-Macedonian Conquest of the East

- 1. Alexander's life and career have been subject to endless study and considerable divergences in interpretation. Among the best recent works are Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, and Robin Lane Fox, Alexander the Great. A review of the major issues and controversies is provided in Alexander the Great: The Main Problems, edited by G. T. Griffith. E. Badian provides a critical assessment of existing scholarship in his review article, "Alexander the Great." An excellent source book for literary and epigraphic materials is M. M. Austin, The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest.
- 2. The Theban affair is recounted in Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander I.7-9, and Diodorus Siculus, Universal History XVII.1-16.
 - 3. Diodorus XVII.9; Arrian, Anabasis I.7-10.

- 4. Fox's narrative, Alexander the Great, is particularly lucid.
- 5. On the unreliability of the Greeks and Alexander's recognition of that fact, see Arrian, *Anabasis* I.18.8-9, I.20, along with Diodorus XVII.31.
- 6. A. T. Olmstead's classic work, *History of the Persian Empire*, remains the most comprehensive treatment.
- 7. Arrian, Anabasis I.18.1-2. Alexander's policies towards the Greeks of Asia Minor is cogently analyzed by E. Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia."
- 8. On the controversial subject of Alexander's claims to divinity, see E. Badian, "The deification of Alexander the Great."
 - 9. Fox, Alexander the Great, chapter twenty-nine.
- 10. A succinct survey of the major interpretations, ancient and modern, is contained in *The Impact of Alexander*, edited by Eugene Borza.
 - 11. See Fox, Alexander the Great, chapter nineteen.
- 12. For Alexander's policy of cooperation with the Persians, see Borza, ed., The Impact of Alexander, chapters 5, 6, and 8.
 - 13. Arrian, Anabasis VII.4.4-8, VII.12.1-3.
 - 14. Ibid., VII.11.5-9.
- 15. Alexander's growing autocracy is perceptively examined in Green, Alexander of Macedon, chapters 7 through 10.
- 16. For Aristotle and Alexander, see Green, Alexander of Macedon, pp. 52-63.
 - 17. Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon 132-34.

6.II Wars of the Successors and the Consolidation of Imperial Patrimonialism

- 1. The geopolitical turmoil following Alexander's death is the subject of several distinguished studies: Max Cary, A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C.; C. B. Welles, Alexander and the Hellenistic World; M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, 3 vols.; and F. W. Walbank, The Hellenistic World. A judgmental treatment, mixing genuine insight with occasional strained efforts to establish contemporary parallels, is offered by Peter Green's synoptic Alexander to Actium.
- 2. Diodorus' *Universal History*, books XVII to XX, provides the major narrative account from Alexander's passing to the battle of Ipsus in 301 BC.
 - 3. The rebellion of the Greeks in Bactria is recounted in Diodorus XVIII.4-8.

- 4. On the class divisions within Athens and the attending difficulties in sustaining the war effort, Diodorus XVIII.8–18; cf. Plutarch, *Phocion* 23–29. The masterly study by F. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, remains basic for this period; C. Mossé, *Athens in Decline*, is the best recent work.
 - 5. Diodorus, XVIII.17.
 - 6. Ibid., XVIII.55.
 - 7. Ibid., XVIII.1-3.
- 8. Edouard Will provides a lucid survey of these struggles in "The Succession to Alexander."
 - 9. Diodorus, XIX.61.
 - 10. See G. T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World, p. 55.
- 11. On patrimonialism as a form of social organization, see Max Weber, Economy and Society, chapters XII and XIII.
- 12. On the royal 'Friends' as an institution, see the excellent account by G. Herman, "The 'Friends' of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials?"
- 13. On the Hellenistic bureaucracies, see Michael Avi-Yonah, Hellenism and the East, chapters 6 and 7; P. Green, Alexander to Actium, chapter 12; and Alan Samuel, From Athens to Alexandria.
- 14. The military systems of the successors are surveyed in Yvon Garlan, "War and Siegecraft"; M. M. Austin, "Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy"; and G. T. Griffith, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World.
- 15. Rostovtzeff's monumental Social and Economic History remains the basic work. Heinz Kreissig, "Landed Property in the 'Hellenistic' Orient," offers an interpretation that draws on the "Asiatic mode of production" concept; cf. the important qualifying remarks of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle, pp. 150–58.
- 16. See Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History, chapter VIII, and Peter Green, Alexander to Actium, chapter 19. Most comprehensive is Paul McKechnie, Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC.
- 17. For detailed overviews, consult Eric Turner, "Ptolemaic Egypt," and Domenico Musti, "Syria and the East." Cf. Walbank, *The Hellenistic World*, p. 65.
- 18. A comprehensive treatment is offered by A. M. H. Jones, The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian; see also Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History, chapter VIII.
- 19. The connection between civic factionalism and ongoing rivalry between the Successors forms a leitmotif in Diodorus' narrative.

- 20. See Green, Alexander to Actium, chapter 3, "Demetrius of Phaleron: The Philosopher-King in Action"; also F. S. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, chapter 2.
- 21. Cf. Diodorus, XIX.63, where five hundred Argive citizens are burned alive in the town hall.
- 22. See Jack Briscoe, "The Antigonids and the Greek States, 276-196 B.C.," pp. 145-47.
 - 23. On the Chremonidean War, see Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, chapter 6.
- 24. Gonatas' remarks are preserved in Plutarch's Moralia 745b. For a comprehensive account, see W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas.
- 25. Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek State, Part II: The Hellenistic State, chapter III.
 - 26. Jones, The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian, p. 300.
 - 27. Diodorus, XX.40.6-7.
- 28. On the erosion of Greek democracy, see Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle, chapter V, section iii.
- 29. As Gallant showns in Risk and Survival, pp. 182-85, benefactions by these 'Friends' were in many cases not so much acts of civic generosity, but ways of securing huge personal profits.
 - 30. See W. Tarn and G. Griffith, Hellenistic Civilization, 2nd ed., chapter III.
 - 31. Ibid., pp. 80-84.
- 32. H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, pp. 149-59, provides a survey of the Hellenistic ephebeia.
 - 33. Polybius, III.59.
- 34. A new synthesis on religious developments in the Hellenistic age is very much needed; the best study available remains Martin Nilsson's classic *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion*, vol. II, Die Hellenistische und Römische Zeit, I–IV.
- 35. The "Hymn to Demetrius," the son of Antigonus the One-Eyed, is preserved in Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists* VI.253d-54d. Victor Ehrenberg provides a most illuminating analysis in chapter XII of his *Aspects of the Ancient World*.
- 36. On Tychê and the vogue for astrology, see Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, chapter VIII, "The Fear of Freedom."
- 37. See J. K. Davies, "Cultural, Social and Economic Features of the Hellenistic World," which reviews the evidence on the growing permeability of Polis boundaries.

6.III Ethics in a New Key: The Retreat from Polis-Citizen Ideals and the Interiorization of Value

6.III.i Epicureanism: Pleasure and Tranquillity in the Garden

- 1. The primary sources for the life and thought of Epicurus are Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book X.1–154; Plutarch's Moralia, vol. XIV, which features the essays: "That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible," "Reply to Colotes in Defense of Other Philosophers," and "Is 'Live Unknown' a Wise Precept?"; Lucretius' didactic poem De Rerum Natura; and the eighty-one apothegms preserved in the Vatican Sayings. The standard collection of the ancient evidence is Herman Usener, Epicurea, but more complete is G. Arrighetti, Epicuro opere, 2nd ed. Of secondary treatments, J. M. Rist's Epicurus: An Introduction is the best recent study, particularly rigorous on the key philosophical issues. Norman DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, remains the most detailed effort to link biography and thought, but there is much "special pleading" throughout in a bid to present Epicurus as a major humanitarian.
 - 2. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals.
- 3. Instructive is the verbal abuse Demosthenes heaped on his chief rival Aeschines, mocked for the humble occupation of his schoolteacher father, On the Crown 129ff.
 - 4. Epicurus' reminiscence is quoted in Plutarch's Moralia 1090e.
- 5. During this period, the Troad was an object of rivalry between Lysimachus and Antigonus One-Eyed, and several minor aspiring autocrats as well. For details, see DeWitt, *Epicurus*, chapter III.
 - 6. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.4.
- 7. Ibid., X.11; the membership pledge is recorded by the later Epicurean Philodemus, in his On Frankness, frg. 45.9–11; the Orwellian-like watchword is related by Seneca, Epistle XXV.5. Bernard Frischer's The Sculpted Word provides a detailed analysis of the Garden's subcultural features, particularly attentive to matters of recruitment.
- 8. Vatican Sayings XXXII, in C. Bailey, Epicurus: The Extant Remains; the passage on the sacral offering of "first-fruits" is quoted in Plutarch, Moralia 1117de.
 - 9. Usener, Epicurea, frg. 221.
 - 10. See David Sedley, "Epicurus, On Nature, Book XXVIII."
 - 11. An excellent treatment is Elizabeth Asmis, Epicurus' Scientific Method.
- 12. One of the first to notice Epicurus' divergences from earlier atomic theory was the young doctoral candidate Karl Marx, in his dissertation, "Difference

Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature." The surviving portions of this work, along with Marx's annotated notebooks, are translated in K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol. 1.

- 13. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* X.35–83; a comprehensive account of Epicurus' views on religion is offered by E. Festugiere, *Epicurus and his Gods*.
- 14. See the discussion in F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, chapters II and III.
 - 15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.143; Kuriai Doxai XII.
 - 16. For a thorough examination, see Rist, Epicurus, chapter 2.
 - 17. See the overview provided by J. M. Rist, "Pleasure: 360-300 B.C."
 - 18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.137.
 - 19. Vatican Sayings XXXIII.
 - 20. See Usener, Epicurea, frgs. 456-91.
 - 21. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.131.
 - 22. Ibid., X.128.
 - 23. Ibid., X.149.
- 24. See A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, chapter 2; and J. M. Rist, *Epicurus*, chapter 6 and appendix D, "The relation between kinetic and katastematic pleasure."
 - 25. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.132.
 - 26. Kuriai Doxai VIII.
 - 27. Kuriai Doxai XXI.
 - 28. Kuriai Doxai XV.
 - 29. Usener, Epicurea, frg. 181.
 - 30. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.130; Vatican Sayings LXIII.
- 31. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* X.5-6. Plutarch complains that the many courtesans "roamed at will" within the school, *Moralia* 1097de.
 - 32. Usener, Epicurea, frgs. 123 and 315.
 - 33. Kuriai Doxai V; Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.132.
- 34. See the views of various contemporary comic poets cited in David Sedley, "Epicurus and his Professional Rivals."

- 35. Sedley, in the essay cited in the previous note, traces the fallout from the vilification campaign launched by the former member Timocrates.
 - 36. See Kuriai Doxai X, XI, XII, XIII.
 - 37. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.123, and Kuriai Doxai I.
 - 38. Kuriai Doxai II.
 - 39. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.125.
 - 40. Vatican Sayings XIV.
 - 41. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.124-25.
 - 42. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura IV.10-25.
- 43. See the discussion in Festugiere, Epicurus and his Gods, pp. 58-72; Plutarch, Moralia 1102b; cf. Usener, Epicurea, frg. 167.
- 44. Usener, Epicurea, frg. 552; Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.117, mentions 'harm from other men' (blabas ex anthrôpôn).
- 45. Kuriai Doxai VI and XIV, which are typically rendered in inadequate translation, owing to awkward phrasing in the original. For related concerns with personal "security," see also doctrines VII, XIII, XXVIII, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIX, XL.
- 46. Metrodorus' antipatriotic line is quoted in Plutarch, Moralia 1125d; cf. Vatican Sayings LXXVI. Pericles is quoted in Thucydides II.40, contrasted here with Vatican Sayings LVIII; Epicurus' counter to the ideal of Demosthenes is conveyed in Vatican Sayings LXVII.
- 47. The Platonists as Dionysokolakas, 'flatters of Dionysios', is reported in Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.7-8; cf. Plutarch, Moralia 1127bc.
- 48. Various utilitarian positions are expressed in the extant remains, see Kuriai Doxai XXXI, XXXII; Vatican Sayings LVIII, LXXII, LXXXI; Usener, Epicurea, frgs. 523 and 551; and Lucretius, De Rerum Natura III.59-77.
- 49. Epicurus' censure of Aristotle is cited in I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, p. 301; other invidious remarks are in Usener, Epicurea, frg. 171.
 - 50. Kuriai Doxai XXVII.
 - 51. Kuriai Doxai XXVIII; Usener, Epicurea, frg. 523.
 - 52. Usener, Epicurea, frg. 548; Kuriai Doxai XL.
- 53. For the social organization of the Garden commune, see DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, chapters IV and V, along with Frischer, The Sculpted Word.

- 54. Epicurus is quoted in Seneca, Epistle XXI.
- 55. For illustrative examples, see Plutarch, Moralia 1089c, 1117ac.
- 56. Vatican Sayings LXXVIII, XXXIV, LII.
- 57. See Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, chapter IV.
- 58. See the important discussion in John Rist, Epicurus, chapter 7.
- 59. Kuriai Doxai VII; Lucretius' remarks are in V.117-35.
- 60. See, for example, the assessments by Eduard Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics; Gilbert Murray, The Five Stages of Greek Religion, chapter III; and more recently, G. Reale, The Systems of the Hellenistic Age, and M. Hossenfelder, Die Philosophie der Antike: Stoa, Epikureismus un Skepsis.
 - 61. The Epicurean Colotes is quoted in Plutarch, Moralia 1124dff.
- 62. Kuriai Doxai XXXIV; cf. Plutarch, Moralia 1127d, where Epicurus seems to allow that the sage would on occasion violate the law, if it were possible to avoid detection. P. A. Vander Waerdt attempts to dispute this antisocial view in "The Justice of the Epicurean Wise Man," but see the critical assessment in Brad Inwood, "Rhetorica Disputatio: The Strategy of de Finibus II."
- 63. For Epicurus' views on the polloi, see Vatican Sayings XXIX, XLV, LXXXI, LXVII, XI.
- 64. Foremost in this camp is the Marxist scholar, B. Farrington, *The Faith of Epicurus*, who inclines this way owing to Epicurus' "materialism," here seen as a political counter to Plato's reactionary "idealism."
- 65. Usener, Epicurea, frg. 187; cf. Vatican Sayings LXXVI. Note too that Epicurus' will calls for the freeing of his slaves only after his death. Nor are there any statements advocating the removal of existing gender and class inequalities. Epicurean "political philosophy" is thus something of a misnomer, seeing that selective withdrawal rather than reformist activism provides the guiding impulse of his program.
- 66. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* X.122. See the discussion by Martha Nussbaum, "Therapeutic arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle," now greatly expanded in her *The Therapy of Desire*.
 - 67. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.131.
 - 68. Ibid., X.77, 81; Kuriai Doxai II.
- 69. This line from Metrodorus—which clearly indicates that Epicureanism was basically a complete and finished philosophy, not subject to doctrinal revision—is quoted in Plutarch, *Moralia* 1117b.

- 70. Paradigmatic is the character sketch of the "Superstitious Man" by Theophrastus, *Characters* XVI.
- 71. A broad overview of these cultural trends is provided by John Ferguson, The Heritage of Hellenism; more critical is Peter Green, Alexander to Actium. For nuanced accounts of the aesthetic developments of this dawning "new age," see John Onians, Art and Thought in the Hellenistic Age, and J. J. Pollitt, Art in the Hellenistic Age.
 - 72. Plutarch, Moralia 1091aff.
- 73. Ibid., 1089c, 1097bf, 1098b, 1099bc, 1100ac; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* X.5, 18.
- 74. Plutarch, Moralia 1091ab, 1096bd, 1097e-98c, 1091e; Usener, Epicurea, frg. 451.
 - 75. Arcesilaus' witticism is quoted in Diogenes Laertius, Lives IV.43.

6.III.ii Stoicism: The Ethos of "Self-Hardening"

- 1. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, section 306. I have also drawn on Nietzsche for use of the term "self-hardening" to characterize the Stoic normative orientation; cf. The Will to Power, section 427, and Beyond Good and Evil, section 198. Most illustrative from the primary evidence is Zeno's expressed admiration for the equanimity of Hindu ascetics who roasted themselves with fire in feats of apathetic endurance, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta I.241 (hereafter cited as SVF, book-entry). Variants on the "self-hardening" theme are offered at SVF III.585, 586. Note also Plutarch's vivid characterization of the Stoic—forged of 'adamantine matter'—as a philosophical Kaineus, a reference to the mythical Lapith invulnerable to iron and insensitive to pain, in Moralia 1057d.
- 2. The primary sources for the lives and doctrines of the early Stoics are Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII.1-202; and Plutarch's Moralia, vol. XIII, which features the essays "On Stoic Self-Contradictions," "The Stoics Talk More Paradoxically than the Poets," and "Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions." The philosophical works of Cicero also contain information on the Old Stoa (especially De Finibus III, IV), but syncretic elements are already present. The standard collection of the ancient evidence is Hans von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols. Of the secondary studies, John Rist, Stoic Philosophy, and F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics, are highly recommended.
- 3. That a major intellectual shift came with Panaetius and Posidonios is universally acknowledged; cf. Rist's *Stoic Philosophy*, chapters 10 and 11, and A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, chapter 5. See also *Philosophia Togata*, an important collection of essays on philosophy in the Roman period, edited by Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes.

- 4. For a discussion, see E. Bréhier, The History of Philosophy: The Hellenistic and Roman Age, pp. 24–26. The scholar who most strongly stressed the "Semitic" angle is Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa, and more recently, G. Reale, The Systems of the Hellenistic World (whose Italian 'semitico' has unfortunately been mistranslated as 'Jew' in the English version).
- 5. On Zeno's background, SVF I.1-44, and Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.1-33.
- 6. An excellent overview of the Cynic-Stoic relationship can be found in Rist, Stoic Philosophy, chapter 4; see also his "Zeno and Stoic Consistency."
- 7. I have discussed these issues in greater detail elsewhere, "Intellectuals and Religion in Ancient Greece."
- 8. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* VII.132ff. See also R. Todd, "Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics," and M. Lapidge, "Stoic Cosmology."
- 9. Diogenes Lacrtius, *Lives* VII.143, 157. See also the account in John Rist, *Human Value*, chapter VI, "Divine Sparks."
- 10. Stoic belief in a providentially determined cosmos also explains their acceptance of divination and astrology.
 - 11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.88.
 - 12. Ibid., VII.87.
 - 13. Ibid., VII.86.
 - 14. Ibid., VII.89; SVF 111.228-236 on the relevant environmental factors.
 - 15. See I. G. Kidd, "Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man."
 - 16. SVF L190.
 - 17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.103.
 - 18. SVF I.192, III.122; Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.105ff.
 - 19. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.106-107.
 - 20. Ibid., VII.107-108.
 - 21. Ibid., VII.89; SVF III.208.
 - 22. SVF I.190, III.95; on phronêsis as the master virtue, SVF I.200.
- 23. SVF I.202, III.459. Brad Inwood's Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism provides a comprehensive treatment.
- 24. SVF I.205-10, III.459-61. Chrysippus presents the soul as body-permeating in SVF II.879, with the *hêgemonikon* localized in the heart, SVF II.836.

- 25. SVF I.206, III.381.
- 26. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* VII.94–95, 116; SVF III.432. It should be noted that the nature and status of the *eupatheiai* within the Stoic ethical system is somewhat obscure, as is the date of its historical appeareance.
- 27. See the important essay by Brad Inwood, "Hierocles: theory and argument in the second century A.D."
- 28. Most comprehensive is H. C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought. G. Aalders, Political Thought in Hellenistic Times, is also informative. Most sophisticated sociologically is Brent Shaw, "The Divine Economy: Stoicism as Ideology," though the thesis that Stoicism functioned as a legitimating metaphysical and ethical system for the Roman ruling class is supported more by way of interpretive juxtaposition than by specification of direct linkages.
- 29. The most detailed account of Zeno's *Politeia* is H. C. Baldry, "Zeno's Ideal State." Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, offers a rather controversial "literalist" reading, imagining that Zeno's proposals were intended for practical realization, rather than as a metaphor for the "spiritual politics" of the wise and virtuous.
 - 30. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.32-34.
 - 31. SVF I.262-69.
 - 32. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.131.
 - 33. SVF III.337.
 - 34. SVF III.314; cf. I.162.
- 35. For the Old Stoa and politics, SVF III.324, 327, 335–37, 613, 614, 679. A judicious secondary synthesis is offered by Margaret Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa. Andrew Erskine's The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action is marred by a tendency to interpret Stoic positions in rather direct political terms, thereby missing the fundamental philosophical "transvaluation" (i.e., practical depoliticization) entailed in the macrocosm-microcosm schema.
 - 36. SVF III.690; Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.121; SVF III.611.
 - 37. SVF III.314.
- 38. For Stoics in court circles, see Reesor, Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa.
 - 39. SVF III.694.
 - 40. SVF III.336.
- 41. Chrysippus is quoted in Plutarch, Moralia 1050a. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, pp. 342–43, 392–94, argue that it was Chrysippus who

pushed Stoicism into "full" or "strong determinism," in contrast to Zeno and Cleanthes, who subscribed to the popular view of Fate, wherein "outcomes" alone were determined. This interpretation is questionable, for while Chrysippus undoubtedly offered considerable refinement and elaboration, his two predecessors can be seen to advance deterministic accounts as well. There is some ambiguity in the famous simile attributed to Zeno, who likened the workings of Destiny to the situation of a dog tethered to a cart: wherever the cart goes, the dog, whether willing or not, is "dragged along" (SVF II.975). Although the actor's volition seems to be the main concern here, the metaphor can also be read to imply that the "course" as well as the "destination" is predetermined—unlike the fate of Oedipus, who personally choses his own "route" to patricide and maternal incest. More decisive is the fact that Zeno himself is credited with the "Eternal Recurrence" doctrine, wherein each world cycle repeats itself in identical fashion ad infinitum, SVF I.109.

42. SVF II.1000.

- 43. SVF I.109, where Zeno declares that following the cosmic conflagration, "the same things will rise up in the same ways," and uses as illustration the legal persecution of Sokrates. See A. Long's important "The Stoics on World-Conflagration and Everlasting Recurrence."
- 44. Though an exceedingly difficult topic, a coherent account of Chyrisippus' views on causality is provided by Sandbach, *The Stoics*, chapter 6. A philosophically stimulating discussion is Richard Sorabji's "Causation, Laws, and Necessity."
- 45. SVF III.228-36, on the origins of vice; immoral fatalism is conveyed in a celebrated anecdote preserved in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* VII.23, regarding Zeno, one of whose slaves is reputed to have objected to a beating from his master by pleading it was "fated" that he commit the offense; to which Zeno replied, the beating was likewise "fated"!
 - 46. SVF II.978.
- 47. SVF I.527; cf. II.978. Cleanthes' use of the notion of Fate "dragging" the unwilling is no novelty, but simply repeats Zeno's position, famously illustrated by his example of the dog tied to a wagon, constrained to follow in its train, SVF II.975.
 - 48. Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus" is presented in SVF I.537.
 - 49. See Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II.37ff.
- 50. Plutarch, Moralia 1048eff. Cf. SVF III.657-85 for Stoic views on the phauloi, or 'wretched'. Singularly instructive on the Stoic transvaluation of politics is their notion that aretê, or 'virtue', itself constitutes "the polis of the wise": hence their designation of the wretched majority as "exiles," i.e., from virtue, SVF III.679.

- 51. SVF III.329, III.328.
- 52. SVF I.159, III.468. For a full discussion, see Rist, Stoic Philosophy, chapter 5.
 - 53. Plutarch, Moralia 1062e (emphasis added), 1063c.
- 54. Ibid., 1038b. An assessment of the intellectual difficulties in the Stoic position is offered in Inwood's paper, "Hierocles."
- 55. SVF II.936, 937, 966, 975, 979, 988. A particularly cogent exegesis is offered in A. Long, "Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action."
- 56. See the insightful comments of Adkins, From the Many to the One, pp. 230ff.
 - 57. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.105; SVF III.193.
- 58. The Stoic sage is discussed in Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.118, 121-23, and Plutarch, Moralia 1043ab, 1057d. See also the discussion in D. Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics.
 - 59. Chrysippus is quoted in Plutarch, Moralia 1041f.
- 60. An indication that commitment came first is Chrysippus' celebrated remark, "Give me the views, I'll find the arguments"; see Sandbach, *The Stoics*, pp. 18-19.
 - 61. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.40.

6.III.iii Syncretism Triumphant: External Unfreedom and the Quest for Inner Plenitude and Immunity

- 1. Informative general accounts are offered by A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, and G. Aalders, Political Thought in Hellenistic Times. See also the collection of essays in The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, edited by M. Schofield and G. Striker. Primary materials, in Greek and Latin originals with accompanying English translation, are collected in Long and Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols.
- 2. The primary sources for Pyrrho and Timon are Diogenes Laertius, Lives IX.61–116, and Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism and various sections of Against the Mathematicians. A valuable secondary treatment is Charlotte Stough, Greek Skepticism. See also the collection of essays in Doubt and Dogmatism, edited by Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes.
- 3. Timon's passage is preserved in Eusebius, Evangelical Preparation XIV.18.2-3. Burnyeat's "Tranquillity without a stop: Timon, frag. 68," provides

a detailed and original exegesis. Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, pp. 470ff., suggest that Pyrrho's skepticism is ontological (citing Diogenes Laertius IX.106); but M. R. Stopper, "Schizzi Pirroniani," is more convincing when he argues that Pyrrho, being a total and consistent skeptic, "will not say how things are," thus refraining from any ontological assertions, p. 274.

- 4. See Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II.356.
- 5. See the full discussion in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists I.110-167; cf. Timon's ideal of being "unmoved by choice and unavoidance" at I.164. It is easier to discern Pyrrho's objective—nihilistic detachment and resulting tranquillity—than to specify his premises.
- 6. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.23; Diogenes Laertius, Lives IX.61; Sextus, Outlines I.28.
- 7. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* IX.74-76; Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists* XI.141-50. For a stimulating assessment, see Myles Burnyeat, "The Sceptic in his Place and Time."
- 8. Most detailed on the connection with Hindu and Buddhist doctrines and ascetic/sannyasi practices is Everard Flintoff, "Pyrrho and India." A more general sociological reading is offered by Mary Douglas, "The Social Preconditions of Radical Scepticism."
- 9. The ancient evidence for the Cyrenaic school is collected in E. Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta.
 - 10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives II.95.
 - 11. Theodorus, frgs. 250-72, in Mannebach's collection.
 - 12. Diogenes Laertius, Lives II.98-99.
 - 13. Ibid., II.94.
 - 14. Ibid., II.95-96; cf. frgs. 247-49 in Mannebach.
 - 15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives II.93.
- 16. Ibid., IV.46–58. The ancient evidence on Bion is assembled in Jan Kindstrand's *Bion of Borysthenes*.
 - 17. See W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas, pp. 236-38.
- 18. Edward O'Neal, Teles: The Cynic Teacher, translates all the extant fragments.
 - 19. Teles, frg. II, On Self-Sufficiency, lines 1-8, 26-31, 65-70, 87-91.
- 20. Stilpo's life and thought is recounted in Diogenes Laertius, Lives II.113-20.

- 21, Teles, frg. III, On Exile, lines 9-25.
- 22. Ibid., lines 38-41.
- 23. Ibid., lines 54-58.
- 24. See Eduard Zeller's Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, especially vol. II, chapters XVIII to XXI. J. P. Lynch's Aristotle's School is an important study.
- 25. The fragments of Speusippus are collected in Leonardo Tarán, Speusippus of Athens; his telic ideal is presented in frg. 77.
- 26. Xenocrates, frg. 753b, in C. J. De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts with Notes and Explanations*, vol. III, Book IV, "The Early Peripatetic School and the Early Academy."
 - 27. Crantor is quoted in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations III.6.12.
- 28. On Arcesilaus and the Middle Academy, see Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, chapter 3. Diogenes Laertius, Lives IV.28-45, offers the basic "life and thoughts" compilation.
 - 29. See G. E. R. Lloyd, Greek Science After Aristotle.
 - 30. Theophrastus' views on Fate are recorded in Plutarch's Moralia 104d.
- 31. Diogenes Laertius, Lives V.82; cf. Plutarch, Moralia 104ab; Polybius, XXIX.21.
- 32. On the Peripatetic hedonist Lyco, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* V.65-74, and Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists* XII.547d-48b. His doctrine on the *telos* is frg. 20 in F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*.
- 33. Hieronymos is quoted in Plutarch, Moralia 1033c; his doctrines on "quietude" are presented in frgs. 12 and 13, in Wehrli's collection.

EPILOGUE: ON REDUCTIONISM, RELATIVISM, AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORALS AND PHILOSOPHY

- 1. For an outstanding work of scholarship in this regard, see Carl Schorske's Fin-De-Siècle Vienna, from which I drew the quote that opened the Preface. A lucid analytical overview is provided by Rodney Nelson, "The sociology of styles of thought."
- 2. The reader will detect in this account the influence of Alasdair MacIntyre, whose various explorations in the history of ethical discourse are marked by alert sensitivities on these issues. In Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? MacIntyre argues compellingly that there can be no decontextualized rationality, no decontextualized sense of justice, of virtue and vice, as these qualities and properties

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invariably require pragmatic realization within operative social contexts and are thus bound within living normative traditions. Particularly incisive here (and in After Virtue) is his analysis of the "abstracted individualism" characteristic of modern and postmodern ethics, a disposition he relates—following both Marx and Weber—to the decline or effective disappearance of public or civic communalism occasioned by the ascendancy of capitalism and mass bureaucratization. A pervasive sense of déjà vu gives special relevance and poignancy to MacIntyre's account in this regard, for he intimates that much like the inhabitants of the Helenistic and Roman empires, we too have become "citizens of nowhere."

- 3. Herbert Marcuse's Negations contains several essays on the history of philosophy that draw out these distinctions in compelling fashion.
- 4. A most useful and suggestive overview is Randall Collins, "For a sociological philosophy." See also the illuminating paper by Craig Calhoun, "Morality, Identity, and Historical Explanation," which offers an astute sociological appreciation of Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self.

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